France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (14 page)

3.

T
HE
F
OUR
P
OWER
P
ACT AND THE
O
UTLINE OF A
F
RANCO
-I
TALIAN
R
APPROCHEMENT

In the vague attempts at a rapprochement between France and Germany, Paul-Boncour’s role had been practically nil. Only François-Poncet and, to some degree, Daladier, had been involved. The opposite was true of another attempt, which Paul-Boncour valued highly, a rapprochement with Italy.

Of course, he carried a millstone around his neck. Until 1932 he had been a member of the Socialist Party, which was violently hostile to
Mussolini, whose henchmen had assassinated Italian socialist Matteotti. In parliament, whenever the word Italy was uttered in a foreign policy debate, one of the socialists would interrupt the speaker with a cry of “Matteotti!” Paul-Boncour had even gone further. In a flight of eloquence, he had at one time compared the Duce to a “Mardi-Gras Caesar.”
⁶⁹
Mussolini had never forgiven him. And yet, Paul-Boncour wrote that “I always have been a strong supporter of friendship with Italy, because I am convinced that, apart from our being neighbors, an alliance between Mediterranean countries constitutes a useful counterweight to the German, British and American powers in the West.” Of course, friendship with fascist Italy was more problematic. But the Duce’s power had been consolidated. “In 1933, there was no alternative.”
⁷⁰
First, in January 1933, Paul-Boncour named his “old friend” Henry de Jouvenel ambassador to Rome. He had long been a member of the French delegation to the League of Nations, and, like Paul-Boncour, he believed in it “with all his heart.”
⁷¹
For a while he had been High Commissioner to the mandates of Syria and Lebanon and had become a senator. He had only agreed to a six months’ mission but was determined to see it through. De Jouvenel took a large file covering the pending issues between the two countries: the status of Italians in Tunisia; colonial compensations owed to Italy by France under article 15 of the treaty of London of April 26, 1915; the border question in Libya and the idea—that had already surfaced in 1932—of “France’s disengagement from Ethiopia,” although Ethiopia was a member of the League of Nations. Before de Jouvenel’s mission, René Massigli made contacts in Geneva and in December 1932, more importantly, another senator, Henry Bérenger, president of the senate committee on foreign affairs, had traveled to Rome. The idea was spreading in Paris that “it was advisable to establish a general policy agreement reserving North Africa for France and Central Europe for Italy.”
⁷²
Bad relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, an ally of France, remained the main obstacle.

Paul-Boncour told de Jouvenel tha they must “establish, during these few months, the basis for a long-term understanding,” and in particular “prevent the split that might appear between the Little Entente, friendly toward France, and the nations trying to claim Italy’s support against the Little Entente.”
⁷³

Mussolini was actually to take the initiative. Hitler’s rise to power worried him. He felt nothing but contempt for Hitler’s race-driven pseudo-fascism. He feared Hitler might attempt to carry out the
Anschluss
with Austria and wanted to avoid it at all costs. On his first visit, on March 3,
1933, de Jouvenel was wondering how he could induce the Duce to spell out the goals of his foreign policy, but Mussolini was immediately willing to play along. “I didn’t think it would be so easy.”
⁷⁴
He said that “we must have a less tense relationship and we should move closer in our views regarding the organization of Europe.” Halfway between an alliance and being good neighbors, why not seek a “political entente?”

What Mussolini was going to propose became clear by March 17. He had made his decision, at a meeting of the fascist Grand Council, to rebuild the pre-1914 “concert of Europe” for Europe, meaning a “directorate of four” to include Italy, England, France and Germany.
⁷⁵

From then on, everything was to revolve around the Italian project. There would be a
positive
phase lasting until June 7, when the Four Power Pact was initialed, and July 15, when it was signed. Then came a
negative
phase, when the pact and the Franco-Italian rapprochement floundered and eventually crumbled.

The vicissitudes of the Four Power Pact stemmed from the deeply contradictory goals each country had assigned it. In the first Italian draft, article 2 stated that “the four powers reaffirm the principle of revision of the peace treaties, according to the clauses of the covenant of the League of Nations, whenever situations arise that might lead to conflict between states.”
⁷⁶
Mussolini, who supported the “dissatisfied” central European countries—Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria—saw this as a means to eventually grant them compensation. For France, which was allied to the “satisfied” countries, the pact’s main goal was to “keep Germany in line.” This was exactly what Mussolini dangled before de Jouvenel: “We either line up two by two, England and France on the one side and Italy and Germany on the other, and bloc against bloc we oppose each other, and go down the path to grievous events, or the four of us agree and collaborate, and only then will Europe and the world breathe easier.” He even saw the possibility of reestablishing enough trust to promote “the resumption of economic activity.”
⁷⁷

The negotiations would prove to be lengthy and complicated. Macdonald, like the French, was unhappy about article 2, which was the only significant article in Mussolini’s plan. Still, it was important not to break with Italy. To quote Paul-Boncour, “It was the beginning of something truly great.” Everyone in the Cartel des Gauches voiced their approval of the pact, except Herriot. Caillaux supported it; Prime Minister Daladier preferred to let the Quai d’Orsay remodel it to suit France’s aims, which meant watering it down.
⁷⁸
Mussolini was very hopeful and
suggested that Daladier pay a visit to Rome. Everyone praised de Jouvenel. “Mr. Mussolini and Mr. Macdonald are delighted and are convinced that the collaboration they are proposing will put an end to Europe’s malaise; it will bring back trust, foster economic recovery and solve the debt problem.” The German ambassador to Rome, on the other hand, “did not conceal his bitterness.”
⁷⁹

The first problem was to lure Germany into the Four Power Pact, and Germany certainly had no wish to be “kept in line” on the issue of rearmament, for example. Germany’s acceptance wasn’t negotiated by French diplomacy, but rather by Mussolini. Hitler decided to join the pact because he wanted to please Mussolini. The Wilhelmstrasse, on the contrary, thought it was fraught with danger.
⁸⁰

For France, the difficulties related to Poland and the Little Entente. Alexis Léger was a great friend and admirer of Czech President Beneš, who was also a friend of Paul-Boncour. Did Léger hinder the successful outcome of the Four Power Pact? Paul-Boncour mentions a rumor according to which Léger had a “phobia” about Italy, but he dismissed it: “Léger was quite incapable of any kind of phobia because his mind was so totally flexible.”
⁸¹
But this is not entirely convincing. The League of Nations desk at the Quai d’Orsay drew up a completely innocuous counterplan, written by Dulong and Fouques-Duparc on March 22, which Massigli sent to Léger. It referred mostly to loyalty to the League of Nations. The term “revision” had disappeared.
⁸²

For two months there would be a sort of pendulum movement between the Italian project, which irritated France’s allies, and the French project, which displeased the Italians. On the French side, Paul-Boncour’s actions showed the same hesitation since he would at times follow Léger and the Quai d’Orsay, or go with de Jouvenel who was prepared to agree to every concession in order to make the Four Power Pact and the rapprochement with Italy succeed. Let us suppose that France had a stable and self-assured government at the time, one that would have realized that
perhaps it was time to revise a policy based on ineffectual alliances with weak countries, and that the only way to ensure its safety and contain Germany was by allying itself with the great powers
. De Jouvenel was very much aware of this issue and set it out most convincingly in a noteworthy telegram dated March 25.
⁸³
We shall quote the following:

Since France is shouldering the weight of four nations by itself, two of which had disappeared from the map of Europe for a long
time
⁸⁴
while the other two have tripled in territory and in population;
⁸⁵
that she can now place the existence and future of these four threatened nations under the guarantee of the four western powers, this being the condition for drawing the United States closer to Europe; is it not France’s interest alone as the sole guarantor of peace between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia; is it not in the interest of those four endangered nations to seek such a contract even if it means making a few localized concessions to France?

But Beneš was telling Jean Paul-Boncour, the nephew and assistant of Paul-Boncour, that the project of the Four Power Pact was “utterly ridiculous” and that the Little Entente had decided to “openly resist it.”
⁸⁶
Both the Romanian minister Titulescu
⁸⁷
and the Turkish president Mustapha Kemal
⁸⁸
agreed. The Polish minister for foreign affairs, Joseph Beck, was the most negative. Furious that Poland should not be considered one of the great powers, he completely opposed any revisions. Beck threatened to pull out of the League of Nations and—something to be remembered—to seek a rapprochement with Germany.
⁸⁹

The hapless Paul-Boncour, caught in the crossfire, saw compromise as the only way out, to “continue to amend the draft with the firm intention of safeguarding its useful features while eliminating its risks.”
⁹⁰
His relations with de Jouvenel took on an increasingly bittersweet tone. His point of view prevailed and the result on June 7 was a text, as Sir John Simon put it, “so insipid, that here in Britain we have a hard time understanding what sudden difficulties prevented the great powers from reaching an agreement that was essentially an expression of good will intended to rekindle a feeling of trust on the eve of the economic conference.”
⁹¹
Still, the authorization to initial was given only after de Jouvenel protested once more and after Léger had made one last effort to further water down an already insipid text.
⁹²
On the same day, June 7, Mussolini, in a speech to the Senate, greatly praised France and, according to de Jouvenel, was cheered by the entire floor.
⁹³
The Germans made a show of appearing to be very pleased.
⁹⁴

De Jouvenel, on the other hand, felt the pact was a “beginning.”
⁹⁵
He had initiated a rapprochement between France and Italy. It was to be followed by financial and colonial negotiations, talks on disarmament, and the drawing up of a common plan for European policy. Italy, he said, was “ready to enter into negotiations as soon as we show the slightest willingness.” It might be a good idea, as Mussolini was suggesting, to “set
up a small Franco-Italian committee.” It would be good for Daladier to visit Rome, either before or after the signature. In short, de Jouvenel felt he had fulfilled his mission. It was now time for him to resign his post and return to his Senate seat. He left Rome on July 20, 1933, with high hopes for the future. His successor, Count Charles Pineton de Chambrun, was appointed on July 29. “I have known Chambrun for a long time,” de Jouvenel wrote to Alexis Léger. “He has an open personality, which, in my opinion, can only appeal to Mr. Mussolini.”
⁹⁶

4.

T
HE
P
URSUIT OF
R
APPROCHEMENT WITH THE
USSR

While relations with Germany were disconcerting from the start, and relations with Italy were full of pitfalls, the talks with Moscow were gratifying to Paul-Boncour.
⁹⁷
Obviously, if the rapprochement continued to progress, it was largely due to the Soviet attitude which in turn was greatly influenced by Hitler’s rise to power.
⁹⁸

The first step was to ratify the non-aggression pact of December 1932. Paul-Boncour was rather optimistic because several members of Daladier’s government were ardent supporters of the USSR. Anatole de Monzie, minister of national education, for example, had made a spectacular trip to Russia, culminating in a book he wrote in 1924.
⁹⁹
He had played a major role in the “recognition” of 1924 during the hopeless negotiations over the tsarist debt and, again, in 1931 had published another book favorable to the Soviets.
¹⁰⁰
Pierre Cot, the young minister of air, and part of the newly elected radicals—the group nicknamed the “Young Turks”—shared the same opinion. The debate took place on May 16 and 18 and Herriot reminded the audience that our most Christian King, Francis I, had indeed struck an alliance with the Muslim Turks.
¹⁰¹

The Chamber voted in favor of ratification 554 to one (Tardieu voted against), and 41 abstentions (among them Louis Marin, Flandin, Mandel, and Scapini, who were all right-wing deputies). The socialists were not very enthusiastic but voted to ratify. The ones who found themselves in a quandary were the communists, who were in the habit of rejecting anything the government proposed. Jacques Duclos, their spokesman, announced a vote in favor, but cautioned, “We very much fear that this pact
is nothing but a sham to hide a continuing policy of aggression against the Soviet Union.”
¹⁰²