Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series) (51 page)

As chief of the General Staff, Jeschonnek made a number of serious mistakes. He was too firm an advocate of the dive-bomber, to the virtual exclusion of the horizontal bomber. He opposed the four-engine bomber. He was too enthusiastic about the Ju-88, which did not live up to expectations. He was too blind a believer in Hitler and National Socialism. He was convinced the Fuehrer would find a diplomatic solution to the “Danzig problem” without resorting to war. When the war started, Jeschonnek allowed the training wings to be committed as of Day One. He backed the Hitler Program against the Kammhuber Program, even though he knew the former was unrealistic.

Jeschonnek hid his unhappiness behind a mask of sarcasm, which alienated members of his staff. His relationship with General of Flyers Hans-Georg von Seidel, the chief of supply and administration, was particularly bad. Seidel, who was in charge of the organizations, armament, and maintenance and supply branches (General Staff Branches II, VI, and IV, respectively), was astute but caustic. Jeschonnek avoided him whenever possible, leading to a further fragmentation within the General Staff.
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Jeschonnek’s blind obedience to Hitler also alienated Hoffmann von Waldau, the chief of operations (Branch I). Hoffmann was personable, urbane, aristocratic, and wise in the ways of the world. He was also one of the very few officers with whom Jeschonnek was on a first-name basis.
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Their relationship cooled, however, especially after the United States entered the war. Except for Milch, Hoffmann von Waldau was just about the only member of the General Staff who recognized the military potential of the United States. Jeschonnek and Goering got rid of Hoffmann in the early spring of 1942 by naming him Air Commander Africa. While commanding X Air Corps, he was killed in an air accident in the Balkans on May 15, 1943. His death cost the Luftwaffe one of its brightest young generals. (He was succeed -ed by General Fiebig, who was named Luftwaffe Commander Southeast.)

Hans Jeschonnek’s tenure as chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe was by no means a total failure. We must remember that, under his leadership, the Luftwaffe played a major (if not decisive) role in the conquest of Poland, Denmark, Norway, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete. Although over-optimistic in June, 1940, he bore little responsibility for the loss of the Battle of Britain. He did, however, favor the Russian invasion and, when it failed in the winter of 1941–42, the Luftwaffe faced a war on three fronts.

Despite the increasing number of enemies arrayed against Germany, Jeschonnek did not insist that the air armaments industry increase its rates of production. His request for aircraft remained quite modest, especially in the 1939–41 period, when German industry was relatively unmolested by Allied bombers. Under Jeschonnek and Udet, the considerable production potential of the German aviation industry remained unused.

Jeschonnek’s decline began in 1942, when the R.A.F. began pounding German cities. On June 1, 1942, the day after the raid on Cologne, Hitler summoned Jeschonnek to his East Prussian headquarters at Rastenburg and asked him how many British bombers had taken part in the assault. Jeschonnek replied that an estimated 200 aircraft penetrated the Luftwaffe’s defenses, according to preliminary reports.

“The Luftwaffe had probably been asleep all night,” the Fuehrer snapped, “ . . . but I have not been asleep. I stay awake when one of my cities is under fire. And—” he screamed, working himself into a fine rage, “and I thank the Almighty that I can rely on my Gauleiter even if the Luftwaffe deceives me! Let me tell you what Gauleiter Grohe has to say! Listen—I ask you to listen carefully—THERE WERE A THOUSAND OR MORE ENGLISH AIRCRAFT—you hear—A THOUSAND . . . maybe more! Herr Goering, of course, is not here. Of course not . . .”
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Hitler’s outbursts against Goering and the Luftwaffe grew more violent as the bombings continued. Goering, in keeping with his character, turned on Jeschonnek, attempting to make him the scapegoat for the Luftwaffe’s failures. Hitler, however, shielded Jeschonnek from the Reichsmarschall. He knew where the real blame lay.

That summer the British began to launch raids of squadron size or less, using the small, fast Mosquitoes. They were so fast that the German fighters could not stop them. Guided by radar, they did little real damage, but they disrupted sleep, caused production disruptions, and would continue to harass the Germans for the rest of the war.

As the Hitler-Goering relationship deteriorated, the Fuehrer took to deal -ing directly with Jeschonnek. Goering—sensing a potential rival for power—took more and more to bypassing the chief of staff and issuing orders directly to the commands through Colonel von Brauchitsch or Ulrich Diesing, members of the “Little General Staff.” The young Prussian now had difficulty in even obtaining an appointment with the Reichsmarschall. When he did, Goering usually just yelled at him. Jeschonnek, meanwhile, had to sit in on the Fuehrer conferences, at which Hitler’s criticisms of the Luftwaffe became more and more bitter and frequently boiled over into rages. Jeschonnek endured them all like the gentleman he was. He just sat there, chalk-white, saying little or nothing. After one of his outbursts of temper, Hitler walked over to Jeschonnek and put his arm around his shoulder. “Of course,” he said, “I didn’t mean you at all.”
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By 1943, Hans Jeschonnek was a worn-out man. He applied for a transfer, asking to command an air fleet. Goering, happy at the prospect of getting rid of Jeschonnek, readily consented. Hitler, however, said it was out of the question. He ordered the two Luftwaffe leaders to effect a reconciliation and start working together, but the new relationship lasted only about two weeks.
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Jeschonnek felt he had only three choices left: denounce Goering to Hitler, resign as chief of staff, or commit suicide.

Jeschonnek had good grounds for resigning, because he was suffering from severe stomach pains and cramps. Such a step was too humiliating for the forty-year-old chief of staff, however. His comrades urged him to speak to Hitler about Goering, but Jeschonnek felt that he owed too much to the Reichsmarschall. On August l, 1943, however, during the Hamburg raids, he finally forced himself to take the necessary steps. He recommended to Hitler that he assume personal command of the Luftwaffe, as he had done with the army. He complained that the Reichsmarschall “is never available for consultation” and submitted a memorandum listing Goering’s numerous errors.
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Hitler, however, could not bring himself to dismiss his old crony.

Beneath Jeschonnek’s hardened exterior lay an extremely vulnerable inner man. “Fundamentally, he was an extremely soft person,” his secretary, Frau Kersten, said later, “but he didn’t want to show it. He erected a wall around himself. In order to hide his inner vulnerability, he assumed a cool, slightly dissatisfied and seemingly sarcastic nature in public.”
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On August 17, 1943, the Americans raided the ball-bearing works at Schweinfurt and the aircraft plants at Regensburg. Although the Luftwaffe appeared to have won a victory, because several enemy bombers had been shot down, the plants were heavily damaged, and the enemy had demon-strated his ability to penetrate to the deep interior of the Reich in broad daylight. That afternoon there was a terrible scene between Goering and his chief of staff. Jeschonnek then went for a ride on a skiff in Goldat Lake. He wanted to see a flight of ducks, he said. Then, in his quarters, he drank a bottle of champagne with his adjutant. That day was Jeschonnek’s daughter’s birthday. Meanwhile, more than 500 R.A.F. bombers blasted the V-weapons research and assembly site at Peenemuende.
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At 8
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. on August 18, Gen. Rudolf Meister, the chief of the Operations Branch, reported the extent of the damage to Jeschonnek. The chief of staff listened without emotion. When Meister left, Jeschonnek shot himself. He left two notes. One said: “I can no longer work together with the Reichsmarschall. Long live the Fuehrer.” The second note said: “Diesing and Brauchitsch shall not be at my funeral.”
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Hans Jeschonnek was buried near Fuehrer Headquarters at Rastenburg. Goering hushed up the suicide, circulating the story that he had died a natural death due to a hemorrhage of the stomach.

CHAPTER 13

Defeat on All Fronts

G
eneral of Flyers Guenther Korten replaced Jeschonnek as chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe. At the time he seemed to be the ideal choice. A Prussian and a strong Nazi, he was highly respected by Milch, and Adolf Hitler also thought a lot of him.

Korten, who had just turned forty-five, was quite experienced for his age. He had entered the service when World War I broke out as a sixteen-year-old Fahnenjunker in the engineers. He remained with this branch throughout most of his pre-Luftwaffe career. He received his pilot’s training in 1925 as a “sports flyer” and was involved in the secret flight training in Russia in the late 1920s, with special emphasis in aerial photography. He joined the secret Luftwaffe as a captain in 1934, as a General Staff officer working for State Secretary Milch.

Korten’s rise had been rapid. He was promoted to major in 1934, lieutenant colonel in 1937, colonel in 1939, major general in 1940, lieutenant general in 1942, and general of flyers the following year, for a total of six promotions in nine years. His assignments included commander of the 122nd Reconnaissance Group (1936–37), chief of staff to the Luftwaffe Commander in Austria (1938–40), and chief of staff of II Air Corps, 3rd Air Fleet and 4th Air Fleet (1940–42), before he became Luftwaffe Commander Don on August 25, 1942. Thereafter he commanded I Air Corps and (briefly) 1st Air Fleet before being summoned to Rastenburg to replace Jeschonnek.
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He was succeeded as commander-in-chief of 1st Air Fleet by Kurt Pflugbeil.

General Korten was an advocate of strategic bombing. Like Hitler, he believed the answer to the British terror attacks was to counterattack. He also believed in a strong fighter defense for the Reich, even if it meant depleting the units at the front. Almost immediately after assuming his new duties, he transferred six fighter squadrons from the eastern front to Germany, and by November he was withdrawing bombers and crews from Russia to Germany, where they were to be retrained for strategic bombing against England.
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As Russian strength grew, more units were transferred west. By January 1944, the Luftwaffe had lost air parity in the East.

Korten’s strategic bombing ideas were attempted too late and with obsolete and inferior aircraft with inadequate bomb loads. (Most German twin-engine bombers carried a maximum of two tons of bombs, versus six for many of the Allied four-engine bombers.) Meanwhile, the Fifteenth U.S. Air Force struck from Italy and damaged the Wiener Neustadt aircraft factories in the Austrian Alps.
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However on August 17, the week Korten became the fifth chief of the General Staff, the Luftwaffe finally rebounded with a series of significant victories over its American opponents.

That day, 376 U.S. heavy bombers from the Eighth Air Force took off from England and headed for the Messerschmitt plant at Regensburg and the ball-bearing plant at Schweinfurt on the Main River in northern Bavaria. Both targets were deep inside the Reich. The bombers were accompanied as far as Aachen by U.S. P-47 “Thunderbolt” fighters. The Luftwaffe waited until the short-range escorts had to return to base due to low fuel and then fell on the bombers, using Wild Boar tactics. Although Regensburg was extensively damaged and 400 Messerschmitt employees were killed, 60 American bombers were shot down and 138 seriously damaged: a 52 percent casualty ratio.
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The R.A.F. was also suffering from the new, free-for-all Luftwaffe fighter tactics. They lost fifty-six bombers on the night of August 24, although they smashed the southern section of Berlin, especially the suburb of Lankwitz. They came again on the night of the thirty-first, but their formations were attacked from as far afield as Denmark and central France and were largely dispersed by the time they reached the capital. Forty-seven more bombers were lost. The third attack in the series came on the night of September 2, and twenty-two more British Lancaster bombers were shot down. Damage to Berlin factories in this raid was minimal.
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