December 1941 (82 page)

Navy Secretary Frank Knox claimed the fleet was at sea and that “the main body of the fleet with its battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers and submarines was ‘. . . seeking contact with the enemy.'”
¹¹
The contradictory information coming from naval sources—other than announcing their submarines successes—was the first real information of any kind since the week after Pearl Harbor. The navy may have been engaged in a disinformation campaign so as to not reveal to the Japanese the true location of the fleet. “The Japanese government is circulating rumors for the obvious purpose of persuading the United States to disclose the location and intentions of the American Pacific fleet. It is obvious that these rumors are intended for and directed at the Philippine Islands.”
¹²

Among all the services, the navy was in the worst shape when it came to men and materiel. The Air Corps had lost hundreds of planes at Hickam but airplanes were easier to replace than destroyed or damaged warships, which tended to take longer to refloat.

Despite the rush at recruitment offices, large ads continued to run looking for “College Men . . . to be Naval Officers.” No sugar-coating, the ads practically begged that “the Navy needs 7000 Seniors now in college or college graduates as prospective officers. In addition, the Navy needs 5000 men now in their Junior year in college as prospective officers.” Upon completion of training, “you will be commissioned as an Ensign, U.S.N.R., at $125 a month and allowances.” However, the Navy also needed “15,000 men now in their Senior, Junior or Sophomore years . . . as prospective Naval aviators. As full-fledged Naval Aviators their pay will be $205 per month plus allowances.”
¹³

But as far as the final word on the disposition of the Pacific Fleet, columnist Paul Mallon who wrote the “News Behind the News” syndicated column said, “The truth probably is that our naval command has decided not to risk heavy ships in waters where the enemy has air superiority, especially after what happened to the
Prince of Wales
and the
Repulse
. It is also probable a third of the fleet was in the Atlantic when the blow fell. A redistribution of naval forces is obviously necessary. The British should have enough of their own capital ships to take care of the Atlantic. . . .”
¹⁴
Mallon was an unusually trenchant columnist.

Japanese parachutists were spotted floating down over Manila, a prelude to invasion and occupation. “Filipino police, sole-remaining defenders of Manila, rushed through the bomb-ravaged and burning city early this morning hunting Japanese parachutists who were said to have been seen swooping down during the night, apparently attempting to prepare the way for invading armies.”
¹⁵
The Japanese War Office broadcast a statement in which they refused to recognize Manila as an open city. “The Japanese will not consider their action at all limited by such ‘arbitrary and unilateral announcements' and will proceed to carry out their war objectives,” they said.
¹⁶

American anti-aircraft guns—what few there were outside the city—scored a couple of hits and brought down three Japanese planes, but the bombings and the invasion continued. The Japanese advised the remaining civilians in the city to evacuate, via air dropped pamphlets. They were told to go to two refugee centers, Antipolo and Montalban. It wasn't that the Filipino and American troops weren't up to the challenge. They were; they fought bravely and tirelessly and by all accounts their equipment was better, but they were now facing overwhelming numbers of Japanese troops. “Outnumbered American and Philippine troops dug in among the coconut groves fringing the Tiaong River . . . for a stand against 10,000 to 15,000 Japanese invaders pushing up the Tabayas Isthmus. Their stand was costing the Japanese ten men for every fallen defender.”
¹⁷

MacArthur had been training these troops for several years, and it had paid off in a superior fighting soldier but as a substitution for victory, he would have gladly accepted more tanks, planes, and men, had they been forthcoming from Washington. One American anti-tank gun was, on average, taking out three Japanese tanks along with field guns.
¹⁸
“This question of reinforcement is difficult because the Philippines lie 7,000 miles from the United States and are amid Japanese island positions that hold a constant threat to reinforcement by air or sea.” The best Washington could realistically offer MacArthur was “Hopeful.”
¹⁹

The Japanese storm continued to rage across the entire Pacific. They had finally gained a toe-hold in the mineral rich Dutch East Indies. The move was a strategic one, aimed at possessing bases near Singapore to stop re-supply and aid from getting to the battered British garrison there.
²⁰
Inhabitants of the East Indies were warned not to run out of their homes when the Japanese dropped leaflets, as it was a ploy.

In Penang, on the Malaya Peninsula, leaflets had been dropped and then Japanese planes strafed the individuals who came out to read the paper which said the Japanese wanted peace.
²¹

The Japanese were also dropping paratroopers onto the Malaya Peninsula and claimed they now controlled one third of the isthmus. Singapore announced it had received assurance from both London and Washington that help was on the way, and the Australian Expeditionary Force was mounting a resilient and valiant effort against the Japanese invaders.
²²
British leaders were already vowing to take back Hong Kong, but that was so much blue sky over the Pacific as they didn't have the manpower to stop the Japanese advance, much less actually defeat them in open battle. That very day, the Japanese held a triumphal troop review in Hong Kong while announcing they had captured six thousand British troops and fifteen thousand Indian troops.
²³

The final chapter of the American presence in China was written when the Japanese seized the consul there and with it, some sixty noncombatants were taken into custody including Kenneth Yearns, the U.S. Consul.
²⁴
It was an open question whether it would also be the final chapter in the American presence in the Western Pacific if the Philippines fell. At this point, Japanese troops had closed to within forty miles of Manila.

A mound of paper crossed President Roosevelt's desk that day but none of it apparently dealing with the Philippines. FDR's inbox was especially heavy, the twenty-ninth. Memos from Secretary of State Cordell Hull on Borneo,
²⁵
copies of British diplomatic memoranda, to the State Department including a memo defining “Security,” and another on the organizational problems in localities where various agencies were crowding and stepping on each other's toes.
²⁶

As often the case, there was a confidential memorandum from John Franklin Carter, a writer (and covert White House operative) who worked out of the National Press Club building in Washington. His memos went directly to FDR, and no one else, and it seemed as if he was a free agent on the outside, outside any chain of command, working exclusively and directly for the president. His memos littered Roosevelt's desk.

A new one, dated the twenty-seventh, dealt with “Intelligence Problems in the New York Area.”
²⁷
“After discussions with F.B.I., O.N.I. [Office of Naval Intelligence] . . . I am convinced . . . Civil Service should be asked to waive or modify some of its rules on recruiting civilian personal for intelligence services.” In so many words, Carter was advocating the creation of a network of private individuals, including Mafiosi and wise guys, to act as covert operatives in behalf of the U.S. government. “There is a need for greater pooling of intelligence reports and services on the New York Area at least.”
²⁸
Roosevelt wrote back and advised Carter to take the matter up with William H. McReynolds and Vincent Astor.
²⁹
McReynolds was a White House aide who carried a portfolio with a wide latitude and extensive contacts in the agencies, and Astor was a New York socialite who, because of his connections to horse racing, presumably had contacts in Gotham's underworld.

He also received a copy of a classified British memo on how Great Britain was dealing with their Alien problem. “The initial policy was to impose on enemy aliens restrictions graduated according to their estimated potential danger. . . . the Executive advised a policy of general internment . . . “
³⁰
Roosevelt also sent a note on White House stationary to “H.H.” saying, “Will you read this over and I will talk with you about it later? F.D.R.”
³¹
The H.H. was Harry Hopkins, and widespread internment of Japanese was for once on the horizon.

The survivors of yet another previous Japanese attack on a civilian American ship in the Pacific washed ashore at Hawaii. But there were only thirteen men out of a compliment of thirty-four aboard the
Prusa
, a 7,000-ton freighter.
³²
Life
magazine published the most comprehensive set of photos of the carnage of Pearl Harbor, but the bulk dealt with the damage done to civilian targets and not the military in the Harbor or at Hickam Field. “First pictures of Jap onslaught show death & destruction at American base.”
³³
Still, few military targets were shown and no images of torpedoed ships were printed. Only the photo of a blasted out hangar and a B-17 that had been forced to belly land were published along with those of some destroyed P-40s that never got off the ground. One surprisingly gruesome photo was of seven dead civilians in the morgue: “[S]even corpses—three men, three women and one child—lie sheeted in an emergency morgue.” The publication claimed, “Now for the first time they [readers] may look on the bodies of their own dead.”
³⁴

To end on a happier note, this being the Christmas season,
Life
ran a montage of boys in uniforms saying good bye to loved ones. At an undisclosed location, up to four troop trains stopped daily.

“As each arrives, volunteer agents of the local Red Cross, the Knights of Columbus or the U.S.O. quickly appears with baskets of books, magazines and jig-saw puzzles which they give away, cartons of cigarets [sic] which they sell at any cost.” Because of the short stay, the young men were not allowed to get off. “As trains vanish into the night the soldiers shout goodbye to the girls on the platform ‘See you again,' they cry ‘We'll bring you a necklace of Jap ears.'”
³⁵

Henry Luce's
Life
magazine seemed to have a direct pipeline into the War Department. In this pre-television era, government publicists saw the splashy, picture-intensive magazine as an important tool in telling the story of the American military and to boost civilian and military morale. Features ran the gamut, from the “Anatomy of Bombs”
³⁶
and the personal story of “Buzz” Wagoner and how he bagged two Japanese Zeros in the Philippines,
³⁷
to the story of the marines and “parachutists,”
³⁸
to “How Nazi Planes May Bomb New York.”
³⁹
The thick, visually compelling weekly was filled with the stories and tales of the American fighting man, including full-sized photos of handsome young G.I.s in uniform.

One feature profiled Ensign George T. Weems, a handsome, six-foot tall specimen of American manhood with everything going for him. Humorously,
Life
also mentioned his one weak spot. The young navy man whose career goal was to become an admiral suffered from “seasickness.”
⁴⁰

That same week, Luce's
Time
magazine sported a flattering profile of MacArthur in the Pacific with a quote from the general saying, “When George Dewey sailed into Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, it was Manifest Destiny working itself out. By God, it was Destiny that brought me here. It was Destiny.” MacArthur smoked a cigarette as he watched Japanese bombs drop from the sky.
⁴¹
The lengthy and gushy two-page profile reviewed his career, that of his father's, his devotion to the Philippines, and his physical courage, as proved in Europe beginning in 1917.

Interestingly, the magazine opened by opining, “For the first time in nearly 10 years of publication,
Time
finds itself unable to tell its readers freely and frankly of all the things it [knows].”
⁴²
While this may have been true, the Luce publishing empire found itself in a position to tell Americans a lot more than what they were getting from other publications and broadsheets, even down to Admiral Chester Nimitz's nickname, “Cottonhead.”
⁴³
Indeed, the periodical had dozens of stories about the war and the men conducting the war in great detail, practically swimming in facts.

The magazine that week also had the complete insider dope on how poorly Fiorello La Guardia was running the Office of Civil Defense. The story and the extensive details could have only come from sources close to a White House very down on the mayor's stewardship. “Indications were that Mr. Roosevelt . . . was getting ready to pluck the Little Flower from OCD.”
⁴⁴

As FDR and Churchill were wrapping up their historic meeting outlining a plan for defeating the Axis Powers, it was revealed that Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in the Churchill government, had made a secret trip to Moscow to meet with Marshall Josef Stalin and his generals to work out the plans to defeat the Axis as it pertained to Russia. It was a “momentous” development, “paralleling the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings in Washington,” said the Associated Press.
⁴⁵
Discussions between the British and the Russians were also held on a post-war world and a “communiqué [outlined] the Anglo-Soviet exchange of views regarding [a] post-war organization of peace ‘provide much useful material which will facilitate further elaboration of concrete proposals on the subject.'”
⁴⁶
The Eden-Stalin meetings were termed “friendly.”
⁴⁷