Complete Works (197 page)

[b] H
IPPIAS
: Take the other side. And, as I just said, the question is not large. I could teach you to answer much harder things than that so no human being could refute you.

S
OCRATES
: That’s amazingly well said! Now, since it’s your command, let me become the man as best I can and try to question you. If you displayed that speech to him, the one you mentioned about the fine activities, he’d listen, and when you stopped speaking he’d ask not about anything else but about the fine—that’s a sort of habit with him—and he’d say: “O [c] visitor from Elis, is it not by justice that just people are just?” Answer, Hippias, as if
he
were the questioner.

H
IPPIAS
: I shall answer that it is by justice.

S
OCRATES
: “And is this justice
something?
”

H
IPPIAS
: Very much so.

S
OCRATES
: “And by wisdom wise people are wise, and by the good all good things are good?”

H
IPPIAS
: How could they be otherwise?

S
OCRATES
: “… by these each
being
something? Of course, it can’t be that they’re not.”

H
IPPIAS
: They are.

S
OCRATES
: “Then all fine things, too, are fine by the fine, isn’t that so?”

H
IPPIAS
: Yes, by the fine. [d]

S
OCRATES
: “… by that being
something?
”

H
IPPIAS
: It is. Why not?

S
OCRATES
: “Tell me then, visitor,” he’ll say, “what is that, the fine?”

H
IPPIAS
: Doesn’t the person who asks this want to find out what is a fine thing?

S
OCRATES
: I don’t think so, Hippias. What is
the
fine.

H
IPPIAS
: And what’s the difference between the one and the other?

S
OCRATES
: You don’t think there is any?

H
IPPIAS
: There’s no difference.

S
OCRATES
: Well, clearly your knowledge is finer. But look here, he’s [e] asking you not what is a fine thing, but what is the fine.

H
IPPIAS
: My friend, I understand. I will indeed tell him what the fine is, and never will I be refuted. Listen, Socrates, to tell the truth, a fine girl is a fine thing.

S
OCRATES
: That’s fine, Hippias; by Dog you have a glorious answer. So you really think, if
I
gave that answer, I’d be answering what was asked,
[288]
and correctly, and never will I be refuted?

H
IPPIAS
: Socrates, how could you be refuted when you say what everyone thinks, when everyone who hears you will testify that you’re right?

S
OCRATES
: Very well. Certainly. Now, look, Hippias, let me go over what you said for myself.
He
will question me somewhat like this: “Come now, Socrates, give me an answer. All those things you say are fine, will they be fine if the fine itself is
what?
” Shall I say that if a fine girl is a fine thing, those things will be fine because of that?

H
IPPIAS
: Then do you think that man will still try to refute you—that what [b] you say is not a fine thing—or if he does try, he won’t be a laughingstock?

S
OCRATES
: You’re wonderful! But I’m sure he’ll try. Whether trying will make him a laughingstock—we’ll see about that. But I want to tell you what he’ll say.

H
IPPIAS
: Tell me.

S
OCRATES
: “How sweet you are, Socrates,” he’ll say. “Isn’t a fine Elean [c] mare a fine thing? The god praised mares in his oracle.” What shall we say, Hippias? Mustn’t we say that the mare is a fine thing? At least if it’s a fine one. How could we dare deny that the fine thing is a fine thing?

H
IPPIAS
: That’s true, Socrates. And the god was right to say that too. We breed very fine mares in our country.

S
OCRATES
: “Very well,” he’ll say. “What about a fine lyre? Isn’t it a fine thing?” Shouldn’t we say so, Hippias?

H
IPPIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Then after that he’ll ask—I know fairly well, judging from the way he is—“Then what about a fine pot, my good fellow? Isn’t it a fine thing?”

[d] H
IPPIAS
: Who is the man, Socrates? What a boor he is to dare in an august proceeding to speak such vulgar speech that way!

S
OCRATES
: He’s like that, Hippias, not refined. He’s garbage, he cares about nothing but the truth. Still the man must have an answer; so here’s my first opinion:
If
the pot should have been turned by a good potter, smooth and round and finely fired, like some of those fine two-handled [e] pots that hold six choes, very fine ones—
if
he’s asking about a pot like that, we have to agree it’s fine. How could we say that what is fine is not a fine thing?

H
IPPIAS
: We couldn’t, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: “Then is a fine pot a fine thing too? Answer me!” he’ll say.

H
IPPIAS
: But I think that’s so, Socrates. Even that utensil is fine if finely
[289]
made. But on the whole that’s not worth judging fine, compared to a horse and a girl and all the other fine things.

S
OCRATES
: Very well. Then I understand how we’ll have to answer him when he asks this question, here: “Don’t you know that what Heraclitus said holds good—‘the finest of monkeys is foul put together with another class’,
⁸
and the finest of pots is foul put together with the class of girls, so says Hippias the wise.” Isn’t that so, Hippias?

H
IPPIAS
: Of course, Socrates. Your answer’s right.

[b] S
OCRATES
: Then listen. I’m sure of what he’ll say next. “What? If you put the class of girls together with the class of gods, won’t the same thing happen as happened when the class of pots was put together with that of girls? Won’t the finest girl be seen to be foul? And didn’t Heraclitus (whom you bring in) say the same thing too, that ‘the wisest of men is seen to be a monkey compared to god in wisdom and fineness and everything else?’ ” Should we agree, Hippias, that the finest girl is foul compared to the class of gods?

H
IPPIAS
: Who would object to that, Socrates?

[c] S
OCRATES
: Then if we agreed to that, he’d laugh and say, “Socrates, do you remember what you were asked?” “Yes,” I’ll say: “Whatever is the fine itself?” “Then,” he’ll say, “when you were asked for the fine, do you answer with something that turns out to be no more fine than foul, as you say yourself?” “Apparently,” I’ll say. Or what do you advise me to say, my friend?

H
IPPIAS
: That’s what I’d say. Because compared to gods, anyway, the human race is not fine—that’s true.

S
OCRATES
: He’ll say: “If I had asked you from the beginning what is both [d] fine and foul, and you had given me the answer you just gave, then wouldn’t you have given the right answer? Do you
still
think that the fine itself by which everything else is beautified and seen to be fine when that form is added to it—that
that
is a girl or a horse or a lyre?”

H
IPPIAS
: But if
that’s
what he’s looking for, it’s the easiest thing in the world to answer him and tell him what the fine (thing) is by which everything else is beautified and is seen to be fine when it is added. The man’s [e] quite simple; he has no feeling at all for fine possessions. If you answer him that this thing he’s asking for, the fine, is just
gold,
he’ll be stuck and won’t try to refute you. Because we all know, don’t we, that wherever that is added, even if it was seen to be foul before, it will be seen to be fine when it has been beautified with gold.

S
OCRATES
: You have no experience of this man, Hippias. He stops at nothing, and he never accepts anything easily.

H
IPPIAS
: So what? He
must
accept what’s said correctly, or, if not, be a
[290]
laughingstock.

S
OCRATES
: Well,
that
answer he certainly will not accept, my friend. And what’s more, he’ll jeer at me, and say, “Are you crazy? Do you think Phidias
⁹
is a bad workman?” And I think I’ll say, “No, not at all.”

H
IPPIAS
: And you’ll be right about that.

S
OCRATES
: Right enough. Then when I agree that Phidias is a good [b] workman, this person will say, “Next, do you think Phidias didn’t know about this fine thing you mention?” “What’s the point?” I’ll say. “The point is,” he’ll say, “that Phidias didn’t make Athena’s eyes out of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her feet, nor her hands—as he would have done if gold would really have made them be seen to be finest—but he made them out of ivory. Apparently he went wrong through ignorance; he didn’t know gold was what made everything fine, wherever it is added.” What shall we answer when he says that, Hippias?

H
IPPIAS
: It’s not hard. We’ll say he made the statue right. Ivory’s fine [c] too, I think.

S
OCRATES
: “Then why didn’t he work the middles of the eyes out of ivory? He used stone, and he found stone that resembled ivory as closely as possible. Isn’t a stone a fine thing too, if it’s a fine one?” Shall we agree?

H
IPPIAS
: Yes, at least when it’s appropriate.

S
OCRATES
: “But when it’s not appropriate it’s foul?” Do I agree or not?

H
IPPIAS
: Yes, when it’s not appropriate anyway.

[d] S
OCRATES
: “Well,” he’ll say. “You’re a wise man! Don’t ivory and gold make things be seen to be fine when they’re appropriate, but foul when they’re not?” Shall we be negative? Or shall we agree with him that he’s right?

H
IPPIAS
: We’ll agree to
this:
whatever is appropriate to each thing makes that particular thing fine.

S
OCRATES
: “Then,” he’ll say, “when someone boils the pot we just mentioned, the fine one, full of fine bean soup, is a gold stirring spoon or a figwood one more appropriate?”

[e] H
IPPIAS
: Heracles! What kind of man is this! Won’t you tell me who he is?

S
OCRATES
: You wouldn’t know him if I told you the name.

H
IPPIAS
: But I know right now he’s an ignoramus.

S
OCRATES
: Oh, he’s a real plague, Hippias. Still, what shall we say? Which of the two spoons is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Isn’t it clearly the wooden one? It makes the soup smell better, and at the same time, my friend, it won’t break our pot, spill out the soup, put out the fire, and make us do without a truly noble meal, when we were going to have a
[291]
banquet. That gold spoon would do all these things; so
I
think we should say the figwood spoon is more appropriate than the gold one, unless you say otherwise.

H
IPPIAS
: Yes, it’s more appropriate. But
I
wouldn’t talk with a man who asked things like that.

S
OCRATES
: Right you are. It wouldn’t be appropriate for you to be filled up with words like that, when you’re so finely dressed, finely shod, and [b] famous for wisdom all over Greece. But it’s nothing much for me to mix with him. So help me get prepared. Answer for my sake. “If the figwood is really more appropriate than the gold,” the man will say, “wouldn’t it be finer? Since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is finer than the not appropriate?”

Hippias, don’t we agree that the figwood spoon is finer than the gold one?

H
IPPIAS
: Would you like me to tell you what you can say the fine is—and save yourself a lot of argument?

[c] S
OCRATES
: Certainly. But not before you tell me how to answer. Which of those two spoons I just mentioned is appropriate and finer?

H
IPPIAS
: Answer, if you’d like, that it’s the one made of fig.

S
OCRATES
: Now tell me what you were going to say. Because by
that
answer, if I say the fine is gold, apparently I’ll be made to see that gold is no finer than wood from a figtree. So what do you say the fine is this time?

[d] H
IPPIAS
: I’ll tell you. I think you’re looking for an answer that says the fine is the sort of thing that will never be seen to be foul for anyone, anywhere, at any time.

S
OCRATES
: Quite right, Hippias. Now you’ve got a fine grasp of it.

H
IPPIAS
: Listen now, if anyone has anything to say against
this,
you can certainly say I’m not an expert on anything.

S
OCRATES
: Tell me quickly, for god’s sake.

H
IPPIAS
: I say, then, that it is always finest, both for every man and in every place, to be rich, healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to arrive at [e] old age, to make a fine memorial to his parents when they die, and to have a fine, grand burial from his own children.

S
OCRATES
: Hurray, Hippias! What a wonderful long speech, worthy of yourself! I’m really delighted at the kind way in which—to the best of your ability—you’ve helped me out. But we didn’t hit the enemy, and now he’ll certainly laugh at us harder than ever.

H
IPPIAS
: That laughter won’t do him any good, Socrates. When he has nothing to say in reply, but laughs anyway, he’ll be laughing at himself,
[292]
and he’ll be a laughingstock to those around.

S
OCRATES
: That may be so. But maybe, as I suspect, he’ll do more than laugh at me for that answer.