Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series) (4 page)

Milch never developed a personal relationship with Hermann Goering. He had, after all, been paying the fat man bribes for years and did not look upon him with a great deal of respect. Down the road, Milch planned to take charge of the Air Ministry and the Luftwaffe himself. Goering would go the route of Junkers, Merkel, and Wronsky and be sacrificed to the ambition of Erhard Milch, or at least that was the plan. First, however, he had to consolidate his own power and create the Luftwaffe.

Milch began his program by dividing the Reich Aviation Ministry (RLM) into a Central Branch, the Air Command Office (LA), the General Air Office (LB), the Technical Office (LC), the Luftwaffe Administrative Office (LD), and the Luftwaffe Personnel Office (LP). The Air Command Office was the most important subdivision and was, in effect, the clandestine General Staff of the Luftwaffe. It was subdivided into the Operations Branch (LA-I), the Organization Branch (LA-II), the Training Branch (LA-III), the Flak Artillery Branch (LA-IV), and the Supply Branch (LA-V), plus signals and medical departments. To officer the RLM, Milch and Goering had to depend on the coordination of General of Infantry (later Field Marshal) Werner von Blomberg, the minister of defense. Fortunately for them, Blomberg was not a selfish man, and he recognized the importance the air force would have in the future. In 1933 alone he transferred 550 officers with aviation experience to the RLM (including his entire air operations staff), followed by about 4,000 junior officers and NCO volunteers.
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More than that, Blomberg did not take this as an opportunity to rid the army of marginal or inefficient officers, as a lesser man might have done. Instead, Blomberg transferred many of his best men to the Luftwaffe. Some of these, including Col. Albert Kessel-ring, made the move with reluctance; others were happy to be back in aviation. Many of the capable General Staff officers Blomberg shipped to the Luftwaffe had no previous aviation experience at all. The list of army officers sent to the new branch included Col. Hans-Juergen Stumpff, an excellent chief of personnel; Lt. Col. Walter Wever, the new chief of the Air Command Office; Col. Wilhelm Wimmer, who took charge of the Technical Office; and Capt. Baron Wolfram von Richthofen, the new chief of the Development and Testing Branch in the Technical Office and one of Wimmer’s two principal assistants. Also transferred to the Luftwaffe were colonels Hugo Sperrle, Hell-muth Felmy, and Ludwig Wolff; lieutenant colonels Hans Geisler, Max von Pohl, Wilhelm Speidel, and Helmuth Volkmann; majors Paul Deichmann, Joseph Kammhuber, Hans Jeschonnek, Herhudt von Rohden, Kurt Student, Otto Hoffmann von Waldau, and Karl Heinrich Bodenschatz; and captains Andreas Nielsen, Hermann Plocher, Joseph “Beppo” Schmid, and Hans Seidemann.

State Secretary Milch realized that the number of air units he could activate depended on two factors: 1) the production of aircraft; and 2) the number of trained crews the aviation schools could produce. Unfortunately, there were no military aviation schools in Germany in 1933, and the German aircraft industry was very small. To build the Luftwaffe would require money. (Hitler estimated the cost at thirty million reichsmarks; it would actually cost three billion reichsmarks over the next six years.) Milch obtained the funds through Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, the president of the Reichs-bank. Schacht funneled the money to RLM through the Metal Research Company (MEFO), the Autobahn Air Transport Office, the Air Depot of the Volunteer Labor Service, Lufthansa, the South German Lufthansa Company, the Glider Research Institute, and others. Meanwhile, Milch busily expanded the Luftwaffe’s training program. In the spring of 1933 he established the Flying School Command within the Aviation Ministry. Subordinate to the Air Command Office, it was responsible for supervising military aviation courses given in commercial flying schools, as well as making preparations for the establishment of military flight training schools.
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The next year Sports Flyers, Ltd., a civilian organization, was placed directly under the command of the state secretary and, in effect, became a paramilitary training organization. The president of Sports Flyers, Ltd., was simultaneously named inspector of reserve flyers. He was none other than Bruno Loerzer, Goering’s World War I comrade (and more recently a cigar salesman), who was destined to become a colonel general in the Luftwaffe.

To build the new military training facilities and to enlarge the capacity of the “civilian” schools, Milch had to provide them with aircraft, which meant he had to greatly expand the German aviation industry. Using MEFO funds, he converted locomotive firms such as Gotha and A.T.G., and shipbuilding concerns, such as Blohm and Voss, into factories for the production of aircraft and aircraft components. Existing aviation firms, including Dornier, Heinkel, Fieseler, Arado, Messerschmitt, and Junkers, were given lucrative government loans to expand their factories and production capabilities.
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When Hitler took power in January 1933, there were 4,000 skilled workers in the German aircraft industry. The number grew to 20,000 by February, 1934, and stood at almost 72,000 by June, 1935. By the end of 1933 there were an estimated two million workers employed in other aspects of the Luftwaffe’s buildup, including the construction of airfields, barracks, bases, military housing, factories, training schools, and other facilities.

Hugo Junkers, Milch’s former employer, presented problems. The former professor of thermodynamics had invented and patented a full-cantilevered flying wing in 1910. Then he left his university and entered the new field of aerodynamics. He invented the Juno diesel engine for trucks and airplanes and turned the Juno Works into a multimillion dollar operation. By the fall of 1933 he owned two airplane companies. Unfortunately, he was an idealist and a visionary who thought aviation should be used for peaceful purposes only. He built passenger planes and went into a violent rage when it was suggested that his firm design bombers. Milch instantly and ruthlessly turned on his former mentor, who was of no further use to him. He had the old man arrested, threatened with prosecution, and interrogated for six hours at a time. Junkers, the father of twelve, was forced to sell 51 percent of his airline, factories, and other aviation assets to the Third Reich, and he only escaped prosecution on trumped-up charges of treason by dying on February 3, 1935. Junkers was replaced by Dr. Heinrich Koppenberg, who later also fell out of Milch’s favor and was sacked by the state secretary.
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On January 1, 1934, the “Rhineland Program” was launched secretly. Its objective was to create an air force of more than 4,029 aircraft—a force that would impress the Allies by pure numbers. The air force thus created was called the “Risk Luftwaffe” (
Risikoluftwaffe
), because it was designed to convince any potential enemy that attacking Germany would be risky. In keeping with this idea, the Risk Luftwaffe was bomber-heavy. It was to include 822 bombers, 590 reconnaissance aircraft, 251 fighters, 51 dive-bombers, and 149 naval aircraft, for a total of 1,863 first-line airplanes. It also included 1,760 trainer aircraft, 89 communications aircraft, and 309 miscellaneous airplanes (mainly experimental prototypes). Many of these planes were obsolete, as Milch and Goering knew. The fighters, for example, were Arado 64s and 65s (Ar-64s and Ar-65s) and Heinkel 51s (He-51s)—all biplanes—but they would have to do until the next generation of aircraft could be put into production. Besides, time was an important factor here. Germany, after all, could hardly expect to keep such a large-scale military buildup secret indefinitely. The Risk Luftwaffe was to be ready by September 1935.
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As the Luftwaffe grew in strength, it became necessary to set up its basic territorial and unit organizations. The territorial organization was established on April 1, 1934, when six senior air offices were established. Later called
Luftkreise
(Air Service Commands), they were corps-level units, headquartered at Koenigsberg (I), Berlin (II), Dresden (III), Muenster (IV), Munich (V), and Kiel (VI) (Sea). Each Luftkreis included a senior air commander (
Hoeherer Fliegerkommandeur
), who was in charge of all aviation units in the Luft -kreis; two or three Air Administrative Area Commands (
Luftgaukommandos
); a Signal Communications Command; an Air Service Area Medical Battalion; and a Procurement and Supply Group. They also had authority over all civilian airfields and the right to issue orders pertaining to civil air defense. Later, in 1935 and 1936, the Luftkreise commanders were made responsible for the flak artillery units in their areas (under the senior flak artillery commander). They were also responsible for personnel replacement in their zones, and in 1935 they added replacement battalions to their organizational charts. In 1936 these were enlarged to replacement regiments (
Fliegerersatzregimente
). The Luftkreise (under various names) were the basic territorial units of the Luftwaffe and remained responsible for flak artillery defense and personnel (including pilot) replacement through much of the war.
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To command the Luftkreise, Goering and Milch induced three Reichs -heer retirees to join the Luftwaffe: lieutenant generals Hans Halm, Edmund Wachenfeld, and Leonhard Kaupisch. All were capable administrators who were immediately promoted to general of flyers. Konrad Zander, a retired naval officer, was also promoted to general of flyers and placed in command of Luftkreis VI at Kiel, where the naval aviation units were concentrated. Two younger Luftwaffe officers, Col. Hugo Sperrle and Maj. Gen. Karl Schweick-hard, both of whom had previously been transferred from the army by Blomberg, were given command of Luftkreise, but they were not promoted.
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During the period of the Risk Luftwaffe, the German Air Force organized its basic combat aviation units, which were to remain standard throughout the Second World War. The basic unit was the Geschwader, which was roughly equivalent to a U.S. Air Force wing. Wings included 100 to 120 aircraft and were commanded by majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and occasionally by major generals. Wings were designated by their aircraft type. Thus the 1st Fighter Wing was
Jagdgeschwader
1 (abbreviated JG 1), the 51st Bomber Wing was
Kampfgeschwader
51 (or KG 51), and so forth. Twin-engine fighter wings were designated “Destroyer Wings” (
Zerstorergeschwader
or ZG). Training wings (
Lehrgeschwader
) could be composed of any type of aircraft.

Each wing had a staff squadron (
Stabsstaffel
) and three (later four) groups (
Gruppen
) of thirty to thirty-six airplanes per group. Normally commanded by majors or lieutenant colonels, each group had a staff squadron and three combat squadrons (
Staffeln
). Groups were designated by Roman numerals. Thus II/StG 1 was the II Group, 1st Stuka Wing (
Stukageschwader
1). Squadrons (nine to twelve airplanes each) were given arabic designations (1, III/JG 3, for example, referred to the 1st Squadron, III Group, 3rd Fighter Wing). As in the wings and groups, the number of aircraft actually in the typical squadron declined considerably as the war progressed.

Squadrons were further subdivided into sections (
Ketten
) of three or four aircraft each. A fighter section was called a
Schwarm
and normally consisted of four aircraft.

On March 9, 1935, Germany announced to foreign military attachés that the Luftwaffe had officially come into being on March 1.
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One week after the announcement, on March 16, Hitler renounced the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and announced plans to create an army of thirty-six divisions. The Luftwaffe and the German Armed Forces (
Wehrmacht
) had come out of the closet.