Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series) (39 page)

Richthofen now had eleven bomber, three Stuka, and seven fighter wings: a formidable air armada.
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Within a week of his corps’ arrival in the Crimea, Richthofen attacked all the Russian airfields believed to be operational in the Kerch Peninsula and the nearby Caucasus area. The VIII Air Corps also subjected the ports of Kerch, Kamysh, Burun, and Novorossiysk to repeated bombings.
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Manstein unleashed his attack on the Parpach line on May 8, using only six German divisions and some marginally effective Rumanian formations against three Russian armies. The bombers and dive-bombers of VIII Air Corps never provided better close air support, as they smashed Soviet fortifications and assembly areas and paved the way for Eleventh Army’s mobile forces. Overhead, Richthofen’s Messerschmitt fighters completely defeated the Red Air Force, establishing absolute air supremacy from the first day. Eighth Air Corps flew more than two thousand sorties on the first day alone, enabling the infantry to make several major penetrations of the Parpach line. On the second day of the offensive, Manstein broke through on a three-mile front. By May 11, the Soviet Fifty-first Army was encircled against the Sea of Azov.
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Kerch fell on May 15, and by the 18th the battle was over. Manstein’s units captured 170,000 men, 1,133 guns, and 258 tanks, as well as 3,800 motor vehicles and almost 300 aircraft.
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Only minor Soviet elements managed to escape across the Kerch Strait to the Kuban.

Manstein’s next target was Sevastopol, then considered to be the strongest land and naval fortress in the world. An outer perimeter encircled the city at a distance of nine to twelve miles, and an inner belt three miles out was also very strong. “Virtually no part of the terrain was without its fortifications,” a German general later commented.
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The city was defended by two Soviet armies controlling 101,238 men, 600 guns, and 2,000 mortars, but only 40 tanks.
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Sevastopol’s air forces were also extremely weak. Its few airfields were within German flak and heavy artillery range, so its good air units had been evacuated in 1941. The Red Air Force at Sevastopol had only sixty obsolete aircraft plus a few seaplanes.
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To attack this massive fortress, Manstein had only seven German and two Rumanian divisions. He did have strong support, however: 1,300 pieces of artillery, as well as the VIII Air Corps, with seven bomber, three Stuka, and four fighter wings—600 aircraft in all—plus seventeen antiaircraft batteries (under Headquarters, 18th Flak Regiment) in corps reserve. During the Battle of Sevastopol, the 18th Flak alone fired over 18,700 rounds of 88mm ammunition. Most of the flak units were employed in direct support of the infantry, but several were used to guard Manstein’s superheavy guns, one of which could hurl a seven-ton shell more than twenty-three miles.
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Several other aviation elements of VIII Air Corps were not used at Sevastopol, but stood by in the Kerch sector, ready to interdict in case the Red Air Force, the Black Sea Fleet, or elite marine amphibious units tried to interfere with Manstein’s main operations by landing in the eastern Crimea.

Richthofen believed that the Luftwaffe could best aid the ground forces by breaking Soviet morale, so he adopted “conveyor belt” tactics. Flight units were kept constantly in the air, landing only long enough to refuel or replenish their ammunition, and they kept Soviet positions under more or less continuous attack. Wave after wave of fighters and dive-bombers pounded Russian positions, almost without letup. Richthofen was right: Soviet morale was affected by his unrelenting aerial bombardment.

The battle began on June 2. The few Russian fighters that tried to intervene from the east were promptly shot down. General von Richthofen personally directed aerial operations from a tower, from which he could see most of the battlefield, including the enemy airstrips. The summer sky was cloudless—typical for the Mediterranean climate of the Crimea—and the Russian aircraft threw up dust clouds when they revved up their engines prior to takeoff. When he saw these dust clouds, Richthofen immediately directed the flak artillery to fire on the airfields, which had no doubt been previously registered. The shells landed on target within thirty seconds of his call for fire, smashing most of the garrison’s few airplanes before they could even take off. His complete control of the air also allowed Richthofen to station his units at airstrips extremely close to the front, so very little time was lost en route to targets. Ju-87s, in fact, barely had time to climb to their attack altitudes before it was time for them to dive on their targets.
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The VIII Air Corps committed 723 aircraft to the battle on the first day and flew up to 2,000 sorties a day. On June 3 it used 643 aircraft, and on June 4, 5, and 6 it flew 585, 555, and 563, respectively. In these five days it dropped 2,264 tons of high explosives and 23,800 incendiary bombs on Sevastopol and its defenders. To the east, other VIII Air units operating from the Kerch Peninsula attacked Russian airfields in the Kuban and the western Caucasus and kept the Soviet Black Sea ports under more or less constant attack. No Soviet naval or amphibious attempts to relieve Sevastopol could be made under such pressure.
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Despite magnificent air support, ground progress was slow at Sevastopol. The terrain was difficult, and fortifications were abundant. Led by fanatical political commissars, Soviet infantrymen and marines held their pillboxes and resisted to the end, frequently fighting to the last man. Every machine-gun nest, fort, minefield, cave, and trench had to be cleared individually in bitter fighting. The outer defensive ring was not cleared until June 26. The attack on the inner ring began on the 29th, but by then the effects of the battle began to tell on the defenders. On the night of June 28-29, elements of the 22nd Air Landing and 24th Infantry divisions crossed the wide North Bay in rubber boats and landed in the Soviet rear east of Sevastopol, but there was no counterattack. Russian morale suddenly collapsed, and the fortress fell quickly. Pockets of fanatical resistance continued to exist in the city of Sevastopol, but Manstein refused to add to his already long casualty lists. He asked Richthofen to annihilate the diehards with his Stukas, which the baron did, running the civilian death toll even higher in the process. There were incidents of commissars blowing themselves up, along with women and children, rather than surrendering.
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When the battle ended on July 4, some 90,000 prisoners had been taken. More than 460 artillery pieces, 758 mortars, and 155 antitank and antiaircraft guns were captured or destroyed.
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During this battle, VIII Air Corps flew 23,751 sorties, dropped more than 20,500 tons of bombs, destroyed 141 enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground, and destroyed 611 motorized vehicles, 10 tanks, and 20 bunkers. It also silenced forty-eight artillery batteries and heavily damaged two destroyers. There was no rest for Richthofen and his men following this victory, however; they quickly flew 120 miles to the north, to the Rossosh area, where the German summer offensive of 1942 was about to begin.
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It would end in the Battle of Stalingrad.

While Sevastopol was rocking under the weight of Richthofen’s bombs, another battle of great importance was being fought north of the Arctic Circle, off the coast of Norway, Finland, and Russia. Since 1941, the Americans and British had been supplying Stalin with arms, clothing, and equipment. Most of it had come through the White Sea ports of Murmansk and Arch -angel. By March, 1942, it was obvious that Russia would not be knocked out of the war anytime soon, so Goering ordered Stumpff to cooperate with the U-boats to destroy the convoys. Long-range reconnaissance was to be undertaken by the Condors of I Group, 40th Bomber Wing, based at Trondheim and the recently constructed airfields in the far north. When the convoys were spotted, Stumpff’s units were to cease supporting the Army of Norway and attack the convoys. Unfortunately for Stumpff, he had very little to attack them with. In February, 1942, he had only sixty Ju-88 antishipping bombers (of the 30th Bomber Wing), thirty Stukas, thirty Me-109s, and fif-teen He-115 seaplane torpedo-carriers.
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Because of the arctic weather, the length of the arctic nights, and the shortage of aircraft, the PQ 12 convoy passed through in early March without loss. PQ 13, which was split up by bad weather, lost two freighters to Ju-88s and three more to U-boats. PQ 14 ran into a dense ice floe in the fog. Sixteen of its twenty-four vessels were damaged and had to return to Iceland; another was sunk by a U-boat.
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By the time PQ 15 came within range, Stumpff had been reinforced with I Group, 26th Bomber Wing (an He-111 unit), but many of his Ju-88 torpedo bombers were back in Germany for refitting, so the convoy lost only three ships (to torpedo vessels). However by late May, when PQ 16 was spotted by the Condors, Stumpff had more than one hundred aircraft ready for the attack. The torpedo bombers scored several hits and damaged a number of vessels, but only seven of the thirty-five ships in the convoy were sunk—a disappointing performance by 5th Air Fleet. The convoy delivered 2,507 vehicles, 321 tanks, and 124 aircraft to Stalin. There were 770 vehicles, 147 tanks, and 77 aircraft aboard the ships that went to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean.
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PQ 17, the largest convoy to date (thirty-five freighters and a few escort vessels), began assembling off the southwestern coast of Iceland in early June. Its presence was promptly reported to Stumpff by the Condors. By now, 5th Air Fleet had been reinforced, and Stumpff was able to assemble 103 Ju-88 bombers, 42 He-111 torpedo bombers, 15 He-115 floatplanes/torpedo bomb -ers, 30 Stukas, 8 Condors, 22 Ju-88 reconnaissance aircraft, and 44 Blohm and Voss 138 (BV-138) reconnaissance seaplanes. The convoy left Iceland on June 27. Now Stumpff had the advantage because of the long days of the arctic summer. His reconnaissance aircraft maintained visual contact twenty-four hours a day.
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The first attack took place on July 4 and scattered the convoy. The dive-bombers, torpedo bombers, and U-boats then began hunting down the cargo ships one by one. Eight of them were sunk by aircraft, nine by U-boats, and there were seven shared kills. The eleven survivors hid along the coast and finally reached Archangel several weeks later. They delivered 896 vehicles, 164 tanks, and 87 aircraft. PQ 17 had lost 3,350 vehicles, 430 tanks, 100,000 tons of other cargo, 210 aircraft, and 24 ships—a total of 143,977 tons. The loss of material was roughly equal to that the Soviets suffered in the Battle of Uman.
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It was a disaster for the Allies and the greatest victory 5th Air Fleet had scored since the conquest of Norway—and its last.

The Allies learned a great deal from the PQ 17 catastrophe. They did not send out another convoy (PQ 18) until October, and then they sent an aircraft carrier with it. The Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses and sank only thirteen of the forty cargo ships. The twenty-seven survivors delivered enough war material to equip an entire Soviet tank army.
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PQ 18 was the last convoy to come under heavy Luftwaffe attack. The Allies invaded North Africa on November 8, and the Ju-88 and He-111 torpedo bombers were withdrawn to the Mediterranean, where they were based in Sardinia. The Allies had learned the lesson of PQ 17 well. Never again did they send out a convoy without major naval units and aircraft carriers. As a result, Germany lost the Battle of the Northern Approaches. Fifteen million tons of the 16.5 million tons of American supplies dispatched to the Soviet Union reached their destination—most of them via Murmansk. These supplies included 13,000 tanks, 135,000 machine guns, tens of thousands of vehicles, and thousands of modern aircraft equal or superior to those of the Luftwaffe. Their impact would soon be felt at the front, both in the air and on the ground.
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