Confronting the Colonies (20 page)

The 1960s were an opportune moment for the JIC to reflect upon its own assessments. The committee's membership was changing and there was a broader Whitehall consideration of intelligence requirements during a period of relative Cold War détente.
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Certain officials feared
that, when compared to the American system, JIS personnel were too tied to their parent departments. This caused potential for intelligence assessments based on low-level interdepartmental consensus rather than independent thinking.
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In a compromise between the British and American systems, the JIS was strengthened in 1965 to involve longer-term membership, greater use of intelligence professionals, secondment of certain members to the Cabinet Office and a stronger JIS chairman. Similarly the Heads of Sections were also enhanced. They were renamed Current Intelligence Groups, their output was reformed to ensure readability for senior consumers and the chairman acquired full-time responsibility for the oversight of current intelligence. Organised around a range of geographical or functional divisions, membership of Current Intelligence Groups was more flexible than that of the Heads of Sections. It was accordingly hoped that all Whitehall departments with something useful to contribute would be represented and it was inside these groups where some of the most vigorous debate took place.
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The JIC's functions remained broadly similar to those in 1957 and the intelligence agenda remained broad. The committee collated, appreciated and disseminated intelligence as required by the cabinet, cabinet committees, ministers or the chiefs of staff, as well as maintaining the ability to commission its own papers.

By the mid-1960s, the JIC's status had increased and the committee enjoyed better links with policy practitioners. Helped by the JIS and ad hoc working parties, strategic intelligence output became increasingly prolific and developed a more direct input into policymaking with products reaching ‘very senior readers'.
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As such, the committee provided threat assessments that were used by civil servants to draw up recommendations for ministers. The JIC did not get directly involved with policymaking but did walk an increasingly fine line between objective assessment and policy recommendation. This was especially true of counterinsurgency specific policy. In addition, the JIC chairman regularly attended high profile cabinet committee meetings, such as those of the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) committee. The JIC now enjoyed a direct link with policymakers. As a result of this higher profile however, the central intelligence machinery increasingly became caught up in debates between the various Whitehall departments. Increased influence and relevance was a double-edged sword: it left intelligence vulnerable to political manipulation.

As had happened in Cyprus less than a decade earlier, an escalating insurgency left the Adeni intelligence requirements beyond the capabilities of local command. Once this became apparent, the JIC intervened in its capacity of keeping ‘intelligence as a whole' at home and overseas under review. Through having specific jurisdiction regarding the organisation of intelligence, the JIC particularly emphasised reforming the regional intelligence assessment and dissemination system. This included overseeing the appointment of key personnel. During these years, the committee enjoyed increased confidence and assertiveness in attempting to exercise management of overseas intelligence more directly, perhaps inspired by chairman Bernard Burrows who had been a former political resident in the Persian Gulf and thus possessed a natural interest in the region. A Colonial Office official appropriately summed up the JIC's role in late 1965 as ‘the body with final responsibility for reviewing the adequacy of our intelligence arrangements'.
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In practice, however, whilst this episode represents the high point of attempts to reform intelligence overseas during an insurgency, the committee continued to lack the authority to implement effective reform.

JIC members had been critical of the regional intelligence organisation long before the declaration of emergency regulations. As far back as 1959, the committee bemoaned local weaknesses in intelligence evaluation. Little progress was made, however. By March 1964 therefore, members soon realised that the intelligence system ‘might not be adequate', causing the JIC to intervene from London. Expressing his ‘considerable concern', Bernard Burrows recommended the creation of a JIC working party to urgently examine the situation. Reliant on accurate and timely intelligence, the chiefs of staff agreed. They lamented that ‘the intelligence resources [as a whole] in Aden were not adequate for the command structure'. This prompted Burrows, along with Duncan Sandys, then colonial secretary, to visit the area and investigate the intelligence organisation.
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JIC meetings played host to a number of debates about rebuilding Aden Special Branch after it had almost been wiped out by terrorism. Such discussion was, however, generally limited to issues of senior personnel and constitutional control as opposed to the mechanics of Special
Branch. The latter remained the preserve of MI5. Instead, the JIC's interests primarily lay in intelligence organisation, assessment and dissemination. Moreover, both the intelligence and policy communities consistently highlighted these aspects as being most in need of reform.
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There were a number of structural deficiencies hampering effective intelligence assessment and dissemination in Aden. Firstly, failing to learn from Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, there was an initial lack of overall management or coordination of intelligence in the form of a director or chief of intelligence. Secondly, ten separate intelligence agencies reflected the complex political set-up. The high commissioner, the police and the armed forces all had their own intelligence gathering organisations, whilst local federal rulers refused to give active intelligence products to a British central collating point.
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Consequently collation, assessment and dissemination proved difficult. Thirdly, the dual nature of intelligence assessment created a duplication of resources. The Local Intelligence Committee in Aden reported to the high commissioner, whereas the JIC (Middle East), which covered the same area, reported to the local commander-in-chief. As a result the various consumers received different intelligence assessments, which occasionally differed in conclusion or emphasis. This hampered military-political coordination. Consistent with the JIC's managerial and oversight remit, reforming the relationship between the LIC and the JIC(ME) was the committee's first priority.

In early 1964 the JIC attempted reform. They sought to reduce confusion between the functions of the two bodies and to increase the flow of intelligence from the theatre to both the regional headquarters and London.
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Burrows flew out to Aden to talk with key figures on the ground. Disaster almost struck en route and, out of the Whitehall bubble, the JIC chairman was close to being dragged into the dangerous realities of the vicious conflict. Not long into the flight, Burrows was informed by the pilot that a bomb was on board. It proved a false alarm, but Burrows bravely insisted that the plane should carry on to Libya where it was refuelling, rather than turn back to London.
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On his return, Burrows emphasised the problem of the ‘dual nature of the intelligence organisation' in Aden. This had led to confusion and ultimately created weaknesses in assessment and dissemination. To alleviate the situation, Burrows advocated the amalgamation of the LIC and the JIC(ME) as far as Aden, the FSA and Yemen were concerned. The
latter would no longer be charged with responsibility for that area. Burrows further recommended that the JIC(ME) chairman be added to LIC membership, and that the LIC should report to all three relevant parties: the high commissioner, the commander-in-chief and the JIC in London through military channels. This would ensure that all relevant information reached all parties concerned, thereby enhancing the flow of intelligence from the periphery to the centre. Indeed, the JIC's increasing access to ministers is illustrated by Burrows's attendance at a Defence and Oversea Policy Committee meeting in mid-May, where ministers accepted the JIC proposals. Consequently, the JIC coordinated reform and urged departments to ‘hasten their implementation'.
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Organisational changes alone, however, were not deemed sufficient to satisfactorily remedy the problems. Therefore, on the recommendations of its working party (and in consultation with the security intelligence adviser seconded from MI5), the JIC also strengthened the LIC and demanded it improve its output. In terms of membership, the JIC concluded that the chairman should be a senior member of the high commissioner's staff with direct access to the high commissioner himself. It also recommended upgrading the post of ‘chief intelligence officer' to ‘chief of intelligence' and aimed to appoint a full-time secretary to relieve him of administrative duties. This new title was designed to convey dynamism and emphasise his coordinating role. Such a role was vital in bringing together the various aspects of the local intelligence cycle and for enhancing how intelligence was assessed, disseminated and ultimately acted upon. Demonstrating the JIC's role in overseeing intelligence reform across the entire British imperial system, the working party compiled terms of reference for this new post. These were subsequently discussed in the full JIC committee and then with the high commissioner. He was to be immediately responsible to the LIC chairman and would advise on all matters of intelligence policy and intelligence organisation requiring coordination, as well as coordinating the activities and resources of all local intelligence organisations.
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On top of this, the JIC then proceeded to oversee the search for a suitable candidate. The committee liaised with the various departments involved and injected urgency into their discussions. Brigadier Tony Cowper, a previous chair of the JIC (Far East), was subsequently appointed in December 1964 and briefed by the JIC a month later.
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Finally, the JIC recommended that the LIC increase its output, including a
weekly intelligence summary to be used in weekly intelligence reviews. This had proved very useful for Cyprus. Summarising the JIC's role of intervention in intelligence matters, the committee informed Cowper that members ‘had gone to endless trouble to deal with both the personnel and the physical problems of the organisation and were still not entirely satisfied'.
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It was clearly a more hands-on approach.

Having scrutinised intelligence performance at the regional and colonial levels, the JIC then intervened deep into the heart of Adeni intelligence. The committee examined the Aden Intelligence Centre (AIC) and Federal Intelligence Committee (FIC). The AIC was tasked by the LIC to collect, collate and assess intelligence and was thus, in essence, its intelligence staff. However, it proved less than the sum of its parts, lacking accurate intelligence and effective assessment. It was understaffed, overcrowded and (demonstrating parallels with Malayan local intelligence) was engulfed in lamentable personal rivalries.
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The JIC was particularly concerned by the potential for local biases within the AIC. Accordingly, it decided that it needed strengthening as ‘the focal point of intelligence collecting and assessing under the Chief of Intelligence'. The JIC therefore recommended adding a desk officer, who specialised in Yemen, to the ranks of the AIC (and who would also serve on the Local Intelligence Committee), as well as a military intelligence officer, an Arab intelligence officer and an administrative assistant. Not only was this intended to bolster the AIC, but the addition of specialist personnel would have helped filter out the local biases that frustrated the committee. Finally, it was suggested that the AIC needed new premises as its current offices, which were shared with Special Branch, were overcrowded.
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Ultimately, these reforms aimed to strengthen the assessment and coordination of intelligence and to ensure that both political and military consumers were adequately served.

Unsurprisingly, strengthening the Local Intelligence Committee and giving it sole responsibility for assessments on Aden proved popular with the Colonial Office. Colonial officials not only deemed the reforms essential due to the ‘seriousness of the threat to our position in Aden', but optimistically praised how they had led to a ‘marked improvement' in the collation and assessment of intelligence.
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The military was, however, perhaps more realistic in its initial assessment. The commander-in-chief (Middle East) cautioned it was too early to tell whether the reforms were ‘entirely satisfactory' and felt that gaps in intelligence remained.
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In fact, implementation of the reforms was painfully slow. They had little tangible impact on the deteriorating security situation, thereby demonstrating the JIC's lack of authority on the ground. By Christmas 1964, violence had increased and continued to rise throughout 1965, causing a second JIC working party to lament that despite some improvement, the intelligence organisation ‘still does not work smoothly'.
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Intelligence in Aden was particularly complicated to fix. The federal government intelligence structures existed in an uneasy relationship with the British-run system, resulting in what David French has described as a ‘machine of Byzantine complexity'.
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On top of this, the historian Clive Jones convincingly blames the lack of impact on incoherence in implementing the reforms. They were ‘introduced piecemeal, without conviction, and with the result being that officials in Aden doubted their efficacy'.
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Despite attempting to recommend reform, the committee lacked the executive authority to ensure coherent implementation—a problem amplified by the stubbornness of Trevaskis in resisting reform.