France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (30 page)

We have not chosen to quote some of these texts at length for their intellectual value but rather to show that a weak government was in some way swept up in a pacifist tornado. A few isolated men did wish that France take immediate military action. However, all organizations, groups, newspapers, political parties, and trade unions stood up against the odious prospect of a war just seventeen and one half years following the previous slaughter.

Without the benefit of the minutes of the cabinet meetings held on Sunday, March 8, and Monday, March 9, we do not have reliable information as to what actually took place, and the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry did not provide a clear chronological description. Following his March 8 speech, Albert Sarraut spoke on radio in strong terms that included the words: “We will not allow that Strasbourg be exposed to German cannon fire.” According to René Massigli, who had written the speech, he had added that sentence and underlined it so that Sarraut could decide whether to keep it or not since it could suggest a forceful reaction.
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Sarraut did not think it sounded negative and kept it, which resulted in a drop in the stock market on Monday, March 9. However, the cabinet took the big decision that day that France would appeal to the countries that had signed the Locarno agreement and to the League of Nations. In other words, it did not see Hitler’s brutal move as a “flagrant” breach of Locarno.

In any case, France had consulted its allies. Belgium had picked the date of March 6 to permanently end the secret military agreement of September 1920,
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choosing a narrow interpretation of Locarno. England was merely “lukewarm,” as Ambassador Corbin had noted, toward a French policy that was too conciliatory towards Italy. Anthony Eden, the new head of the Foreign Office since January 2, did not appear to back a firm attitude at all. No British historian ever considered Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin as the embodiment of a firm policy. “The position of Downing Street,” wrote Corbin, “seems to be as follows: take no initiatives, create no obstacles.”
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It will come as no surprise that Eden’s main initiative on March 7 consisted in preventing the French from doing anything at all. He made some calls to Flandin that we were unable to trace in the archives. He also met with Corbin in the late morning of March 7. The German action was, he said, “deplorable,” but “he feels that due to the seriousness of the circumstances it would be desirable that no action that could irreparably influence the future be taken before the governments affected, and mainly those of France and Great Britain had the opportunity to consult with one another.”
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What did General Maurin say at the cabinet meeting?

In his opinion a partial and temporary military demonstration would not force Hitler to turn back. He therefore wanted the government to consider going to war. This meant British support, if possible, and in any case
French general mobilization
. “That request elicited loud protests from the cabinet,” wrote Flandin. “A general mobilization six weeks
before elections was insane.”
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According to Flandin who was writing long after those events, the only ones “in favor of immediate military action” (limited in scope, no doubt) were himself, Sarraut, Paul-Boncour, and Mandel (the one closest to Maurin). But in the midst of the usual commotion Mandel said nothing. Paul-Boncour spoke with Maurin
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about calling up available men. Finally, everything led to the decision to do nothing at all.

The only promise of external support came from Poland and the USSR. Beck summoned Ambassador Léon Noël at 5 p.m. on March 7 and brought up the “alliance” between France and Poland, suggesting they stay in very close contact.
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On March 10 in London Soviet Ambassador Maisky had a meeting with Corbin and told him that “the government of the USSR was willing to participate in any action against Germany that was taken by the League of Nations.”
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But Polish enthusiasm was short-lived and Léon Noël remained skeptical. During the night of March 7 to 8 the Polish press agency
Iskra
issued a communiqué that was favorable to Germany.
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The Soviets were convinced, as Maisky said, “that any German aggression can only be prevented with strong opposition and not by agreeing to the offers made by the Reich.” The French government, however, did not appear to want the pact it had just ratified to come into play.

The Paris
Bourse
was back up on Tuesday, March 10. In Berlin, following two nervous days, “an almost unfettered optimism prevails.”
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The negotiations that were to take place beginning March 12, while France was in the thick of its election campaign, are well known. Anthony Eden probably provides the best account on the subject.
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French documents confirm that Eden clearly understood several points: first, “neither before nor during the dispute were the French ministers firmly agreed upon a settled course of action. Theirs was the agony of an essentially pacific, democratic country believing that, in this instance, pacifism was not enough and searching for stronger action that might be carried through with the support of their own people but without the risk of war.”
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The main negotiator Flandin, on the other hand, was deeply troubled. In private conversations with British negotiators he generally approved their realistic approach. However, during the conferences he backed much more demanding positions that were impossible to sustain and could only be implemented through the use of force.
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In a speech at the House of Commons on March 9, Eden had clearly explained Britain’s hesitation at getting into a policy of retaliation.

The first phase lasted from March 10 to 19. It included a series of meetings of the countries that had signed Locarno, except Germany (and Italy being represented only by its ambassador) then by the Council of the League of Nations. The meetings took place on March 10 in Paris and later in London. On March 11 Flandin left for the British capital feeling confident.
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He thought he could “take guarantees” without “too much trouble.” He asked the Navy—which was flabbergasted—for a blockade plan. Alexis Léger told Admiral Durand-Veil that “we can seriously…reduce, even by an honorable compromise, Germany’s strength and prestige.”
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Let us digress to examine the inclinations for “taking guarantees” that the military leaders discussed for a few days. The Navy felt that the operations Flandin was suggesting to occupy Heligoland, blockade Bremen or Hamburg, and seize German ships in the high seas were, despite the fact that it was clearly superior to the German navy, “as adventurous as they were unproductive.”
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Security measures would first be necessary. In any case British cooperation was necessary—its fleet was concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean since September 1935 —as well as Italy’s, which was totally absorbed by the war in Ethiopia.

Air Force Chief of Staff General Pujo, whose authority was too weak compared to the army’s, did not want to undertake bombing raids without the full mobilization of his units, including those of
Défense aérienne du territoire
, because Paris was vulnerable to an attack. The French air force was still relatively stronger than Germany’s.
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Then there was the army. In October 1932, when Germany only had about 100,000 soldiers, plan D called for the complete occupation of the Saar. The plan included 3 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and a Senegalese brigade. Plan D
bis
of April 1935 included “taking guarantees in the Saar” without listing the units. In his book
Servir
,
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Gamelin states that he gave an order in February 1936 to prepare for a possible operation limited to the left bank of the Saar. According to le Goyet, who conducted a thorough investigation, there is no trace of any such order in army archives.
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Only on March 11 did the Superior War Council propose—within the framework of the League of Nations—either the occupation of the left bank of the Saar or the occupation of Luxembourg.
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But this required going to the “reinforced security” stage of 1,200,000 men. There was very little enthusiasm to go around. The operation would take eight days to get going. We would quickly be up against the bulk of the German army, and all this would cost at least 20 million
francs a day. For the left bank of the Saar alone, 10 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry and five army corps organic units or three times more troops than were planned for the entire Saar in 1932.
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With these ambitious drafts and a memo from Massigli to remind him correctly that “the question at hand is to find out whether Europe was to become German or not,”
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Flandin presented the French position: to agree with the Locarno powers to ask the Council of the League of Nations for economic and later military sanctions and to refuse negotiations with Hitler based upon his March 7 proposals.

He immediately encountered the polite but firm opposition of Anthony Eden. Sanctions against Germany? That was out of the question. France had rejected oil sanctions against Italy. British public opinion did not feel concerned by the reoccupation of what was, after all, German territory. The French alliances in Central Europe were of no interest; the British did not want any military sanctions and were strongly opposed to economic ones. The French were mistaken in any case if they thought they would get a general consensus among other members of the League of Nations for sanctions. Neither the Scandinavians nor the Latin Americans would accept them. Eden did agree that one of Hitler’s proposals—for a demilitarized zone straddling both borders of France and Belgium—was absurd because it would include the length of the Maginot Line. On the other hand, it was necessary to consider his non-aggression pact offers and, since he brought up the issue, to encourage him to rejoin the League of Nations.
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Flandin, in conversation with a few British leaders, became indignant and threatened to leave the League of Nations. Massigli didn’t hide his thinking from Harold Nicolson: “He’s very bitter and feels that we’re traitors.”
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Flandin then fell back on a new position: he would only negotiate with the Germans if they evacuated the demilitarized zone or at least if they sent no further troops into the Rhineland area and pledged not to build any fortifications!
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Eden then invited Germany to send an observer to the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. Hitler picked the Nazi Joachim von Ribbentrop (he was to be appointed ambassador to England on August 11). For now “confused discussions were taking place.”
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March 19 turned out to be a key date. First, Ribbentrop was allowed into the Council—and he naturally rejected all the French proposals. Other offers were made: keep a 20-kilometer demilitarized area under the control of international troops, and bring the problem of the zone to the
court of The Hague. On March 24 Hitler vigorously rejected those “dishonorable” proposals. In other words, the forcible takeover had been accepted by attrition and the British views of an actual negotiation with Hitler. He had therefore won.
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France, however, was not losing everything. England obviously had a major stake in preventing a German invasion of Belgium or France. Locarno, with its system of guarantees, fulfilled that task. Whatever was left of Locarno had to be preserved. On that same March 19, 1936, England extended its guarantee to France and Belgium in the event of a German invasion. In his memoirs Flandin brags about it as a great personal achievement and refers to it as “the Franco-British alliance.”
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This was written with the benefit of hindsight. More accurately, this agreement should be called the natural extension of British policy. The main guarantee of Locarno was upheld without Germany, which had unilaterally breached the treaty. The stipulations regarding the demilitarized zone, which the British never thought much of, and which no longer actually existed, were cut. The only new point was to start military talks among the British, French, and Belgians. Eden was able to gain acceptance for these points in the House of Commons. Ambassador Corbin, who wasn’t completely reassured by the speech, felt there was good reason “to declare oneself satisfied” with the agreement of March 19.
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The negotiations then bogged down amid widespread indifference on the part of the French, by now totally focused on the elections. In a speech on April 1, Hitler offered a new plan
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that included twenty-five-year non-aggression pacts and Germany’s possible return to the League of Nations, with many new stipulations for humanizing warfare. This proposal was obviously aimed at British public opinion.
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On April 3, Sarraut, Flandin and Paul-Boncour took stock of the situation with Ambassadors François-Poncet, Corbin, de Chambrun, and Laroche, as well as Alexis Léger and Charles Rochat, Flandin’s cabinet director. François-Poncet gave a long presentation on the events that took place, suggesting a discussion of the new German plan. “Through discussions, we can pressure Mr. Hitler into being more precise about his aims and block his traps with some counter-traps.” Corbin pointed out “the willful illusions and optimism” of British public opinion and the absence of “definite ideas” in the government in London. The decision was reached to answer Germany but remain vigilant. François-Poncet concluded: “We must make some concessions to the public’s naïveté but we must also be armed.”
The French counterproposals were rejected by Germany and the negotiations ended there.
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