Complete Works (87 page)

“And it won’t be different from another, as long as it is one; for it is not proper to one to be different from something, but proper to different-from-another alone, and to nothing else.”—“That’s right.”—“Therefore it won’t be different by being one. Or do you think it will?”—“No indeed.”—“Yet if it isn’t different by being one, it will not be so by itself; and if it isn’t so by itself, it will not itself be so. And if it is itself in no way different, it will be different from nothing.”—“That’s right.”

“Nor will it be the same as itself.”—“Why not?”—“The nature of the [d] one is not, of course, also that of the same.”—“Why?”—“Because it is not the case that, whenever a thing comes to be the same as something, it comes to be one.”—“But why?”—“If it comes to be the same as the many, it must come to be many, not one.”—“True.”—“But if the one and the same in no way differ, whenever something came to be the same, it would always come to be one; and whenever it came to be one, it would always [e] come to be the same.”—“Certainly.”—“Therefore, if the one is to be the same as itself, it won’t be one with itself; and thus it will be one and not one. But this surely is impossible. Therefore the one can’t be either different from another or the same as itself.”—“It can’t.”—“Thus the one could neither be different from nor the same as itself or another.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”

“Furthermore, it will be neither like nor unlike anything, either itself or another.”—“Why?”—“Because whatever has a property the same is surely like.”—“Yes.”—“But it was shown that the same is separate in its nature
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from the one.”—“Yes, it was.”—“But if the one has any property apart from being one, it would be more than one; and that is impossible.”—“Yes.”—“Therefore, the one can in no way have a property the same as another or itself.”—“Apparently not.”—“So it cannot be like another or itself either.”—“It seems not.”

“Nor does the one have the property of being different; for in this way too it would be more than one.”—“Yes, it would be more.”—“Surely that which has a property different from itself or another would be unlike itself [b] or another, if in fact what has a property the same is like.”—“That’s right.”—“But the one, as it seems, since it in no way has a property different, is in no way unlike itself or another thing.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”—“Therefore the one could be neither like nor unlike another or itself.”—“Apparently not.”

“Furthermore, being like that, it will be neither equal nor unequal to itself or another.”—“How?”—“If it is equal, it will be of the same measures as that to which it is equal.”—“Yes.”—“But surely if it is greater or less, [c] it will, in the case of things with which it is commensurate, have more measures than those that are less, and fewer than those that are greater.”—“Yes.”—“And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will be of smaller measures in the one case, and of larger measures in the other.”—“No doubt.”—“Well, if a thing doesn’t partake of the same, it can’t be of the same measures or of the same anything else at all, can it?”—“It can’t.”—“So it couldn’t be equal to itself or another, if it is not of the same measures.”—“It certainly appears not.”—“Yet if it is, on the other [d] hand, of more measures or fewer, it would have as many parts as measures; and thus, again, it will be no longer one, but just as many as are its measures.”—“That’s right.”—“And if it were of one measure, it would prove to be equal to its measure; but it was shown that it couldn’t be equal to anything.”—“Yes, it was.”—“Therefore, since it doesn’t partake of one measure or many or few, and since it doesn’t partake of the same at all, it will, as it seems, never be equal to itself or another; nor again will it be greater or less than itself or another.”—“That’s absolutely so.”

[e] “What about this? Do you think that the one can be older or younger than, or the same age as, anything?”—“Yes, why not?”—“Because if it is the same age as itself or another, it will surely partake of likeness and of equality of time, of which – likeness and equality – we said the one has no share.”—“Yes, we did say that.”—“And we also said that it does not partake of unlikeness and inequality.”—“Of course.”—“Then, being like that, how will it be able to be older or younger than, or the same age as,
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anything?”—“In no way.”—“Therefore, the one could not be younger or older than, or the same age as, itself or another.”—“Apparently not.”

“So if it is like that, the one could not even be in time at all, could it? Or isn’t it necessary, if something is in time, that it always come to be older than itself?”—“Necessarily.”—“Isn’t the older always older than a younger?”—“To be sure.”—“Therefore, that which comes to be older than [b] itself comes to be, at the same time, younger than itself, if in fact it is to have something it comes to be older than.”—“What do you mean?”—“I mean this: there is no need for a thing to come to be different from a thing that is already different; it must, rather, already be different from what is already different, have come to be different from what has come to be different, and be going to be different from what is going to be different; but it must not have come to be, be going to be, or be different from what comes to be different: it must come to be different, and nothing else.”—“Yes, that’s necessary.”—“But surely older is a difference from younger [c] and from nothing else.”—“Yes, it is.”—“So that which comes to be older than itself must also, at the same time, come to be younger than itself.”—“So it seems.”—“But it must also not come to be for more or less time than itself; it must come to be and be and have come to be and be going to be for a time equal to itself.”—“Yes, that too is necessary.”—“Therefore it is necessary, as it seems, that each thing that is in time and partakes of time be the same age as itself and, at the same time, come to be both older [d] and younger than itself.”—“It looks that way.”—“But the one surely had no share of any of that.”—“No, it didn’t.”—“Therefore, it has no share of time, nor is it
in
any time.”—“It certainly isn’t, as the argument proves.”

“Now, don’t you think that ‘was’ and ‘has come to be’ and ‘was coming to be’ signify partaking of time past?”—“By all means.”—“And again that [e] ‘will be’ and ‘will come to be’ and ‘will be coming to be’ signify partaking of time hereafter?”—“Yes.”—“And that ‘is’ and ‘comes to be’ signify partaking of time now present?”—“Of course.”—“Therefore, if the one partakes of no time at all, it is not the case that it has at one time come to be, was coming to be, or was; or has now come to be, comes to be, or is; or will hereafter come to be, will be coming to be, or will be.”—“Very true.”—“Could something partake of being except in one of those ways?”—“It couldn’t.”—“Therefore the one in no way partakes of being.”—“It seems not.”—“Therefore the one in no way is.”—“Apparently not.”—“Therefore neither
is
it in such a way as to be one, because it would then, by being and partaking of being, be. But, as it seems, the one neither is one nor is, if we are obliged to trust this argument.”—“It looks that way.”
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“If something is not, could anything belong
to
this thing that is not, or be
of
it?”—“How could it?”—“Therefore, no name belongs to it, nor is there an account or any knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”—“Apparently not.”—“Therefore it is not named or spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it.”—“It seems not.”—“Is it possible that these things are so for the one?”—“I certainly don’t think so.”

[b] “Do you want to return to the hypothesis from the beginning, in the hope that another kind of result may come to light as we go back over it?”—“I do indeed.”—“If one is, we are saying, aren’t we, that we must agree on the consequences for it, whatever they happen to be?”—“Yes.”—“Consider from the beginning: if one is, can it
be
, but not partake of being?”—“It cannot.”—“So there would also be the being of the one, and that is not the same as the one. For if it were, it couldn’t be the being of [c] the one, nor could the one partake of it. On the contrary, saying that one is would be like saying that one is one. But this time that is not the hypothesis, namely, what the consequences must be, if one is one, but if one is. Isn’t that so?”—“Of course.”—“Is that because ‘is’ signifies something other than ‘one’?”—“Necessarily.”—“So whenever someone, being brief, says ‘one is,’ would this simply mean that the one partakes of being?”—“Certainly.”

“Let’s again say what the consequences will be, if one is. Consider [d] whether this hypothesis must not signify that the one is such as to have parts.”—“How so?”—“In this way: if we state the ‘is’ of the one that is, and the ‘one’ of that which is one, and if being and oneness are not the same, but both belong to that same thing that we hypothesized, namely, the one that is, must it not itself, since it is one being, be a whole, and the parts of this whole be oneness and being?”—“Necessarily.”—“Shall we call each of these two parts a part only, or must the part be called part of the whole?”—“Of the whole.”—“Therefore whatever is one both is a whole and has a part.”—“Certainly.”

“Now, what about each of these two parts of the one that is, oneness [e] and being? Is oneness ever absent from the being part or being from the oneness part?”—“That couldn’t be.”—“So again, each of the two parts possesses oneness and being; and the part, in its turn, is composed of at least two parts; and in this way always, for the same reason, whatever part turns up always possesses these two parts, since oneness always possesses being and being always possesses oneness. So, since it always
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proves to be two, it must never be one.”—“Absolutely.”—“So, in this way, wouldn’t the one that is be unlimited in multitude?”—“So it seems.”

“Come, let’s proceed further in the following way.”—“How?”—“Do we say that the one partakes of being, and hence is?”—“Yes.”—“And for this reason the one that is was shown to be many.”—“Just so.”—“And what about the one itself, which we say partakes of being? If we grasp it in thought alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, will it appear to be only one, or will this same thing also appear to be many?”—[b] “One, I should think.”—“Let’s see. Must not its being be something and it itself something different, if in fact the one is not being but, as one, partakes of being?”—“Necessarily.”—“So if being is something and the one is something different, it is not by its being one that the one is different from being, nor by its being being that being is other than the one. On the contrary, they are different from each other by difference and otherness.”—“Of course.”—“And so difference is not the same as oneness or being.”—“Obviously not.”

“Now, if we select from them, say, being and difference, or being and [c] oneness, or oneness and difference, do we not in each selection choose a certain pair that is correctly called ‘both’?”—“How so?”—“As follows: we can say ‘being’?”—“We can.”—“And, again, we can say ‘one’?”—“That too.”—“So hasn’t each of the pair been mentioned?”—“Yes.”—“What about when I say ‘being and oneness’? Haven’t both been mentioned?”—“Certainly.”—“And if I say ‘being and difference’ or ‘difference and oneness,’ and so on – in each case don’t I speak of both?”—“Yes.”—“Can things [d] that are correctly called ‘both’ be both, but not two?”—“They cannot.”—“If there are two things, is there any way for each member of the pair not to be one?”—“Not at all.”—“Therefore, since in fact each pair taken together turns out to be two, each member would be one.”—“Apparently.”—“And if each of them is one, when any one is added to any couple, doesn’t the total prove to be three?”—“Yes.”—“And isn’t three odd, and two even?”—“Doubtless.”

“What about this? Since there are two, must there not also be twice, and [e] since there are three, thrice, if in fact two is two times one and three is three times one?”—“Necessarily.”—“Since there are two and twice, must there not be two times two? And since there are three and thrice, must there not be three times three?”—“Doubtless.”—“And again: if there are three and they are two times, and if there are two and they are three times, must there not be two times three and three times two?”—“There certainly must.”—“Therefore, there would be even times even, odd times odd, odd
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times even, and even times odd.”—“That’s so.”—“Then if that is so, do you think there is any number that need not be?”—“In no way at all.”—“Therefore, if one is, there must also be number.”—“Necessarily.”—“But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. Or doesn’t number, unlimited in multitude, also prove to partake of being?”—“It certainly does.”—“So if all number partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it?”—“Yes.”

“So has being been distributed to all things, which are many, and is it [b] missing from none of the beings, neither the smallest nor the largest? Or is it unreasonable even to ask that question? How could being be missing from any of the beings?”—“In no way.”—“So being is chopped up into beings of all kinds, from the smallest to the largest possible, and is the most divided thing of all; and the parts of being are countless.”—“Quite [c] so.”—“Therefore its parts are the most numerous of things.”—“The most numerous indeed.”

“Now, is there any of them that is part of being, yet not one part?”—“How could that happen?”—“I take it, on the contrary, that if in fact it
is
, it must always, as long as it is, be some one thing; it cannot be nothing.”—“Necessarily.”—“So oneness is attached to every part of being and is not absent from a smaller or a larger, or any other, part.”—“Just so.”—“So, [d] being one, is it, as a whole, in many places at the same time? Look at this carefully.”—“I am– and I see that it’s impossible.”—“Therefore as divided, if in fact not as a whole; for surely it will be present to all the parts of being at the same time only as divided.”—“Yes.”—“Furthermore, a divided thing certainly must be as numerous as its parts.”—“Necessarily.”—“So we were not speaking truly just now, when we said that being had been distributed into the most numerous parts. It is not distributed into more [e] parts than oneness, but, as it seems, into parts equal to oneness, since neither is being absent from oneness, nor is oneness absent from being. On the contrary, being two, they are always equal throughout all things.”—“It appears absolutely so.”—“Therefore, the one itself, chopped up by being, is many and unlimited in multitude.”—“Apparently.”—“So not only is it the case that the one being is many, but also the one itself, completely distributed by being, must be many.”—“Absolutely.”