Confronting the Colonies (24 page)

This trend continued throughout the insurgency. In fact, shortly before withdrawal, the JIC had surprisingly become the most vocal body emphasising the Egyptian threat. For example, the JIS chairman, Alan Crick, grew concerned that departments had downplayed the threat of Egyptian intervention post-independence. Perhaps learning from the JIC's own initial underestimation of Nasser, Crick warned that British norms and constraints had been projected onto Nasser and analysis had thus underestimated the impact of factors such as prestige in outweighing economic disadvantages. The committee therefore concluded that Nasser would, in the last resort, intervene militarily.
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JIC intelligence assessments, however, went too far the other way—swinging from one side of the pendulum to the other as the conflict progressed. Demonstrating parallels with assessments of earlier insurgencies, once the central intelligence machinery decided that Egypt was directing violence, local agency was once again underplayed. From 1964, intelligence assessments propagated the idea of Egypt as a puppeteer and Adeni insurgents as Egyptian front organisations. Like earlier assessments of the impact of the Cold War on Malaya and Cyprus, such output lacked nuance and ended up bending local developments into a broader narrative. For example, a 1966 intelligence assessment on the outlook for South Arabia and the broader region concluded simply that there would be intense political manoeuvring for influence after the British withdrawal and that the internal groups would be directed by external actors (in this case Egypt and Saudi Arabia).
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Just as intelligence appreciations of Malaya and Cyprus were distorted by the Cold War gaze, assessments of South Arabia were dangerously warped by the fixation on Nasser. Intelligence ultimately neglected the role of local ideology and internal factors that may have inspired discontent with British imperial rule. This could well illustrate an unwillingness of the metropolis to acknowledge flaws in the imperial model or the legitimacy of local complaints. Such a narrative could also have been driven by broader cultural factors. Spencer Mawby, for example, has drawn fascinating connections between this ‘tendency to rob local actors of agency and to deny the significance of ideological commitments' and the writings of Edward Said on Orientalism.
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A key difference between Aden and the earlier insurgencies in Malaya and Cyprus, however, was that of the Cold War. In the late 1940s and 1950s, intelligence assessments were quick to link any violence to broader Soviet designs. By the mid-1960s, however, the JIC was more dismissive of the role of communism. Instead, the committee preferred to propagate the idea that Nasser's fiery brand of pan-Arab nationalism was more influential, and even downplayed the role of ideology altogether. This, as Mawby rightly points out, impeded policymakers' ability to consider the emergence of a Marxist-Leninist government which ultimately acceded to power in the new South Yemen shortly after British withdrawal.
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Although the external framework or narrative had clearly changed, the central flaw in intelligence assessment remained.

In 1964 the new Labour Government renewed the Conservative pledge to grant independence to the FSA by 1968 but maintain the military base in Aden. The 1966 Defence White Paper, announcing that Britain would withdraw from the base and end all defence commitments came, therefore, as an unwelcome surprise to the local rulers. It had severe ramifications for security until South Arabian independence on 30 November 1967.
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Strategic intelligence assessments played a direct role in policy formulation and provide an interesting example of the intelligence community providing objective analysis, which was then used responsibly by policymakers.

The JIC provided the policy community with intelligence assessments on both the content and timing of the White Paper. Regarding the
former, the JIC warned its consumers in December 1965 of the potentially dangerous ramifications. The committee considered the White Paper's impact on Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen. It warned that Nasser would present Britain's withdrawal as a defeat for British policy. He would claim it was Egyptian pressure that forced the British out. Accordingly, the JIC correctly predicted that ‘the Egyptians will be tempted to continue and even increase subversion and terrorism in the Federation until independence in order to demonstrate that the British are being forced to withdraw as a result of persistent nationalist pressures'. The JIC did, however, note that the extent to which withdrawal would be portrayed as a defeat of British policy depended not only on the White Paper but also on the progress of Egyptian forces in Yemen.
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Until the start of 1966, the Republican forces were completely dependent on the Egyptians. The war was proving a significant drain on Nasser's resources and by the middle of the decade some 50,000 Egyptians were bogged down in the Yemeni stalemate. Accordingly, the war was becoming increasingly unpopular in Egypt. In August 1965, Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed the Jeddah agreement, in which the leaders of both countries pledged to end the war. Nasser promised to withdraw from the Yemen and the fighting calmed to an extent. Full Egyptian withdrawal, however, did not take place during 1966 as planned. A major factor in this was the British announcement that its forces would leave South Arabia by 1968, thereby causing Nasser to abandon plans for withdrawal and seek to establish control of South Arabia. The move provoked Nasser to devise a new strategy involving the redeployment of a sizable Egyptian force closer to the southern border with the FSA.
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The British decision to withdraw could therefore be seen as an unintended gift to the old enemy, Nasser. It granted him the opportunity to claim a victory that had eluded him on the battlefield. The JIC had warned policymakers of this.

Regarding other security ramifications, the JIC feared a ‘grave effect' including loss of morale and efficiency amongst the police and the Federal Regular Army. Intelligence accurately predicted that it would become ‘more difficult, perhaps impossible, to obtain Arab co-operation in collecting intelligence in Aden'.
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Harmful political consequences, however, were softened at the insistence of the Colonial Office. To balance the negatives, the JIC also suggested that the White Paper could provide an incentive for the local FSA rulers to work together to create
a viable state.
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Given that the FSA was a tenuous construction, this was wishful thinking and reflects Colonial Office pressure on the committee to paint a rosier picture than the evidence (and experience) suggested. Colonial Office optimism was perhaps vindicated to an extent considering that there was no very dramatic collapse of the political situation following February 1966. Moreover, the difficulties in political negotiations long preceded the tenure of the Labour government in Britain. According to Mawby, notions that the White Paper intensified the insurgency should be treated with caution. It was instead part of a downward trend in the political and security situation.
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With hindsight, this may well have been the case, but the JIC apparently believed that the White Paper would have had a significant impact in itself.

The JIC also assessed the threat posed by the timing of the White Paper announcement, which was made in February 1966. The committee was asked to consider the prospect of an early announcement. Regarding local internal factors, the JIC assessed that the advantages of an early statement lay in the political domain. The potential reduction in uncertainty would aid political and constitutional negotiations (albeit at the expense of future British influence). By contrast, the JIC felt an early announcement would be disadvantageous in the security domain. The committee warned that ‘the earlier the announcement is made the more difficult it will be to build up an effective security organisation, and the greater will be the problems of maintaining law and order in Aden in the interim period'.
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On balance, and after input from Robert Blaikley, the Colonial Office representative on the JIC, the committee appeared to agree that an early announcement ‘would help the position in South Arabia'.
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Demonstrating the role of strategic intelligence assessment, the JIC also placed the White Paper in the bigger picture and examined broader regional implications. This led to quite different conclusions from those following examination of the internal situation alone. By contrast, the JIC argued that there were a number of factors which ‘call[ed] for varying degrees of delay' regarding British regional interests. These included the need to secure the agreement of Persian Gulf rulers regarding the establishment of additional military facilities in the Gulf and the need for withdrawal not to be perceived as a defeat to Egypt.
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Indicating the work of a responsible intelligence organisation, the JIC's role was one of objectivity and the committee left policymakers to ‘give
the appropriate political weight to the conflicting considerations'.
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Consequently, the JIC's assessments directly impacted upon policy discussions. There was however much disagreement within Whitehall. Foreign Office officials hoped to defer any announcement, whilst their Colonial Office counterparts warned that delay would undermine local confidence in Britain.
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Based on JIC conclusions, policy officials posited that intelligence had raised doubts about the benefits of an early announcement. Consequently they re-evaluated the balance between an early declaration (to aid constitutional negotiations) and a later one (by which time the UAR situation would have become clearer).
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Similarly, the Colonial Office drew on JIC conclusions a month later but presented a more positive outlook of the impact solely on South Arabia of an early announcement. Echoing the JIC, the Colonial Office acknowledged that Britain needed to give ‘concrete evidence' of its intention to keep an adequate military presence in the region at the same time as the announcement.
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In fact, the decision to move aircraft to the Persian Gulf in order to give a ‘clear physical sign' of the British commitment directly quoted the JIC assessment.
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Almost immediately after the Yemeni coup, local authorities and certain ministers bombarded policymakers in Whitehall with requests for covert action. These ranged from military support for friendly tribes on the South Arabian frontier to direct intervention in the Yemeni civil war. They even extended to the assassination of Egyptian intelligence officers. Proponents of such measures included local colonial officials such as Aden Governor Charles Johnston and High Commissioner Kennedy Trevaskis who were under pressure from local tribal rulers for British support against territorial incursions from the north. These views were echoed by Conservative ministers in London including Billy McLean. McLean was member of parliament for Inverness but had spent time with the Royalists and acted as an advisor to mercenaries operating in the region. A charming adventurer, he was no stranger to covert operations and was a veteran of Britain's wartime Special Operations Executive—notably working with partisans against the Germans in Albania.
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Another minister sharing these views was Julian Amery, the minister for aviation. Like McLean, Amery had a romantic vision of empire and naturally supported the Royalist movement. Other ministers included Enoch Powell, minister for health; Duncan Sandys, secretary of state for commonwealth relations and also for the colonies; and Peter Thorneycroft, minister of (and later secretary of state for) defence.

With a history of clandestine operations over the Yemeni border dating back to the 1950s, Britain initially authorised limited covert action. This was somewhat extended in the summer of 1964. However, local officials and the aforementioned politicians pressed for deeper, more aggressive and more direct intervention throughout. Indeed, Trevaskis expressed continued frustration from the very outbreak of the violence that local recommendations were not being sanctioned by London. He insisted that lack of initial implementation necessitated stronger, more coercive and more repressive measures.
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These old Tory imperialists, according to former Foreign Office official Christopher Gandy, ‘apparently believed that if only all the King's horses and all the King's men could push hard enough they could put Humpty Dumpty together again and restore the Imamate, provided only that they were not held back by that awkward squad of wets and pussy-footers in the Foreign Office'.
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In light of the various proposals coming from partisan parties, objective intelligence assessments were vital. It fell to interdepartmental intelligence to help policymakers determine the situation on the ground, to establish the levels of British intervention required, to assess the merits of covert action and to help ensure that this potentially risky strategy was used cautiously.

Covert action is a perilous approach to policy and proposals regarding Yemen became potentially dangerous as they grew in scope, ambition and directness. Using Loch Johnson's influential scale to define covert action, the proposals can be seen as ‘high risk options' given that they involved arms supplies. However, they arguably had the potential to develop into ‘extreme options' in the form of a major secret war.
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Before sanctioning covert action, it is therefore vital that the intelligence services are able to conduct an objective assessment of the likely risks and gains, and of the benefits and limitations. This is important in ensuring that covert action is necessary and if so that it is conducted as responsibly as possible. For example, Gregory Treverton, a member of the first Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has warned about
unintended consequences of covert action, often caused by unchecked escalation.
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More recently, former CIA operations officer William Daugherty has argued that it is important to assess ‘the odds of achieving policy goals, chances of compromise versus value objectives to be gained, and value of the objective versus the cost in money, resources and, perhaps, lives expended to achieve the objective'.
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Indeed British journalist Anthony Verrier wrote at the end of the conflict that covert action was very much a double-edged sword with inherent risks involved. Whilst, ‘it helped secure the demise of Nasser in Yemen', aggressive intervention, he argued, undermined South Arabian security.
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Intelligence assessments were therefore important in ensuring the right balance could be met.