Death to Tyrants! (12 page)

44
Hansen (1999: 105). Josiah Ober has recently argued (2008: 205–8) that each tribe had at least one theater wherein the members of its constituent demes could meet to conduct tribal business. Such a structure would have been ideal for the oath ceremony. For local theaters in Attica, see now Paga (2010).

45
The theater of Dionysos at Mounichia would have been a suitable location, both practically and symbolically, for swearing the oath: it was within the long walls, and thus the participants would not have been at risk of an attack from the Spartans stationed at Dekeleia; and it was there that, after the assassination of Phrynichos, the Athenians had met in order to coordinate their attack on the regime of the Four Hundred.

46
Chwe (2001: 13–16 and passim). Strictly speaking, Chwe notes only that common knowledge is required for individuals to coordinate. But his analysis certainly assumes that the substance of that common knowledge must be a credible commitment.

47
Chwe (2001: 20–22).

48
Chwe (2001: 30–33).

49
Chwe (2001: 27–29).

50
Chwe (2001: 29–30).

51
The application of such a rationalistic calculus has limits, of course. An individual, for example, might decide irrationally to kill a tyrant, without careful reasoning of the sort described here. My point is simply that, under the circumstances created by the oath of Demophantos, such an act might also be arrived at rationally, by a balancing of costs and benefits.

52
In addition to the general measures listed below, two acts of the Athenian state taken against specific tyrants should be noted. A stele commemorating the injustices of the Peisistratidai stood on the Acropolis (Thuc. 6.55.1); the members of the family were named and no doubt banned. A stele was also erected to record the banishment of the followers of Isagoras because they had ambitions at tyranny (Schol. Ar.
Lys
. 273).

53
ἐάν τινες τυραννεῖν ἐπανιστῶνται
[
ἐπὶ τυραννίδι
]
ἢ συγκαθιστῇ τὴν τυραννίδα
,
ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γένος
(If any persons rise in insurrection in order to govern tyrannically, or if any person assists in establishing the tyranny, he himself and his family shall be without rights). On this law, the language of which is explicitly echoed in the decree of Demophantos, see Ostwald (1955: 105–10); Gagarin (1981).

54
This proclamation probably originated during the very first years of the Athenian democracy, when Hippias was still alive and the Athenians were concerned about “friends of the tyrants” (
Ath
.
Pol
. 22.6). That conclusion—accepted by Dunbar (1995: 583–84)—would conform well with Connor's conclusion (1989) that the City Dionysia originated circa 501 as a celebration of the end of tyranny and the creation of the new democracy.

55
Rhodes (1985a: 36–37). Rhodes assumes this based on the fact that the procedures for the
boulē
and
ekklesia
were often parallel.

56
See above in the section titled “The Oath of Demophantos.”

57
There is another possible reason for the apparent failure of the measures against tyranny: it might have been a common perception that they were antiquated and thus irrelevant. Aristophanes certainly appears to suggest as much when he ridicules the traditional proclamation announced at the Dionysia (Ar.
Av
. 1072–75): “On this particular day, you know, we hear it once again proclaimed that … whoever kills any of the long deceased tyrants shall get a talent.”

58
The Thirty were supported by a Spartan garrison of 700 men and 3,000 fully armed citizens. The rest of the Athenian population was disarmed. The substance of the Thirty's propaganda is provided by Lysias (12.5): “the Thirty … declared that the city must be purged of unjust men and the rest of the citizens inclined to virtue and justice.” Few would have disagreed with such generic objectives, and the Thirty did begin their rule somewhat moderately, executing only individuals whom many people thought should be eliminated. For sources for the so-called good period, see Ostwald (1986: 478n72).

59
These are admittedly late sources, but three points suggest that the tradition is genuine, and that the practice described by Philostratos began at the end of the fifth century, perhaps at the Panathenaia of 402. First, the most logical time to begin honoring the heroes of Phyle together with Harmodios and Aristogeiton would be immediately after the overthrow of the Thirty. Second, the deeds committed by the heroes of Phyle were analogous to the deeds attributed to the tyrannicides: the latter, according to the democratic version of events, founded the democracy by overthrowing a tyranny; the former refounded the democracy by overthrowing the Thirty Tyrants. Third, in the decree of Archinos (Aischin. 3.190), the Athenians, shortly after the fall of the Thirty, honored the heroes of Phyle both for being the first to resist the unjust regime and for risking their lives in doing so: “they first began (
πρῶτοι
…
ἦρξαν
) to depose those who ruled the polis with unjust ordinances, risking their lives [sc., for the cause].” These are precisely the reasons for which the Athenians honored the original tyrannicides.

60
The early representations are a black-figure lekythos, 470–460 (Vienna, Österreichisches Museum 5247; Brunnsåker [1971: 102–4, fig. 15, plate 23]); a red-figure stamnos, 470–460 (Würzburg, Martin von Wagner Museum 515; Brunnsåker [1971: 108, fig. 16]); and a fragment of a red-figure skyphos, 460–450 (Rome, Museo Nazionale Etrusco di Villa Giulia 50321; Brunnsåker [1971: 108–9]; Neer [2002: 175, fig. 86]). A possible fourth example is a fragment of a red-figure glaux in Agrigento, ca. 470 (
ARV
²
559, no. 147; Brunnsåker [1971: 110, fig. 17]).

61
Hildesheim, Pelizäus-Museum 1253, 1254; London, British Museum B 605; Brunnsåker (1971: 104–5, plate 23). Two of the amphoras were painted by the same hand (Aristophanes); Beazley (1986: 89) accepts a date of 402 for all three. The other two vases dated circa 400 are both red-figure oinochoai, one (supposedly found in the grave of Dexileos) in Boston (Museum of Fine Arts 98.936; Brunnsåker [1971: 105–6, plate 24]), the other in Rome (Museo Nazionale Etrusco di Villa Giulia 44.205; Brunnsåker [1971: 106, plate 24]).

62
One is reminded here of the chorus's prayer to Athena in Aristophanes's
Thesmophoriazusae
(1136–59). Therein the chorus prays, “Pallas Athena … who alone safeguards our city … you who loathe tyrants.”

63
It is interesting to compare the provision in the oath of Demophantos whereby the
dēmos
promised to treat a fallen tyrant killer “just like (
καθάπερ
) Harmodios and Aristogeiton” with the pledge found in the Athenian tyrannicide
skolia
(Ath. 15.695a–b): “I will carry my sword in a myrtle branch, just like (
ὥσπερ
) Harmodios and Aristogeiton when they killed the tyrant.” The tyrannicides were, in the words of Ober (2005c: 219), models of “democratically correct” behavior. It is almost certainly the case, then, that the Athenians viewed the oath of Demophantos as a means to encourage individuals to emulate the famous models. (Ar.
Lys
. 630–35 humorously depicts a man's futile attempt to act like Harmodios.) One need not doubt, however, that the Athenians were also aware of the oath's epistemic value in generating mutually shared knowledge: compare Plato's comment (
Leg
. 738d–e) on the importance of public rituals: “The people may fraternize with one another at the sacrifices and gain knowledge (
γνωρίζωσιν
) and intimacy, since nothing is of more benefit to the state than this mutual acquaintance (
οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθόν
,
ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι
).”

64
Andok.
Myst
. 90–91; Xen.
Hell
. 2.4.43.

65
Thus, as Andokides attests (
Myst
. 90–91), the Athenians also included the pledge
οὐ μνησικακήσω
in the jury oath.

66
MacDowell (1962: 118).

67
For further discussion of the meaning of
μὴ μνησικακεῖν
, see Carawan (2002: 3–5) and Joyce (2008: 508–12). For a detailed examination of the reconciliation agreement, including the amnesty provision, see Loening (1987). On the paradoxical sociological complexities of collectively forgetting, see Loraux (2002) and Wolpert (2002).

68
On the danger of neutrality during stasis in a Greek polis, see Thuc. 3.82.8: “Neutral citizens were continuously destroyed by members of both factions, either because they would not fight with them or because of jealously that they should survive.”

69
A large-scale modern example of this dynamic followed the explosion of the golden dome of the Askariya mosque in Samarra, Iraq, on February 22, 2006. The mosque is a particularly sacred site for Shiite Muslims, and its destruction, especially given the political instability of Iraq at the time, predictably ignited widespread sectarian violence. It would be interesting to know whether most of the individuals who participated in the violence following that explosion actually wanted to do so, or if they concluded that they must participate because they believed that a significant number of other individuals would participate.

70
Archinos, who urged the
boulē
to execute a citizen because he “began to remember past wrongs” (
Ath
.
Pol
. 40.2), was perhaps worried that one person might set off such a stasis bandwagon. The fact that all Athenians had sworn the amnesty oath might have prevented such an outcome.

71
It is important to note here, however, that the Athenians, when they promulgated the law of Eukrates, were concerned that they would be unable to respond to a pro-Macedonian coup due to a revolutionary coordination problem. See the section in
chapter 3
titled “The Tyrannical Threat.”

72
Ostwald (1955: 121).

73
Two further points are worth mentioning. First, Lykourgos (
Leok
. 124) states that the Athenians swore the oath of Demophantos after the fall of the Thirty. In this he is probably mistaken, but if he is correct, it might suggest that the Athenians swore the oath a second time precisely because they believed that it had contributed to their recent victory. Second, the following chapters will demonstrate that the citizens of other poleis promulgated tyrant-killing legislation that clearly echoed the decree of Demophantos. That borrowing suggests that, in the opinion of the citizens of those states, such legislation was effective.

74
Political scientists would say that the Athenian democracy became “self-enforcing.” For self-enforcing constitutions and the important role of coordination therein, see Weingast (1997).

75
It is interesting to note, in this regard, Hypereides's comment about the Thirty (
Against Philippides
, 8): “You [Philippides] have concluded that one person will be immortal, yet you sentenced to death a city as old as ours, never realizing the simple fact that no tyrant has risen from the dead while many cities, though utterly destroyed, have come again to power. You and your party took no account of the history of the Thirty or of the city's triumph over her assailants from without and those within her walls who joined in the attack upon her.” Hypereides delivered this speech between 338 and 336. Thus the fact that democrats successfully mobilized against the Thirty was still viewed as having deterrent value three generations later.

II

Tyrant-Killing Legislation in the Late Classical Period

2

The Eretrian Tyrant-Killing Law

Introduction

In the summer of 342, Philip of Macedon commenced large-scale military operations on the island of Euboia in order to support pro-Macedonian regimes in two prominent cities. He first sent Hipponikos with one thousand mercenaries to Eretria. That force crushed the exiled democrats' fort at Porthmos and secured in power Kleitarchos, Automedon, and Hipparchos, men who recently had overthrown the Eretrian democracy. Later—exactly how much later is unknown—Philip ordered two additional invasions into Eretria in order to assist that puppet regime's efforts to quash a serious insurgency. It is likely in conjunction with the final (i.e., the third) intervention in Eretria that Philip's mercenary forces, led this time by Parmenion, stormed the northern Euboian city of Oreos and secured in power five men (Philistides, Menippos, Sokrates, Thoas, and Agapaios) who had recently overthrown the democracy in their city. Thus, by the fall of 342, Philip's partisans controlled two of Euboia's four major cities.
¹

Philip's gains in Euboia directly threatened Athenian security. Demosthenes, in his speech
On the Chersonese
(delivered in early 341), concluded that Philip invaded that island in order to establish bases (
epiteichismata
) from which he would attack both Attika and the island of Skiathos (36). That was a reasonable concern: Eretria was less than five kilometers away from Attika; Skiathos, near Oreos, was an important base for Athenian military operations in the northern Aegean.
²
And, although Demosthenes did not articulate this concern in his aforementioned speech, Philip's gains in Euboia also put him in a position, potentially, to take the southern Euboian city of Karystos and thus disrupt Athens's important grain shipments.
³

The Athenians, led by Demosthenes, responded decisively to Philip's aggressive move into Euboia. They first (late spring/early summer 341) formed an offensive and defensive alliance with Kallias, the strongman of the Euboian city of Chalkis (Aischin. 3.91; Philoch. Frag. 159). For years, that man sought to bring the cities of Euboia into a federal league (
koinon
) that would be heavily influenced by Chalkis. And in 348, the aggressive pursuit of that objective led him into military confrontation with the Athenians—much to the Athenians' dismay.
⁴
Later (perhaps by mid-343), however, he incurred the enmity of both Philip and Thebes while in the pursuit of those imperial ambitions. How he managed to anger those important powers is unknown. But it was serious: according to Aischines (3.89–91), Philip and the Thebans actively moved against him. It is thus not particularly surprising that he formed an alliance with his former enemy, the Athenians.