Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series) (6 page)

Ironically enough, Goering’s order to halt all work on the four-engine bomber was issued on April 29, 1937. A Technical Office report dated April 26 (and reflecting aircraft status as of March 15) listed both the Ju-89 and Do-19 as “SV”—ready for testing.
¹³
The prototypes of both models were scrapped.

In addition to the loss of four-engine bombers, Wever’s death also led to a dangerous command fragmentation that would hamper the Luftwaffe for the rest of its existence. The direct causes of this fragmentation were the personalities of Hermann Goering and Erhard Milch.

Hermann Goering, the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, was fully acceptable to the senior air force officers for a number of reasons. Because he was a holder of the
Pour le Merite
and the last commander of the 1st Fighter Wing “Richthofen,” he was looked upon as a comrade as well as a superior. He was optimistic, humorous, and generally respected by his men. Not blood-thirsty by nature, he did not want a war—and certainly not before the Luftwaffe was fully prepared for it. Also, he made no attempt to involve himself in the day-to-day activities of the Luftwaffe, and—until 1940—he was the man closest to Adolf Hitler: a fact that was of immeasurable use to the German Air Force. His main role in the Luftwaffe’s expansion was in the procurement of funds. When the minister of finance turned down a request for money, Wever and his successors would simply turn the matter over to Goering, who would go directly to the Fuehrer.

“Here it is!” Goering would exclaim later, when he returned with the approved appropriation. “The Fuehrer is surprised that we’re so modest. He expected us to ask for a lot more. Incidentally, once and for all, money is no object. Remember that!”
¹⁴
He would then turn on his heel and leave. It would be hard for anyone
not
to like a boss like that.

After 1934, Goering’s energy diminished greatly. His wife had died of cancer in 1931. Lonely for some time, Hermann met and fell in love with Emmy Sonnemann, a generous, big-hearted, natural blonde, who was an actress with the Weimar National Theater. They were married on April 10, 1935. Emmy was as unlike the first Frau Goering as can be imagined. Where Karin had pushed Hermann to work harder for the Fuehrer, Emmy encouraged his natural tendencies to laziness and luxurious living. Whereas Karin was a rabid Nazi, Emmy was definitely not. One gets the impression that she did not take Hitler and his crowd very seriously. She consistently refused to disassociate herself from her Jewish friends. Every time Goering returned home after another wave of Jewish persecution shook Germany, Emmy would meet him at the door with a list of Jews she wanted Hermann to help. Shaking his head, Goering would present the list to his adjutant, knowing full well that the news of his “influence” would reach Hitler’s ears via Gestapo Chief Heinrich Himmler and others.
¹⁵

In the meantime, Goering constructed his own palace, named “Karin-hall” in honor of his first wife, on a 100,000-acre private estate he acquired for himself in East Prussia. Life was now thoroughly enjoyable for Hermann Goering. He ballooned to about 300 pounds, gorging himself on his favorite dish (blinis with caviar, smothered with whipped cream), chased down with champagne or expensive wine. These gastronomic orgies were usually followed by a fit of dieting and exercise, the positive results of which were almost immediately negated by a midnight raid on his well-stocked refrigerator. To make matters worse, he went back on drugs. This time it was para-codeine, a mild morphine narcotic. By the end of 1937, he was taking up to ten pills a day.
¹⁶
With his many posts, his indulgent wife, his natural love of luxury, and his drug habit, Goering had little time for the Luftwaffe.

Milch, of course, knew all of this. Like Goering, Milch loved both luxury and power. His advancement had been rapid. Commissioned colonel in the Reichswehr in 1933, he was promoted to major general on March 24, 1934, lieutenant general on March 28, 1935, and general of flyers on April 20, 1936. Meanwhile, he carefully cultivated Adolf Hitler. The chancellor had even personally conferred the Golden Party Badge on the half-Jewish Milch in a special cabinet meeting—a rare, special sign of favor. Meanwhile, Goering’s spies in the RLM informed him that Milch privately referred to himself as the minister of aviation—implying that Goering was merely a figurehead whom Milch would someday replace. The fact that Milch was regarded as the future minister by Defense Minister Blomberg, SS Chief Heinrich Himmler, Nazi party chief Rudolf Hess, and others did nothing to mitigate Goering’s suspicions.
¹⁷

Nothing came of the behind-the-scenes plotting as long as Walter Wever was alive. The dynamic chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe had kept friction at a minimum, skillfully placating both Milch and Goering and still getting his own way. This happy situation changed radically with his death, when Goering appointed Lt. Gen. Albert Kesselring to the vacant post.

Although undoubtedly capable as an administrator and as a tactician, Kesselring lacked the strategic genius of Walter Wever. He also lacked Wever’s ability (and inclination) to deal with the ambitious Milch. He and the deputy C-in-C of the Luftwaffe clashed almost immediately. Milch demanded that Maj. Hans Jeschonnek, the commander of the III Training Group at Greifswald, be court-martialled because of the high number of flying accidents taking place there. Kesselring steadfastly refused. Furthermore, Kesselring joined the growing list of General Staff officers who demanded Milch be restricted exclusively to civil aviation. At one point, Kesselring even accused Milch of high treason for divulging too much information about the Luftwaffe’s strength to the British during a trip he took to England.
¹⁸

For his part, Milch could never understand the generals’ attitude toward him. He, after all, held the same rank as they did—if not higher—and he understood the complex areas of aircraft production and business negotiations, which they at first did not. He took his title literally and considered himself Goering’s deputy in all matters, including those involving the General Staff. He also had a talent for manipulation and internal political intrigue, which he used against his enemies to the maximum extent possible.

The generals’ attitudes are easy to understand. Milch was younger than most of the other air force generals who had been transferred from the army by Blomberg. He also lacked their command experience and General Staff training. True enough he had the initial advantage of vastly superior technical aviation knowledge, but the bright newcomers applied themselves to their new field and were gradually closing the technical gap between themselves and Milch. They looked down on the state secretary, whom they considered a civilian who owed his appointment to political considerations. Goering, of course, was also a civilian, but they accepted him, because he held the keys to promotions and never tried to run the Luftwaffe on a dayto-day basis, as Milch did. Whispers about Milch’s Jewish ancestry could also be heard in the halls of the ministry. Milch responded by filling ministerial appointments with his own people, insofar as that was possible. Insecure and sensitive, he surrounded himself with yes-men. Worse than that, he refused to cooperate with the chief of the General Staff, whoever that might be.

Goering—no professional officer himself—feared both sides in the power struggle (i.e., both Milch and the General Staff). He had only briefly commanded an air wing eighteen years before, and the Luftwaffe was full of men who were technologically and professionally better qualified than he. He should have stepped in and settled the dispute between Milch and the General Staff, but instead he encouraged it—a prime example of divide and rule. With Milch and the General Staff at each others’ throats, neither could threaten Goering, who realized that he was technologically inferior to either faction. Hermann thus protected his own position, even though he did irreparable damage to the Luftwaffe in the process.

Kesselring soon tired of the constant bickering and backbiting and resigned as chief of staff in 1937. He was given a promotion and a territorial command (Luftkreis III at Dresden) and was succeeded for one year by Gen. Hans-Juergen Stumpff, the chief of the Personnel Office. Stumpff never wanted the post and indeed was not the first choice. The appointment had been offered to two army officers—Lt. Gen. Franz Halder and Col. Alfred Jodl—but both declined because they did not want to work with (or against) Milch.
¹⁹

In early 1937, Goering announced the reorganization of the Air Ministry into military and civilian branches. The General Staff was to be in charge of the High Command of the Luftwaffe (
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe
, or OKL), but Milch retained control of the General Air Office, the Central Branch, and the inspectorates, and would simultaneously be inspector general of the Luftwaffe. This organizational setup was obviously unworkable and Milch said so. “You are ruining the Luftwaffe this way,” he warned Goering. “Somebody has to be in charge of everything. If I don’t do it, then you will have to . . . but you won’t!”
²⁰
Milch submitted his resignation, but Goering refused to accept it. “Look here, Milch,” he said, “I’m not demoting you because you failed, but because you’ve succeeded
too
well. The Party keeps telling me that it’s Milch who does all the work. And . . . I won’t stand for that!”
²¹
At a time when revolutionary developments were being made in the fields of aircraft design, radar, jet engines, and rocket propulsion, the leading men of the Luftwaffe were preoccupied with jealousy, power struggles, and petty personnel disputes. The division of authority and the internal strife continued until 1944.

The Luftwaffe’s internal situation deteriorated even further in 1937 and 1938, when Goering removed three offices from Air Ministry and General Staff control and placed them directly under the minister (i.e., Goering himself). These were the Personnel Office (under Gen. Ritter Robert von Greim), the Office of the Chief of Air Defense (Gen. Otto Guenther Ruedel), and the Technical Office (Maj. Gen. Ernst Udet). Since Goering had no interest in their daily operations, these changes in effect made these offices independent of any control or outside supervision. It was tantamount to total command fragmentation and paralysis of many important functions. Before June, 1936, there was only one center of power in the Luftwaffe and that was Milch. After this date there were two (Milch and Kesselring, followed by Stumpff). By January 1938, there were five: Milch, Stumpff, Udet, Greim, and Ruedel. In the cases of Greim and Ruedel, it mattered little. Greim was a capable personnel officer and Ruedel, the former inspector of antiaircraft artillery, needed no supervision in the Air Defense Office.
²²
The Technical Office, however, was another matter entirely.

In June 1936, Goering had replaced the competent Gen. Wilhelm Wimmer (whom he disliked) with Colonel Udet, his old friend from the Richt -hofen wing. He made Udet’s office independent of Milch and Stumpff in 1937 and expanded it into the Office of Supply and Procurement in 1938.
²³

Ernst Udet was a military adventurer and the leading German ace to survive World War I. Born in Frankfurt-am-Main on April 26, 1896, he attended school in Munich before joining the 26th Infantry Division as a motorcycle dispatch rider. Young Udet was a war volunteer, rather than a soldier, so he managed to secure a discharge in the fall of 1914. He immediately reported to an aviation replacement unit but was not accepted for pilot’s training because he was too young. He was not to be blocked, however. His father, Adolf Udet, paid 2,000 marks to Gustav Otto, the owner of the Otto Works in Munich, so that young Ernst could take his private pilot’s training. He rejoined the service as an enlisted pilot with the 9th Reserve Flying Detachment on June 15, 1915, and was soon sent to the western front with the 206th Artillery Flying Detachment. He was promoted to lance corporal (
Gefreiten
) on September 21, 1915.
²⁴

Initially Udet flew for an artillery observer and was awarded the Iron Cross, 2d Class, for bravery in the Vosges sector. Later he spent seven days in the stockade for losing an aircraft due to his own carelessness. Nevertheless he was promoted to sergeant (
Unterofzzier
) and was transferred to the 68th Field Flying Detachment in Flanders as a fighter pilot in late 1915.
²⁵