Bad Men Do What Good Men Dream: A Forensic Psychiatrist Illuminates the Darker Side of Human Behavior (39 page)

Negotiating with the Devil

The negotiator handling a cult crisis must have an understanding of the defense mechanism of projective identification. Lack of awareness of this defense may well play into the self-fulfilling apocalyptic prophecies of a mentally disturbed cult leader. Given their knowledge of projection, mental health professionals may help negotiators in crisis situations. What is needed is a critical window into the cult leader’s mental state. Usually there is one negotiator who is in regular contact with the cult leader. If the feelings engendered in that negotiator by the cult leader can be psychologically held, examined, and properly interpreted—without immediate action being taken—it is possible to obtain important data about the cult leader’s state of mind, and to gather it on a continuing basis.

For example, a cult leader stressed by a confrontation crisis may experience an increase in feelings of helplessness, fear, and rage. The leader, although conscious of these threatening feelings, may misperceive their origins and project them onto an adversary. The leader’s efforts to control the adversary may create similar feelings of helplessness, fear, and rage in the negotiator. What needs to happen is for these feelings to be deciphered and taken into account before any action is taken. What sometimes occurs, though, is that these feelings are reflexively acted upon by the authorities, themselves triggering an attack that fulfills the leader’s projections as well as the apocalyptic fantasies.

No one can know with any certainty the extent to which such mechanisms as good-bad splitting, projection, and projective identification played parts in the mass murders and suicides of the 82 Branch Davidians. But it is likely that they played a prominent role. For example, it had been alleged that Koresh had been abused as a child. It was the reports of his increasing physical and sexual abuse of the children at Ranch Apocalypse that produced a realistic sense of helplessness in the authorities. They perceived a need to act, ostensibly to protect the remaining children. Could it be that the escalating child abuse at the hands of Koresh was also a sign of increased good-bad splitting within himself and of his projecting the bad aspect onto certain cult children?

Adding to the authorities’ mounting sense of frustration were Koresh’s repeated promises to surrender peacefully, promises that he never kept. Koresh, rather than the authorities, seemed to be in control of the situation. Inside the compound, as a cult member later testified at the trial of surviving Branch Davidians, Koresh “told the ladies to do 50 pushups, 50 situps, 50 deep knee bends, every two hours…to make us strong, to stop the American Army, the Assyrians, from raping us, the ladies.” Koresh likely saw the Branch Davidians as all good and the world outside as all bad. From Koresh’s psychological perspective, evil did not lurk in his heart but resided in the minds and intentions of the government agents who were besieging him. Cult members shot the ATF agents because they “knew” the agents would kill them. The members did not fully comprehend that they were stockpiling arms intended to kill other people because Koresh had projected his (and their) fear, hate, and rage at the outside world. Koresh projected his terrible feelings onto the FB I and then attempted to control the FBI and the likelihood of FBI retaliation against him and his followers.

Finally, according to a spokesman for the FB I, “there was simply an accumulation of frustrations: the negotiations had gone nowhere, they were convinced that Koresh was stalling and feared he was spoiling for a confrontation.” To what extent was this statement a true assessment of David Koresh’s thinking? Is it possible that the decision to assault the compound was driven by feelings Koresh had communicated in his deranged mental state and that these feelings had not been properly psychologically assessed?

In both instances, with Jim Jones and with David Koresh, government officials grossly misunderstood the psychological forces operating inside the cults and in the minds of their leaders. The authorities did not comprehend the siege mentality or the suicidal intent of the cults. They did not seem to know how to evaluate or decipher such mechanisms as good-bad splitting, projection, and projective identification. As a result, 15 years after Representative Leo Ryan set foot on a Guyana airstrip and provided an unwitting trigger to Jim Jones’s apocalyptic end for over 900 of his cult members, the government authorities replicated their mistake in that first assault in which four ATF agents were killed. Once government agents had been killed, the fiery apocalyptic fate of the Branch Davidians was all but signed and sealed. It was later delivered on national television.

During the 51-day siege, the FB I’s Behavioral Science Unit composed a psychological profile of David Koresh. In a detailed memo, these behavioral experts concluded that a high probability existed that the cult leader would commit suicide if directly confronted by the FBI. Nonetheless, the FB I agents on the scene handling the negotiations reportedly grew impatient and disregarded the advice of their own behavioral science experts. When the government forces attacked, the apocalypse took place as Koresh might have wished—live for a national television audience. The futility and folly of using intimidation and then of mounting a frontal assault upon a would-be martyr with an apocalyptic vision ought to have been apparent to the authorities, but it was not.

After the fires cooled, a psychiatric expert on the panel who reviewed the government’s handling of the siege disagreed with what had been done to “resolve” the crisis. He criticized the FB I for using pressure tactics and tear gas that may well have pushed Koresh into triggering his plan for mass suicide. In the future, it is hoped that negotiators in similar situations—and there will be others—will use the psychological knowledge that is available about cult leaders and their followers to avoid unwittingly becoming the executioners of a cult leader’s self-fulfilling death wish.

Analysis of the psyches of cult leaders has its limitations, however. Cult leaders are not available for psychiatric examination at the time of crisis. Moreover, cult leaders’ personalities vary greatly, particularly in their motivations and degree of mental aberration. Cultural and ethnic differences, if present, may also complicate psychological analysis. Moreover, psychiatrists cannot draw clear distinctions between mystical experiences of the sort that cult leaders say they have and deviant mental states. Nevertheless, when a cult leader becomes psychotic, it is reasonably certain that tragedy is likely to be a result.

Forensic Psychiatrists and Cults

There are many types of litigation involving cult members and cults in which forensic psychiatrists can and do become involved. For example, forensic psychiatrists may testify in suits alleging fraud, unlawful imprisonment, or the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We try to grapple with some of the following questions: Was the alleged emotional trauma caused by the cult experience, or can it be traced to some other cause? Did the emotional trauma exist before the person’s joining the cult? Was the trauma exacerbated by joining a cult? What is the extent of the psychological damages that have been incurred?

All psychiatric interventions involving involuntary evaluation or treatment of a cult member are fraught with thorny ethical and legal dilemmas. Some psychiatrists who have given adverse testimony about a cult member’s mental competency and against the cult itself have been hit with civil suits and even with threats of physical violence. No involuntary examinations of cult members should be attempted without prior consultation with psychiatrists and attorneys who have had experience dealing with cults.

Forensic psychiatrists can also lend a hand in incidents involving cults during a developing crisis or confrontation. Most forensic psychiatrists have acquired knowledge and experience concerning the always murky relationship between mental illness and the emergence of violence. Psychiatrists do not possess the ability to accurately predict violence but, in association with other mental health experts, forensic psychiatrists are sometimes called on to attempt to assess the risk of violence.

Mental health professionals can be of consultative assistance to negotiators, generally in hostage situations, whether domestic or terrorist. A critically important role for mental health professionals is the treatment and management of those who have been psychologically traumatized by terrorist events.

Al-Qaeda and the Mind of the Jihadist

Psychiatrists and other mental health professionals cannot perform the same consultative roles when dealing with terrorist groups like alQaeda. As noted above, psychological profiling of terrorists lacks reliability. Psychiatrists and psychologists have taken part in interrogations of captured terrorists. This is a highly controversial role. It is unnatural and unethical for a psychiatrist to participate in the torture of detainees for interrogation purposes. But psychiatrists and psychologists have acted as consultants to interrogators—and there is no bright line separating consultation from participation.

Is al-Qaeda, translated as “The Base,” a killer cult? At first glance, it appears to share similarities with the killer cults discussed above. For example, Osama bin Laden is a charismatic leader. He is considered by many in the Islamic world to be the
Mahdi
, the missing and longawaited Messianic deliverer, the mighty warrior of the apocalypse. Like killer cults, some of bin Laden’s group and other al-Qaeda groups live in distant isolation, hiding from their enemies. As do killer cults, al-Qaeda espouses a death ethic, but for reasons of Islamic revolution. Suicide bombings are its trademark. The terrorist feels enraged, humiliated, and besieged by the “crusaders” who occupy Arab lands. A prominent Saudi imam has issued a
fatwa,
or religious ruling, granting bin Laden and other Islamic terrorists permission to use nuclear weapons to kill 10 million Americans. Bin Laden’s vision is not a self-destructive apocalypse but a nuclear Armageddon visited on the United States. It includes a worldwide Islamic revolution at the tip of a sword, if conversion to Islam is not voluntary.

The Muslim–infidel dichotomy is a classic example of good-bad splitting. This is a psychological mechanism that allows demonization of “infidels,” that is, persons of other religions. Good-bad splitting is endemic to the human condition, but is taken to extremes among killer cults and terrorist organizations. There is, however, little similarity between al-Qaeda and killer cults such as the Peoples Temple and the Branch Davidians. Al-Qaeda is governed by a leadership council, and major decisions made by the core group are approved by bin Laden. There is a known second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon. Unlike killer cults, which consist of members trapped within the delusion (and control) of a deranged leader, al-Qaeda has a distinct governance infrastructure based on cells organized for sharply defined purposes including logistics, fundraising, and sophisticated media management. To launch a single suicide bomber requires many levels of assistance, for example a quartermaster who obtains explosives and other materials (nails, ball bearings, nuts, bolts), a technician to make the bomb, a reconnaissance operative, and someone to identify the specific target. Before the operation, a handler sequesters the bomber in a safe house, away from family and friends, sees to it that a film crew helps the bomber make a martyrdom video for propaganda and recruitment purposes (and so the bomber will not back out), and then places the bomber as close as possible to the target.

The administrative infrastructure is very sophisticated; al-Qaeda is run much like a multinational corporation whose reach and scope extends to many countries. Instead of manufacturing a product, alQaeda aims to export Islamic revolution and death. It is innovative, resilient, and determined. Losses of personnel are replaced by a seemingly never-ending stream of loyalists and recruits. Al-Qaeda learns from its mistakes and constantly reinvents itself.

Another difference between al-Qaeda and killer cults can be seen in al-Qaeda’s interaction with the wider world. Killer cults are often isolated microcommunities that have little contact with the outside world. The vision of the killer cult has to do with defense and survival. Recruitment of new members has long since ceased by the time the leader sinks into madness and the cult begins to disintegrate. No leadership structure remains to counter the leader’s paranoia and enable the group to survive. Al-Qaeda’s strong organization belies the wishful thinking of critics who believe it is only an offbeat killer cult that will sooner or later self-destruct. Moreover, its leadership differs. Although killer cult leaders are often disadvantaged, marginally functioning individuals, al-Qaeda’s leaders are educated and come from the middle and upper classes, frequently from prosperous families. Some of the 9/11 hijackers also came from such backgrounds. Osama bin Laden himself is a multimillionaire. And despite the beliefs of many outsiders to the contrary, there is no evidence that bin Laden or others in leadership positions of al-Qaeda are manifestly mentally ill.

What is most difficult for Westerners and Christians to understand about Islamic terrorists is the desire, even the yearning, that they display for death. This desire, we think, goes against the primal human instinct for life. The suicide bomber believes otherwise. He (or in some cases, she) is overjoyed to join Allah’s jihad against infidels, for the reward is great—eternal bliss in paradise’s garden of sensual delights. As Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran put it, “The purest joy in Islam is to kill and be killed for Allah.” Martyrdom is the only certain path to paradise. Honorable actions, good deeds, and devotion to God do not guarantee entrance to paradise.

People who survived a suicide bombing on a bus described the terrorist as going to his death with a smile. He acknowledged passengers, smiled, then activated the bomb. In the Shia Islamic tradition, this is known as the “smile of joy,” anticipating one’s imminent martyrdom and entrance into paradise. In his last will and testament, the 9/11 hijackers’ ringleader Mohammed Atta used the phrase, “The sky smiles, my young son.”