Death to Tyrants! (47 page)

31
Koch (1996: 54–55) suggests that the Ilion law articulates a careful distinction with regard to the participation of magistrates in a nondemocratic regime. The first stage—when the revolution actually takes place—is addressed in provision 5. In that case, the office holder is not necessarily complicit in the revolution and is unsure of what he should do. He might stay in office even if he does not fully support the new regime. Thus the penalty would not harm a well-intended office holder (assuming, of course, that he did not acquire another individual's property). Provision 6 concerns the second stage, when it is clear that the democracy has been overthrown and that the office holder thus clearly
chose
to participate fully in the nondemocratic regime. In that case the “hurt” of the penalty is unavoidable: he must pay pack double the money that he managed because, by definition, he illegally appropriated the money. This is an interesting observation and is accepted, with some nuance, by Dössel (2003: 210 with n. 27). Maffi (2005: 146–47) rejects Koch's theory by noting that, if a democratically selected magistrate continued to hold his office after an anti-democratic coup, he would be deemed to have been complicit with the anti-democratic regime once the democrats regained control of the polis. Koch's theory probably should be rejected.

32
Dössel (2003: 211–12 with n. 30) suggests that the stipulation “while the Ilians are governed democratically” is included in order to prevent members of a successful anti-democratic coup from somehow using the provision against magistrates that had been selected during the previous democracy. Maffi (2005: 147–48), advances a very different interpretation of the phrase
ὅταν
 | [
βούλητ
]
αι
,
μέχ
[
ρι
]
τέλος δί
|[
κης γέν
]
ηται
[
δη
]
μοκρατου
|[
μένων Ἰλ
]
ιέων
(lines 78–81). He does not believe that
τέλος δί
|[
κης
refers to a trial begun by the accusation of
ho boulomenos
. Instead he argues that it refers to the end of a period of time within which
ho boulomenos
can make his legal complaint to initiate a trial—what the Greeks called a
prothesmia
. Thus, in this interpretation, anybody can make an accusation against an official who worked in a non-democratic regime whenever he wants (
ὅταν
 | [
βούλητ
]
αι
) from the time that the democracy is established until (
μέχ
[
ρι
]) an established closing date for such trials (i.e.,
τέλος δί
[
κης
).

33
Koch (1996: 57) believes that the subject of
ὑπόδι
|[
κος δὲ ἔστω
is the individual who made the accusation (“der Kläger”) against someone for “giving or receiving money from them.” His reasoning:
ὑπόδικος δὲ ἔστω
is not included in provision 6, where the accuser is explicitly referred to as
ho boulomenos
(a “volunteer” who takes initiative); thus provision 7 likely articulates some risk to the accuser. This is unlikely correct: (1) it is not necessary grammatically (the likely subject of
ὑπόδικος
is the same subject as that of the two finite verbs:
δῶι
and
λὰβηι
(“gives” and “takes”); (2) one might seriously doubt that the law would specify any risk to a potential accuser: the whole law seems to be 100 percent with accusers and against the accused. Maffi (2005: 148–49) also rejects Koch's interpretation. Maffi then offers his own interpretation of lines 84–85. He does not think that
ὑπόδι
|[
κος
(which he suggests should be restored
ὑπόδι
|[
κωι
) begins a new clause but, instead, modifies the magistrate that may be tried in court. He translates, “Il sera loisible de l'appeler en justice comme s'il était responsable du vol de choses appartenant à l'Etate….”

34
Frisch (1975: 76) suggests that the targets of this provision were the regime's “hangers-on” (Mitläufer).

35
Dössel (2003: 213) concludes that this provision was included in order to help ensure that property confiscated by a non-democratic regime would more likely be returned to its original owners after they returned from exile. She cites (2003: n. 33) an inscription from Mytilene (
RO
85) as an example of the basic issue. One might also note Plut.
Arat
. 12–14 for a description of the dynamic in mid-third-century Sikyon. Dössel concludes that the guilty non-democratic magistrates and those complicit with them would be responsible for reimbursing a third party that had lawfully purchased confiscated property.

36
Maffi (2005: 155–56) offers a very different interpretation of the clause
ἐ
|
ὰν δέ τις τύραννος ἢ ἡγεμὼν ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ ὅσ
|
τις Ἰλιέων ἀρχὰς συ
[
ν
]
αποδεικνύηι μετὰ τού
[
των
] (lines 106–8). He first notes that this provision (i.e., provision 10) is very similar to provision 5. Provision 5 seeks to prevent anybody from buying or in any way acquiring anything from anybody who, during a nondemocratic regime, served as any financial magistrate or taxed either an Ilian or a metic. Thus Maffi believes that provision 10 should be interpreted as referring to all magistrates in a nondemocratic regime: they cannot buy anything; provision 5, that is, deals with illegal magistrates unloading property while provision 10 deals with illegal magistrates acquiring property. Evidence in support of his theory rests heavily on a very strained interpretation of
ἢ ὅσ|τις Ἰλιέων ἀρχὰς συ
[
ν
]-
αποδεικνύηι μετὰ τού
[
των
] (lines 107–8). He suggests it does not mean “or whoever appoints Ilion's magistrates with them”; instead it means “ou tout autre magistrat que quiconque des Iliens aura démontré avoir coopéré avec eux dans cette sorte d'opérations.” This interpretation of the Greek is almost certainly incorrect.

37
Koch (1996: 50) wonders whether or not the person who bought something
πρὸ τούτων
(sc., the tyrant, leader of the oligarchy, or office-appointing official) would receive compensation once the democracy is reinstated—perhaps from the fund set up per provision 3. This is quite unlikely, since such an individual would have been complicit with the tyranny: he would have bought something “on behalf” of the regime leaders. Koch is led to this consideration, it appears, because he interprets, in note 55,
πρὸ τούτων
as meaning “in ihrem Auftrag.”

38
Koch (1996: 60n80) does not believe that this provision concerns formal death-sentence trials. He suggests, instead, that the provision concerns anybody killed as a result of regime policy or practice during a nondemocratic regime. His reasoning is that provision 9 concerns executions subsequent to a trial. This is an understandable position. But provision 8 does appear to deal with court cases (thus the provision refers to
ὁ κατηγορήσας
and
τιμαί
) and provision 9 deals with executions specifically brought about by magistrates (and certainly appears to envision something different than a normal trial in the
dikasterion
; see below). Maffi (2005: 149–50 with n. 19) essentially agrees with Koch, although admitting that the provision might address executions pursuant to a trial.

39
IJG
accepts the standard punctuation (which I too accept) whereby a comma is placed right after—not, as Frisch prefers, right before—
δεσμῶν
and translates (II: 31) “s'il a dû fuir pour échapper à la prison.” This is possible. But one might expect the use of a preposition such as
ἀπό
: compare the restoration in line 102. Friedel (1937: 91) accepts the traditional punctuation yet translates it differently: “[Wenn aber ein Bürger … ] zu einer Gefängnisstrafe verurteilt wurde.” Berve (1967: 420) both appears to accept the traditional (i.e., not Frisch's) punctuation and interprets the language as Friedel did. Maffi (2005: 151) accepts the traditional punctuation and translates it as “[Si un homme … ] s'est soustrait aux entraves.” Koch (1996: 57) and Dössel (2003: 203), however, accept Frisch's translation.

40
For
φεύγηι
as “defendant” with the potential punishment in the genitive, see
LSJ
s.v.
φεύγω
IV. For the plural
δεσμοί
meaning “imprisonment”, see Thuc. 7.82.2.

41
See
RO
84B (lines 3–6) for an example—in Chios—of confining someone until he provided guarantors for assigned penalties.

42
IJG
translates (II: 31) “doubles amendes et doubles domages-intérêts.” Friedel (1937: 91), Berve (1967: 420), and Koch (1996: 57) translate it similarly. Maffi (2005: 151) translates it like
IJG
yet he translates
timai
as “pénalité.”

43
Koch (1996: 57–58) suggests that lines 94–95 (
ἐὰν δὲ χρήματα ἐ
[
κ
]
τείσηι
,
διπλάσια ἀποτινέ
|[
τ
]
ω ὁ κατηγορήσ
[
ας
]) seek to protect a former magistrate of an anti-democratic regime from having to pay his mandated penalty twice: the subject of
ἐ
[
κ
]
τείσηι
is thus the former magistrate of an anti-democratic regime. This interpretation likely should be rejected: as I noted above with reference to provision 7, the whole law seems to be 100 percent with accusers and against the accused.

44
Lines 102–3 are difficult. I have accepted the standard (Dittenberger) restoration:
ἐὰν τὴν
|
δίκ
[
ην ἀποφεύγηι τις
,
ψῆφον πρ
]
οσθέμενος
. In this case
ἐὰν τὴν
|
δίκ
[
ην ἀποφεύγηι
almost certainly means “if someone goes into exile to escape a trial” and the following participle,
πρ
]
οσ-θέμενος
, is causal: “since he voted.” The law thus seeks to ensure that such an individual will still pay a very high price for his vote: the Ilians will punish his family.
IJG
(II: 31), Friedel (1937: 91), and Berve (1967: 420) interpret it similarly. If, however,
τὴν | δίκ
[
ην ἀποφεύγηι
means “be acquitted” or “escape conviction” (which is perfectly good Greek—cf. Ar.
Nub.
167) the participle
πρ
]
οσθέμενος
must be concessive: “although having voted.” But, in that case, the scenario is difficult to imagine: the law would seek to punish someone who, during a nondemocratic regime, (allegedly) voted for an individual's execution despite the fact that he (i.e., the person who voted for the execution) was subsequently acquitted in a trial held (almost certainly) under the reinstated democracy. Despite its difficulty, Maffi (2005: 154) suggests such an interpretation. Frisch restores the text differently:
ἐὰν τὴν | δίκ
[
ην μὴ νικήσηι
,
ψῆφον πρ
]
οσθέμενος
. In this case one might translate, “If he did not prevail at trial, although having voted to kill [the defendant].” This makes sense, especially when the following
ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι
is recognized as a potential result clause, bordering on a purpose clause. Thus the law would seek to punish an individual—Frisch argues just the accuser (Ankläger)—who voted for an individual to be executed even if that individual was not actually executed. This interpretation (accepted by Koch [1996: 59–60] and Dössel [2003: 214]), however, likely should be rejected. First, later in the law (lines 157–58, 163–64) “to prevail in a trial” uses the dative, not the accusative:
ἐὰν δίκηι νικᾶται
. Second, the following stipulation that a “murder may not be atoned for” seems to suggest that both protases (i.e., “if clauses”) contained in section 9 refer to a situation where an individual was, indeed, executed.

45
It is to be noted that the text printed here accepts the standard emendation of
ἐπιγαμία〈ι〉ς
(i.e., it does not accept
ἐπιγαμίας
which is inscribed on the stone). Frisch (1975: 77) does not accept that emendation and takes
ἐπιγαμίας
to be accusative plural and the subject of the infinitive
μὴ καταλλάσ
[
σεσ
]
θαι
. He thus translates, “Einen Mord sollen die Familien nicht versöhnend beilegen, auch nicht mit Geld.” But it is easy to believe that the engraver made a simple mistake (as he did in lines 53–54, where he used accusatives where genitives are clearly required). And
ἐπιγαμία
in the plural means intermarriage (
LSJ
s.v. IIb). I thus conclude that both nouns were supposed to be datives of instrument and the infinitive is passive (
LSJ
s.v.
καταλλάσσω
II.2).