Find, Fix, Finish (27 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Abu Layth became an expert in explosives and guerrilla warfare, and played a pivotal role in recruiting and training operatives in the mountainous tribal areas of western Pakistan, according to US officials.
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Unlike many others, he did not start as an al-Qaeda foot soldier; he had his own group of Libyan militants and was a leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an organization primarily dedicated to overthrowing Qadhafi.
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Unlike many others, he did not start as an al-Qaeda foot soldier; he had his own group of Libyan militants and was a leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an organization primarily dedicated to overthrowing Qadhafi.
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After Abu Hamza died, Abu Layth took over responsibility for Afghanistan and Pakistan, as bin Laden had become increasingly dependent on his organizing and military skills.
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“[Abu Layth] al-Libi was the face of al-Qaeda for the past two years, practically commanding all operational activities,” commented Ahmad Zaidan, Islamabad bureau chief for Al Jazeera.
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He was the top ground commander, trainer, and coordinator, and a deputy to Zawahiri. “Operationally he was very competent,” commented Henry Crumpton, former CIA official and counterterrorism coordinator for the State Department.
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“[Abu Layth] al-Libi was the face of al-Qaeda for the past two years, practically commanding all operational activities,” commented Ahmad Zaidan, Islamabad bureau chief for Al Jazeera.
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He was the top ground commander, trainer, and coordinator, and a deputy to Zawahiri. “Operationally he was very competent,” commented Henry Crumpton, former CIA official and counterterrorism coordinator for the State Department.
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Abu Layth earned a promotion to fifth place on the CIA’s list, as well as a US $5 million bounty on his head, for his role in a February 2007 bombing attack on the Bagram air base in Afghanistan.
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Al-Qaeda later claimed that it was an attempted assassination of Vice President Dick Cheney, who was visiting at the time. Cheney was unhurt, but the explosion killed twenty-three others.
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Al-Qaeda later claimed that it was an attempted assassination of Vice President Dick Cheney, who was visiting at the time. Cheney was unhurt, but the explosion killed twenty-three others.
Abu Layth hardly seemed ill at ease with the new attention. He felt secure enough to move about Pakistan, meet foreign officials, and visit wounded fighters as he planned further operations.
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He was considered a “good and pious Muslim” by a few local politicians in Peshawar, and he met openly with a diplomat from Libya.
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The fact that he could operate so freely for so long seemed to undermine the claim that Islamabad and the ISI were doing everything they could to hunt senior terrorist leaders.
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He was considered a “good and pious Muslim” by a few local politicians in Peshawar, and he met openly with a diplomat from Libya.
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The fact that he could operate so freely for so long seemed to undermine the claim that Islamabad and the ISI were doing everything they could to hunt senior terrorist leaders.
Abu Layth was about forty years old when he, too, was cut down by a missile strike. In the predawn hours of January 29, 2008, a CIA-operated drone circled a safe house in the village of Khushali Torikel in North Waziristan.
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The UAV focused its optical lens on a cluster of mud brick buildings a few miles from the town center, then fired its two Hellfire missiles—vaporizing Abu Layth and probably a dozen others inside the home of a local tribal leader.
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It was the first successful operation against al-Qaeda’s core leadership in more than two years.
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The UAV focused its optical lens on a cluster of mud brick buildings a few miles from the town center, then fired its two Hellfire missiles—vaporizing Abu Layth and probably a dozen others inside the home of a local tribal leader.
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It was the first successful operation against al-Qaeda’s core leadership in more than two years.
Hours before the attack, assets on the ground alerted CIA to a convoy of vehicles moving through North Waziristan that strongly suggested the “signature” of al-Qaeda fighters.
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Although the assets’ identities remain veiled, they were probably well-paid informants from the local population, unconnected to the Pakistani army or intelligence service.
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According to a former CIA officer who served in Waziristan, small American teams comprised of CIA and Special Forces officers had begun working from Pakistani military bases across the tribal belt, recruiting a network of paid informers to help the US find and target al-Qaeda operatives.
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Tribal and religious leaders who had once embraced al-Qaeda increasingly viewed their presence with hostility, and had both a practical and financial motivation to sell them out. “All it takes,” said one official, “is bags of cash.”
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CIA case officers had likewise begun equipping local tribesmen with electronic devices that they could plant near a militant’s house, enabling US drones to quickly hone in on the signal.
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Although the assets’ identities remain veiled, they were probably well-paid informants from the local population, unconnected to the Pakistani army or intelligence service.
65
According to a former CIA officer who served in Waziristan, small American teams comprised of CIA and Special Forces officers had begun working from Pakistani military bases across the tribal belt, recruiting a network of paid informers to help the US find and target al-Qaeda operatives.
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Tribal and religious leaders who had once embraced al-Qaeda increasingly viewed their presence with hostility, and had both a practical and financial motivation to sell them out. “All it takes,” said one official, “is bags of cash.”
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CIA case officers had likewise begun equipping local tribesmen with electronic devices that they could plant near a militant’s house, enabling US drones to quickly hone in on the signal.
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The American assets determined that the convoy carried up to seven al-Qaeda operatives and one unidentified high-ranking individual.
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The CIA then followed the convoy using a variety of surveillance techniques through the town of Mir Ali into a walled compound.
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As the UAV’s pilot surveyed the scene, US intelligence zeroed in on Abu Layth and his associates through satellite phone signals emanating from the house.
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With the importance of the target confirmed, the strike was approved, and the two buildings and their inhabitants went up in smoke.
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The CIA then followed the convoy using a variety of surveillance techniques through the town of Mir Ali into a walled compound.
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As the UAV’s pilot surveyed the scene, US intelligence zeroed in on Abu Layth and his associates through satellite phone signals emanating from the house.
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With the importance of the target confirmed, the strike was approved, and the two buildings and their inhabitants went up in smoke.
Abu Layth’s elimination occurred as the US was again escalating the drone program inside Pakistan’s tribal areas. Several news sources reported that the strike had been unilateral; the Pakistani government was notified only as the operation was under way.
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Having been denied permission for similar strikes in the past, the US now seemed to be demonstrating a willingness to act first and seek approval later. But this may have been a mutually convenient misperception. US operations against al-Qaeda depended on Pakistan’s continued support, and three weeks earlier America’s top two intelligence officials—DNI Mike McConnell and CIA director Michael Hayden—had traveled in secret to Pakistan to press for greater freedom for operations in the tribal areas.
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Having been denied permission for similar strikes in the past, the US now seemed to be demonstrating a willingness to act first and seek approval later. But this may have been a mutually convenient misperception. US operations against al-Qaeda depended on Pakistan’s continued support, and three weeks earlier America’s top two intelligence officials—DNI Mike McConnell and CIA director Michael Hayden—had traveled in secret to Pakistan to press for greater freedom for operations in the tribal areas.
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President Musharraf reportedly dismissed proposals for an overt American combat presence, but agreed to increase the number and scope of drone missions launched from the Shamsi air base inside Pakistan.
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A secret agreement was probably reached to allow the US to strike important al-Qaeda targets without specific permission from the Pakistani military.
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According to one report, the agreement included a tacit understanding with Musharraf and Pakistani chief of army staff Ashfaq Kayani that any strikes would be directed against foreign fighters operating in Pakistan, not the Pakistani Taliban.
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A secret agreement was probably reached to allow the US to strike important al-Qaeda targets without specific permission from the Pakistani military.
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According to one report, the agreement included a tacit understanding with Musharraf and Pakistani chief of army staff Ashfaq Kayani that any strikes would be directed against foreign fighters operating in Pakistan, not the Pakistani Taliban.
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Shortly after Abu Layth’s death, the Bush administration granted US officers greater freedom of action when attacking suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the tribal areas.
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In addition to grinding down enemy ranks, US officials hoped to collect new information on the senior leaders by continually harassing lower-level operatives to force them to move and communicate in ways that US intelligence could detect.
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Previously, US officers were required to follow strict guidelines before striking, such as confirming the identity of a suspected militant before attacking. Now they were free to strike convoys of vehicles that bore the signature of al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run, as long as they judged the risk of civilian casualties to be low.
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In addition to grinding down enemy ranks, US officials hoped to collect new information on the senior leaders by continually harassing lower-level operatives to force them to move and communicate in ways that US intelligence could detect.
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Previously, US officers were required to follow strict guidelines before striking, such as confirming the identity of a suspected militant before attacking. Now they were free to strike convoys of vehicles that bore the signature of al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run, as long as they judged the risk of civilian casualties to be low.
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This new arrangement was shaped by intense political dynamics within the US and Pakistan. UAV pilots had been clamoring for years for greater freedom to strike at targets of opportunity, frustrated by what they saw as missed chances to take out enemy combatants because of bureaucratic and diplomatic niceties. “In the past, it required getting approval from the highest levels,” noted one former US official, “you may have information that is valid for only 30 minutes. If you wait, the information is no longer valid.”
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CIA officials were likewise frustrated with the political stalemate in northwestern Pakistan, and worried that lukewarm cooperation from the Pakistanis would eventually lead to another successful attack against a US target. More importantly, 2008 was President Bush’s final year in office, and there was intense pressure to track down bin Laden before he passed the baton.
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The question of how to operate in Pakistan against al-Qaeda had become a political issue in the presidential campaign, and Bush administration officials hoped new tactical victories would validate their counterterrorism strategy.
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CIA officials were likewise frustrated with the political stalemate in northwestern Pakistan, and worried that lukewarm cooperation from the Pakistanis would eventually lead to another successful attack against a US target. More importantly, 2008 was President Bush’s final year in office, and there was intense pressure to track down bin Laden before he passed the baton.
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The question of how to operate in Pakistan against al-Qaeda had become a political issue in the presidential campaign, and Bush administration officials hoped new tactical victories would validate their counterterrorism strategy.
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It was a dangerous compromise for Musharraf. Washington was ratcheting up the pressure even as he was fighting a protracted political battle over the domestic perception that the US could run roughshod over him. Former counterterrorism official Richard Clarke summarized the US approach: “The United States . . . sends a high-level delegation over to beat Musharraf up, and then you find that within a week or two a high-value target has been identified. Then he ignores us for a while until we send over another high-level delegation.”
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By agreeing to US quasi-unilateral strikes, Musharraf felt he could appease both the US and his own people by continuing to deny that the Pakistani government was approving US military strikes in the country.
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By agreeing to US quasi-unilateral strikes, Musharraf felt he could appease both the US and his own people by continuing to deny that the Pakistani government was approving US military strikes in the country.
But Musharraf nonetheless risked reaping the whirlwind. In March 2008 he suffered a political defeat that, among other national disturbances, would eventually lead to his forced resignation later that year.
THE ACCOUNTANT GETS A PROMOTION: SHAYKH SAID AL-MASRI (KILLED, MAY 2010)UAV strikes accelerated throughout 2008, 2009, and 2010, taking out dozens of lower-level militants in an attempt to ravage the top tier of al-Qaeda’s commanders.
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As CIA director Hayden said at the time,
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As CIA director Hayden said at the time,
By making a safe haven feel less safe, we keep al-Qaeda guessing. We make them doubt their allies; question their methods, their plans, even their priorities . . . we force them to spend more time and resources on self-preservation, and that distracts them, at least partially and at least for a time, from laying the groundwork for the next attack.
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Pakistan’s political and military leaders continued to denounce the strikes in public, but in private provided intelligence for the missions and received collected surveillance data to aid their own operations.
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In frustration, the Taliban began to kill more and more suspected spies, both villagers and fellow jihadists, in a frustrated effort to uncover the sources of the intelligence for the deadly and accurate new strikes.
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In frustration, the Taliban began to kill more and more suspected spies, both villagers and fellow jihadists, in a frustrated effort to uncover the sources of the intelligence for the deadly and accurate new strikes.
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In May 2010, Shaykh Said al-Masri (Mustafa Ahmed Muhammad Uthman Abu al-Yazid)—one of the core founders of al-Qaeda promoted to fill a leadership gap created by the US campaign—was felled. He was fifty-four years old at the time of his death. He had long been the chief financial manager for bin Laden and was one of a dwindling number of veterans left from the pre-9/11 organization.
Like many Egyptian members of al-Qaeda, Shaykh Said cut his jihadist teeth with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) alongside Zawahiri. As a young man involved in political Islam, he was imprisoned after Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981.
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His actual involvement in Sadat’s murder was unclear, but his relatively short three-year sentence suggests the authorities were unable to link him directly to the operation or did not think he was particularly important. His Egyptian prison experience seemed to solidify his dedication to the global Islamist cause. After being released, he made his way to Afghanistan and eventually became a core member of al-Qaeda’s advisory council.
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His actual involvement in Sadat’s murder was unclear, but his relatively short three-year sentence suggests the authorities were unable to link him directly to the operation or did not think he was particularly important. His Egyptian prison experience seemed to solidify his dedication to the global Islamist cause. After being released, he made his way to Afghanistan and eventually became a core member of al-Qaeda’s advisory council.
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Shaykh Said followed bin Laden to Sudan, serving as accountant for the many businesses that served as both a front and a revenue stream for the terrorist enterprise.
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In time, bin Laden allowed him to manage the organization’s overall finances and help arrange funding for numerous worldwide operations. For instance, Shaykh Said supplied 9/11 lead hijacker Muhammad Atta with the money he needed to plan and carry out the operation.
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Interestingly, recovered documents show that he opposed the 9/11 attacks, believing that the US response would endanger the movement.
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This pragmatism does not appear to have damaged his credibility within the organization, however, for he was considered a trusted and popular member who could reconcile conflicting trends within Islamic fundamentalist thought.
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In time, bin Laden allowed him to manage the organization’s overall finances and help arrange funding for numerous worldwide operations. For instance, Shaykh Said supplied 9/11 lead hijacker Muhammad Atta with the money he needed to plan and carry out the operation.
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Interestingly, recovered documents show that he opposed the 9/11 attacks, believing that the US response would endanger the movement.
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This pragmatism does not appear to have damaged his credibility within the organization, however, for he was considered a trusted and popular member who could reconcile conflicting trends within Islamic fundamentalist thought.
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Shaykh Said largely disappeared from view after 9/11 but probably continued his role as al-Qaeda’s money man. An accountant by training, he appeared to have little interest in military planning.
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Some reports place him in Iran during this period along with several other al-Qaeda leaders, but there is no proof of this and he would later publicly denounce Iran.
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He first reappeared publicly in May 2007 when he was named the operational commander for the struggle in Afghanistan in a video recording. This gave him the nominal authority to plan military attacks, but he seemed to indicate in the interview that he would continue to focus on fund-raising and personnel recruitment.
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Some reports place him in Iran during this period along with several other al-Qaeda leaders, but there is no proof of this and he would later publicly denounce Iran.
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He first reappeared publicly in May 2007 when he was named the operational commander for the struggle in Afghanistan in a video recording. This gave him the nominal authority to plan military attacks, but he seemed to indicate in the interview that he would continue to focus on fund-raising and personnel recruitment.
Shaykh Said was described by those who had met him as a spiritual leader with good management skills, but not a natural fit as a military commander.
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He probably inherited al-Qaeda’s number 3 spot to ensure some degree of continuity with the past, reinforce ties to the Taliban, and reassure supporters that, despite terrifyingly accurate US attacks, the organization remained strong and cohesive. He enjoyed a close personal relationship with bin Laden and Zawahiri and was a well-respected liaison with Taliban leader Mullah Omar, being fluent in Pashto as well as in Arabic.
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As a core member of al-Qaeda, he had doubtlessly received training in field operations, weapons, and other skills. Still, al-Qaeda’s ranks must have been badly depleted when the organization decided to place a middle-aged accountant with almost no military experience in the top operational command spot.
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He probably inherited al-Qaeda’s number 3 spot to ensure some degree of continuity with the past, reinforce ties to the Taliban, and reassure supporters that, despite terrifyingly accurate US attacks, the organization remained strong and cohesive. He enjoyed a close personal relationship with bin Laden and Zawahiri and was a well-respected liaison with Taliban leader Mullah Omar, being fluent in Pashto as well as in Arabic.
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As a core member of al-Qaeda, he had doubtlessly received training in field operations, weapons, and other skills. Still, al-Qaeda’s ranks must have been badly depleted when the organization decided to place a middle-aged accountant with almost no military experience in the top operational command spot.
Shaykh Said began taping various propaganda videos and messages threatening the US and soliciting funds and fighters for the jihadist cause.
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In July 2008 he even appeared in a television interview with Pakistan satellite channel
Geo TV
, condemning Danish newspapers that had published cartoons featuring the Prophet Mohammad. In September he claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Danish embassy in Islamabad.
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The cartoon scandal proved remarkably successful in mobilizing Muslim youth, and in an elaborate fifty-five-minute video Shaykh Said urged European Muslims to plan similar operations against their own governments.
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He garnered further attention in a June 2009 interview with Al Jazeera in which he promised that al-Qaeda would use Pakistan’s nuclear weapons against the US once it gained access to them.
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In July 2008 he even appeared in a television interview with Pakistan satellite channel
Geo TV
, condemning Danish newspapers that had published cartoons featuring the Prophet Mohammad. In September he claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Danish embassy in Islamabad.
99
The cartoon scandal proved remarkably successful in mobilizing Muslim youth, and in an elaborate fifty-five-minute video Shaykh Said urged European Muslims to plan similar operations against their own governments.
100
He garnered further attention in a June 2009 interview with Al Jazeera in which he promised that al-Qaeda would use Pakistan’s nuclear weapons against the US once it gained access to them.
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