Complete Works (90 page)

“Let’s speak of it yet a third time. If the one is as we have described it – being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partaking of time – must it not, because it is one, sometimes partake of being, and in turn because it is not, sometimes not partake of being?”—“Necessarily.”—“When it partakes, can it at that time not partake, or partake when it doesn’t?”—“It cannot.”—“So it partakes at one time, and doesn’t partake at another; for only in this way could it both partake and not partake of
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the same thing.”—“That’s right.”—“Isn’t there, then, a definite time when it gets a share of being and when it parts from it? Or how can it at one time have and at another time not have the same thing, if it never gets and releases it?”—“In no way.”

“Don’t you in fact call getting a share of being ‘coming-to-be’?”—“I do.”—“And parting from being ‘ceasing-to-be’?”—“Most certainly.”—“Indeed the one, as it seems, when it gets and releases being, comes to be [b] and ceases to be.”—“Necessarily.”—“And since it is one and many and comes to be and ceases to be, doesn’t its being many cease to be whenever it comes to be one, and doesn’t its being one cease to be whenever it comes to be many?”—“Certainly.”—“Whenever it comes to be one and many, must it not separate and combine?”—“It certainly must.”—“Furthermore, whenever it comes to be like and unlike, must it not be made like and unlike?”—“Yes.”—“And whenever it comes to be greater and less and equal, must it not increase and decrease and be made equal?”—“Just so.”

[c] “And whenever, being in motion, it comes to a rest, and whenever, being at rest, it changes to moving, it must itself, presumably, be in no time at all.”—“How is that?”—“It won’t be able to undergo being previously at rest and later in motion or being previously in motion and later at rest without changing.”—“Obviously not.”—“Yet there is no time in which something can, simultaneously, be neither in motion nor at rest.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”—“Yet surely it also doesn’t change without changing.”—“Hardly.”—“So when does it change? For it does not change while it is at rest or in motion, or while it is in time.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”

[d] “Is there, then, this queer thing in which it might be, just when it changes?”—“What queer thing?”—“The instant. The instant seems to signify something such that changing occurs from it to each of two states. For a thing doesn’t change from rest while rest continues, or from motion while motion continues. Rather, this queer creature, the instant, lurks [e] between motion and rest – being in no time at all – and to it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the resting thing changes to moving.”—“It looks that way.”—“And the one, if in fact it both rests and moves, could change to each state – for only in this way could it do both. But in changing, it changes at an instant, and when it changes, it would be in no time at all, and just then it would be neither in motion nor at rest.”—“No, it wouldn’t.”

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“Is it so with the other changes too? Whenever the one changes from being to ceasing-to-be, or from not-being to coming-to-be, isn’t it then between certain states of motion and rest? And then it neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be?”—“It seems so, at any rate.”—“Indeed, according to the same argument, when it goes from one to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and neither separates nor combines. And when it goes from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it being made like or unlike. And when it goes from small to large and to equal and vice versa, [b] it is neither small nor large nor equal; nor would it be increasing or decreasing or being made equal.”—“It seems not.”—“The one, if it is, could undergo all that.”—“Doubtless.”

“Must we not examine what would be proper for the others to undergo, if one is?”—“We must.”—“Are we to say, then, what properties things other than the one must have, if one is?”—“Let’s do.”—“Well then, since in fact they are other than the one, the others are not the one. For if they were, they would not be other than the one.”—“That’s right.” [c]

“And yet the others are not absolutely deprived of the one, but somehow partake of it.”—“In what way?”—“In that things other than the one are surely other because they have parts; for if they didn’t have parts, they would be altogether one.”—“That’s right.”—“And parts, we say, are parts of that which is a whole.”—“Yes, we do.”—“Yet the whole of which the parts are to be parts must be one thing composed of many, because each of the parts must be part, not of many, but of a whole.”—“Why is that?”—“If something were to be part of many, in which it itself is, it will, of [d] course, be both part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if in fact it is part of all of them. For if it is not part of one, it will be part of the others, that one excepted, and thus it will not be part of each one. And if it is not part of each, it will be part of none of the many. But if something is part of none, it cannot be a part, or anything else at all, of all those things of which it is no part of any.”—“It certainly appears so.”—“So the part would not be part of many things or all, but of some one character and of some one thing, which we call a ‘whole,’ since it has [e] come to be one complete thing composed of all. This is what the part would be part of.”—“Absolutely.”—“So if the others have parts, they would also partake of some one whole.”—“Certainly.”—“So things other than the one must be one complete whole with parts.”—“Necessarily.”

“Furthermore, the same account applies also to each part, since it too
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must partake of the one. For if each of them is a part, ‘each,’ of course, signifies that it is one thing, detached from the others and being by itself, if in fact it is to be
each
.”—“That’s right.”—“But clearly it would partake of the one, while being something other than one. Otherwise, it wouldn’t partake, but would itself be one. But as it is, it is surely impossible for anything except the one itself to be one.”—“Impossible.”

“But both the whole and the part must partake of the one; for the whole will be one thing of which the parts are parts, and in turn each thing that is part of a whole will be one part of the whole.”—“Just so.”—“Well, then, [b] won’t things that partake of the one partake of it, while being different from it?”—“Doubtless.”—“And things different from the one would surely be many; for if things other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”

“Since both things that partake of the oneness of a part and things that partake of the oneness of a whole are more than one, must not those things themselves that get a share of the one in fact be unlimited in multitude?”—“How so?”—“Let’s observe the following: isn’t it the case that, at the time when they get a share of the one, they get a share, while not being one and not partaking of the one?”—“Quite clearly.”—“While being multitudes, [c] then, in which oneness is not present?”—“Certainly, multitudes.”—“Now, if we should be willing to subtract, in thought, the very least we can from these multitudes, must not that which is subtracted, too, be a multitude and not one, if in fact it doesn’t partake of the one?”—“Necessarily.”—“So always, as we examine in this way its nature, itself by itself, different from the form, won’t as much of it as we ever see be unlimited in multitude?”—“Absolutely.”

[d] “Furthermore, whenever each part comes to be one part, the parts then have a limit in relation to each other and in relation to the whole, and the whole has a limit in relation to the parts.”—“Quite so.”—“Accordingly, it follows for things other than the one that from the one and themselves gaining communion with each other, as it seems, something different comes to be in them, which affords a limit for them in relation to each other; but their own nature, by themselves, affords unlimitedness.”—“Apparently.”—“In this way, indeed, things other than the one, taken both as wholes and part by part, both are unlimited and partake of a limit.”—“Certainly.”

[e] “Well, aren’t they both like and unlike each other and themselves?”—“In what way?”—“On the one hand, insofar as they are all unlimited by their own nature, they would in this way have a property the same.”—“Certainly.”—“Furthermore, insofar as they all partake of a limit, in this way, too, they would all have a property the same.”—“Doubtless.”—“On the other hand, insofar as they are both limited and unlimited, they have
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these properties, which are opposite to each other.”—“Yes.”—“And opposite properties are as unlike as possible.”—“To be sure.”—“So in respect of either property they would be like themselves and each other, but in respect of both properties they would be utterly opposite and unlike both themselves and each other.”—“It looks that way.”—“Thus the others would be both like and unlike themselves and each other.”—“Just so.”

“And indeed we will have no further trouble in finding that things other than the one are both the same as and different from each other, both in motion and at rest, and have all the opposite properties, since in fact they [b] were shown to have those we mentioned.”—“You’re right.”

“Well, then, suppose we now concede those results as evident and examine again, if one is: Are things other than the one also not so, or only so?”—“Of course.”—“Let’s say from the beginning, what properties things other than the one must have, if one is.”—“Yes, let’s do.”—“Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others separate from the one?”—“Why?”—“Because surely there is not something else in addition to them [c] that is both other than the one and other than the others; for all things have been mentioned, once the one and the others are mentioned.”—“Yes, all things.”—“So there is no further thing, different from them, in which same thing the one and the others could be.”—“No, there isn’t.”—“So the one and the others are never in the same thing.”—“It seems not.”—“So they are separate?”—“Yes.”

“Furthermore, we say that what is really one doesn’t have parts.”—“Obviously not.”—“So the one could not be in the others as a whole, nor could parts of it be in them, if it is separate from the others and doesn’t have parts.”—“Obviously not.”—“So the others could in no way partake [d] of the one, if they partake neither by getting some part of it nor by getting it as a whole.”—“It seems not.”—“In no way, then, are the others one, nor do they have any oneness in them.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”

“So the others aren’t many either; for each of them would be one part of a whole, if they were many. But as it is, things other than the one are neither one nor many nor a whole nor parts, since they in no way partake of the one.”—“That’s right.”—“Therefore, the others are not themselves two or three, nor are two or three in them, if in fact they are entirely [e] deprived of the one.”—“Just so.”

“So the others aren’t themselves like and unlike the one, and likeness and unlikeness aren’t in them. For if they were themselves like and unlike, or had likeness and unlikeness in them, things other than the one would surely have in themselves two forms opposite to each other.”—“Apparently.”—“But it was impossible for things that couldn’t partake even of one to partake of any two.”—“Impossible.”—“So the others are neither like nor unlike nor both. If they were like or unlike, they would partake
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of one of the two forms, and if they were both, they would partake of two opposite forms. But these alternatives were shown to be impossible.”—“True.”

“So they are neither the same nor different, neither in motion nor at rest, neither coming to be nor ceasing to be, neither greater nor less nor equal. Nor do they have any other such properties. For if the others submit to having any such property, they will partake of one and two and three and odd and even, of which it was shown they could not partake, since [b] they are in every way entirely deprived of the one.”—“Very true.”

“Thus if one is, the one is all things and is not even one, both in relation to itself and, likewise, in relation to the others.”
¹⁷
“Exactly.”

“So far so good. But must we not next examine what the consequences must be, if the one is not?”—“Yes, we must.”—“What, then, would this hypothesis be: ‘if one is not’? Does it differ at all from this hypothesis: ‘if not-one is not’?”—“Of course it differs.”—“Does it merely differ, or is saying ‘if not-one is not’ the complete opposite of saying, ‘if one is not’?”—[c] “The complete opposite.”—“What if someone were to say, ‘if largeness is not’ or ‘if smallness is not’ or anything else like that, would it be clear in each case that what he is saying is not is something different?”—“Certainly.”—“So now, too, whenever he says, ‘if one is not,’ isn’t it clear that what he says is not is different from the others, and don’t we recognize what he means?”—“We do.”—“So he speaks of something, in the first place, knowable, and in the second, different from the others, whenever [d] he says ‘one,’ whether he attaches being or not-being to it; for we still know what thing is said not to be, and that it is different from the others. Isn’t that so?”—“Necessarily.”

“Then we must state from the beginning as follows what must be the case, if one is not. First, as it seems, this must be so for it, that there is knowledge of it; otherwise we don’t even know what is meant when someone says, ‘if one is not’.”—“True.”—“And it must be the case that the others are different from it – or else it isn’t said to be different from them?”—“Certainly.”—“Therefore difference in kind pertains to it in addition [e] to knowledge. For someone doesn’t speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says that the one is different from the others, but of
that
thing’s difference in kind.”—“Apparently.”

“Furthermore, the one that is not partakes of
that
and of
something
,
this
,
to this
,
these
, and so on; for the one could not be mentioned, nor could things be different from the one, nor could anything belong to it or be of it, nor could it be said to be anything, unless it had a share of
something
and the rest.”—“That’s right.”—“The one can’t
be
, if in fact it is not, but nothing prevents it from partaking of many things. Indeed, it’s even
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necessary, if in fact it’s that one and not another that is not. If, however, neither the one nor
that
is not to be, but the account is about something else, we shouldn’t even utter a sound. But if that one and not another is posited not to be, it must have a share of
that
and of many other things.”—“Quite certainly.”