Find, Fix, Finish (26 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
While it was true that Abu Hamza’s name was seldom mentioned by the US before his death, US officials eventually concluded that he was a senior terrorist leader
10
and Pakistani officials confirmed that he was on a CIA watch list.
11
Abu Hamza almost certainly was in the driver’s seat in Pakistan, but there is little evidence to suggest that he directed global operations effectively. Abu Hamza had little time to gain experience, as he was killed after about six months on the job. At the time of his death, he had a US $5 million bounty on his head.
10
and Pakistani officials confirmed that he was on a CIA watch list.
11
Abu Hamza almost certainly was in the driver’s seat in Pakistan, but there is little evidence to suggest that he directed global operations effectively. Abu Hamza had little time to gain experience, as he was killed after about six months on the job. At the time of his death, he had a US $5 million bounty on his head.
Abu Hamza had been playing hide and seek with American and Pakistani forces for months, transiting between the Pakistani tribal areas and the Afghan border.
12
He had been wounded in the leg in a UAV strike on November 5 that killed eight others—including his wife and eleven-year-old daughter.
13
Local residents said that UAVs had been flying around the clock in the border region before the attack,
14
and one reported that some of the men had arrived only a day before,
15
suggesting that the US was tracking Abu Hamza and his confederates as they traveled from place to place via signals intelligence.
16
12
He had been wounded in the leg in a UAV strike on November 5 that killed eight others—including his wife and eleven-year-old daughter.
13
Local residents said that UAVs had been flying around the clock in the border region before the attack,
14
and one reported that some of the men had arrived only a day before,
15
suggesting that the US was tracking Abu Hamza and his confederates as they traveled from place to place via signals intelligence.
16
Finally, a missile from a UAV killed Abu Hamza on December 1, 2005, around 1:30 AM. He was taking refuge in the village of Asoray, near Miranshah, in North Waziristan. Besides him, the strike killed four others—two Arabs and the seventeen-year-old son and eight-year-old nephew of the man harboring them.
17
17
Although the exact details of how the US tracked the terrorist leader remain shrouded in mystery, US intelligence probably had access to his cell phone through a British penetration of a terror cell in Manchester.
18
The Manchester police counterterrorism unit worked for three years to provide intelligence about who was directing and funding the operations in their city; senior officials later claimed that the investigation was instrumental in disrupting and destabilizing the senior levels of al-Qaeda.
19
Furthermore, given the two men’s close relationship, Abu Faraj’s debriefings doubtlessly provided crucial details in tracking Abu Hamza.
18
The Manchester police counterterrorism unit worked for three years to provide intelligence about who was directing and funding the operations in their city; senior officials later claimed that the investigation was instrumental in disrupting and destabilizing the senior levels of al-Qaeda.
19
Furthermore, given the two men’s close relationship, Abu Faraj’s debriefings doubtlessly provided crucial details in tracking Abu Hamza.
Islamabad initially denied reports that the Americans killed Abu Hamza, claiming instead that he had died accidentally while constructing a bomb.
20
But this story began to fall apart almost immediately. Several local residents told a Pakistani newspaper that a missile destroyed the house.
21
A Pakistani journalist shortly corroborated their account by taking a photo showing villagers with a piece of shrapnel with “AGM-114” (a Hellfire missile’s designator) written on it.
22
Pakistani intelligence sources later also confirmed, anonymously, that a UAV felled Abu Hamza.
23
20
But this story began to fall apart almost immediately. Several local residents told a Pakistani newspaper that a missile destroyed the house.
21
A Pakistani journalist shortly corroborated their account by taking a photo showing villagers with a piece of shrapnel with “AGM-114” (a Hellfire missile’s designator) written on it.
22
Pakistani intelligence sources later also confirmed, anonymously, that a UAV felled Abu Hamza.
23
Meanwhile, al-Qaeda flat-out denied that he died in the attack, claiming that he was safe and that the attack had killed mostly locals.
24
Their claims were buttressed by the fact that villagers had recovered the bodies from the rubble and turned them over to local militants, leaving little physical evidence.
25
President Musharraf responded in a fit of hyperbole, saying he was “200 percent certain” that Abu Hamza had been killed. Eventually Musharraf would amend his comments to say it was “500 percent confirmed.”
26
American officials were more circumspect, having been previously fooled into prematurely celebrating a senior operative’s demise. They refused to confirm Abu Hamza’s death without physical evidence. However, US intelligence subsequently overheard lamentations shared between militants that seemed to confirm he was indeed dead.
24
Their claims were buttressed by the fact that villagers had recovered the bodies from the rubble and turned them over to local militants, leaving little physical evidence.
25
President Musharraf responded in a fit of hyperbole, saying he was “200 percent certain” that Abu Hamza had been killed. Eventually Musharraf would amend his comments to say it was “500 percent confirmed.”
26
American officials were more circumspect, having been previously fooled into prematurely celebrating a senior operative’s demise. They refused to confirm Abu Hamza’s death without physical evidence. However, US intelligence subsequently overheard lamentations shared between militants that seemed to confirm he was indeed dead.
Abu Hamza’s killing was probably the result of intense US-Pakistani behind-the-scenes negotiations. US analysts had concluded that northwestern Pakistan served, not just as a hiding place for al-Qaeda leaders, but as an effective operational base, giving them the ability to coordinate and carry out attacks on the US.
27
Under pressure, the ISI was selectively cooperating—periodically tossing over a low-level terrorist to the Americans to keep Washington at bay—but failed to give the CIA the full access it needed.
27
Under pressure, the ISI was selectively cooperating—periodically tossing over a low-level terrorist to the Americans to keep Washington at bay—but failed to give the CIA the full access it needed.
The Pakistani military was similarly reluctant to overextend into a dangerous area where it could exert only marginal political control. After a brief push into the tribal agencies, the government brokered a truce: the army would not interfere as long as local leaders did not attack government officials, impede development projects, or allow foreign militants to operate within their territory. In the resulting power vacuum, al-Qaeda operatives moved freely and Taliban militants, distinctive with their dour expressions, unique headdresses, and lined eyes, moved against conciliatory tribal and religious leaders, kidnapped journalists, and imposed a brutal interpretation of Islamic law.
28
28
Frustrated with the safe haven al-Qaeda enjoyed and by the inability or unwillingness of the ISI to pursue operations there, the Bush administration evidently struck a deal to allow occasional clandestine airspace access into the northwest of the country for armed American Predators to hunt down suspected terrorist leaders.
29
29
Islamabad continued to deny that such cooperation existed, but several officials speaking under anonymity confirmed the agreement. Questioned about Abu Hamza’s death, one official commented, “Here is what I can tell you: Our troops were not involved in the operation, but this is one of the areas where our intelligence and operational cooperation with US services is most intense . . . comments on media reports that it was a Predator strike would invoke sovereignty issues.”
30
National security advisor Steven Hadley essentially confirmed the understanding: “There are conflicting reports as to what happened.... This is something that occurred on Pakistani soil. They obviously will be the ones to come forward and indicate how this happened.”
31
30
National security advisor Steven Hadley essentially confirmed the understanding: “There are conflicting reports as to what happened.... This is something that occurred on Pakistani soil. They obviously will be the ones to come forward and indicate how this happened.”
31
Pakistan’s attempt at covering up its complicity revealed the concern senior officials felt over the potential for blowback in pursuing the new line of operations. There had been remarkably little controversy over the Abu Zubaydah capture; most Pakistanis were seemingly prepared to accept US assistance in combating foreign fighters on their soil, as long as Pakistan led the charge and civilian casualties were avoided. Abu Hamza’s death, however, was different. His killing immediately triggered a political backlash. In the tribal regions, local militants responded by staging a series of bombings, striking out against pro-government leaders, and kidnapping paramilitary troops patrolling the area.
32
Musharraf ’s truce in the hinterlands was in jeopardy—and Musharraf was beginning to lose control over the increasingly jittery country.
THE SPOKESMAN: ABU LAYTH AL-LIBI (KILLED, JANUARY 2008)32
Musharraf ’s truce in the hinterlands was in jeopardy—and Musharraf was beginning to lose control over the increasingly jittery country.
By this point, the standard criticism to the strategy of killing any particular al-Qaeda leader was that the group would simply replace him with another person from within the organization.
33
To some degree, this was true. Without actually dismantling the al-Qaeda infrastructure, depriving the organization of a refuge, and countering the appeal of the jihadist ideology, isolated US successes could not eliminate the threat. Still, like waves crashing on the shore, the US campaign was wearing away al-Qaeda’s effectiveness as a fighting force. Al-Qaeda still acted as a management structure for jihadist activities worldwide and, in this sense, depended on effective leadership to organize, motivate, and coordinate its personnel. With each leader the US successfully tracked down and neutralized, America further degraded its knowledge, experience, and connections in the terrorist underworld.
33
To some degree, this was true. Without actually dismantling the al-Qaeda infrastructure, depriving the organization of a refuge, and countering the appeal of the jihadist ideology, isolated US successes could not eliminate the threat. Still, like waves crashing on the shore, the US campaign was wearing away al-Qaeda’s effectiveness as a fighting force. Al-Qaeda still acted as a management structure for jihadist activities worldwide and, in this sense, depended on effective leadership to organize, motivate, and coordinate its personnel. With each leader the US successfully tracked down and neutralized, America further degraded its knowledge, experience, and connections in the terrorist underworld.
US intelligence experienced some setbacks but gained valuable new tools in 2006 and 2007 that allowed it to penetrate deeper into the terrorist networks threatening America and its allies. The Protect America Act of 2007 amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to further expand the umbrella under which the US could legally conduct wiretaps on international targets, asserting that agents did not need a warrant as long as there was sufficient justification and one side was “reasonably believed” to be outside the US.
34
The director of national intelligence—a position that had only come into existence a few years before—told Congress in early 2008 that the first six months of using these new authorities had already allowed the IC to better understand al-Qaeda’s global network, identify key individuals at critical nodes, and disrupt terrorist attacks.
35
34
The director of national intelligence—a position that had only come into existence a few years before—told Congress in early 2008 that the first six months of using these new authorities had already allowed the IC to better understand al-Qaeda’s global network, identify key individuals at critical nodes, and disrupt terrorist attacks.
35
By 2006, and probably as early as 2004, the US had begun operating armed UAVs from a secret air base in southwestern Pakistan.
39
The Shamsi air base—located in a secluded, windswept part of Baluchistan once used by Arab sheikhs for falconry expeditions—extended the reach of American find-fix-finish campaigns and allowed the US to launch a drone within minutes of receiving actionable intelligence on a leader’s location. It was also about one hundred miles south of the border with Afghanistan, allowing US operators to squeeze al-Qaeda militants as they attempted to escape one area for the next.
39
The Shamsi air base—located in a secluded, windswept part of Baluchistan once used by Arab sheikhs for falconry expeditions—extended the reach of American find-fix-finish campaigns and allowed the US to launch a drone within minutes of receiving actionable intelligence on a leader’s location. It was also about one hundred miles south of the border with Afghanistan, allowing US operators to squeeze al-Qaeda militants as they attempted to escape one area for the next.
Also in 2007, the US began deploying the MQ-9 “Reaper” UAV, a larger and more capable version of the MQ-1 Predator. It boasted an increased payload, better sensors, and a drastically improved range.
36
Whereas the original Predator was capable of flying 454 miles and had a maximum speed of 135 miles per hour, the new Reaper could travel 3,682 miles with a maximum speed of 300 miles per hour.
37
The significant improvement in reach and duration allowed near-constant overhead monitoring. It also added several cameras, including an improved synthetic aperture radar (SAR), allowing pilots to penetrate cloud cover and sandstorms—frequent obstacles in the South Asian battleground. The Reaper was especially attractive because it extended the operational advantages of the Predator but used the same control stations, allowing pilots to quickly adapt and put the new machine into service. According to the US military, the Reaper began operating in Afghanistan in September 2007 and made its first strike on enemy insurgents in October.
38
36
Whereas the original Predator was capable of flying 454 miles and had a maximum speed of 135 miles per hour, the new Reaper could travel 3,682 miles with a maximum speed of 300 miles per hour.
37
The significant improvement in reach and duration allowed near-constant overhead monitoring. It also added several cameras, including an improved synthetic aperture radar (SAR), allowing pilots to penetrate cloud cover and sandstorms—frequent obstacles in the South Asian battleground. The Reaper was especially attractive because it extended the operational advantages of the Predator but used the same control stations, allowing pilots to quickly adapt and put the new machine into service. According to the US military, the Reaper began operating in Afghanistan in September 2007 and made its first strike on enemy insurgents in October.
38
The US now possessed the tools and the technology to maintain persistent overhead surveillance and rapidly strike within the al-Qaeda safe haven, but there were continuing strategic drawbacks. While the ability to strike without warning in northwestern Pakistan may have brought fear to the hearts of al-Qaeda members—perhaps forcing them to be even more careful in their communications and movements—it also cut the intelligence trail cold. With these strikes, there was little opportunity for the US to interrogate survivors, exploit recovered data, gather physical evidence, or manipulate enemy communications. The intensified reliance on UAVs as the primary tool for neutralizing terrorist leaders also emphasized the lack of other options. Finally, the psychic effects of the collateral damage were not limited to al-Qaeda’s leaders. Broadcast every few weeks on the evening news and across the nation’s newspapers, the images of devastation inevitably increased public hostility against US and Pakistani leaders in Pakistan, in particular against Musharraf.
40
At the extreme, it risked undermining support for the Pakistani government to the point of inviting a fundamentalist takeover—an al-Qaeda-influenced administration with access to nuclear weapons, Washington’s worst fear.
41
40
At the extreme, it risked undermining support for the Pakistani government to the point of inviting a fundamentalist takeover—an al-Qaeda-influenced administration with access to nuclear weapons, Washington’s worst fear.
41
Despite these misgivings, the US forged ahead with its targeted killing program. US officials had identified the safe havens in Pakistan as the core of the al-Qaeda problem and, with Musharraf’s cooperation, America’s aerial platforms allowed them to reach deep into Pakistani territory. There were some early successes; based partially on intelligence from Abu Faraj: on January 13, 2006 the CIA thought it might have located Ayman al-Zawahiri.
42
This strike, however, killed as many as eighteen civilians, including women and children, and sparked protests across Pakistan.
43
By 2008 the campaign was flagging and US officials were voicing frustration with the results. Despite $10 billion in assistance to Islamabad—much of which went to upgrade conventional capabilities in order to fight Pakistan’s real bogeyman, India—al-Qaeda had strengthened its position in the tribal areas and enjoyed the freedom to recruit, train, and plot new attacks.
44
Worse, al-Qaeda commanders—such as Abu Layth al-Libi—apparently traveled around Pakistan without fear of detection or capture.
45
42
This strike, however, killed as many as eighteen civilians, including women and children, and sparked protests across Pakistan.
43
By 2008 the campaign was flagging and US officials were voicing frustration with the results. Despite $10 billion in assistance to Islamabad—much of which went to upgrade conventional capabilities in order to fight Pakistan’s real bogeyman, India—al-Qaeda had strengthened its position in the tribal areas and enjoyed the freedom to recruit, train, and plot new attacks.
44
Worse, al-Qaeda commanders—such as Abu Layth al-Libi—apparently traveled around Pakistan without fear of detection or capture.
45
Abu Layth al-Libi (Ali Ammar Ashur al-Rufayi) was a longtime associate of bin Laden and joined al-Qaeda after 9/11.
46
Like many of his colleagues, he had come to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviet Union.
47
In 1994, he returned to his native Libya and took part in an attempt to overthrow Muammar Qadhafi; when it failed, he escaped to Saudi Arabia. Following a bombing in 1995, he was imprisoned and probably tortured by Saudi security forces.
48
One report described him as a tall, burly man with scars on his back “as if beaten by a belt or wire.”
49
After he was released or he escaped (the record is unclear), he returned to Afghanistan and rose to prominence after the US invasion.
50
He eventually became al-Qaeda’s de facto spokesman, appearing on a Saudi-owned television channel in July 2002 to report that bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar were “in good health.”
51
Another video showed him leading an attack on Afghan forces in 2004, and in 2006 he spoke to say that al-Qaeda was waging a holy war to restore the Taliban regime in Kabul.
52
In 2007 he appeared in a video with Zawahiri, indicating he maintained a close relationship with the top leadership.
53
46
Like many of his colleagues, he had come to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviet Union.
47
In 1994, he returned to his native Libya and took part in an attempt to overthrow Muammar Qadhafi; when it failed, he escaped to Saudi Arabia. Following a bombing in 1995, he was imprisoned and probably tortured by Saudi security forces.
48
One report described him as a tall, burly man with scars on his back “as if beaten by a belt or wire.”
49
After he was released or he escaped (the record is unclear), he returned to Afghanistan and rose to prominence after the US invasion.
50
He eventually became al-Qaeda’s de facto spokesman, appearing on a Saudi-owned television channel in July 2002 to report that bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar were “in good health.”
51
Another video showed him leading an attack on Afghan forces in 2004, and in 2006 he spoke to say that al-Qaeda was waging a holy war to restore the Taliban regime in Kabul.
52
In 2007 he appeared in a video with Zawahiri, indicating he maintained a close relationship with the top leadership.
53
Other books
Cold Winter in Bordeaux by Allan Massie
Spellbound by Atley, Marcus
Death Comes to the Ballets Russes by David Dickinson
A Thousand Tomorrows & Just Beyond the Clouds Omnibus by Karen Kingsbury
Sergeant Verity and the Blood Royal by Francis Selwyn
Comeback (Gun Pedersen Book 1) by L. L. Enger
Don't Go Breaking My Heart by Ron Shillingford
Lord of Lies by David Zindell
Jack the Ripper Victims Series: The Double Event by Alan M. Clark
The Story of My Face by Kathy Page