Death to Tyrants! (45 page)

One might thus conclude that, by promulgating their tyrant-killing law, the Ilians deterred anti-democrats from staging a coup. First, the democrats will likely retake control of the polis and, in the process, kill many of those defending the nondemocratic regime. Second, once the democrats take control, they will punish everybody who was involved with or otherwise benefited from the nondemocratic regime. Anti-democrats would therefore conclude that, should they stage a coup, an insufficient number of people would follow them; they thus would choose not to defect. The result would be a stable democracy. And in the years after the promulgation of their law, the Ilian democracy was, in fact, stable and prosperous.

Conclusion

In the conclusion to
chapter 4
, I demonstrated that Alexander the Great heavily promoted anti-tyranny or tyrant-killing ideology during his conquest of western Asia Minor: he publicly referred to prominent members of cities' pro-Persian faction as “tyrants”; he issued an anti-tyranny proclamation after the battle of Gaugamela; he made known his intention to return to Athens the original statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. I now defend this much bolder thesis: the promulgation of anti-tyranny or tyrant-killing laws and decrees contributed significantly to the success of democracy in Hellenistic western Asia Minor. As would be expected, the argument in defense of that thesis is complex, consisting of several parts.

First, the citizens of several different poleis, dispersed widely in and around western Asia Minor, promulgated anti-tyranny or tyrant-killing laws or decrees during the first two generations of the Hellenistic period. The final three chapters of this book studied significant examples in Eresos, Erythrai, and Ilion. And, as noted in the introduction to this book, we must add a few more (mostly fragments) to that list.

•  Ephesos (
I. Ephesos
1377). This is a small fragment likely dated to the fourth or third century BCE—thus an early Hellenistic date is quite likely. That it is an anti-tyranny law is suggested by (1)
ἤν τις
(“if someone”) in line 3; (2)
ἢ τύραννον
(“or a tyrant”) in line 6.

•  Priene (
I. Priene
11). This is a decree of the
dēmos
establishing a Soteria festival after having overthrown a tyrant. The reference to the tyrant is restored by Robert (1944: 7–8) in line 11 (
τ
[
ὸν τύραννον καὶ τοὺς στρατιώ
|
τ]α̣ς
[
ἐκ
]
πεσεῖν
[
ἐ
]
κ τῆς πόλεως
). The reference is almost certainly correct, in light of the fact that the people of Priene did suffer through the tyranny of Hiero. And Hiero is repeatedly referred to as
ὁ τύραννος
in a later decree of Priene (
I. Priene
37).

•  Mylasa (
I. Labraunda
41). This is a very fragmentary decree (dated to the second half of the fourth century) that quite possibly concerns a democratic constitution. Line 2 reads [-].
τ̣υρα
[
νν
? .c.3.] (“tyra[nt” vel sim.). And line 4 reads [-
δ]ι̣καζε
[.c.5.] (“a]djudica[te”).

•  Olbia (Lebedev [1996], pp. 263–68). This inscription copies part of the epigram engraved on Harmodios and Aristogeiton's Athenian tomb. Lebedev noted that the lettering is virtually identical to
IOSPE
I
²
160—a dedication of a statue to Zeus Eleutherius that dates to the first half of the third century. Lebedev prefers to date the inscribing of the tyrannicide epigram in Olbia, however, to the last third of the fourth century. The final two lines of the inscription read: [
ο
]
ἳ κτάνο
[
ν
]
ἄνδρα τύρα
[
ννον ἐλευεθερίην τ᾿ ἐσάωσαν
] |
πατρίδι καὶ λαοὺς αὀτ
[
ονόμους ἔθεσαν
(vel
ἐθέτην
)] (“who killed the tyrant, preserved freedom for the fatherland, and made the people autonomous”).

•  Kalymna (Tit. Calymnii Test. XII). This inscription, dated to the first half of the third century, records a mass public oath to defend the democracy. They swore (lines 21–22)
ὀλγαρχίαν δὲ οὐδὲ τύραννον οὐδὲ ἄλλο πολίτευμα ἔξω δαμο
|
κρατίας οὐ καταστάσω
(“I will not establish an oligarchy and not a tyranny nor any other regime except democracy”).

•  Nisyros (
Syll
.
³
1220). This fragment, dated to the third century, forbids burials or the erection of any type of grave monuments for certain individuals. It is quite likely, as noted by Dittenberger, that this fragment is part of a tyrant-killing law.

Thus, if we include the enactments studied in the last three chapters of this book (i.e., from Eresos, Erythrai, and Ilion), there is evidence for anti-tyranny or tyrant-killing enactments promulgated in six different geographic regions during the early Hellenistic period: the northern Black Sea Area (Olbia), the eastern Aegean (Nisyros, Kalymna), Troas (Ilion), Lesbos (Eresos), Ionia (Erythrai, Priene, Ephesos), and Karia (Mylasa).
⁸⁸
Such a distribution, by itself,
suggests that inscribed anti-tyranny proclamations were very popular in and around Asia Minor at that time. And when we include the fact that Alexander widely promoted anti-tyranny and tyrant-killing ideology during his conquest of Asia Minor, there can be little doubt about it.

Second, tyrant-killing legislation was effective in the three Asia Minor cases that we can fully analyze. I made the argument for Eresos, Erythrai, and Ilion in
chapters 4
,
5
, and
6
, respectively. In each case, it appears that, subsequent to the law's promulgation, anti-democrats were deterred from staging a coup d'état. There thus is no reason to suppose that tyrant-killing legislation, for some reason, would be ineffective in Asia Minor poleis.

Third, it is unlikely that tyrant-killing legislation would spread so widely in Asia Minor unless it was effective. This is just common sense: people and states adopt new technologies if they actually solve problems. The more effective the technology, the more likely it will spread, assuming, of course, that it is suitable and sufficiently publicized. The diffusion of hoplite warfare and the spread of coinage throughout the Greek world are prominent examples of this dynamic.

Finally, it appears that Ilian pro-democrats expected their tyrant-killing law to work. The key point here is that the law focuses so extensively—provisions 5 through 13—on punishing various activities that would take place while the democracy is overthrown. It is true that the law from Eretria articulates a punishment for anyone who does not help the
dēmos
regain control of the polis after a successful anti-democratic coup (new fragment, line 30 to end). But the law from Ilion goes much further, for example, by outlawing different types of financial transactions and prescribing different punishments for those who use the law court, depending on the trial's outcome. The detailed articulation in the law of what will be done once pro-democrats regain control of the polis strongly suggests that the Ilian pro-democrats believed that the promulgation of the law would facilitate their efforts to respond to a coup. Perhaps they knew that tyrant-killing legislation had been effective in other cities in Asia Minor.

Many factors contributed to the success of democracy in Hellenistic western Asia Minor. The ability of pro-democrats to mobilize in defense of their regime, however, was virtually a necessary condition for its survival. And the argument presented above demonstrated that Athenian-invented tyrant-killing law was both popular and effective in Asia Minor from the time of Alexander's conquest through the early years of the Hellenistic period. Any accounting for the success of what might be called Asia Minor's
“Hellenistic democratic revolution” must thus include the important role played by tyrant-killing law.

Finally, I would like to return to the conclusion of
chapter 2
, where I suggested that there might be a link between the success of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law and the subsequent popularity of tyrant-killing legislation in the early Hellenistic period. That connection can now be made more explicit. Simply put, Alexander likely observed that both the Athenians and the Eretrians, by promulgating tyrant-killing law, successfully countered his father's attempt to subvert their democracy. Alexander thus promoted that law type and its underlying ideology in order to prevent his opponents from subverting the democracies that he established in and around Asia Minor. That explains how and why the technology of tyrant-killing law “jumped” from the Greek mainland to Asia Minor.

1
There are some signs, however, that Ilion's economic condition improved slightly starting around the middle of the fourth century. See Berlin (2002) and Lawall (2002).

2
Ilion, since it is was a polis on the mainland of Asia Minor, became part of the Persian Empire pursuant to the terms of the King's Peace (Xen.
Hell
. 5.1.31). The internal history of Ilion with respect to events in the Troad during this period is not well known. Ariobarzanes was the first satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia after the King's Peace, and thus the regional overlord of Ilion (Xen.
Hell
. 5.1.28). By 366 he was in rebellion against Artaxerxes II, as a leading figure in the so-called Great Satraps' Revolt (Diod. Sic. 15.90.3—falsely compressing events into the single year 362/1). Ariobarzanes was subsequently betrayed by his son Mithridates and executed in circa 361 (Xen.
Cyr
. 8.8.4; Arist.
Pol
. 1312a16). According to Diodoros (17.17.6), there was an overthrown statue of him by the temple of Athena at Ilion when Alexander arrived. After the capture of Ariobarzanes, Artabazos was appointed the lawful satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia and he appears to have held Ilion for a time (perhaps with his brothers-in-law, Mentor and Memnon): Dem. 23.154–58. He revolted (in 356) soon after Artaxerxes III assumed the throne in 359/8 (Diod. Sic. 16.22.1); in 352, he fled to Macedon, but was later pardoned by Artazerxes III (Diod. Sic. 16.52.3).

3
In 360, Charidemos of Oreos controlled Ilion (Dem. 23.154–58, Aen. Tact. 24.4–14, Polyaenus 3.14, Plut.,
Sert
. 1.6, [Arist.] Oec. 2.30). (He had initially sided with Artabazos's brothers-in-law against the Persian king during the former's period of revolt, but betrayed that alliance to gain control of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilion.) Charidemos ruled Ilion for only one year. (
I. Ilion
23 likely records the Ilians' gratitude to Menelaos the son of Arrabaios for his role in liberating the city from Charidemos in 359.) It then appears that Artabazos's brothers-in-law, likely with Artabazos himself, controlled Ilion for a couple of years (Dem. 23.157–58). And finally, from 355–334, the Athenian mercenary general Chares probably controlled Ilion along with Sigeion: many coins minted in Sigeion while Chares controlled it have been found in Ilion; when Alexander arrived at Ilion (334), Chares traveled from Sigeion to greet him (Arr.
Anab.
1.12.1; Cook [1973: 180]; Berlin [2002]).

4
Alexander sacrificing at Ilion: Plut.
Alex.
15; Diod. Sic. 17.17.6–18.1; Arr.
Anab.
1.11.7–1.12.1; Strabo 13.1.26 (alone in placing the sacrifice after the battle of Granikos). The temple to Athena in Ilion as part of Alexander's “last plans”: Diod. Sic. 18.4.5; cf. Strabo 13.1.26. Since Ilion was an Aeolic polis, it would have been democratically governed per Alexander's order (334) to Alkimachos: Arr.
Anab.
1.18.1–2. Strabo wrote (13.1.26) that Alexander elevated Ilion to the status of polis. But Xenophon (
Hell
. 3.1.16) already referred to it as a polis.

5
The earliest evidence for the koinon at Ilion is
I. Ilion
1, an inscription that includes five decrees of the koinon (each text begins with
γνώμη τῶν συνέδρων
) praising Malousios of Gargara. The decrees praise Malousios for (inter alia) providing funds to (1) send embassies to Antigonos (lines 8–9, 23–26 [where he is referred to as “king”]); (2) build a theater (lines 10, 28, 39). On the koinon at Ilion, see the comments in Billows (1990: 218–20) and Magie (1950: 869–71n53). There is no evidence linking Alexander and the koinon at Ilion, although it is reasonable, considering how interested he was with Ilion's temple of Athena, to suspect that he was somehow involved. For the terrace wall and “prytaneion,” see Rose (1999: 46). On the improved fortunes of cities in the Troad under Antigonos, see McShane (1964: 24–25).

6
Text: Peter Frisch,
Die Inschriften von Ilion
, no. 25 with some changes (indicated in the notes). Frisch also provides a commentary and German translation. There are two other standard commentaries: (1)
IJG
(II: 22–57) (text, French translation, and a discussion that includes an investigation of some Athenian material); (2)
OGIS
218 (text with Latin commentary). There are, in addition, several other important works on this law. Friedel (1937: 82–97) provides a (not reliable) Greek text for lines 19–106, 116–30, a German translation of much of the law (not, bizarrely, of lines 106–16), and comments. Berve (1967: 419–22) provides a quite brief overview of the law's provisions and short comment. Funck (1994) presents the law's possible historical and political context. Koch (1996) provides an analysis of several of the law's provisions and situates the law in the general history of regime-preservation legislation. Dössel (2003) provides a text, German translation, and comments on several of the law's provisions. Maffi (2005) provides a through examination of several of the law's provisions and a French translation of some of the law's most controversial provisions. The editio princeps: Brueckner (1894). Somewhat surprisingly, this law is not included in any of the standard “sources in translation” books that cover the Hellenistic period (i.e., Austin [1981], Burstein [1985], Bagnall and Derow [2004]).