Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series) (45 page)

Meanwhile, a pregnant event occurred. On August 17, 1942, eighteen American Boeing B-17E “Flying Fortresses,” personally led by Gen. Ira Eaker, bombed Rouen-Sotteville, France, and returned to England without loss. It was the modest beginning of the United States Air Force’s daylight bombing operations in Europe. Convinced that unescorted daylight bombing could be successful if the bombers were sufficiently well armed, the American four-engine bombers “bristled” with.50-caliber heavy machine guns and flew a formation designed for mutual defense and maximum combined firepower.
³²
Although the Rouen raid was insignificant in itself, it argued ill for the future of the Luftwaffe in the West.

By the end of 1942, the Luftwaffe was in dire straits. Due largely to Udet’s mismanagement, it was short 43 percent of its establishment in combat aircraft, and (unlike the Allies) it had failed to equip its units with aircraft significantly better than those with which they had entered the war. Only three new models had been introduced in appreciable numbers: the disappointing Ju-88, the FW-189 (a good short-range reconnaissance plane), and the FW-190 fighter which, although an excellent fighter at low altitudes, was also a bit of a disappointment. It was sturdier, more maneuverable, and better armed than the Me-109 it was designed to replace, but its performance deteriorated rapidly above 20,000 feet (i.e., the altitudes at which bombers operated). The FW-190 also had teething problems and its air-cooling system problems were never fully solved.
³³
It was therefore decided to keep the old Me-109s in production (indeed, more Me-109s would be manufactured than any other aircraft in the Second World War).

In short, the nonarrival of the Me-210, He-177, and other aircraft from the Udet era meant that most of the warplanes of the Luftwaffe were obsolete by the end of 1942, and the combined air armaments industries of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were vastly out-producing that of Nazi Germany. Most of the Luftwaffe’s senior officers did not realize it yet, but they were on the brink of disaster. They were in for an education in 1943 and 1944.

CHAPTER 12

The Tide Turns, 1943

T
he Luftwaffe was committed to the Mediterranean front in January, 1941, when the X Air Corps (with 330 first-line aircraft) was transferred from Norway to Sicily and Libya to support the Italians. The preparations were directed by Maj. Gen. Otto Hoffmann von Waldau. By February they were mining Tobruk harbor and the Suez Canal, bombing Benghazi, attacking British truck convoys, and supporting Gen. Erwin Rommel’s newly formed Afrika Korps,
¹
which formed the nucleus of what became Panzer Army Afrika.

Direct support of Rommel’s ground forces was the responsibility of Rumanian-born Maj. Gen. Stefan Froehlich, who had served thirty years in the Austrian armed forces before being incorporated into the Luftwaffe as a lieutenant colonel in 1938. He had commanded I Group, 76th Bomber Wing, in Poland, and then the wing itself in the Western campaign and the Battle of Britain. Prior to the war his group had been based at Wiener Neustadt, south of Vienna,
²
where Colonel Rommel commanded the infantry school. There was never any indication of friendship between the two, however.

The role of the Luftwaffe in Rommel’s early victories was not as great as might have been expected, because Air Command Afrika was not subordinate to Rommel. The Luftwaffe flew many dive-bomber and air interdiction missions for the Afrika Korps, and it even flew in supplies, but there were no all-out attacks on British lines of retreat, nor were there any major attempts to destroy the R.A.F. units in Cyrenaica. The R.A.F. was very weak at this time because of the reinforcements it had sent to Greece.
³
Rommel was halted at Tobruk in April, and the R.A.F. gradually took command of the air. Operation “Battleaxe,” Rommel’s brilliant defensive victory in June, was won despite local R.A.F. air superiority.
⁴

As the Royal Air Force and British fleet took control of the air and sea lanes from Italy to Africa, the Italian navy proved unable to supply Rommel, and his supply situation reached dangerous levels. Geisler’s X Air Corps attempted to subdue Malta, the strategic island and major Royal Navy base between Sicily and Rommel’s main supply port at Tripoli, but was unsuccessful. At the end of April 1941, Geisler had called off the battle due to heavy losses and severe maintenance problems. He then proposed that since the natural German supply route to North Africa was via Greece and Crete, it was the eastern half of the Mediterranean that required X Air Corps’ attention. Despite the objections of the Italians, who wanted to concentrate against Malta, Geisler’s arguments won the day.
⁵

The Italians were right. By November, British naval and air units operating out of Malta were sinking 77 percent of Rommel’s supplies. Then, on November 23, the British launched a major offensive (Operation “Crusader”), aimed at breaking the Siege of Tobruk. Rommel’s men went into this battle with only 15 percent of the fuel they required and suffered their first major defeat in the field. Clearly something had to be done, or Panzer Army Afrika (and with it all of North Africa) would be lost. Hitler responded by sending II Air Corps (Loerzer) to the area, along with HQ, 2nd Air Fleet (Kesselring). Field Marshal Kesselring was simultaneously named commander-in-chief, South (
Oberbe -fehl shaber Süd
, or OB South). Second Air Fleet assumed control of all Luftwaffe forces in the Mediterranean (II and X Air Corps and Air Command Afrika). By January, 1942, Kesselring had completed his reorganization of the Mediterranean theater. He had 650 frontline aircraft, of which 260 were in Africa, and more reinforcements were on their way. In mid-January he resumed limited air operations against Malta.

Kesselring launched his major aerial onslaught against the island in mid-March. By the end of April, II Air Corps had flown more than 11,000 sorties and dropped 10,000 tons of bombs on the island. All British submarines and warships had been forced to abandon the island, and the Desert Fox was receiving his supplies regularly. This allowed him to launch a major offensive against the Gazala line in May. Meanwhile, Rommel had succeeded in divesting himself of General Froehlich. His friction with Rommel and his lack of success in Libya did Froehlich’s career no harm, however, because the Reichsmarschall and the Desert Fox were also at odds. Rommel referred to the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe as “my bitterest enemy.” Goering thought that there were easy laurels to be won in North Africa, so he was maneuvering to get the Luftwaffe put in charge of the entire African theater. This, of course, meant getting rid of Rommel, whom Goering denounced as a pessimist and a “fair weather commander.”
⁶
Rommel, however, won the battle of intrigue at Fuehrer Headquarters, and Froehlich lost his command. Nevertheless Goering promoted Froehlich and gave him command of the 2nd Air Division on the Russian front. Later Froehlich rose to command the 10th Air Fleet (later redesignated Replacement Air Fleet) in the last weeks of the war.
⁷

The new Air Commander Africa was Maj. Gen. Otto Hoffmann von Waldau, the former deputy chief of the General Staff. He was an extremely capable staff officer, but his “forthright manner” and “fresh approach” had alienated both Goering and Jeschonnek.
⁸
Among other things, he had warned Goering of the military potential of the United States.
⁹
This, plus his frank opposition to Hitler’s strategy and his opposition to the adoption of the Ju-88 and other aircraft, had cost him his job in Berlin.

Waldau worked well with Rommel and directed his units with great skill. As a result, Rommel had better air support in the Battle of the Gazala Line and at Tobruk than at any time in the entire desert war. Luftwaffe casualties, however, had been high, and aircraft serviceability had declined rapidly in the harsh desert environment. By the time Tobruk fell on June 21, 1942, Air Command Africa was at the end of its strength. Rommel nevertheless wanted to immediately invade Egypt and pursue the defeated British Eighth Army all the way to the Suez Canal.

In the meantime, OKL had depleted II Air Corps by sending six fighter and bomber groups to the East for the Stalingrad campaign. Malta had not yet recovered from its pounding, however, and Kesselring wanted to seize it by a parachute attack
before
Rommel pushed into Egypt. It was the greatest strategic decision of the desert war. Hitler ruled in Rommel’s favor. He cancelled Operation “Hercules,” the airborne invasion of Malta, and Panzer Army Afrika rolled into Egypt. Malta recovered with amazing rapidity and once again strangled Rommel’s supply lines. Without effective air support, the Desert Fox was checked in the First Battle of El Alamein and was decisively defeated in the second. From then on, all roads led backwards in the Mediterranean theater.

On November 8, 1942, American and British forces landed in Algeria and Morocco and quickly subdued most of French North Africa, placing Rommel’s defeated army between two fires. He called for the immediate evacuation of North Africa but Hitler, supported by the ever-optimistic Kesselring, decided to hold a bridgehead in Tunisia. On November 9 a new command, Air Command Tunis, was formed under Colonel Harlinghausen, the antishipping expert. Of his 140 aircraft, 109 were fighters and dive-bombers.
¹⁰
The German ground forces in Tunisia were controlled by XC Corps (Gen. Walter Nehring), which was upgraded to Fifth Panzer Army when Col. Gen. Hans Juergen von Arnim took over on December 5. When Rommel entered the Tunisian bridgehead in February 1943, he assumed command of all ground forces as commander-in-chief, Army Group Afrika. He left Africa on March 9 and was replaced by General von Arnim. By this time there were 130,000 German and Italian soldiers in Tunisia. Kesselring promised Hitler that he could keep them supplied.

There were several command changes in the Mediterranean from Aug -ust 1942 to March 1943. Gen. Hoffmann von Waldau succeeded Geisler as commander of X Air Corps and was replaced as air commander Africa by Maj. Gen. Hans Seidemann, who had been Kesselring’s chief of staff since October, 1940. When Rommel’s army reached Tunisia, this command was abolished and Seidemann became air commander Tunis. Meanwhile, Hermann Goering recalled Bruno Loerzer. Goering’s first pilot and World War I comrade had not been an outstanding corps commander (Irving called him “incompetent and corrupt”), and he is said to have sent back trainloads of oranges and silk stockings to Germany.
¹¹
This was no great sin in Goering’s eyes, however; he promoted his old friend to colonel general on February 16, 1943, and named him chief of the Personnel Office at RLM. Later his title was expanded to chief of personnel armament and, on June 19, 1944, he became chief of the National Socialist Leadership Branch of the Luftwaffe as well.
¹²
Harlinghausen (now a major general) became acting com mander of II Air Corps.
¹³

These command arrangements fit in well with Kesselring’s strategy. Air Command Tunis was given the task of defending Tunis against Allied air attacks and flying close support missions for the army. Second Air Corps had the job of protecting friendly shipping and attacking enemy transports and naval vessels. As a former naval officer and veteran antishipping expert, Harlinghausen seemed well qualified for the job.