Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon (61 page)

In addition to these researchers, I’m greatly indebted to David Albright at the Institute for Science and International Security, who helped not only me but also Symantec and Ralph Langner with understanding Stuxnet’s effects on Natanz and the enrichment process. Both he and Olli Heinonen, formerly of the IAEA and now a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, provided great insight into the Iranian nuclear program in general and to the enrichment process at Natanz in particular.

In addition, I’d like to thank Corey Hinderstein, now with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, for providing me with her firsthand memories of the press conference where Natanz was first exposed and her work uncovering the infamous satellite images.

I’d also like to thank Dale Peterson, Perry Pederson, Joe Weiss, and Mike Assante for helping me understand the wider effects of Stuxnet and
weapons like it on critical infrastructure. Dale and Perry were especially helpful in reading the chapter on industrial control systems and providing feedback.

Similarly, I’d like to thank Jason Healey and Marcus Sachs for providing background information about the early days of the government’s digital warfare program and to Jason for providing perspective on the implications of Stuxnet and Flame and where we go from here. I’d also like to thank Charlie Miller and Chaouki Bekrar for their frankness in discussing the zero-day market and helping me understand the motivations that drive this market.

In addition to all of these people, there are others who sat for interviews or read through chapters or parts of chapters to provide welcomed and helpful feedback. Some of them I have named here; many others have asked to remain anonymous.

One reader I’d like to thank in particular is Andrea Matwyshyn, a good and valued friend who has been supportive of my work and career for many years and who took some of these chapters with her to conferences and holidays to provide the feedback I needed in a timely manner. I’d also especially like to thank Cem Paya, another good friend and supporter of my work who took chapters on holiday to Turkey and even read various versions of chapters several times to ensure that the technical details were accurate and consistent.

This book on Stuxnet is the culmination of more than a decade of experience reporting on cybersecurity, hackers, and the security community, all of which helped sharpen my knowledge and understanding of these complex issues. I’d like to thank the many friends, family, and colleagues who have provided much support, inspiration, guidance, encouragement, good editing, and a voice of reason over the years, including Richard Thieme, Dan Goodin, Elinor Mills, and Rob Lemos, as well as my
Wired
colleagues past and present—Chuck Squatriglia, Jim Merithew, Kevin Poulsen, Ryan Singel, and David Kravets. I’d also like to thank David Zetter and Mark Zetter for their enduring support and many good memories.