Death to Tyrants! (11 page)

Taylor's analysis, however, is debatable. First and most important, it does not take into account the (apparent) underlying operative dynamic in Athens at that time (i.e., how fear and disinformation affect behavior of individuals and thus of groups). Second, it ignores subsequent fervor for democracy described in Thucydides's text, including the uprising in the Piraeus (8.92) and the oath of the Athenian soldiers on Samos (8.75.2). Third, it ignores the decree of Demophantos and other texts that show strong support for democracy (e.g.,
ML
85, honoring the killers of Phrynichos and their accomplices).

22
On the demographic reality, see Munn (2000:138, 390n24). Munn suggests that 9,000–10,000 Athenians were killed or captured at Sicily and that two-thirds of that number were
thetes
. He also suggests that most of the remaining population of
thetes
was, after the disaster at Sicily, with the Ionian fleet and thus not in Athens. For Athenian demography between 431 and 395, see Strauss (1986: 70–86).

23
It should be noted that a revolutionary threshold above 5 does not necessarily indicate support for the regime. A person with a threshold of 6, for example, might oppose the regime, but nevertheless be quite timid and thus require a very large percentage (in this case, 60 percent) of the population to act in opposition before he does. And, on the other hand, a supporter of the regime could have a threshold lower than 5, if, for example, he is afraid that the regime is vulnerable, and would thus act with the opposition in the early stages of a revolt. Nevertheless, a person with a threshold above 5 would not act in opposition to the regime unless over half of the population has already done so. And such behavior is consistent with someone who supports the status quo—thus the general rule asserted (without argument) by Kuran (1991: 23).

24
Thuc. 8.92.2. The translation is slightly modified from the Loeb.

25
The meeting in the Pnyx wherein the Four Hundred were officially deposed took place after a devastating Athenian defeat at Eretria (Thuc. 8.95). Thucydides wrote (8.96.1) that, after that defeat (and subsequent revolt throughout Euboia, except Oreos), “there was greater consternation than ever before.”

26
Kuran (1989: 60; 1991: 20). In Kuran's model, each person's action is as significant as the action of any other individual. In reality, of course, that is not the case: a prominent person's act, in most circumstances, is more influential than the action of an obscure one. That important nuance does not invalidate the operative dynamic of Kuran's model: one need only to suppose that, should an influential individual join in a protest, an ordinary individual would consider that act to be equivalent to, say, the actions of two ordinary people. Granovetter (1978: 1428) comes close to this observation when he discusses the significance of “the effects of friendship and influence.”

27
The seminal early essay on threshold modeling is Granovetter (1978). Kuran (1989 and 1991), because his focus was high-stakes political revolution (whereas Granovetter's analysis was generic), introduced the important psychological element of preference falsification. That psychological element is important (inter alia) in accounting for the fact that people do not necessarily free ride in revolutionary situations (as would be expected, according to rational choice theory—see Olson [1965] for the classic formulation). Lohmann (1994) also employed threshold modeling in studying the fall of communism in East Germany. She criticizes Kuran's model as being “monotonic” (pp. 87–88): i.e., it suggests that the number of individuals engaged in anti-regime activity simply increases until it stops. Her analysis of the Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig (pp. 65–84), however, shows that the number of individuals protesting fluctuated: sometimes it was very high, sometimes significantly lower. Lohmann also downplays the role of radicals in protest movements, stressing instead the importance of “activist moderates.” Those later individuals, she asserts, provide more information to the whole public concerning the amount and nature of support for the protest (pp. 53–54). It is important to recognize the difference, however, between demonstrations or protests against a modern government and an armed rebellion against an ancient regime. First, in the latter case, radicals are essential—and even in modern protests against oppressive governments, activist moderates would not join if radicals have not already acted. Second, individuals who join in the armed rebellion against an ancient regime on one day likely would not go home the next day (as in modern demonstrations). Lohmann's objections thus do not invalidate Kuran's theory as applied to the armed uprising in Athens. And it is to be noted that Lohmann sought to combine her theory with Kuran's (pp. 54–55). For further reading on threshold models, see Kuran and Sunstein (1999); Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). For an overview on the modern study of revolutions, see Goldstone (2001). For a brief critique of the use of game theory to analyze collective behavior, see Granovetter (1978: 1433–35).

28
The restoration of the Dionysia in line 13 of the inscription is nearly universally accepted; see Wilson (2009: 1–16) for a discussion.

29
The sources on the identity of the assassins and their accomplices, as well as on other details, are difficult to reconcile: see
ML
85; Lykourg.
Leok
. 112–14; Lys. 13.71; the comments in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1981: 309–11); the comments in
ML
85. Further (indirect) evidence for the conclusion that the Athenians considered the assassination of Phrynichos to have been an important moment in their political history is found in the verdict pronounced against Archeptolemos and Antiphon ([Plut.]
X orat
. 834b). The verdict was delivered after the fall of the Four Hundred and before the reinstatement of the democracy—that is, during the regime of the Five Thousand (411); it concludes, “This sentence shall be inscribed upon a pillar of bronze and set up in the same place as the decrees concerning Phrynichos.”

30
The decree was certainly inscribed. Andokides,
Myst
. 95, wrote that the stele was placed “in front of the Bouleuterion.” Lykourgos,
Leok
. 124, wrote that the stele was “in the Bouleuterion.” Demosthenes (20.159) refers to “the stele of Demophantos,” but not its location.

31
The text for the decree of Demophantos: Andok.
Myst
. 96–98. The date for the decree is based on information provided in
ML
84, lines 1–3, where it is stated that Klegenes (Kleigenēs in Andokides's text) was secretary while Glaukippos was Archon (i.e., in 410–409) and that Aiantis, the tribe in prytany when the decree of Demophantos was promulgated, held the first prytany of that year.

32
Trans. MacDowell (1962: 134–35), slightly modified. For earlier scholarship on the decree of Demophantos, see Droysen (1873); Günzler (1907); Friedel (1937: 56–58); Ostwald (1955; 1986: 414–18); McGlew (1993: 185–87); Shear (2007; 2011: 71–75, 96–106, 136–41, and passim). MacDowell (1962: 134–36) provides a brief commentary on the decree. Each of these works is an important contribution. But none of them explains either how the oath would help defend the Athenian democracy or whether or not the oath actually did facilitate the Athenians' attempt to do so.

33
See Thuc. 6.54–59 and
Ath
.
Pol
. 18–19 for a narrative of Harmodios and Aristogeiton's act. The democrats' version of that assassination—what happened, why it happened, and its consequence—was challenged in the fifth century by citizens of a less democratic persuasion. Thucydides (1.20.2–3; 6.54.1) and Herodotos (6.123.2) explicitly challenge the popular and thus democratic version. The debate over the true history of the tyrannicides continued into the later fourth century: the author of the
Ath
.
Pol
. (18.5) states that “democrats” had one version, while “some” had another. For Athenian democrats' views of Harmodios and Aristogeiton, see Taylor (1981); Raaflaub (2003: 63–70); Ober (2005c).

34
It might appear as though the reference to tyranny (and thus tyrannicide) in the oath of Demophantos is anachronistic. But, as is well known, later fifth-century Athenians considered any nondemocratic regime to be a “tyranny,” and thus the assassination of any high-profile member of a nondemocratic regime would be an act of tyrannicide. Thucydides (6.60.1), for example, asserts that the Athenians were so frightened by the mutilation of the Herms (415) because “the whole thing seemed to them to have been done in connection with an oligarchic and tyrannical conspiracy.” And Andokides (
Myst
. 75) referred to the period of the Four Hundred's domination as “during the time of the tyrants.”

35
The earliest statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton were sculptured by Antenor in, according to Pliny the Elder (
NH
34.17), 509. Those statues were stolen by Xerxes's forces in 478 and returned to Athens by either Alexander the Great (Arr.
Anab
. 3.16.7–8 [referring to 331]; Arr.
Anab
. 7.19.2 [referring to 325/4]), or Antiochos I (Paus. 1.8.5), or Seleukos (Val. Max. 2.10,
ext
. 1). Very little can be said about them; see Taylor (1981: 34–37). A second pair of statues was made by Kritios and Nesiotes in 477/6 (
Marmor
Parium
, A, ep. 54 [
FGrH
239 A54, lines 70–71]); the earliest references to them are Ar.
Lys
. 631–35 and Ar.
Eccl
. 681–83. For this statue group, see esp. Brunnsåker (1971) and Taylor (1981: 33–50). See Figure 1 for a picture of a Roman copy of the Greek original. The earliest evidence for the Athenian tyrannicide cult is
Ath
.
Pol
. 58.1. The date for the foundation of this cult cannot be determined with any specificity beyond the obvious fact that it must antedate the composition of the
Ath
.
Pol
. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Athenians started the cult in the early to middle fifth century, perhaps soon after the foundation of the Kleisthenic democracy, perhaps after the erection of the Kritios and Nesiotes statue group, perhaps in the context of the promulgation of the “Prytaneion decree” (for which, see the next note).

36
IG
I
³
131 (ca. 440–432). On this decree—the “Prytaneion decree”—and its substance, see Taylor (1981: 10–12) with literature cited in the notes.

37
This speculation is based on the decree of Theozotides (Stroud 1971). Promulgated after the fall either of the Four Hundred or (more likely) of the Thirty, the decree provides for the sons of those Athenians who, “during the oligarchy, died a violent death helping the democracy.”

38
On the oath in Athenian political culture, see Cole (1996), Rhodes (2007), and the essays in Sommerstein and Fletcher (2007). The Athenians also used the oath as an instrument of imperial control. For the texts of such oaths, see Meiggs (1972: 579–82); for a discussion, see Bolmarcich (2007).

39
“Of themselves, the Athenians could not do so [sc., abrogate any of Solon's laws)] since they had bound themselves by great oaths that for ten years they would live under whatever laws Solon would enact” (Hdt. 1.29, trans. Grene, Chicago, 1987). Cf.
Ath
.
Pol
. 7.1: “they wrote up the laws on the
kyrbeis
and placed them in the Royal Stoa, and all swore to use them.”

In two publications, P. J. Rhodes (1993: 135; 2007: 18–22) has identified several examples where all the citizens of a polis took the same oath: Thera, late seventh century (
ML
5); Kyzikos, late sixth century (
Syll
.
³
4); Naupaktos, circa 500 (
ML
20); Teos and its colony Abdera, circa 480–450 (
SEG
xxxi 985); Erythrai, circa 450 (
ML
40); Chalkis, 446/5 (
ML
52); Megara, 424 (Thuc. 4.74.2–3); Thasos, 407/6 (
SEG
xxxviii 851); Kyrene, 400 (Diod. Sic. 14.34.3–6);
sympoliteia
of Euaimon and Arkadian Orchomenos, 378 (
IG
V 2, 343;
SdA
2, 297); Keos, 363/2 (
RO
39); Xanthus, 337 (
RO
78); Mytilene, 324 (
RO
85); Tegea, 324 (
RO
101); Tauric Chersonese, circa 300 (
Syll
.
³
360); Itanos in Crete, circa 300 (
Syll
.
³
526); Absorption of Magnesia-by-Sipylos into Smyrna, post-243 (
OGIS
229); Kos and Kalymna, end of third century (
SdA
3, no. 545). There are other instances of such mass public oaths not noted by Rhodes: Halieis, 424/3 (
IG
I
³
75); Selymbria, 407 (
ML
87). It is also possible, though unlikely, that all Athenians swore a mass public oath pursuant to the decree of Patrokleides in 405 (Andok.
Myst
. 76) and their surrender to the Spartans in 404 (Andok. 3.22). The most celebrated example of all mass public oaths is the amnesty oath that the Athenians swore after the fall of the Thirty (Andok.
Myst
. 90), discussed below.

40
On
τέλειος
, meaning “fully grown,” in the sense that the victim has a complete set of teeth, see Rosivach (1994: 91–93, 148–53).

41
Cole (1996: 230). See also Plescia (1970: 10) for movements that accompanied oath rituals.

42
Günzler (1907: 5) concluded that an individual swore the oath twice, once with his deme and once with his tribe. As Whitehead (1986: 109) notes, that is quite unlikely; he suggests that the oath was sworn at each tribe's tribal assembly.

43
Julia Shear (2007; 2011: 136–41) has argued that all Athenians, except for those away on campaign, swore the oath in the agora on 9 Elaphebolion, (probably) the day before the first day of the Dionysia. More recently, Wilson (2009) has argued that all Athenians swore the oath in the theater of Dionysos just before the tragic competitions and before the
dēmos
honored the assassins of Phrynichos.