Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series) (37 page)

Hermann Goering as Reichsmarschall.
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Another look at the Ju-88.
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A pair of “Stuka” dive bombers

A British fighter roars past a Do-17 bomber during the Battle of Britain, 1940.
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A Do-17.
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A diagram of the American “box” (or combat box stagger) formation that was so effective in defeating the Luftwaffe in the skies above Germany.

An Allied ship sunk by Stukas at Dunkirk, 1940.

Field Marshals Walter von Reichenau and Erhard Milch.
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Gen. Ernst Udet, 1936.

Col. Hans-Ulrich Rudel, the leading ground-support and dive-bomber ace of World War II. He personally destroyed more than 700 Soviet tanks and armored vehicles.

Col. Gen. Alexander Loehr. Commander of the Austrian Air Force when the Third Reich annexed the country in 1938, Loehr later commanded the 4th Air Fleet on the Eatern Front and Army Group F in the Balkans.

CHAPTER 10

The Russian Front, 1942–43

W
hile Milch struggled with the mammoth problems of the air armaments industry, the men on the eastern front struggled just to stay alive. On December 6, 1941, Stalin launched a major offensive all along the eastern front. The situation was especially critical in the zone of Army Group Center, which was supported now by only the VIII Air Corps of General Baron von Richthofen. (Kesselring’s HQ, 2nd Air Fleet, and Loerzer’s II Air Corps had both been sent to the Mediterranean to fight the British on December 1.) The situation of Richthofen’s units was typical of those on the Russian front in the winter of 1941–42, if not worse. The Red Air Force now had major advantages over the VIII Air Corps. Not only were they more experienced at flying in extremely cold weather, but they had shorter supply lines and were using the paved airports in the vicinity of Moscow. All Richthofen had was dirt strips.
¹
It was very difficult for his airplanes to even take off in the terrible Russian winter. Under heavy pressure, Army Group Center began to give ground in the second week of December. Then, on December 16, Hitler issued his first “hold at all costs” order. He also directed that VIII Air Corps was to be reinforced with a full bomber wing from the West, as well as three newly activated bomber wings, a twin-engine fighter wing from the night-fighter forces (to replenish the two fighter wings that Richthofen already had), a transport wing from the 4th Air Fleet in southern Russia, and four air transport wings from Germany, equipped with the last Ju-52s of the chief of training of the Luftwaffe. This short-sighted order completely disrupted air transport training and would have serious consequences in the days ahead.
²

The German armies in the East did not hold, despite Hitler’s orders. They were gradually pushed back 100 to 200 miles all along the front and lost 30 percent of their strength in the process. Naturally, casualties were heaviest in infantry and panzer units. Eighth Air Corps acted as a fire brigade for Army Group Center during the winter of 1941–42, when weather permitted. It opposed at least eight Soviet fighter regiments in the Moscow sector alone and suffered heavy casualties in both men and equipment due to the weather and enemy action. It nevertheless provided close air support to hard-pressed ground units and airlifted or airdropped vital supplies for troops that had been cut off or encircled. It conducted medical evacuations and reconnaissance and aerial interdiction missions and bombed several partisan concentrations out of existence. The hard-working pilots air-transported fresh combat battalions to threatened sectors, sometimes almost to the front lines. It accomplished all of these tasks despite the Russian winter, in cold so intense that rubber items—especially tires—froze and ruptured easily on takeoffs and landings. In early 1942 VIII Air Corps played a major part in slowing the major Russian breakthrough toward Rzhev (between Ostashkov and Kalinin), as well as in stopping the Russian offensive on the boundary between the Fourth Army and the Fourth Panzer Army.
³
By the time the Red Army was finally halted in March 1942, VIII Corps was exhausted. General Plocher observed: