Complete Works (194 page)

S
OCRATES
: And therefore a good teacher of his own virtue if anyone was?

A
NYTUS
: I think so, if he wanted to be.

S
OCRATES
: But do you think he did not want some other people to be worthy men, and especially his own son? Or do you think he begrudged [d] him this, and deliberately did not pass on to him his own virtue? Have you not heard that Themistocles taught his son Cleophantus to be a good horseman? He could remain standing upright on horseback and shoot javelins from that position and do many other remarkable things which his father had him taught and made skillful at, all of which required good teachers. Have you not heard this from your elders?—I have.

S
OCRATES
: So one could not blame the poor natural talents of the son [e] for his failure in virtue?—Perhaps not.

S
OCRATES
: But have you ever heard anyone, young or old, say that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, was a good and wise man at the same pursuits as his father?—Never.

S
OCRATES
: Are we to believe that he wanted to educate his son in those other things but not to do better than his neighbors in that skill which he himself possessed, if indeed virtue can be taught?—Perhaps not, by Zeus.

S
OCRATES
: And yet he was, as you yourself agree, among the best teachers
[94]
of virtue in the past. Let us consider another man, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. Do you not agree that he was good?—I very definitely do.

S
OCRATES
: He too gave his own son Lysimachus the best Athenian education in matters which are the business of teachers, and do you think he made him a better man than anyone else? For you have been in his company [b] wisdom. You know that he brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus?—I know.

S
OCRATES
: You also know that he taught them to be as good horsemen as any Athenian, that he educated them in the arts, in gymnastics, and in all else that was a matter of skill not to be inferior to anyone, but did he not want to make them good men? I think he did, but this could not be taught. And lest you think that only a few most inferior Athenians are incapable in this respect, reflect that Thucydides
¹⁷
too brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, that he educated them well in all other things. [c] They were the best wrestlers in Athens—he entrusted the one to Xanthias and the other to Eudorus, who were thought to be the best wrestlers of the day, or do you not remember?

A
NYTUS
: I remember I have heard that said.

S
OCRATES
: It is surely clear that he would not have taught his boys what [d] it costs money to teach, but have failed to teach them what costs nothing—making them good men—if that could be taught? Or was Thucydides perhaps an inferior person who had not many friends among the Athenians and the allies? He belonged to a great house; he had great influence in the city and among the other Greeks, so that if virtue could be taught he would have found the man who could make his sons good men, be it a citizen or a stranger, if he himself did not have the time because of his [e] public concerns. But, friend Anytus, virtue can certainly not be taught.

A
NYTUS
: I think, Socrates, that you easily speak ill of people. I would advise you, if you will listen to me, to be careful. Perhaps also in another city, and certainly here, it is easier to injure people than to benefit them. I think you know that yourself.
[95]

S
OCRATES
: I think, Meno, that Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised. He thinks, to begin with, that I am slandering those men, and then he believes himself to be one of them. If he ever realizes what slander is, he will cease from anger, but he does not know it now. You tell me, are there not worthy men among your people?—Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: Well now, are they willing to offer themselves to the young [b] as teachers? Do they agree they are teachers, and that virtue can be taught?

M
ENO
: No, by Zeus, Socrates, but sometimes you would hear them say that it can be taught, at other times, that it cannot.

S
OCRATES
: Should we say that they are teachers of this subject, when they do not even agree on this point?—I do not think so, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Further, do you think that these sophists, who alone profess to be so, are teachers of virtue?

M
ENO
: I admire this most in Gorgias, Socrates, that you would never [c] hear him promising this. Indeed, he ridicules the others when he hears them making this claim. He thinks one should make people clever speakers.

S
OCRATES
: You do not think then that the sophists are teachers?

M
ENO
: I cannot tell, Socrates; like most people, at times I think they are, at other times I think that they are not.

S
OCRATES
: Do you know that not only you and the other public men at [d] times think that it can be taught, at other times that it cannot, but that the poet Theognis
¹⁸
says the same thing?—Where?

S
OCRATES
: In his elegiacs: “Eat and drink with these men, and keep their company. Please those whose power is great, for you will learn goodness [e] you possess.” You see that here he speaks as if virtue can be taught?—So it appears.

S
OCRATES
: Elsewhere, he changes somewhat: “If this could be done,” he says, “and intelligence could be instilled,” somehow those who could do this “would collect large and numerous fees,” and further: “Never would a bad son be born of a good father, for he would be persuaded by wise
[96]
words, but you will never make a bad man good by teaching.” You realize that the poet is contradicting himself on the same subject?—He seems to be.

S
OCRATES
: Can you mention any other subject of which those who claim to be teachers not only are not recognized to be teachers of others but are not recognized to have knowledge of it themselves, and are thought to be [b] poor in the very matter which they profess to teach? Or any other subject of which those who are recognized as worthy teachers at one time say it can be taught and at other times that it cannot? Would you say that people who are so confused about a subject can be effective teachers of it?—No, by Zeus, I would not.

S
OCRATES
: If then neither the sophists nor the worthy people themselves are teachers of this subject, clearly there would be no others?—I do not think there are.

[c] S
OCRATES
: If there are no teachers, neither are there pupils?—As you say.

S
OCRATES
: And we agreed that a subject that has neither teachers nor pupils is not teachable?—We have so agreed.

S
OCRATES
: Now there seem to be no teachers of virtue anywhere?—That is so.

S
OCRATES
: If there are no teachers, there are no learners?—That seems so.

S
OCRATES
: Then virtue cannot be taught?

[d] M
ENO
: Apparently not, if we have investigated this correctly. I certainly wonder, Socrates, whether there are no good men either, or in what way good men come to be.

S
OCRATES
: We are probably poor specimens, you and I, Meno. Gorgias has not adequately educated you, nor Prodicus me. We must then at all costs turn our attention to ourselves and find someone who will in some [e] way make us better. I say this in view of our recent investigation, for it is ridiculous that we failed to see that it is not only under the guidance of knowledge that men succeed in their affairs, and that is perhaps why the knowledge of how good men come to be escapes us.

M
ENO
: How do you mean, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: I mean this: we were right to agree that good men must be beneficent, and that this could not be otherwise. Is that not so?—Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And that they will be beneficent if they give us correct guidance in our affairs. To this too we were right to agree?—Yes.
[97]

S
OCRATES
: But that one cannot guide correctly if one does not have knowledge; to this our agreement is likely to be incorrect.—How do you mean?

S
OCRATES
: I will tell you. A man who knew the way to Larissa, or anywhere else you like, and went there and guided others would surely lead them well and correctly?—Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: What if someone had had a correct opinion as to which was [b] the way but had not gone there nor indeed had knowledge of it, would he not also lead correctly?—Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: And as long as he has the right opinion about that of which the other has knowledge, he will not be a worse guide than the one who knows, as he has a true opinion, though not knowledge.—In no way worse.

S
OCRATES
: So true opinion is in no way a worse guide to correct action than knowledge. It is this that we omitted in our investigation of the nature of virtue, when we said that only knowledge can lead to correct action, [c] for true opinion can do so also.—So it seems.

S
OCRATES
: So correct opinion is no less useful than knowledge?

M
ENO
: Yes, to this extent, Socrates. But the man who has knowledge will always succeed, whereas he who has true opinion will only succeed at times.

S
OCRATES
: How do you mean? Will he who has the right opinion not always succeed, as long as his opinion is right?

M
ENO
: That appears to be so of necessity, and it makes me wonder, Socrates, this being the case, why knowledge is prized far more highly [d] than right opinion, and why they are different.

S
OCRATES
: Do you know why you wonder, or shall I tell you?—By all means tell me.

S
OCRATES
: It is because you have paid no attention to the statues of Daedalus, but perhaps there are none in Thessaly.

M
ENO
: What do you have in mind when you say this?

S
OCRATES
: That they too run away and escape if one does not tie them down but remain in place if tied down.—So what? [e]

S
OCRATES
: To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are very beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain
[98]
long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down.

M
ENO
: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, it seems to be something like that.

[b] S
OCRATES
: Indeed, I too speak as one who does not have knowledge but is guessing. However, I certainly do not think I am guessing that right opinion is a different thing from knowledge. If I claim to know anything else—and I would make that claim about few things—I would put this down as one of the things I know.—Rightly so, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, is it not correct that when true opinion guides the course of every action, it does no worse than knowledge?—I think you are right in this too.

[c] S
OCRATES
: Correct opinion is then neither inferior to knowledge nor less useful in directing actions, nor is the man who has it less so than he who has knowledge.—That is so.

S
OCRATES
: And we agreed that the good man is beneficent.—Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Since then it is not only through knowledge but also through right opinion that men are good, and beneficial to their cities when they [d] are, and neither knowledge nor true opinion come to men by nature but are acquired—or do you think either of these comes by nature?—I do not think so.

S
OCRATES
: Then if they do not come by nature, men are not so by nature either.—Surely not.

S
OCRATES
: As goodness does not come by nature, we inquired next whether it could be taught.—Yes.

S
OCRATES
: We thought it could be taught, if it was knowledge?—Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And that it was knowledge if it could be taught?—Quite so.

[e] S
OCRATES
: And that if there were teachers of it, it could be taught, but if there were not, it was not teachable?—That is so.

S
OCRATES
: And then we agreed that there were no teachers of it?—We did.

S
OCRATES
: So we agreed that it was neither teachable nor knowledge?—Quite so.

S
OCRATES
: But we certainly agree that virtue is a good thing?—Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And that which guides correctly is both useful and good?—Certainly.

[99]
S
OCRATES
: And that only these two things, true belief and knowledge, guide correctly, and that if a man possesses these he gives correct guidance. The things that turn out right by some chance are not due to human guidance, but where there is correct human guidance it is due to two things, true belief or knowledge.—I think that is so.

S
OCRATES
: Now because it cannot be taught, virtue no longer seems to be knowledge?—It seems not.

[b] S
OCRATES
: So one of the two good and useful things has been excluded, and knowledge is not the guide in public affairs.—I do not think so.