Find, Fix, Finish (24 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
ENTER RASHID RAUF
The mastermind of Operation Overt turned out to be a young man of British Pakistani origin from Birmingham, England, with a history of violence, Rashid Rauf. He gained some notoriety in 2002, when he murdered his uncle, incited by a family problem with an arranged marriage.
15
At the time, he was twenty-one years old. Rauf then gave British authorities the slip and made his way to the dusty city of Bahawalpur in southern Pakistan. Since the UK and Pakistan lacked an extradition treaty,
16
Rauf was safe from British justice.
15
At the time, he was twenty-one years old. Rauf then gave British authorities the slip and made his way to the dusty city of Bahawalpur in southern Pakistan. Since the UK and Pakistan lacked an extradition treaty,
16
Rauf was safe from British justice.
Rauf quickly aligned himself with one of the most hard-core jihadist organizations in the country, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), by marrying the sister of its founder. Rauf likely had few delusions about the nature and extracurricular pursuits of his in-laws. A few months before Rauf entered Pakistan, JeM unleashed a brutal terror attack against the Indian parliament in Delhi that left a dozen dead and brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war.
These family ties gave Rauf the bona fides that allowed him to join extremist circles. In mid-2002, Rauf contacted al-Qaeda’s chief in Pakistan, Amjad Hussein Farooqi, and the two men cemented a personal relationship that would last until Pakistani security forces killed Farooqi in September 2004.
17
At some point, Rauf also established contact with Abu Faraj al-Libi and al-Qaeda’s master bomb maker, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri.
18
17
At some point, Rauf also established contact with Abu Faraj al-Libi and al-Qaeda’s master bomb maker, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri.
18
Meanwhile, Rauf maintained associates in England—Abdulla Ahmed Ali and Assad Sarwar, two nondescript, twenty-something British Pakistani fellows—who would be his contacts in carrying out the attack. Notably, the duo traveled to Pakistan in February 2003 where Rauf met with them to discuss possible attacks in the UK.
19
At this point, Rauf had been serving as an interlocutor to the outside world for not only Abu Faraj but also Ayman al-Zawahiri.
20
19
At this point, Rauf had been serving as an interlocutor to the outside world for not only Abu Faraj but also Ayman al-Zawahiri.
20
Ali returned to Pakistan a number of times over the course of 2004 and 2005.
21
At the same time, al-Qaeda’s Abu Ubaydah al-Masri taught the future London transit attackers how to construct miniature hydrogen peroxide bombs, al-Qaeda’s suicide weapon of choice for cramped quarters such as subways, trains, and busses.
22
21
At the same time, al-Qaeda’s Abu Ubaydah al-Masri taught the future London transit attackers how to construct miniature hydrogen peroxide bombs, al-Qaeda’s suicide weapon of choice for cramped quarters such as subways, trains, and busses.
22
It remains inconclusive whether any other plane plotters received the same deadly training from Abu Ubaydah, but subsequent phone records linked Ali to the leader of the ineffectual July 21 follow-up bombing attack on London, Muktar Said Ibrahim.
23
Ali had also been in touch with the leader of the devastating July 7 bombings.
24
During the simmering month of June 2005—as Khan and Ibrahim prepared to blast their way into history and oblivion—Ali would return to Pakistan once more.
23
Ali had also been in touch with the leader of the devastating July 7 bombings.
24
During the simmering month of June 2005—as Khan and Ibrahim prepared to blast their way into history and oblivion—Ali would return to Pakistan once more.
Sometime in 2005, one of Ali’s confederates paid the equivalent of US$260,000 in cash for an anonymous-looking second-story apartment in Walthamstow, the largest Pakistani enclave in London.
25
Naturally, after the transport bombings, the neighborhood was on high alert for anything or anyone who would bring additional police pressure on the community. Perhaps in an effort to show the authorities their commitment to British safety, “several people” living in the neighborhood tipped off authorities to a “small group of angry young Muslim men” who had just moved into several rooms in a tan-colored row house along Forest Road.
26
Law enforcement officials would later call it the “bomb factory.”
27
25
Naturally, after the transport bombings, the neighborhood was on high alert for anything or anyone who would bring additional police pressure on the community. Perhaps in an effort to show the authorities their commitment to British safety, “several people” living in the neighborhood tipped off authorities to a “small group of angry young Muslim men” who had just moved into several rooms in a tan-colored row house along Forest Road.
26
Law enforcement officials would later call it the “bomb factory.”
27
Ali returned to Pakistan under the guise of helping the victims of the devastating October 2005 earthquake. This time, Arafat Waheed Khan—Ali’s schoolmate whom MI5 once tried unsuccessfully to recruit as an asset
28
—and Assad Sarwar accompanied him. By April 2006, Sarwar drove to South Wales and used a false name to make his first purchases of hydrogen peroxide, the key bomb-making chemical used in the transit attacks the year prior.
29
Later that month, he purchased even more.
28
—and Assad Sarwar accompanied him. By April 2006, Sarwar drove to South Wales and used a false name to make his first purchases of hydrogen peroxide, the key bomb-making chemical used in the transit attacks the year prior.
29
Later that month, he purchased even more.
By 2006, Rashid Rauf was in constant e-mail and phone contact with Ali—which was intercepted by the UK’s SIGINT collection organization, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the NSA.
30
Since most of the world’s electronic communications pass through the US, it would be a reasonable assumption that the US liberally utilized FISA-related warrants to collect and monitor Rauf, Ghabrah, Ali, and their widening circle of co-conspirators. Armed with eavesdropping hardware, the US took the lead in electronically monitoring the plotters, and then NSA or CIA passed along the transcriptions to their British counterparts.
30
Since most of the world’s electronic communications pass through the US, it would be a reasonable assumption that the US liberally utilized FISA-related warrants to collect and monitor Rauf, Ghabrah, Ali, and their widening circle of co-conspirators. Armed with eavesdropping hardware, the US took the lead in electronically monitoring the plotters, and then NSA or CIA passed along the transcriptions to their British counterparts.
Ali and Sarwar departed for Islamabad to visit Rauf for the last time. Upon returning to London’s Heathrow International Airport on June 24, British authorities, already keeping a sharp watch on the two, surreptitiously searched their belongings before they collected their baggage at the luggage carousels.
31
Inside, they found packets of Tang drink mix and a curiously large number of batteries—possibly the makings of a so-called Tang bomb.
32
31
Inside, they found packets of Tang drink mix and a curiously large number of batteries—possibly the makings of a so-called Tang bomb.
32
There is, of course, nothing illegal or unseemly about either the sugary orange drink mix or batteries. However, when mixed with purified hydrogen peroxide, the citric acid in Tang reacts and causes an explosion. According to Erroll Southers, the chief of intelligence and counterterrorism at Los Angeles International Airport, these bombs “are the weapon of choice in the Middle East,” since “they leave no residue, they’re extremely volatile, they’re easy to make and they’ve been quite effective.”
33
33
With some trepidation, British authorities allowed the two bombers to leave the airport, since they had committed no crime at that point. But the investigation quickly expanded, consuming intelligence resources at an exponential rate.
34
Quickly taking precedence over the thirty other plots MI5 had been tracking at the time, Operation Overt became the only show in town.
35
34
Quickly taking precedence over the thirty other plots MI5 had been tracking at the time, Operation Overt became the only show in town.
35
Ali soon noticed the increasingly invasive surveillance and e-mailed Rauf about it. Rauf dismissed his concerns, telling Ali not to worry, rather casually noting that “it’s normal in summer time when it gets hot.”
36
Still, a spooked Ali began to conduct meetings in public spaces such as restaurants, parks, and even a cemetery—locations where he believed that security officials would not be able to overhear him.
37
On July 4, Ali told Rauf he was ready for a test run.
38
36
Still, a spooked Ali began to conduct meetings in public spaces such as restaurants, parks, and even a cemetery—locations where he believed that security officials would not be able to overhear him.
37
On July 4, Ali told Rauf he was ready for a test run.
38
The authorities overheard Ali’s words and more; they were monitoring some 200 individuals. By that time, 220 officers from across Britain were detailed to assist in the widening investigation.
39
Support was strong across the pond as well, as over 200 FBI agents and an unknown number of CIA and NSA officers combed through thousands of pieces of secret information from Britain and Pakistan to glean more information about the plot.
40
39
Support was strong across the pond as well, as over 200 FBI agents and an unknown number of CIA and NSA officers combed through thousands of pieces of secret information from Britain and Pakistan to glean more information about the plot.
40
MI5 decided to step up its efforts, planting listening devices and tiny cameras throughout the Forest Road apartment.
41
Their persistent surveillance revealed that the plot was nearing completion; a number of the bombers began to tape martyrdom videos for release on the Internet after the attack was complete.
42
In his video, Ali stated that he had desired martyrdom since he was fifteen years old.
43
Others thanked Allah and blamed American and British foreign policy for their actions, stating, “don’t mess with the Muslims.”
44
41
Their persistent surveillance revealed that the plot was nearing completion; a number of the bombers began to tape martyrdom videos for release on the Internet after the attack was complete.
42
In his video, Ali stated that he had desired martyrdom since he was fifteen years old.
43
Others thanked Allah and blamed American and British foreign policy for their actions, stating, “don’t mess with the Muslims.”
44
On August 6, a plainclothes police officer observed Ali enter a local Internet café to research the departing flight schedules of major transatlantic flights leaving London for points in North America.
45
Ali made sure the flights were large passenger aircraft that would depart from Heathrow’s Terminal 3 within a window of about two and a half hours—a short time that would allow bombers to board and detonate their lethal packages before the pilots or other passengers would become aware of their mortal situation.
46
And before they could fight back.
45
Ali made sure the flights were large passenger aircraft that would depart from Heathrow’s Terminal 3 within a window of about two and a half hours—a short time that would allow bombers to board and detonate their lethal packages before the pilots or other passengers would become aware of their mortal situation.
46
And before they could fight back.
The bombs were crude but effective devices. The attackers planned to bring prepared soda bottles onto the flights in their carry-on luggage, as well as disposable cameras and regular batteries—probably the ones that some of the plotters had brought back from Pakistan in June—with their contents removed and replaced with explosives. To detonate the bombs on board, the conspirators would connect the bottle to the disposable camera via a small metal wire. When the camera flash went off, so, too, would the detonator and the explosive.
A number of the plotters tested the mixture somewhere in Pakistan and found that such contraptions could be effective.
47
The Forensics Explosives Laboratory in London later re-created the devices to measure and record the effects.
48
The resulting explosion destroyed one of the video cameras and sprayed the external sections of the laboratory with pieces of the reinforced protective walls meant to contain the detritus from the blast.
49
According to Sidney Alford, a British explosives engineer, the ensuing fiery explosion would have opened a gaping wound in the fuselage of the aircraft, causing significant pressure changes inside an aircraft traveling at high altitude.
50
“I wouldn’t have liked to [have] been in that airplane,” he said.
47
The Forensics Explosives Laboratory in London later re-created the devices to measure and record the effects.
48
The resulting explosion destroyed one of the video cameras and sprayed the external sections of the laboratory with pieces of the reinforced protective walls meant to contain the detritus from the blast.
49
According to Sidney Alford, a British explosives engineer, the ensuing fiery explosion would have opened a gaping wound in the fuselage of the aircraft, causing significant pressure changes inside an aircraft traveling at high altitude.
50
“I wouldn’t have liked to [have] been in that airplane,” he said.
To smuggle the bombs on board, the conspirators enlisted a Heathrow airport security guard, Amin Asmin Tariq, to participate in the plot. Tariq planned to disguise the plotters as airport employees to allow the ringleaders to case Terminal 3. He also provided inside information about standard airport security procedures.
51
With this level of knowledge, the plotters may well have been able to pull off the operation.
51
With this level of knowledge, the plotters may well have been able to pull off the operation.
Knowing these procedures, they planned to keep one unadulterated drink with them in case airport security officials asked them to taste the liquids inside.
52
To further confuse and embarrass airline security officials, the bombers planned to bring adult magazines and condoms with them in their carry-on luggage.
53
Ali took the preparations one diabolical step further than the others: he planned to bring his infant son on the suicide mission, so that the baby’s bottle could be used to hold chemicals and deceive airport staff.
54
52
To further confuse and embarrass airline security officials, the bombers planned to bring adult magazines and condoms with them in their carry-on luggage.
53
Ali took the preparations one diabolical step further than the others: he planned to bring his infant son on the suicide mission, so that the baby’s bottle could be used to hold chemicals and deceive airport staff.
54
The discovery of the second Bojinka plot raised the “strike versus develop” dilemma; officials had to decide whether to wait to gather more evidence or to sweep in and crush the menace. The precise series of events in the case remains unclear, and two competing narratives of the final days have emerged.
One possibility is that on August 6, Prime Minister Blair personally updated President Bush on the British investigation.
55
At this point, the British were still compiling evidence in expectation of an upcoming trial. The White House, however, wanted to move more quickly. President Bush later discussed Rauf ’s threat with American intelligence officers and policymakers—but not with the British prime minister.
56
Investigative journalist Ron Suskind suggested that Bush was acutely frustrated with British recalcitrance, as he saw it, in cracking down on the attackers and wanted to eliminate the threat then and there. He expressed this dissatisfaction to Vice President Cheney,
57
who then quietly ordered CIA’s national clandestine service director, Jose Rodriguez Jr., to meet with ISI and take down Rauf—without informing the British.
58
According to Suskind, Pakistani officials already had Rauf under surveillance and arrested the al-Qaeda plotter on August 9.
59
There was no coordination within the CIA or with the United Kingdom until after the deed was done.
55
At this point, the British were still compiling evidence in expectation of an upcoming trial. The White House, however, wanted to move more quickly. President Bush later discussed Rauf ’s threat with American intelligence officers and policymakers—but not with the British prime minister.
56
Investigative journalist Ron Suskind suggested that Bush was acutely frustrated with British recalcitrance, as he saw it, in cracking down on the attackers and wanted to eliminate the threat then and there. He expressed this dissatisfaction to Vice President Cheney,
57
who then quietly ordered CIA’s national clandestine service director, Jose Rodriguez Jr., to meet with ISI and take down Rauf—without informing the British.
58
According to Suskind, Pakistani officials already had Rauf under surveillance and arrested the al-Qaeda plotter on August 9.
59
There was no coordination within the CIA or with the United Kingdom until after the deed was done.
On the other hand, Jose Rodriguez might have been in Pakistan around August 9 and unilaterally authorized Rauf’s arrest. During much of the past year, the US acted as the conduit between MI6 and ISI, as the two intelligence services had, for historical reasons, an extremely poor working relationship. Since both services trusted the CIA, however, it attempted to facilitate a free flow of information between the Pakistanis and the British. Still, not all information was always passed along.
In any case, Rodriguez was meeting with ISI’s top leadership when he learned they had actionable intelligence on Rauf’s whereabouts. US officials had previously believed Rauf might be in the Northwest Frontier Province, like bin Laden and Zawahiri.
60
After all, why would a top man in an imminent attack risk being in Pakistan proper—instead of the northern badlands—unless he felt secure from risk of arrest? It’s possible that Rodriguez told his Pakistani counterparts to detain Rauf without higher authorization. He was a top American official. Once back in secure communication with officials in CIA headquarters, Rodriguez briefed them on ISI’s actions; they would have then passed along the message to British intelligence.
61
60
After all, why would a top man in an imminent attack risk being in Pakistan proper—instead of the northern badlands—unless he felt secure from risk of arrest? It’s possible that Rodriguez told his Pakistani counterparts to detain Rauf without higher authorization. He was a top American official. Once back in secure communication with officials in CIA headquarters, Rodriguez briefed them on ISI’s actions; they would have then passed along the message to British intelligence.
61
Either way, Rashid Rauf’s arrest in Pakistan forced London’s hand in rolling up the conspiracy—some say, before the British government could fully construct its legal case. British officials knew that any delay would either push the conspirators underground or oblige them to perform the operation the next day. One Pakistan-based militant arrested days before had already sent a message to the UK plotters, urging them to “do your attacks now.”
62
Britain’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) ordered the country’s threat level increased to its highest level, reflecting the possibility of an imminent terror attack.
63
The top policymakers in the UK, including Prime Minister Blair, MI5 Director Eliza Manningham-Buller,
64
and Home Secretary John Reid, among others, convened to discuss the series of events. All in attendance agreed to take down the network that night.
65
62
Britain’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) ordered the country’s threat level increased to its highest level, reflecting the possibility of an imminent terror attack.
63
The top policymakers in the UK, including Prime Minister Blair, MI5 Director Eliza Manningham-Buller,
64
and Home Secretary John Reid, among others, convened to discuss the series of events. All in attendance agreed to take down the network that night.
65
Other books
The Beauty of the Mist by May McGoldrick
An Agreeable Arrangement by Shirley Marks
Some Girls Don't (Outback Heat Book 2) by Amy Andrews
Riluo City (Blue Phoenix Book 1) by Tinalynge
Lingering Touch: The Summer Park Psychics, Book 3 by Cassandra Chandler
The Distracted Preacher by Thomas Hardy
Rose of the Mists by Parker, Laura
The Reckoning by Rennie Airth
A Week to Be Wicked by Tessa Dare
Burnt Devotion by Ethington, Rebecca