Death to Tyrants! (46 page)

7
The stone reads
τύραννον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν
.

8
Frish (followed by Dössel) punctuates this differently: [
á¼¢
]
φεύγηι
,
δεσμῶν τιμάς κτλ
. See below, in the discussion of provision 8, for the significance of that alternative punctuation. The punctuation accepted here is standard (i.e., in Dittenberger).

9
Frish (followed by Dössel) restores this differently:
ἐὰν τὴν | δίκ
[
ην μὴ νικήσηι
,
ψῆφον πρ
]
οσ-θέμενος κτλ
. For a discussion of Frisch's restoration and the standard (in Dittenberger) restoration accepted here, see the discussion of provision 9 below.

10
Frish does not accept this standard (in Dittenberger) emendation. Instead he keeps the stone's
ἐπιγαμίας
. For a discussion of this emendation, see the discussion of provision 9 below.

11
This is the standard (in Dittenberger) emendation of the stone's
οτου
.

12
This translation starts with line 19: no sense can be made of the previous lines.

13
There is a minor problem here. In lines 76–78 the law reads, [
ἐξ
]
εῖναι δὲ δι
[
κάσ
]
ασθαι τῶι
 |[
βουλο
]
μένωι ὡ
[
ς
]
περὶ δημοσί
|[
ων ἐν τ
]
ῶι δικα
[
σ
]
τηρίωι
. In lines 84–85 the law reads,
ἐξεῖν
]
αι δικ
[
άσ
]
ασθαι ὡς
 | [
περὶ δημοσίων
]
χρημάτων
. It is thus tempting to read lines 84–85 as an abbreviation of lines 76–78—that is to assume an implied
τῶι βουλομένωι
in provision 7. I have chosen, however, not to translate lines 84–85 based on that assumption. This results in regarding the infinitive
δικάσασθαι
as in the middle voice in line 76 (“to plead one's case”) and in a passive sense in line 84 (“to be judged”). But even if lines 84–85 abbreviate lines 76–78 (i.e., there is an implied
τῶι βουλομένωι
), there is virtually no difference in meaning.

14
The authors of
IJG
(II: 37) conclude that the law's language is clumsy and impure—a quality that makes the text rather confusing. They further conclude that the provisions are inserted without order.

15
One can only speculate about the content of these first lines. Friedel (1937: 84–85) suggests that, after some sort of prescript, the law articulated the legal position of a tyrant or oligarchic leader (e.g., he is
atimos
or
polemios
). Berve (1967: 422) suggests that the law stated that the tyrant can be killed; the tyrant's relatives are banned forever (if not killed); the tyrant's property and that of his family is confiscated; the Ilians must utter a curse on the tyrant and his family; the tyrant cannot be buried in Ilian soil. Koch (1996: 46n40) suggests that the first lines of the law would have contained a reference to the ruling king (which, according to Koch, was Seleukos I) or some explanation for why the Ilians promulgated such a law. Koch also suggests (1996: 47) that, in the lost opening section, there was an order to kill anti-democratic revolutionaries and an assurance of immunity for the assassin. Dössel (2003: 208) suggests that the opening lines ordered the confiscation of the anti-democratic leader's property, provided guidelines on what must be done with the property, and deemed such a leader to be an outlaw.

16
The meaning of
enarchos
is not immediately self-evident.
IJG
(II: 39) suggests that
enarchos
refers to a subject of Ilion's empire (
archē
). Dittenberger (
OGIS
218) argued that, in this law,
enarchos
simply means “citizen” since it is most logical to divide a Greek polis's society into citizens, foreigners, and slaves. Dittenberger did suggest, however, that the use of the word
enarchos
to mean citizen indicates that, at some previous time, the Ilians had two citizenship statuses: high-level citizens (who were entitled to serve as magistrates) and low-level citizens (who were not so entitled). He cites the meaning of
entimos
as a potential parallel: it can mean “honored” or “in office” as well as (likely a later evolution) “eligible for honors or office.” Friedel (1937: 83–84), Frisch (1975: ad loc.), Berve (1967: 420), Koch (1996: 46), and Dössel (2003: 202) all agree that an
enarchos
is a full citizen (
Vollbürger
). Funck (1994: 321–22) understands the word
enarchos
as maintaining, in addition to its larger sense of citizen, the more limited sense of “in office.”

17
Friedel (1937: 86) suggests that the grant of citizenship is made explicit because of problems that might arise; he notes the situation in Athens after the fall of the Thirty. For a brief discussion of the rewards given after the fall of the Thirty, see
RO
4 and the accompanying commentary.

18
Dittenberger (ad loc.), Frisch (ad loc.), and
IJG
(II: 40) concluded that the slave tyrannicide is given full citizenship rights. This is an understandable position:
ἐπί
]
τιμος
[
ἔ
]
στω καὶ πολιτεί
|[
ας μ
]
ε
[
τεχέτω
seems to suggest that. But several points argue against that conclusion. First, one might conclude that, just as a
xenos
tyrannicide is elevated one status level to become a
politēs
, a
doulos
tyrannicide is elevated one status level to become (in some sense) a
xenos
. (And note that Hansen [1998: 104] demonstrated that, in Athens, manumitted slaves became registered as metics—i.e., not as citizens—with their former master as
prostatēs.
) Second, since the slave tyrannicide receives a smaller cash payment than a free foreigner does, one might also conclude that his other rewards were smaller; also, note that the slave receives neither
sitēsis
nor
proedria
, although both the citizen and free foreigner do. Third, the law does not explicitly state that a
doulos
would become a
politēs
, but it does say so with respect to the
xenos
tyrannicide (line 30). Fourth, the law does not simply say “participate in the regime” but “participate in the regime according to the law” (
πολιτεί
|[
ας μ
]
ε
[
τεχέτω κατὰ τὸν ν
]
όμογ
). Perhaps the Ilians had a law on the rights of freed slaves vis-à-vis their ability to participate in the regime. Both Friedel (1937: 87) and Berve (1967: 420) suggest that the slave tyrannicide was elevated to the status of a metic. Koch (1996: 48) suggests that the slave tyrannicide was given some sort of limited citizenship (“die vorgesehene Hereinnahme von Fremden und—wenn auch eingeschränkt—von Slaven in die Bürgerschaft”). And this appears to be the position of Funck (1994: 321). Dössel (2003: 202) does not comment, but translates
ἐπί
]
τιμος
[
ἔ
]
στω καὶ πολιτεί
|[
ας μ
]
ε
[
τεχέτω κατὰ τὸν ν
]
όμογ
as “so soll er die Ehrenrechte erhalten und das Bürgerrecht gemäss dem Gesetz.”

19
Koch (1996: 51) asserts that the pardon covers only actions committed in common with other anti-democrats, not any private crime he may have committed. That is a reasonable position: the law does state (lines 49–51), “he shall not be punished for what he did with them.” But Koch's interpretation might be overly subtle: the distinction might be difficult to make. On a different note, Maffi (2005: 142–43) raises the interesting question of how a tyrant-killing mercenary soldier might subsequently help “establish democracy.” He suggests that he would join exiled democrats in their fight to reclaim their polis.

20
See the section in
chapter 1
titled “The Oath of Demophantos” for the evidence. Friedel (1937: 85) asserts that the provisions of the decree of Demophantos do not allow for the erection of a statue of the tyrant killer. This is incorrect. The Athenians erected statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. And, according to the oath of Demophantos, the Athenians will treat a fallen tyrannicide “just like” Harmodios and Aristogeiton.

21
Note that Aeneas Tacticus (10.16–17) recommends that it be publicly announced that, should one of the associates (
sunontes
) kill “the exile, the monarch, or the general,” he will be rewarded and guaranteed safe return to him home. As noted in the introduction to this book, Aeneas Tacticus is essentially recommending the promulgation of a tyrant-killing law. Note too that
I. Erythrai
2 B (lines 14–end) perhaps provides incentives (or simply the authority) for individuals to inform magistrates about anti-regime behavior.

22
Berve (1967: 420) asserts without explanation that the daily stipend corresponds with the spirit of the Hellenistic period.

23
On mercenary soldiers killing a tyrant (their paymaster), note Xen.
Hier.
6.11.

24
Note, too, the passage in Aeneas Tacticus noted above in note 21. A couple of possible striking omissions in the Ilion law's incentive package should be noted. First, there is no indication that the state will provide for a tyrannicide's children, should he die as a result of his deed. Second, there is no statement that a tyrannicide would be deemed “pure.” This latter point is minor and certainly implied. And both features might very well have been included in a lost part of the law. On a different note, Frisch (1975: 74) concluded that the rewards are moderate when compared to those given by the Athenians to Harmodios and Aristogeiton: there is no prohibition in the Ilian law against placing another statue by their statue, as there was in Athens (
Syll
.
³
320 lines 30–33); there is no grant of
sitēsis
for a tyrannicide's descendants, as there was in Athens (
IG
I
³
131).

25
Frisch restores—and I have accepted—
ἔσ
]
τω πολίτης
(“let him be a citizen”) in line 39. Dittenberger leaves his text blank after
μνᾶ
[
ς
] and before [
τὰ δὲ ἄ
]
λλα
;
IJG
prints …
τω πολίτη
[
ς
. Frisch's restoration seems reasonable. But note that, in line 30, the Greek for “let him be a citizen” is
πολίτης ἔστω
, while, in 39, Frisch's restoration reverses the two words.

26
Koch (1996: 50) rightly notes that this provision (i.e., about confiscated property) concerns the leaders of the anti-democrats, not those who held office while the democracy was overthrown or who—again, during a nondemocratic regime—voted to execute an individual. The law lists penalties for those individuals elsewhere (lines 54–86, 97–106). Frisch (1975: 74) suggests that, according to this provision, part of the tyrant's property would be given to the tyrannicide, part would be used to establish a fund for victims of the regime.

27
Thus Dittenberger (ad loc.) following
IJG
. It will be recalled that the decree of Demophantos also mandated that the slain tyrant's property be sold and that one-half of the money raised be given to the tyrant slayer. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the other half went to the polis of Athens. But the decree of Demophantos did not state what the Athenians should do with the money.

28
Dössel (2003: 211) helpfully draws attention to a passage in a speech by Aischines (3.21): in Athens, magistrates were not allowed to rid themselves of assets or lower their net worth until they had successfully completed their
euthynai
. The purpose was to ensure that the magistrate could pay any fines that may be levied against him. Maffi (2005: 145) also came to this conclusion, citing the passage in Aischines.

29
Maffi (2005: 147) argues that
τὸ δεύτερον
in the phrase
ἐὰν δέ τις | τὸ δεύτερον
[
σ
]
τρατηγήσηι | ἢ ἄλλην ἀρ
[
χὴν
]
ἄρξηι
(lines 71–73) should be translated “en deuxième lieu.” That is, he does not believe that provision 6 focuses on magistrates who hold office a second time. Instead, he sees provision 6 as articulating the second part of a single provision that begins with (what I label) provision 5. The first part of that provision (= my provision 5) states that magistrates of a nondemocratic regime cannot rid themselves of any property; the second part (= my provision 6) states that, second (
τὸ δεύτερον
), those magistrates must pay back all the money they spent while in office. Maffi himself acknowledges (2005: 147) that this is a daring interpretation, without parallel. Indeed, the most natural reading of the Greek is “If someone holds the office of
strategos
a second time….” Maffi
'
s interpretation almost certainly should be rejected.

30
Thus Friedel (1937: 90).