Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (89 page)

78
. Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1984), “Life, teleology, and eudaimonia in the ethics of Ayn Rand,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 68; Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991, 1993; Saint-Andre 1993. Interestingly, Kellner (1989, 32) argues that the Frankfurt school theorist, Max Horkheimer, also embraced a “eudaemonistic ethics.” In
Chapter 11
, I discuss important parallels between Rand and Habermas, who can be considered a member of the Frankfurt tradition.

79.
Den Uyl and Rasmussen are among the foremost “flourishers” in this debate. The survivalist argument can be found in Kelley 1992c; Kelley, in Stata 1993; Mozes 1992; Khawaja 1992. For an interesting discussion of the “survivalist” vs. “flourishers” controversy within Objectivism, and an attempted reconciliation, see Bidinotto 1994, Saint-Andre 1993, and Scuoteguazza 1993.

80
. However, Kelley (in Stata 1993, 7) argues that flourishing has validity “in certain contexts, but we need to work out the concept exactly and how it applies.”

81
. Rand 1964b, 9; (June 1964), “The cult of moral grayness,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 75.

82
. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 25.

83
. Rand (31 July 1950), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes, 1949–1958,” in Binswanger 5.4.4.

84
. Rand (July 1962), Doesn’t life require compromise?,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 68; (January 1964), “The anatomy of compromise,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 147.

85
. Rand (April 1962), “How does one lead a rational life in an irrational society?,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 71.

86
. B. Branden, quoted in Rand (January 1963), “Collectivized ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 80. In a communication printed in
Commonweal
after the publication of
Atlas Shrugged
, a young Murray Rothbard (1957, 313) defended Rand’s book against those who saw it as embodying an “anti-charity” creed. Rothbard, who was characteristically critical of Rand in later years, argues that despite its rejection of the traditional virtue of “humility,”
Atlas Shrugged
does praise “charity
for the sake of virtues
” and not “for the subsidization of vice”: “The difference between Miss Rand’s concept and the usual Christian morality is that there is compassion for a man’s
fight against
suffering, or against unjustly imposed suffering, rather than pity for suffering
per se.
”

87
. Rand (February 1963), “The ethics of emergencies,” in
Virtue of
Selfishness, 46–47.

88
. Rothbard 1987; N. Branden 1989, 296; Bidinotto 1989; Kelley 1990, 76; B. Branden 1990, 51; Smith 1991, 218.

89
. N. Branden 1989, 296. Branden argues that the “strain of Manichaeism” in Rand’s thought is not a “literal” dualism, but a “tendency to see good and evil as essentially separate and opposed principles, and to interpret all human experience in terms of their confrontation.”

90
. In Rand (September 1971), “Brief summary,” in
Objectivist,
1091, she stated: “One cannot start with or build on a negative; it is only by establishing what is the good that one can know what is evil and why.”

91
. Rosenthal 1975, 129; B. Branden 1986T. Interestingly, there are passages in Lossky [1917] 1928 which also suggest that evil was not coequal with good, and that it was dependent on good for its existence; see 182–83.

92
. N. Branden (September 1962), “Isn’t everyone selfish?,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 60.

93
. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 10. Despite this view, in Peikoff (18 May 1989), “Fact and value,” in Schwartz 5.1, he continues the practice of intellectual “purges.”

CHAPTER 10. A LIBERTARIAN POLITICS

1
. Rand ([1964] 1993cT) acknowledged that Mises and Hazlitt “are usually called libertarians.” She distinguished them from traditional conservatives because they did not defend capitalism on mystical grounds. She also recognized that the libertarians were a loosely defined group of thinkers who came from a variety of philosophical traditions. Though she agreed with libertarians on most political and economic issues, she argued that these issues could not be separated from a more basic philosophical framework.

2
. Rand (September 1971), “Brief summary,” in
Objectivist
10:1090.

3.
Rand (9 May 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.4.

4
. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 15, and (April 1963), “Man’s rights,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 92.

5
. Rand (23 October 1972), “A nation’s unity, part two,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
2:127.

6
. Rand (1 January 1945), quoted in Peikoff 1991a, x.

7
. In Rand (January 1963), “Collectivized ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 81, she suggested that the “fallacy of the frozen abstraction,” is a variation on the fallacy of composition, in which one substitutes a “particular concrete for the wider abstract class to which it belongs.”

8
. N. Branden (February 1962), “Intellectual ammunition department,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
1:7.

9
. McKeon (January 1941), “Introduction,” in Aristotle 1941, xxvi.

10
. Aristotle,
Politics
1.2.1253a2, in Aristotle 1941, 1129. This Aristotelian predilection reappears even in Locke’s state of nature, where individuals compose a polity out of their compelling interests. Replogle 1984, 83. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s (1991) development of Aristotle’s social conception is informed by Rand’s insights.

11
.
Atlas Shrugged
, 747, and Rand 1947.

12
. N. Branden (August 1963), “The divine right of stagnation,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 123; N. Branden and E. D. Branden 1983, 9.

13
. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 16.

14
. Ibid., 22–23.

15
. Rand (3 June–1 July 1974), “Egalitarianism and inflation,” in
Philosophy
, 153.

16
. Rand (23 October 1972), “A nation’s unity, part two,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
2:125–26.

17
. Rand (17 February 1960), “Faith and force: The destroyers of the modern world,” in
Philosophy
, 79–80.

18
. Rand (17 February 1960), “Faith and force: The destroyers of the modern world,” in
Philosophy
, 79–80. A discussion of the reason/freedom and faith/force distinction is provided by Hollinger (1984), “Ayn Rand’s epistemology in historical perspective,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984.

19
. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 32.

20
. For an Objectivist view of the development of the concept of individual rights, see Ridpath 1983T.

21
. O’Neill 1983; Osterfeld 1983; Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1983; Mack (1984), “The fundamental moral elements of Rand’s theory of rights,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984; Nozick 1974, 179n. I dealt with some of the critics’ objections to Rand’s views in
Chapter 9
, since most focus on the ethical basis of the theory.

22
. Rand (April 1963), “Man’s rights,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 92. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 6) emphasizes that Rand’s theory of rights does not apply to a state-of-nature or a Robinson Crusoe scenario. Rights are strictly applicable to a social context.

23
. Rand (April 1963), “Man’s rights,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 93.

24
. Marx (1875), “Critique of the Gotha programme,” in Marx and Engels 1968, 333–34.

25
. Marx [1843] 1963, 44. Marx [1843] 1963 is hereafter cited as
Critique
by page number in text and notes.

26
. Marx, [1843–44] 1971, 103, 108.

27
. On these issues, see N. Branden (April 1962), “Counterfeit individualism,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 135; 1980, 51; and 1983b, 230.

28
. This parallel between Rand and Hegel was first noted in print by Den Uyl and Rasmussen (“Capitalism,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 172, 181 n.25). The authors speculate that Rand could have developed a theory of alienation that would have had obvious similarities to the Marxian view. By coercively appropriating a person’s property,
the state, through taxation, alienates an aspect of the person. I explore some of these themes in
Part 3
.

29
. On abortion, see Rand (September–November 1968), “Of living death,” in
Voice of Reason
, 58–59; Schwartz (June 1980), “Interview with Ayn Rand,” in Binswanger 1.3.1–2. On animal rights, see Peikoff 1991b, 358.

30
. On intellectual property rights, see Rand (May 1964), “Patents and copyrights,” in
Unknown Ideal.
On inheritance, see N. Branden (June 1963), “Inherited wealth,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 92. On corporate rights, see Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 9, and Hessen 1979. On removing immigration restrictions, see Rand 1973T.

31
. Rand (April 1964), “The property status of the airwaves,” in
Unknown Ideal
, and Kelley and Donway 1983. Though in Rand (24 April 1972), “The Shanghai gesture, part three,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
1:68, she saw the “somberly dignified Indian,” as one of America’s most important self-images, she was, by and large, not very respectful of those Native American cultures which lacked a notion of private property. She was insensitive to the different cultural means through which the notion of property was filtered. On Native American rights, see Rand 1974bT; Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 9; and Binswanger 1991T, Lecture 3. For an alternative view of European–Native American relations, see Franck 1992. His argument against the Spaniard devastation of the indigenous populations is fully within the Objectivist tradition.

32
. Rand (April 1963), “Man’s rights,” and (June 1963), “Collectivized ‘rights,’” in
Virtue of Selfishness
.

33
. Rothbard, quoted in B. Branden 1986, 413.

34
. Rothbard 1973, 15–18. Childs ([1969] 1994) also criticized Rand’s position on the nature of government. Though he later changed his views on the subject, Childs utilized key Objectivist concepts in his defense of anarchism. B. Branden, 28 June 1993C.

35
. Thomas 1980, 56. Horkheimer observes similarly that “Anarchism and authoritarian statism both belong to the same cultural epoch.” Jay 1973, 125.

36
. Rand (September 1971), “Brief summary,” in
Objectivist
10:1090.

37
. See Schwartz (1986) for an extensive critique of anarcho-capitalism from an Objectivist perspective. Also see Sciabarra 1987.

38
. An analysis of anarcho-capitalist ideology is central to Nozick’s famed work,
Anarchy
,
State, and Utopia
(1974).

39
. Rothbard (1982) provides an Aristotelian-Thomistic-Lockean foundation for his particular brand of libertarian theory.

40
. Rand (December 1963), “The nature of government,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 112. Rothbard’s libertarianism has elicited critical responses from socialists, conservatives, Hayekians, and Objectivists. On this provocative critical convergence, see Sciabarra 1991. Rothbard (1978) is the best introduction to his thought.

41
. B. Branden 1962T, Lecture 8; Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 7.

42
. Rand (December 1963), “The nature of government,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 112–13.

43
. Ibid., 109.

44
. Rand (June 1963), “Collectivized ‘rights,’” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 103.

45
. Rand (April–May 1967), “The wreckage of the consensus,” in
Unknown Ideal.

46
. Rand (February 1964), “Government financing in a free society,” in
Virtue of Selfishness.

47
. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 18.

48
. For raising this issue, thanks to Nyberg (2 December 1993C).

49
. It was Hayek (in “History and politics,” in Hayek 1954, 15) who first observed that it was somewhat misleading to use the word “capitalism,” when it had been closely tied to a socialist interpretation of history.

50
. Weber 1930; Novak 1993.

51.
Mises ([1949] 1963) defends a “value-free” approach to economics. Hayek (1976, 120, 132) argues that the market economy, governed by the rule of law, will maximize chance opportunities, even though its rewards “
often have no connection with merit.
”

52
. It is for this reason perhaps that Walsh ([1985] 1990T, Lecture 3) acknowledges that the institutions of Western capitalism were developed in their initial stages by non-capitalist means, which were the only methods available at the time. One commits an ahistorical fallacy if one indicts capitalism as a social system for having utilized methods that were distinctive to the historical period out of which it emerged. On this basis, all of human history is bathed in blood, and nothing on earth is legitimate.

53
. Rand (7 December 1960), “Conservatism: An obituary,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 195.

54
. Rand (April 1963), “Man’s rights,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 95. Rand does not use the word “eudaemonic.”

55
. Rand (August–September 1967), “Requiem for man,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 308. This same apprehension is expressed by Peikoff, in (July 1992), “Some notes about tomorrow, part one,” in Schwartz 6.4, in which he analyzes the movement away from communism in the former Soviet Union.

56
. Rand (January 1962), “Check your premises,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
1:1.