France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (28 page)

Dobler, the former consul general in Cologne, testifying to the committee of inquiry after the war accused François-Poncet of not taking his information seriously enough and even of telling him, “You shouldn’t send such cables they get people worried.”
³²
Dobler also stated that at the Quai, starting with Alexis Léger, there was a “screen put up by those sedentary officials opposed to distributing information in France coming from agents overseas.”
³³
Flandin told the same committee, “I was one of the rare foreign ministers who read every cable”—an unproven statement in view of the very few comments penciled in by the
minister on the documents themselves—and said he had read some of Dobler’s cables.
³⁴
One may wonder if, in this case, Dobler was not settling a personal grievance against the powerful man who was in charge of the embassy.

Besides François-Poncet and his team of diplomats, other information was provided by the military attachés.

In Berlin the naval attaché was Captain Tracou. General Renondeau was the military attaché since 1930 and Léon Poincaré, an aeronautics engineer and the son of the renowned mathematician, was the air force attaché. Renondeau had long been stationed in Tokyo, knew Japanese, was a graduate of the École Polytechnique, and a highly cultured man. “He always showed great intellectual curiosity, was calm and collected and always very courteous.”
³⁵
Stehlin gave the following description of Léon Poincaré:

“I have rarely met a man with such a keen gift for observation. In his memory he could photograph anything of interest. His reports were extensive, complete, and full of drawings and graphs. No one made more of a contribution than he did in effectively describing the German air force.”
³⁶

Were the military attachés better informed than the ambassadors? There is evidence that they did not pass along all the information they obtained to their ambassador. For example, Jules-François Blondel, the chargé d’affaires in Rome from 1936 to 1938, recollected, “There was such a team spirit in every section of that embassy that I felt I could ask our five special attachés to hand me a report on their observations in their specialty every six months …It was an unusual request that could cause friction due to the various administrative autonomies. But I did succeed.”
³⁷

This goes to show that daily communications left much to be desired. However, it does appear that the relationship among General Renondeau, Léon Poincaré, and Ambassador François-Poncet was good. They consulted daily about predictions regarding the demilitarized zone (François-Poncet met with his entire staff every day).

If we examine, for example, the information relating to the probable remilitarization of the Rhineland, we find that General Renondeau was slightly more pessimistic than his ambassador. As early as June 19, 1935, he wrote to Minister of War Fabry that the German government—which was setting up recruitment offices inside the demilitarized zone—was
currently
committed to respecting the demilitarization clauses. But he added,
“There is no doubt that the issue of their cancellation will come up some day.” The problem was to find out whether it would be a matter of “several months or several years.”
³⁸
On December 10
³⁹
he reported that Hitler, according to Generals Reichenau and von Stulpnagel, confirmed the zone would not be tampered with. “I am very skeptical,” he added. It was possible that Hitler would act by surprise, and 1937 appeared to be the outer limit. On January 15 a rumor was circulating that the reoccupation would take place on January 30. “There are no clues,” he writes, to confirm this information. “There is no doubt in my mind that the demilitarized zone will be reoccupied by Germany; only the date remains unknown. We must accept the fact that it may take place rather soon”
⁴⁰
On March 4, using a report from Dobler, about which the embassy had consulted with him, and listing many clues, he concluded that the reoccupation was imminent but didn’t reach a firm conclusion.
⁴¹

Colonel de La Forest-Divonne, the military attaché in Switzerland, was much more explicit but in the opposite direction. Basing his conclusion on the fact that barracks in the Rhineland were not completely repaired, according to information provided by the consul general in Basel, he stated on February 27 that he did not believe in “an early occupation of the Rhineland area.”
⁴²

In conclusion, according to
available
information (which was not necessarily
read
), the French government could reasonably conclude that Hitler would soon reoccupy the zone but that, until the evening of March 6, it did not know the date nor the circumstances.

The newspapers were mentioning this possibility less than they discussed the war in Ethiopia or the Franco-Soviet Pact. Part of the left-wing press didn’t even mention the issue fearing that it might work against the ratification of the treaty. The communist daily
L’Humanité
was basically silent about it except for two rather vague articles by Gabriel Péri
⁴³
and Paul Nizan.
⁴⁴
The socialist
Le Populaire
was
completely
silent. The only mention appeared on March 7 as German units were on the march. It was an unsigned news item dated “Berlin, March 6,” stating that Hitler was about to invoke “the right” to occupy the Rhineland area. “However, it doesn’t mean that Adolf Hitler wants to turn this unilateral rejection of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno into an ultimatum or a
fait accompli
.”

The newspaper
L’Œuvre
, which was closer to the radicals, had a much better informed writer in Geneviève Tabouis. She did write about the issue from time to time but reached different conclusions. On January 14
the news “concerning the demilitarized zone was increasingly alarming.” Great Britain “already hinted that she wouldn’t take any action if such an event took place.”
⁴⁵
Then, after François-Poncet took an initiative with von Bülow, there was a wave of optimism: “It is believed in international circles in the capital of the Reich that Hitler’s government was surprised by the strong attitude Paris was showing on this occasion.”
⁴⁶
When Flandin traveled to London, Tabouis again addressed the German threat: “A joint declaration could possibly influence the decisions Germany will make.”
⁴⁷
But “London feels that the French are exaggerating about the seriousness of the situation.”
⁴⁸
London also believes that Hitler will not move before the Berlin Olympics, scheduled for August 1936.
⁴⁹
Cassandra’s
optimism increased in February: “It is generally thought that the Germans will not occupy the demilitarized zone but that they are keeping the possibility in abeyance should it become necessary.”
⁵⁰
It all ended on March 6 with a prophecy of the same vintage as
Le Populaire
: “News from Berlin has it that the Germans will proceed by slow infiltration to get around if not breach articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.”
⁵¹

Even though the subject only came up occasionally, the right-wing newspapers were much more eager than the left to mention the remilitarization of the Rhineland since this was an argument against the Franco-Soviet Pact.

As an example there was no dearth of articles on the subject in
L’Action Française
and
Le Jour
. Would they provide Hitler’s government an excuse? I
S A
S
HOWDOWN
A
BOUT TO
H
APPEN
?,
⁵²
T
OWARDS A
C
OUP
,
⁵³
H
ITLER
, M
ASTER OF THE
H
OUR
, are the headlines usually found in the monarchist daily. On February 26 J. Delbecque
⁵⁴
accurately described what he expected would happen. Will Germany “use the Franco-Soviet Pact ratification as an excuse to break the Locarno Treaty and reoccupy the demilitarized zone?” What would France’s attitude then be? “Without making any prophecies we may surmise that we will lodge an energetic protest to Berlin, that we will agree with Great Britain and Belgium (let’s no longer even mention Italy, alas!) and take some protective measures on the border. Then what?”

In
Le Jour
Léon Bailby asked what part Britain would agree to play. “Will she make commitments on the Rhine?”
⁵⁵
“Was the Rhineland issue discussed in London?” (during the Eden-Flandin meeting). “The minister of foreign affairs said yesterday that France will not allow the remilitarization of the Rhineland area. Will you remain as firm all the way?”
⁵⁶

When, on February 29,
Paris-Midi
published an interview with Hitler by Bertrand de Jouvenel, everyone drew a sigh of relief. Hitler sounded unfocused and sentimental. He made a point of “his wish to leave no stone unturned to improve Franco-German relations.”
⁵⁷
What a charming man who bore no grudges just two days after the Franco-Soviet Pact was ratified! But just a minute! The interview took place on February 21 and was set up by the German embassy in Paris. Hitler “wanted to impress French public opinion while the debate on the Franco-Soviet Pact was taking place.” He noticed, however, that his interview was published only after ratification took place. Was that some manipulation by François-Poncet? Or the Quai d’Orsay? On the morning of March 2 an important meeting took place at the Reich Chancellery with the military leaders and ministers in attendance. Once the decision was made, Hitler received François-Poncet at 11:30 p.m. “I could see the nervousness, the worry and embarrassment displayed by the chancellor,” wrote the ambassador. The
Paris-Midi
interview was already “an old story” to him.
⁵⁸

The entrance of the German army units on March 7 into the Rhineland demilitarized zone was like a bolt from the blue. While public opinion had always known about some vague threat, it had never taken it seriously. The tragedy took place without the French being prepared for it.

3.

W
AS A
C
OUNTERMOVE
P
LANNED
?

Despite obvious gaps in available information, the Quai d’Orsay and the military ministries were well aware that a German operation into the demilitarized zone was not to be excluded. Responsibility for a countermove rested with the cabinet alone. Was such a counter-move considered?
⁵⁹

At several times from January to March 7, 1936, the Quai d’Orsay drew the attention of the Ministry of War to the idea of a counter-move. A memo from Foreign Affairs dated February brought up the problem very effectively: “It is appropriate to see which precautions or responses should be prepared in the very short term, should Germany take any initiative to unilaterally breach the status of the demilitarized zone. It is
up to the Ministry of War to make recommendations.”
⁶⁰
The commercial relations department of the Quai d’Orsay was considering economic sanctions. Since François-Poncet’s reports described Germany’s economic condition in rather dark colors, the diplomats felt optimistic about the effectiveness of those sanctions that could, if applied, “have fateful consequences for the Reich that could endanger the regime itself.”
⁶¹
However, Flandin and at least his closest deputy, René Massigli, felt it was necessary to go further and consider a military response. On February 7 a meeting took place at the Ministry of War with four ministers—Flandin, General Maurin, Piétri and Déat—assisted by the chiefs of staff of the three branches of the military: Gamelin, Admiral Durand-Viel and General Pujo. Flandin clearly brought up the issue of “countermeasures.” According to the minutes,
⁶²
the military offered no response. The answer came in a dispatch from the Army High Command signed by Maurin, dated February 12, and addressed to Flandin that didn’t mention anything about a
countermove
but only precautions: “I am considering reducing the number of measures now planned to a minimum in the event of a threat of sudden attack in order to avoid offering any real excuse for a conflict.”
⁶³

The existing plan of concentration, called plan D
bis
, in effect since April 15, 1935, before general mobilization, called for three series of “precautionary” measures allowing the deployment of the “covering units” in 23 days. These were:

a. “Simple Alert” level: regular army units go to their areas including the Maginot Line;

b. “Reinforced Alert” level where border reservists are called up;

c. The “Security” level, allowing the call-up of many regulars and reservists to set up a “solid defensive front.” Including 21 infantry divisions of which 7 are motorized and 5 cavalry divisions including the DLM [Light Motorized Division];
⁶⁴

d. The “Simple or reinforced” cover with three available classes and many reservists.

[a. Implied no “call-up”; b. A call-up of about 35,000 men; c. 120,000; d. 1 million men.
⁶⁵
]

Precautionary measures had nothing to do with a response. Flandin immediately informed General Maurin of this.
⁶⁶
He agreed with him that the government alone could make a decision on the substance of the issue but it could also consider the appropriate actions to be taken if they
had been prepared. “It actually means for us not just to respond to a possible initiative on Germany’s part but, if possible, to discourage the Reich from going down that path.” To this, General Maurin responded on February 17 by listing once more the precautionary measures. As for the rest: “It could be contrary to French interests to use our right to occupy the demilitarized zone… We would actually risk being considered the aggressor and thus find ourselves alone facing Germany. Such an operation couldn’t be considered without the full support of the British government.”
⁶⁷