Complete Works (191 page)

S
OCRATES
: It is a theatrical answer so it pleases you, Meno, more than that about shape.—It does.

S
OCRATES
: It is not better, son of Alexidemus, but I am convinced that the other is, and I think you would agree, if you did not have to go away before the mysteries as you told me yesterday, but could remain and be initiated.

M
ENO
: I would stay, Socrates, if you could tell me many things like
[77]
these.

S
OCRATES
: I shall certainly not be lacking in eagerness to tell you such things, both for your sake and my own, but I may not be able to tell you many. Come now, you too try to fulfill your promise to me and tell me the nature of virtue as a whole and stop making many out of one, as jokers say whenever someone breaks something; but allow virtue to remain whole [b] and sound, and tell me what it is, for I have given you examples.

M
ENO
: I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, “to find joy in beautiful things and have power.” So I say that virtue is to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them.

S
OCRATES
: Do you mean that the man who desires beautiful things desires good things?—Most certainly.

S
OCRATES
: Do you assume that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Do you not think, my good man, that [c] all men desire good things?

M
ENO
: I do not.

S
OCRATES
: But some desire bad things?—Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and nevertheless desire them?—I think there are both kinds.

S
OCRATES
: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, nevertheless desires them?—I certainly do.

S
OCRATES
: What do you mean by desiring? Is it to secure for oneself?—What else?

S
OCRATES
: Does he think that the bad things benefit him who possesses [d] them, or does he know they harm him?

M
ENO
: There are some who believe that the bad things benefit them, others who know that the bad things harm them.

S
OCRATES
: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know that they are bad?

M
ENO
: No, that I cannot altogether believe.

S
OCRATES
: It is clear then that those who do not know things to be bad do not desire what is bad, but they desire those things that they believe [e] to be good but that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge of these things and believe them to be good clearly desire good things. Is that not so?—It is likely.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, those who you say desire bad things, believing that bad things harm their possessor, know that they will be harmed by them?—Necessarily.

S
OCRATES
: And do they not think that those who are harmed are miserable
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to the extent that they are harmed?—That too is inevitable.

S
OCRATES
: And that those who are miserable are unhappy?—I think so.

S
OCRATES
: Does anyone wish to be miserable and unhappy?—I do not think so, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: No one then wants what is bad, Meno, unless he wants to be such. For what else is being miserable but to desire bad things and secure them?

M
ENO
: You are probably right, Socrates, and no one wants what is bad. [b]

S
OCRATES
: Were you not saying just now that virtue is to desire good things and have the power to secure them?—Yes, I was.

S
OCRATES
: The desiring part of this statement is common to everybody, and one man is no better than another in this?—So it appears.

S
OCRATES
: Clearly then, if one man is better than another, he must be better at securing them.—Quite so.

S
OCRATES
: This then is virtue according to your argument, the power of [c] securing good things.

M
ENO
: I think, Socrates, that the case is altogether as you now understand it.

S
OCRATES
: Let us see then whether what you say is true, for you may well be right. You say that the capacity to acquire good things is virtue?—I do.

S
OCRATES
: And by good things you mean, for example, health and wealth?

M
ENO
: Yes, and also to acquire gold and silver, also honors and offices in the city.

S
OCRATES
: By good things you do not mean other goods than these?

M
ENO
: No, but I mean all things of this kind.

[d] S
OCRATES
: Very well. According to Meno, the hereditary guest friend of the Great King, virtue is the acquisition of gold and silver. Do you add to this acquiring, Meno, the words justly and piously, or does it make no difference to you but even if one secures these things unjustly, you call it virtue none the less?

M
ENO
: Certainly not, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: You would then call it wickedness?—Indeed I would.

S
OCRATES
: It seems then that the acquisition must be accompanied by [e] justice or moderation or piety or some other part of virtue; if it is not, it will not be virtue, even though it provides good things.

M
ENO
: How could there be virtue without these?

S
OCRATES
: Then failing to secure gold and silver, whenever it would not be just to do so, either for oneself or another, is not this failure to secure them also virtue?

M
ENO
: So it seems.

S
OCRATES
: Then to provide these goods would not be virtue any more
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than not to provide them, but apparently whatever is done with justice will be virtue, and what is done without anything of the kind is wickedness.

M
ENO
: I think it must necessarily be as you say.

S
OCRATES
: We said a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue, namely, justice and moderation and all such things?—Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Then you are playing with me, Meno.—How so, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: Because I begged you just now not to break up or fragment virtue, and I gave examples of how you should answer. You paid no [b] attention, but you tell me that virtue is to be able to secure good things with justice, and justice, you say, is a part of virtue.

M
ENO
: I do.

S
OCRATES
: It follows then from what you agree to, that to act in whatever you do with a part of virtue is virtue, for you say that justice is a part of virtue, as are all such qualities. Why do I say this? Because when I begged you to tell me about virtue as a whole, you are far from telling me what it is. Rather, you say that every action is virtue if it is performed with a [c] part of virtue, as if you had said what virtue is as a whole, so I would already know that, even if you fragment it into parts. I think you must face the same question from the beginning, my dear Meno, namely, what is virtue, if every action performed with a part of virtue is virtue? For that is what one is saying when he says that every action performed with justice is virtue. Do you not think you should face the same question again, or do you think one knows what a part of virtue is if one does not know virtue itself?—I do not think so.

S
OCRATES
: If you remember, when I was answering you about shape, [d] we rejected the kind of answer that tried to answer in terms still being the subject of inquiry and not yet agreed upon.—And we were right to reject them.

S
OCRATES
: Then surely, my good sir, you must not think, while the nature of virtue as a whole is still under inquiry, that by answering in terms of the parts of virtue you can make its nature clear to anyone or make anything else clear by speaking in this way, but only that the same question must be put to you again—what do you take the nature of virtue to be when [e] you say what you say? Or do you think there is no point in what I am saying?—I think what you say is right.

S
OCRATES
: Answer me again then from the beginning: What do you and your friend say that virtue is?

M
ENO
: Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always
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in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me, simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of effect on me, for both [b] my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. Yet I have made many speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions, very good speeches as I thought, but now I cannot even say what it is. I think you are wise not to sail away from Athens to go and stay elsewhere, for if you were to behave like this as a stranger in another city, you would be driven away for practising sorcery.

S
OCRATES
: You are a rascal, Meno, and you nearly deceived me.

M
ENO
: Why so particularly, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: I know why you drew this image of me. [c]

M
ENO
: Why do you think I did?

S
OCRATES
: So that I should draw an image of you in return. I know that all handsome men rejoice in images of themselves; it is to their advantage, for I think that the images of beautiful people are also beautiful, but I will draw no image of you in turn. Now if the torpedo fish is itself numb and so makes others numb, then I resemble it, but not otherwise, for I myself do not have the answer when I perplex others, but I am more perplexed than anyone when I cause perplexity in others. So now I do not know what virtue is; perhaps you knew before you contacted me, but now you [d] are certainly like one who does not know. Nevertheless, I want to examine and seek together with you what it may be.

M
ENO
: How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?

[e] S
OCRATES
: I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for.

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M
ENO
: Does that argument not seem sound to you, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: Not to me.

M
ENO
: Can you tell me why?

S
OCRATES
: I can. I have heard wise men and women talk about divine matters …

M
ENO
: What did they say?

S
OCRATES
: What was, I thought, both true and beautiful.

M
ENO
: What was it, and who were they?

S
OCRATES
: The speakers were among the priests and priestesses whose [b] care it is to be able to give an account of their practices. Pindar too says it, and many others of the divine among our poets. What they say is this; see whether you think they speak the truth: They say that the human soul is immortal; at times it comes to an end, which they call dying; at times it is reborn, but it is never destroyed, and one must therefore live one’s life as piously as possible:

Persephone will return to the sun above in the ninth year
the souls of those from whom
she will exact punishment for old miseries,
[c]
and from these come noble kings,
mighty in strength and greatest in wisdom,
and for the rest of time men will call them sacred heroes.
⁴

As the soul is immortal, has been born often, and has seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is in no way surprising that it can recollect the things it knew before, both [d] about virtue and other things. As the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, after recalling one thing only—a process men call learning—discovering everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, for searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection. We must, therefore, not believe that debater’s argument, for it would make us idle, and fainthearted men like to hear it, [e] whereas my argument makes them energetic and keen on the search. I trust that this is true, and I want to inquire along with you into the nature of virtue.

M
ENO
: Yes, Socrates, but how do you mean that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach me that this is so?

S
OCRATES
: As I said just now, Meno, you are a rascal. You now ask me if I can teach you, when I say there is no teaching but recollection, in order
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to show me up at once as contradicting myself.

M
ENO
: No, by Zeus, Socrates, that was not my intention when I spoke, but just a habit. If you can somehow show me that things are as you say, please do so.

S
OCRATES
: It is not easy, but I am nevertheless willing to do my best for your sake. Call one of these many attendants of yours, whichever you like, [b] that I may prove it to you in his case.