Death to Tyrants! (14 page)

(Old Fragment)

G
o
ds.

The
probouloi
and the
strategoi
proposed: for the
g
oo
d
for
tune of the d
ēmos
of Eretria: in order that concord and friendship
w
ith
one anothe
r may be established in the city, resolved by the council and the
dēmos
.
Th
e tyrant, his offspring, and whoever
makes an a
tt
empt at tyranny shall be
with
out
righ
ts. And
who
ever kills a member of the tyrant's faction or th
e t
y
rant, if he
is a
c
i
t
izen, … shall be given to him … an
d
stand near the altar his … bronze statue. And he shall have a front seat at the festivals that the polis sponsors
and public maintenance
in the town hall as long as he lives. And if the k
ill
e
r of t
he tyrant or the leader of an oligarchy dies,
to
his
ch
ild
ren
, should they be male, to each shall be
g
i
v
en
the written
reward whenever they reach the legal age.
And
should they be dau
ghters
, each shall receive one thousand
drachm
as as a dowry whenever they turn fourteen.

(New Fragment)

Oth
erwise,
who
ever wishes … to the
council or t
o
the holy places in
…
or a council
or or magistrate, although the council f
or
bi
ds him, travels abroad
, he shall be depriv
ed of office imm
ediately
and be without rights, both
he and his offspring, because he is
dissolv
in
g the
dēmos
.
And if someone
attempt
s to dissolve this re
gime—
the one now in existence—by making a proposal or putting a measure to v
ote, should he be a magistrate or a
private citizen, he shall be without rights and his property
shall be
c
onfiscated with
one tenth consecrat
ed
to Artemis Amarynthos
, and he s
hall
not be buried
in the land of Eretria. And if someone
ki
lls
him or his family member,
his hands shall be pure and
he shall receive
the rewards
for these things j
ust as is written in the stele if someone
ki
lls the t
yrant.
And against one speaking or act
i
ng contrary to these
[measures] the priests an
d priestesses
shall pronounce a
cu
rse
at the Dionysia and Artemisia that [their] wives do not bear
their sons as
is customary (
κατὰ νόμον
) nor [their] flock n
or land flour
ish; and if [sons] are born, that they are not their
l
eg
itimate sons, but that
all of them, together with their house, be utterly ruined.
²¹
If someone, either magistrate or private citizen, p
uts it to a vote, writes up a draft,
or votes that the Eretrians must
establish
so
me re
gime other than a council and
prytanei
a
appointed by lot
from all Eretria
ns just as is written; and if someone es
tablishes either a tyranny
or an oligarchy and uses force
, al
l
citizens must
ass
ist the
dēmos
immediately and join in battle against those who will prev
ent [a meeting of] the assembl
y and
prytaneia
, each considering himself
competent to fight withou
t
an o
rder
.
But, if it is impos
sible to secure the Ag
oraion immediately in order for the council
to convene according to the law, or if the
dēmos
is shut out of the walls, sec
ure some
Eretrian
stronghold,
whatever seems advantageous for all h
e
lpers
to arriv
e
at;
after securin
g [the stronghold], receive any
Greek who
arr
ives and wishes to help
the
dēmos
of Eretria.
And if an Eretrian does not help the
dē
mos
, impeach him before the
pry
taneia
just as is written and
join in
battl
e against him. To the
Eretrians who secure some terr
itory and
make the
dēmos
of Eretri
a autonomous and f
ree
shall be distribu
ted
a part
of the land and property of those who rema
ined behind to be ruled by a tyra
nny or some regime other than a c
ouncil appointed by lot from all.

Eretrian pro-democrats clearly promulgated their tyrant-killing law in order to defend their democracy against attacks launched by anti-democrats (variously referred to in the law as tyrants, partisans of tyrants, and, obliquely, as oligarchs). It is also clear that the threat posed by those anti-democrats was very serious: one need note only that the law envisions as a distinct possibility the anti-democrats shutting “the
dēmos
” out of the city walls. One might thus wonder whether or not the promulgation of this tyrant-killing law actually helped the Eretrian democrats maintain control of their polis. The primary objective of this chapter is to answer that simple question. Doing so, however, will require a thorough analysis of the law's provisions and its historical and sociopolitical context.

This chapter defends the following thesis: the promulgation of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law played an important role in defending Eretria's newly reinstated democratic regime against internal subversion during the years immediately following the Athenian led liberation of 341. The arguments in support of that thesis are presented in three sections. In the first section, I argue that the Eretrian pro-democrats quite likely would have lost control of their polis shortly after the Athenian-led liberation, if no serious attempt were made to facilitate their efforts to mobilize in defense of their regime (i.e., to solve a revolutionary coordination problem). I next argue that, by promulgating their tyrant-killing law, the Eretrian democrats greatly increased the likelihood that they would successfully mobilize in defense of their regime (i.e., overcome a potential revolutionary coordination problem) and thus likely would have deterred anti-democrats from attempting a coup. And in the final section, I argue that the Eretrian democrats maintained secure control of their polis, under very difficult circumstances, for several years after they promulgated their tyrant-killing law.

Threats to Stability

The comments presented in this section demonstrate that the Eretrian pro-democrats quite likely would have lost control of their polis shortly after the Athenian-led liberation of 341, if no serious attempt were made to facilitate their efforts to mobilize in defense of their regime. Counterfactuals are problematic, of course: it is impossible to say for certain what would have happened if something else did not happen. It is important to note, however, that it is, in fact, necessary to answer a counterfactual in order to determine whether or not any attempt to solve a particular problem actually “worked.” For example, in order to determine whether or not the United States' massive bank bailout of 2008 stabilized that country's financial system, one must first determine what would have happened to their financial system if no action had been taken. Only after it was demonstrated that the banking system would have failed if nothing had been done could someone determine persuasively
whether or not, and to what extent, the bailout helped prevent that failure. The same logic applies to the study of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law.
²²

This section's argument rests on two complementary points. The first point is that, during the generation prior to the Athenian-led liberation of 341, Eretrian democrats had been consistently unable to maintain control of their polis, instead regularly being subdued by strongmen. The historical record is clear on that point. The Eretrians joined the Second Athenian League in 377 as a democratically governed polis.
²³
But quite likely in 370, and certainly by 366, they lost control of the polis to a strongman named Themison.
²⁴
The date of Themison's fall from power is not known. It is almost certain, however, that Eretrian democrats again controlled the polis in 357/6, after the Athenians invaded Euboia in either 358/7 or 357/6 (Knoepfler [1995: 334n100]) and drove out the Thebans.
²⁵
But their regime was not long lasting: by 352, Menestratos, another autocrat—whom Demosthenes (23.124) politely referred to as a
dynastēs
—dominated Eretrian politics.
²⁶
He fell quickly too; and by 349, another strongman, not the
dēmos
, named Ploutarchos controlled the polis. When Ploutarchos fell from power (perhaps in 344/3), the Eretrian democrats governed their polis yet again.
²⁷
But, true to form, they retained control for only a matter of months: in 343 (perhaps in the summer), a faction led by Kleitarchos and two other men seized control of the polis.
²⁸
Thus during the generation prior to the Athenian led liberation, the Eretrians had three different (all failed) democratic regimes covering (collectively) about twelve years (377–370, 357–353, 344–343) and four
different “strongman” regimes covering about eighteen years (370–357, 353–349, 349–344, 343–341).

The second complementary point is that, after the Athenian-led liberation of 341, would-be Eretrian strongmen, enjoying Philip's support and encouragement, almost certainly would have attempted to overthrow the recently reinstated Eretrian democracy. In defense of that point, one might note, first, that Philip had a motive to assist a would-be Eretrian strongman's efforts to overthrow the Eretrian democracy. The fact that he sent mercenary forces to Eretria on three different occasions within one year clearly demonstrates that Philip thought that the control of that city was in his strategic interest. And it is also possible that Philip believed that his credibility was at stake: Macedonian sympathizers in other poleis might no longer trust him if he did not follow through with his commitment to the strongmen in Eretria. In addition to motive, Philip would have had ample opportunity to assist would-be Eretrian strongmen in overthrowing the Eretrian democracy. As the previous paragraph suggests, there seems to have been no shortage of Eretrians who wanted to dominate their polis. And even an apparently pro-democratic leader could be “flipped” and support a narrow oligarchy; such was quite likely the case, for example, with the “tyrant” Kleitarchos.
²⁹
And finally, the chances were quite good that a would-be Eretrian strongman would succeed in taking control of the city: the Eretrians clearly had a bad track record of defending their democracy; and the fact that they recently lost control of the polis once again might very well have lowered their moral even further.
³⁰
It would thus be worth the risk to stage a Macedonian-backed coup.

Thus Eretrian democrats repeatedly failed to maintain control of their polis during the years preceding the Athenian-led liberation of 341, and there is very good reason to believe that, in the postliberation period, their ability to maintain control would be severely tested. On might reasonably conclude, therefore, that Eretrian democrats quite likely would have lost control of their polis shortly after the Athenian-led liberation, if no serious attempt were made to facilitate their efforts to mobilize in defense of their regime.

_____________________

The remaining comments in this section describe (what would appear to be) a typical, Macedonian-supported coup—including the coup at Eretria—during the years immediately preceding the Athenian-led liberation of 341. Such a description, at the very least, will provide both important historical context and insight into the mechanisms of Philip's imperial success, at least as with regard to Greek cities. There is, however, a potential payoff for this section's argument. I demonstrate that Philip, in order to gain control of a Greek polis, induced and then exploited a revolutionary coordination problem among its citizens. It might not be unreasonable to suspect, then, that were Philip and his supporters to stage a coup in Eretria—which, per the reasoning presented above, they would likely attempt—they would in some way follow the pattern that Philip had previously followed with success on other occasions, including, again, in Eretria.

It must be noted that the evidence used in the following description is found almost entirely in Demosthenes's
Third Philippic
. The reason: that speech is the only source that describes in any detail the manner by which Philip installed puppet regimes in a Greek polis. This is, no doubt, an unfortunate situation. Beyond the fact that much of what he wrote cannot be independently corroborated, Demosthenes is a potentially tainted source. He had, first of all, a strongly held worldview: namely, no democracy would choose to side with Philip and against Athens; if it did, it was corrupted. And he had a political agenda: namely, to persuade the Athenian
dēmos
to see things his way and thus adopt his policies.
³¹
Those two points notwithstanding, the speech is of considerable evidentiary value since it was written by an astute observer of democratic politics virtually contemporaneously to the events described.
³²
And it is also worth pointing out that this chapter's larger argument supports Demosthenes's analysis.