Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series) (60 page)

Luftwaffe Command East was greatly outnumbered by the Red Air Force, but it was able to maintain air parity due to the superior skill of its pilots and even managed to win a few significant tactical victories. In late July, for example, Soviet ground forces pushed to the outskirts of Rzhev. Greim committed the 1st Air Division to the battle, and its dive-bombers inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. Meanwhile, the 51st Fighter Wing, under Lt. Col. Karl-Gottfried Nordmann, established air superiority in Ninth Army’s sector. The battle lasted well into October, but all Communist attempts to seize Rzhev were turned back with heavy losses.
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In November, 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad reached its climax. It drew both Luftwaffe and army units into the inferno like a magnet. From August 17 to November 29 Luftwaffe Command East was reduced from eleven bomber groups to seven, from five and one-third fighter groups to four and one-third, and lost its only antitank and ground attack squadrons. It was allowed, however, to keep its three dive-bomber groups. Most or all of these units ended up on the southern sector. Despite these losses, Greim had to help contain the Russian breakthrough between Bely and Velikiye-Luki. Greim directed the air operations from a command train commuting between Vitebsk and Nevel. He committed his glider units to resupply Velikiye-Luki, which was surrounded by the Russians. He delivered flame throwers and antitank guns to the garrison and provided close air support for Army Group Center’s unsuccessful relief attempt, which bogged down within two miles of the town. Only 180 of the 7,000 men surrounded at Velikiye-Luki escaped.
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The unrelenting battle of attrition on the central sector continued in 1943, especially in the zones of the Third Panzer and Ninth armies, from Velikiye-Luki to Rzhev. The Germans were pushed back toward Vitebsk, but in general managed to hold their lines. Whenever possible, Greim energetically attacked the Russian railroad system, to hamper their attempts to resume the offensive. The bombings severely damaged the Soviet supply depots at Kalinin, Toropets, and Velikopolye. In February the Second Army and Second Panzer Army came under heavy attacks in the Kursk-Orel sector. Greim concentrated all available units on the threatened zone and shot down as many as 38 Soviet airplanes and destroyed up to 116 tanks per day, until the Russians gave up the offensive in late March. Meanwhile, the other air units covered the evacuation of the Rzhev salient during the first two weeks in March. This operation shortened Kluge’s line by about 120 miles and released ten divisions for use elsewhere.
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As it frequently did, the Luftwaffe acted as a sort of fire brigade for the ground forces in time of crisis, until the rainy season arrived in April and halted almost all military operations.

Greim used the weather-imposed lull to rehabilitate his flying units and also to attack Russian railroad facilities, supply bases, airfields, and industrial installations deep in the Soviet rear. For his tactical successes Greim received a number of rewards from Hitler, who held him in high esteem. On February 16 he was promoted to colonel general, and on April 4 the Fuehrer personally decorated him with the Oak Leaves to the Knights Cross.
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On May 11 Luftwaffe Command East was formally upgraded and became the 6th Air Fleet.
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Meanwhile, Hitler and his generals launched what turned out to be their last major offensive on the eastern front. Their objective was to sever the Kursk salient at its base. The results we have seen. From that point on, all roads led back to Berlin for the battered Army Group Center and the depleted 6th Air Fleet which supported it.

Despite fighting odds of 4.4 to 1 and greater, Greim remained fanatically loyal to the Nazi cause. One prisoner taken in 1944 said he was becoming “more important and more fanatic” and “the outstanding Number One man in the Luftwaffe.”
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There can be little doubt that he had a talent for inspiring his men. “Few commanders were more popular among German airmen than Greim,” General Plocher wrote after the war.
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On June 22, 1944, the Soviets struck Army Group Center (now under Field Marshal Ernst Busch) with 2,500,000 men.
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They were supported by 2,318 fighters, 1,744 ground attack aircraft, 1,662 bombers, 431 night bomb -ers, and 179 reconnaissance aircraft—a total of 6,334 airplanes.
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Greim met this vast armada with 775 machines: an 8.2 to 1 inferiority. To make matters worse, 6th Air Fleet was ill-constituted to meet such an attack, as it had only 100 ground attack aircraft and 100 single-engine fighters, and Greim’s 370 long-range bombers were of little tactical value. Ironically, Greim had given up fifty fighters to Air Fleet Reich only the month before.
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Greim could do nothing to prevent the wholesale destruction of Army Group Center. Twenty-eight German divisions were smashed or totally destroyed, and some 350,000 men were killed, wounded, or missing.
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Sixth Air Fleet also lost heavily in pilots, aircraft, and flak guns during the debacle. The forward air bases were also overrun, forcing 6th Air back to unprepared, unstocked bases in Poland and East Prussia. Greim did receive some reinforcements as he fell back, but they did not make much difference and probably did not equal his losses. Overall, the Luftwaffe strength on the eastern front declined from 2,085 aircraft in June to 1,760 by July 31.
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For his part in the disaster, Field Marshal Busch was sacked, despite the fact that he was a fanatical Nazi. Hitler, however, attached no blame to Greim, even though he had failed to detect the magnitude of the Soviet buildup. On August 31, 1944, he invested Ritter von Greim with the Knights Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords,
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making him one of the most decorated men in German history. Very few men held the Oak Leaves and Swords
and
the
Pour le Merite
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Hitler considered Greim, along with Richthofen and Kesselring, to be the best Luftwaffe generals. In 1944 he began to look for a possible successor to Goering as supreme commander of the air force. Kesselring, who was conducting a brilliant ground campaign in Italy, could not be spared, and Richthofen was seriously ill with the tumor that would eventually kill him. The Fuehrer, therefore, began to look upon Greim as a possible C-in-C of the Luftwaffe. On July 20, 1944, in the attempt on Hitler’s life, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Guenther Korten was mortally wounded. As soon as the confusion died down, Hitler proposed that Greim be named his successor. On July 24, however, the Reichsmarschall appointed Gen. Werner Kreipe instead. The reason Goering passed over Greim was simple: he mistrusted the air fleet commander, correctly guessing that Hitler might be tempted to take the next logical step and name Greim commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe.
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Goering was right to fear Greim. In mid-September, after 12,000 civilians were killed in an Allied air raid that destroyed the center of Darmstadt, Hitler actually spoke of the possibility of making Greim C-in-C of the air force.
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On September 21, the Fuehrer interviewed Greim and offered him the post of deputy commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe. According to the terms Hitler proposed, Greim would be de facto supreme commander, and Goering would be little more than a figurehead. Greim discussed the offer with Himmler, Bormann, and SS general Hermann Fegelein (chief SS liaison officer to the Fuehrer) over the next two weeks,
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before Goering worked up the nerve to confront Greim on October 3. He was in a “towering rage” when he met the colonel general at Karinhall that day. Greim recalled later that Goering was “so angry as to appear to have taken leave of his senses. In the cloud-cuckoo-land of his hunting lodge, he was once more the mighty creator of the Luftwaffe.”
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After a vicious tongue-lashing, the “Fat One” ordered Greim to return immediately to his air fleet, which was now in Poland. When Kreipe called on Goering later, he found the Reichsmarschall “completely broken.” Goering complained bitterly that Greim was a traitor and that “they” were trying to get rid of him behind his back.
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Goering’s move spoiled Hitler’s plans and left him with only two choices: acquiesce to Goering’s order or sack the Reichsmarschall. Either alternative was poor. If he replaced Goering—the number two man in Nazi Germany and a man who had been with him since 1922—it would be an admission to the entire world of the desperate straits in which the Third Reich found itself. The other choice was to leave Goering in charge, and he had already proven he was incapable of running the air war. Dissatisfied, the Fuehrer decided to do nothing for the time being.
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By late October, however, he was again considering replacing Goering with Greim.
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His criticisms of the Luftwaffe became more and more bitter after the Greim idea failed.
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Perhaps as a consolation prize, Hitler officially cited Greim a second time for the services of his flak units and for his outstanding leadership as commander of the 6th Air Fleet soon after he returned to the East.
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This action may have been taken to ensure that Goering took no steps against Greim, as he had against Field Marshal Milch when that officer became a threat to his position. If so, it worked. The Reichsmarschall may have been hostile to the Ritter, but he never brought up the possibility of replacing him, despite the deteriorating situation in the East.

Greim was in mental turmoil in the winter of 1944–45. Still a believer in Hitler, he felt torn between this loyalty and his loyalty to Germany and the Luftwaffe. On the evening of January 13, 1945, Col. Guenther Luetzow and Col. Johannes Steinhoff, the commanders of the 4th Air Division and the 7th Fighter Wing, respectively, turned up at his headquarters at Lodz, Poland. These two young officers had shot down more than 250 enemy aircraft between them. Now they wanted to induce Greim into a plot to replace Goering as C-in-C of the Luftwaffe by personally appealing to Hitler for his removal. “Papa” Greim invited them to sit down by the fireplace. In the glow of the dying embers, he listened in silence as they presented their case. When they had finished, he gave vent to some of his personal anguish:

Gentlemen, I ask you to appreciate what a wretched position all this has put me in. I who have served the Reichsmarschall faithfully all of these many years. Who has believed in the Fuehrer—and, damn it, still believe in him. At least I try to . . . You’ve no idea of the things I have to force myself to sign. One simply has to believe—I mean one needs this faith like a rock in order to survive it all. What you go through in your units I have here a hundred times over . . . And the lookout for my air fleet becoming daily more hopeless. No, gentlemen—you’re asking too much of me. I can’t become a traitor. I just can’t. And least of all against Hermann Goering. Do you understand that? I can’t do it!
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His voice then failed him and, choked with emotion, he sank down into his armchair, his fists pressed against his forehead.

As the officers left, Greim warned them that the high command already knew of their plans. Since he considered their motives honorable, Greim tried to protect them from Goering’s wrath, but to no avail. The Reichsmarschall relieved both men of their commands, along with several of their confederates. He even threatened to have the outspoken Luetzow shot.
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After East Prussia was cut off from the rest of Germany during the Russian advances of early 1945, 6th Air Fleet concentrated in Czechoslovakia. On April 7, 1945, the 4th Air Fleet (still fighting on the southern sector of the eastern front) was downgraded to Luftwaffe Command 4 and absorbed by Greim’s command.
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This move gave Greim responsibility for the air battles over eastern Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and Croatia.
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In the second week of April a further command consolidation took place. Greim’s 6th Air Fleet absorbed Luftwaffe Command West and VII Air Corps, while Stumpff’s Air Fleet Reich absorbed Luftwaffe Command Northeast (formerly II Air Corps), 14th Air Division, and 1st and 2nd Fighter Divisions. Thus the Luftwaffe was divided into two major commands, with Stumpff concentrating against the Anglo-Americans. Greim’s veteran ground attack formations continued to fight the Russians, but he had only 2,200 aircraft of all classes to bring against 15,000 Soviet airplanes, and most of the best German pilots were already dead. Teenage Luftwaffe pilots were being thrown into battle with only forty hours of training flight time. Nevertheless, when the Soviets began their final push across the Oder on April 16, Greim managed to fly 1,000 sorties against it. This level of resistance could not be maintained for long against the Red Air Force’s 6.8 to 1 aerial superiority. Besides, Greim was running out of aviation fuel. By April 25, when Berlin was completely surrounded, the Communists had total aerial supremacy over the capital of the Reich.
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