Complete Works (92 page)
“Let us then say this – and also that, as it seems, whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.”—“Very true.”
1
. Lit., “the things that are.”
2
. I.e., the all (cf. 128a8–b1).
3
. In English we normally speak of a hypothesis
that
something is the case. Instead, Zeno here, and later Socrates and Parmenides, regularly place the content of a hypothesis within an “if” clause, ready for us to draw out its implications and consequences: e.g., “if the all is one, then … ,” or “if the all is many, then… .”
4
. According to the usage of this dialogue, something is “itself by itself,” first, if it is separate from other things or is considered on its own, apart from other things. When the phrase is construed in this way, “by itself” means “apart, on its own.” Second, something is “itself by itself,” if it is itself responsible for its own proper being, independently of other things. When the phrase is understood in this way, “by itself” means “in virtue of, or because of, itself.” Both of these meanings should be kept in mind whenever this phrase recurs in the translation.
5
. In this dialogue Plato uses the expression
to hen
in several ways. It is variously translated as “the one,” “oneness,” and “one” depending on the context.
6
. In this dialogue Plato uses three different abstract expressions to specify these entities, two of which occur here:
genos
(a term restricted to the part of the dialogue preceding the “Deductions”), rendered as “kind,” and
eidos
, rendered as “form.” Later he will use a third term,
idea
, rendered as “character.”
7
. Removing the brackets in a10–11.
8
. Alternatively: “If you look at them all in the same way with the mind’s eye, won’t some one large again appear, by which all these appear large?”
9
. Alternatively: “But, Parmenides, maybe each of the forms is a thought of these things.”
10
. Alternatively: “or that, although they are thoughts, they are not thought?”
11
. Removing the brackets in e1.
12
. The Greek word is
dialegesthai
, which could instead be translated as “discourse,” or untechnically as “conversation.”
13
. Alternatively: “if [things] are many,” or “if there are many.”
14
. Ibycus frg. 6 (Page 1962). Ibycus of Rhegium (sixth century
B.C.
) was best known for his love poems.
15
. The hypothesis could also be rendered “if one is.” But cf. Parmenides’ statement above at 137b.
16
. The word translated here and below as “fraction” is elsewhere translated as “part.”
17
. Alternatively, accepting a plausible emendation at b3: “Thus if one is, the one is all things and is not even one, both in relation to itself and in relation to the others, and likewise for the others.” With this emended text, the sentence describes the contents of all four deductions, instead of only the first two.
18
. Dropping the supplement in 162a8 and removing the brackets in b2.
19
. Plato’s word here refers specifically to painting that aims at the illusion of volume through the contrast of light and shadow.
Translated by Dorothea Frede.
Scholars universally agree that this is one of Plato’s last works, along with at
least
Laws
(about which we have independent testimony that it was a work of
his old age), plus
Sophist
and
Statesman
. It was written after
Phaedo, Republic,
and
Phaedrus,
and also after
Parmenides
and
Theaetetus
. In those
other latest works (as well as
Timaeus
and
Critias,
whatever their place in the
order of composition may have been), the principal speaker who directs the discussion’s
agenda is not Socrates, but the Athenian visitor (
Laws
), or the visitor
from Elea (
Sophist
and
Statesman
), or Timaeus or Critias themselves. Indeed,
although he participates actively in the first part of
Parmenides,
Socrates is already made to yield center stage there to the dialogue’s namesake—
Parmenides calls the tunes. Here, however, Socrates is again fully in
charge. Naturally enough: the topic is again one we readily associate with Socrates
in Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues, as well as in
Phaedo, Republic,
and
Phaedrus
: what is ‘the human good’? how will a human being lead the best
life possible? Yet this is a Socrates very sure of his ground, ready to expound
at length difficult metaphysical doctrines, and possessed of a whole theory
about the ingredients of the best life and their proper ordering. He pursues the
discussion much more in the manner of the Visitor of
Sophist
or
Statesman
than in his own manner in either the ‘Socratic’ dialogues or the
Republic
—
though his fellow discussant is much more ready to throw up opposition to his
ideas than the Visitor’s are in
Sophist
and
Statesman
.
We pick up the thread
in mediis rebus
. In the presence of a company of
young men, Socrates has been disputing with one of them, Philebus, about
what constitutes the good in human life. Is it pleasure, as Philebus had maintained,
or knowledge—Socrates’ candidate? (We know nothing of Philebus,
apart from this dialogue: his name means “youth lover” and so pleasure seeker,
and he is presented as himself an attractive young man. He may be purely fictional.)
They had ended at loggerheads. Now another young man, Protarchus,
takes over Philebus’ side. (He is addressed at 19b as “son of Callias,” the very
rich Athenian said in
Apology
20a to have spent more than anyone else on
the sophists, and at 58a–b he seems to speak as a respectful admirer of Gorgias.) The discussion now takes a new tack. Socrates will argue, not that the good in
human life is knowledge (not pleasure), but that it is some third thing, in fact
the principle for the proper mixture of knowledge and pleasure—both together—
within a life. Knowledge, he will argue, though not the good itself, is
vastly closer and more akin to it than pleasure is. Thus knowledge wins second
prize in the contest, coming far ahead of pleasure in the final accounting.
Socrates first insists that neither pleasure nor knowledge is a simple unity;
there are significantly different varieties of each—different ways of being a pleasure
or an instance of knowledge—which must be examined first before one
can determine the value of pleasure and knowledge, and so resolve the question
of their respective places in the best life. This leads to a lengthy defense of the
basic philosophical method of looking to unity-in-plurality in coming to understand
the nature of anything and to a metaphysical division (not easy to understand)
of ‘everything that actually exists now in the universe’ into four basic
categories: the ‘unlimited’, ‘limit’, the ‘mixture’ of these two, and the ‘cause’ of
the mixture. These methodological and metaphysical passages should be studied
alongside the
Sophist’
s theories about being and not being, and the method of
division exemplified and discussed in
Sophist
and
Statesman
. There follows a
delineation and examination of various genera of pleasure and then of knowledge,
including a controversial discussion of some pleasures as ‘false’ ones. Finally,
we reach the ‘mixed’ life and its ordering principle.
The dialogue ends, as it began,
in mediis rebus
: Protarchus is not ready to
let Socrates off; more points require to be dealt with. But which ones? That is
left for the reader to ponder.
J.M.C.
S
OCRATES
: Well, then, Protarchus, consider just what the thesis is that
[11]
you are now taking over from Philebus—and what
our
thesis is that you are going to argue against, if you find that you do not agree with it. Shall [b] we summarize them both?
P
ROTARCHUS
: Yes, let’s do that.
S
OCRATES
: Philebus holds that what is good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves, to be pleased and delighted, and whatever else goes together with that kind of thing. We contend that not these, but knowing, understanding, and remembering, and what belongs with them, right opinion and true calculations, are better than pleasure and more agreeable to all [c] who can attain them; those who can, get the maximum benefit possible from having them, both those now alive and future generations. Isn’t that how we present our respective positions, Philebus?
P
HILEBUS
: Absolutely, Socrates.
S
OCRATES
: Do you agree, Protarchus, to take over this thesis that’s now offered you?
P
ROTARCHUS
: I am afraid I have to. Fair Philebus has given up on us.
S
OCRATES
: So we must do everything possible to get through somehow to the truth about these matters?
P
ROTARCHUS
: We certainly must. [d]
S
OCRATES
: Come on, then. Here is a further point we need to agree on.
P
ROTARCHUS
: What is that?
S
OCRATES
: That each of us will be trying to prove some possession or state of the soul to be the one that can render life happy for all human beings. Isn’t that so?
P
ROTARCHUS
: Quite so.
S
OCRATES
: You, that it is pleasure; we, that it is knowledge?
P
ROTARCHUS
: That is so.
S
OCRATES
: What if it should turn out that there is another possession, [e] better than either of them? Would the result not be that, if it turns out to be more closely related to pleasure, we will both lose out against a life
[12]
that firmly possesses that, but the life of pleasure will defeat the life of knowledge?
P
ROTARCHUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: And if it is closer to knowledge, then knowledge wins over pleasure, and pleasure loses? Do you accept this as agreed?
P
ROTARCHUS
: It seems agreeable to me.
S
OCRATES
: But also to Philebus? Philebus, what do you say?
P
HILEBUS
: To my mind pleasure wins and always will win, no matter what. But you must see for yourself, Protarchus.
P
ROTARCHUS
: But now you have handed over the argument to us, Philebus, you can no longer control the agreements we make with Socrates nor our disagreements.
[b] P
HILEBUS
: You are right. I absolve myself of all responsibility and now call the goddess herself as my witness.
P
ROTARCHUS
: We will be your witnesses, too,—that you did say what you are now saying. As to what follows, Socrates, let us go ahead and try to push through to a conclusion, with Philebus’ consent or not.
S
OCRATES
: We must do our best, making our start with the goddess herself—this fellow claims that though she is called Aphrodite her truest name is pleasure.
P
ROTARCHUS
: Certainly.
[c] S
OCRATES
: I always feel a more than human dread over what names to use for the gods—it surpasses the greatest fear.
1
So now I address Aphrodite by whatever title pleases her. But as to pleasure, I know that it is complex and, just as I said, we must make it our starting point and consider carefully what sort of nature it has. If one just goes by the name it is one single thing, but in fact it comes in many forms that are in some way even quite unlike each other. Think about it: we say that a debauched person gets [d] pleasure, as well as that a sober-minded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety. Again, we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and hopes, gets pleasure, but likewise a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom. But surely anyone who said in either case that these pleasures are like one another would rightly be regarded as a fool.
P
ROTARCHUS
: Well, yes, Socrates—the pleasures come from opposite things. But
they
are not at all opposed to one another. For how could pleasure not be, of all things, most like pleasure? How could that thing [e] not be most like itself?
S
OCRATES
: Just as color is most like color! Really, you surprise me: Colors certainly won’t differ insofar as every one of them is a color; but we all know that black is not only different from white but is in fact its very opposite. And shape is most like shape in the same way. For shape is all one in genus, but some of its parts are absolutely opposite to one another,
[13]
and others differ in innumerable ways. And we will discover many other such cases. So don’t rely on this argument which makes a unity of all the things that are most opposed. I am afraid we will find there are some pleasures that are contrary to others.
P
ROTARCHUS
: Maybe so. But how will this harm our thesis?
S
OCRATES
: Because you call these unlike things, we will say, by a different name. For you say that all pleasant things are
good
. Now, no one contends that pleasant things are not pleasant. But while most of them are bad but [b] some good, as we hold, you nevertheless call them all good, even though you would admit that they are unlike one another if someone pressed the point. What is the common element in the good and bad pleasures that allows you to call them all good?