Complete Works (62 page)

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: And again a little earlier I said that it
is
unutterable, unsayable, and inexpressible in speech. Do you follow?

T
HEAETETUS
: I follow, of course.

V
ISITOR
: So in trying to attach
being
to it wasn’t I saying things that were
[239]
the contrary of what I’d said before?

T
HEAETETUS
: Apparently.

V
ISITOR
: And in attaching
that which
,
¹⁰
wasn’t I speaking of it as
one
?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: And also in speaking of it as something inexpressible in speech, unsayable, and unutterable, I was speaking of it as one thing.

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: But we say that if someone speaks correctly he shouldn’t definitely fix it as either one or plural. He shouldn’t even call it
it
at all, since even calling it by that label he’d be addressing it by means of the form,
one
.

T
HEAETETUS
: Absolutely.

[b] V
ISITOR
: Then what would somebody say about me? He’d find that the refutation of that which is not has been defeating me for a long time. So, as I said, let’s not use what I say to help us think of how to speak correctly about that which is not. Come on, let’s use what you say instead.

T
HEAETETUS
: What do you mean?

V
ISITOR
: Come on, pull yourself together for us as well as you can and try it—since you’re young. Try to say something correct about that which is not, without attaching either
being
,
one
, or numerical
plurality
to it.

[c] T
HEAETETUS
: I’d have to have a strangely large amount of enthusiasm for the project to try it myself after seeing what you’ve gone through.

V
ISITOR
: Well, let’s give up on both you and me, if you prefer. But until we meet someone who can do it let’s say that the sophist has stopped at nothing. He’s escaped down into inaccessible confusion.

T
HEAETETUS
: He certainly seems to have.

V
ISITOR
: So if we say he has some expertise in appearance-making, it [d] will be easy for him to grab hold of our use of words in return and twist our words in the contrary direction. Whenever we call him a copy-maker he’ll ask us what in the world we mean by a “copy.” We need to think, Theaetetus, about how to answer the young man’s question.

T
HEAETETUS
: Obviously we’ll say we mean copies in water and mirrors, and also copies that are drawn and stamped and everything else like that.

[e] V
ISITOR
: Evidently, Theaetetus, you haven’t seen a sophist.

T
HEAETETUS
: Why do you say that?

V
ISITOR
: He’ll seem to you to have his eyes shut, or else not to have any eyes at all.

T
HEAETETUS
: How?

V
ISITOR
: He’ll laugh at what you say when you answer him that way, with talk about things in mirrors or sculptures, and when you speak
[240]
to him as if he could see. He’ll pretend he doesn’t know about mirrors or water or even sight, and he’ll put his question to you only in terms of words.

T
HEAETETUS
: What sort of question?

V
ISITOR
: He’ll ask about what runs through all those things which you call many, but which you thought you should call by the one name,
copy
, to cover them all, as if they were all one thing. Say something, then, and defend yourself, and don’t give any ground to him.

T
HEAETETUS
: What in the world would we say a copy is, sir, except something that’s made similar to a true thing and is another thing that’s [b] like it?

V
ISITOR
: You’re saying it’s another
true
thing like it? Or what do you mean by
like it
?

T
HEAETETUS
: Not that it’s
true
at all, but that it resembles the true thing.

V
ISITOR
: Meaning by
true
, really being?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: And meaning by
not true
, contrary of true?

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: So you’re saying that that which is like is not really that which is, if you speak of it as not true.

T
HEAETETUS
: But it
is
, in a way.

V
ISITOR
: But not truly, you say.

T
HEAETETUS
: No, except that it really is a likeness.

V
ISITOR
: So it’s not really what is, but it really is what we call a likeness?

T
HEAETETUS
: Maybe
that which is not
is woven together with
that which
[c]
is
in some way like that—it’s quite bizarre.

V
ISITOR
: Of course it’s strange. Anyway, you can see that the many-headed sophist is still using this interweaving to force us to agree unwillingly that that which is not in a way is.

T
HEAETETUS
: I definitely do see it.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, how can we define his field of expertise, so as to be consistent?

T
HEAETETUS
: What do you mean? What kind of problem are you afraid of?

V
ISITOR
: When we say that he deceives us about appearances and that [d] he’s an expert at deception, are we saying so because his expertise makes our souls believe what is false? Or what shall we say?

T
HEAETETUS
: Just that. What else would we say?

V
ISITOR
: Again, a false belief will be a matter of believing things that are contrary to those which are? Or what?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes, contrary.

V
ISITOR
: So you’re saying that a false belief is believing those which are not.

T
HEAETETUS
: Necessarily.

V
ISITOR
: Believing that those which are not are not, or that those which [e] in no way are in a way are?

T
HEAETETUS
: That those which are not are in a way, it has to be, if anyone is ever going to be even a little bit wrong.

V
ISITOR
: Well, doesn’t a false belief also believe that those which completely are in no way are?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

V
ISITOR
: And this is false too?

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes.

[241]
V
ISITOR
: And I think we’ll also regard false speaking the same way, as saying that those which are are not, and that those which are not are.

T
HEAETETUS
: How else would it be false?

V
ISITOR
: I don’t suppose there’s any other way. The sophist, though, is going to deny that this way is possible. And how could any sensible person accept it, now that what we agreed to earlier has been reinforced.
¹¹
Do we understand what he’s saying, Theaetetus?

T
HEAETETUS
: How could we not understand that when we dare to say that falsity is in beliefs and words contain falsity, we’re saying what is [b] contrary to what we said just before. We’re forced to attach that which is to that which is not, even though we agreed just now that that’s completely impossible.

V
ISITOR
: Your memory’s correct. But think about what we need to do about the sophist. You see how many and easily available his supply of objections and confusions is if we assume, as we search for him, that he’s an expert at cheating and falsehood-making.

T
HEAETETUS
: Definitely.

[c] V
ISITOR
: He’s got a practically infinite supply of them, and we’ve gone through only a small fraction.

T
HEAETETUS
: If so, then it seems it would be impossible to catch him.

V
ISITOR
: What, then? Are we going to go soft and give up?

T
HEAETETUS
: I say we shouldn’t, if there’s even the smallest chance that we can catch him.

V
ISITOR
: So you’ll be forgiving and, as you said, happy if we can somehow extricate ourselves even slightly from such a powerful argument?

T
HEAETETUS
: Of course.

[d] V
ISITOR
: Then I’ve got something even more urgent to request.

T
HEAETETUS
: What?

V
ISITOR
: Not to think that I’m turning into some kind of patricide.

T
HEAETETUS
: What do you mean?

V
ISITOR
: In order to defend ourselves we’re going to have to subject father Parmenides’ saying to further examination, and insist by brute force both that
that which is not
somehow is, and then again that
that which is
somehow is not.

T
HEAETETUS
: It does seem that in what we’re going to say, we’ll to have to fight through that issue.

[e] V
ISITOR
: That’s obvious even to a blind man, as they say. We’ll never be able to avoid having to make ourselves ridiculous by saying conflicting things whenever we talk about false statements and beliefs, either as copies or likenesses or imitations or appearances, or about whatever sorts of expertise there are concerning those things—unless, that is, we either refute Parmenides’ claims or else agree to accept them.

T
HEAETETUS
: That’s true.

V
ISITOR
: So that’s why we have to be bold enough to attack what our
[242]
father says. Or, if fear keeps us from doing that, then we’ll have to leave it alone completely.

T
HEAETETUS
: Fear, anyway, isn’t going to stop us.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, I’ve got a third thing to ask you, something small.

T
HEAETETUS
: Just tell me what it is.

V
ISITOR
: When I was talking a minute ago I said that I’ve always given up whenever I’ve tried to refute what Parmenides said, just the way I did this time.

T
HEAETETUS
: Yes, you did say that.

V
ISITOR
: I’m afraid I’ll seem insane to you if I’m always shifting my position back and forth, given what I’ve said. It’s for your sake that we’ll [b] be trying to refute what Parmenides said—
if
we can do it.

T
HEAETETUS
: Go ahead, then. Don’t worry about that. I won’t think you’re behaving inappropriately in any way if you go right ahead with your refutation and demonstration.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, how shall I begin this dangerous discussion? The path we absolutely have to turn onto, my boy, is this.

T
HEAETETUS
: Namely, … ?

V
ISITOR
: We have to reconsider whether we may not be somehow confused about things that now seem to be clear, and whether over-hasty [c] judgment may make us agree too easily.

T
HEAETETUS
: Say what you mean more clearly.

V
ISITOR
: Parmenides’ way of talking to us has been rather easygoing, it seems to me. So does the way of talking that everyone uses who has ever urged us to specify just how many beings there are and what they’re like.

T
HEAETETUS
: How?

V
ISITOR
: They each appear to me to tell us a myth, as if we were children. One tells us that there are three beings, and that sometimes they’re somehow at war with each other, while at other times they become friendly, [d] marry, give birth, and bring up their offspring. Another one says that there are two beings, wet and dry or hot and cold. He marries them off and makes them set up house together. And our Eleatic tribe, starting from Xenophanes and even people before him, tells us their myth on the assumption that what they call “all things” are just one.
¹²
Later on, some Ionian and Sicilian muses both had the idea that it was safer to weave the two [e] views together. They say that
that which is
is both many and one, and is bound by both hatred and friendship. According to the terser of these muses, in being taken apart they’re brought together.
¹³
The more relaxed muses, though, allow things to be free from that condition sometimes. They say that all that there is alternates, and that sometimes it’s one and
[243]
friendly under Aphrodite’s influence, but at other times it’s many and at war with itself because of some kind of strife.
¹⁴
It’s hard to say whether any one of these thinkers has told us the truth or not, and it wouldn’t be appropriate for us to be critical of such renowned and venerable men. But it wouldn’t be offensive to note the following thing, either.

T
HEAETETUS
: What?

V
ISITOR
: That they’ve overlooked the many of us and belittled us. They’ve simply been talking their way through their explanations, without [b] paying any attention to whether we were following them or were left behind.

T
HEAETETUS
: What do you mean?

V
ISITOR
: For heaven’s sake, Theaetetus, do you understand anything of what they mean each time one of them says that many or one or two things
are
or
have become
or
are becoming,
or when another one speaks of hot mixed with cold and supposes that there are separations and combinations?
¹⁵
Earlier in my life I used to think I understood exactly what someone meant when he said just what we’re confused about now, namely, this is not. You do see what confusion we’re in about it?