France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (29 page)

The Quai d’Orsay could only take note of the general staff’s refusal. In a document probably written by Massigli, one reads that General Maurin’s letter “says nothing regarding initiatives France could take to intimidate or force the opponent to retreat.” It only discusses moves that are intended as “guarantees in order to protect us from a further development of the German initiative.”
⁶⁸
The Quai d’Orsay and the cabinet both resigned themselves at the meeting of February 27. Despite the possibility offered by the Locarno agreements to act alone without waiting for a decision of the Council of the League of Nations in the event of a “blatant and unquestionable breach” of Locarno, “the French government will take no isolated action. It will only act in agreement with the signatories of Locarno.” It only reserves the right to take “preparatory” actions. Belgian Ambassador de Kerchove was informed as of February 27 and Eden a few days later in Geneva.
⁶⁹

The French government, therefore, decided in advance to side with the general staff but this still requires an explanation: Was Gamelin thinking that the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone would be insignificant? Not at all. At a meeting of the chiefs of staff on February 19, where no ministers were in attendance, he made the surprising statement: “We must do everything we can to keep the clauses of the treaty of Versailles regarding the demilitarized zone at least up to the moment when the impact of the low birth rate classes is no longer felt in our manpower meaning until 1940 or 1942.”

Do everything? Except acting alone militarily. And what if, as it appears very probable, Great Britain and Belgium refused to cooperate?
⁷⁰
Why not attempt to take action with just French troops since France has the right to do so in case of a “blatant breach?”

There is a general answer to this. The French army was based on a
defensive
doctrine. There were no plans to engage “a potential expeditionary
corps” quickly beyond the Maginot Line (an expression used by Gamelin himself.)
⁷¹
As Michalon and Vernet write,
⁷²
“Therefore following the military triumph of the army of 1918, the regular French army, designed to include three million men at mobilization, had become within fifteen years and in spite of its 400,000 men a cumbersome mass incapable of having immediate operational capabilities.”

But there was also another, more compelling, motivation.
Gamelin believed that the German armed forces were already stronger than the French forces
.

The idea was making the rounds in political circles. On January 30, during the debate regarding the Sarraut government’s policy statement, the ultra-nationalist Radical Franklin-Bouillon declared, “Today Germany has an army twice the size of ours and two times better equipped.” And he quoted the War Budget Committee Chairman Léon Archimbaud (Radical): “I said so because it’s the truth!” he cried out.
⁷³

Gamelin, it was assumed, was much better informed than the members of Parliament. However, his estimates don’t match what we know today. Starting in April 1935, Gamelin spoke in terms of a German army “of 32 infantry divisions, doubling possibly even by the end of 1935 and 50 divisions of Grenzschutz (border protection units) reaching the planned 120 divisions.”
⁷⁴
Facing them, what could the French army do, since it had only 350,000 men (20 infantry divisions, 3 North African divisions, 2 light mechanized divisions and 8 fortress brigades)?
⁷⁵
Furthermore, Gamelin thought that in a long war—and he didn’t conceive of any other—German manpower would overwhelm the French.

One could conclude that Gamelin’s mistake originated in faulty evaluations by the
Deuxième Bureau
of the Army General Staff, which was in charge of intelligence gathering. However,
Deuxième Bureau
was well informed. As Colonel Defrasne wrote, its assessments “for the most part corroborate recent works by German authors, both in their manpower or location.”
⁷⁶
In March 1936 the
Deuxième Bureau
estimated that Germany had an army of 480,000 men coming from a very mixed recruitment: 90,000 from the old Reichswehr; 90,000 that joined in 1934; 90,000 that joined in 1935; 50,000 policemen incorporated into the army and 160,000 conscripts from the class of 1934. On paper this was a far cry from the 32 divisions that could be doubled as described by Gamelin. But this army had a fundamental weakness prior to 1937 that could not be overcome: the lack of officers. These numbered 4,300 in 1933 when 30,000 were required. Despite the hasty training of younger officers, the
recall of many retired officers, and the promotions of NCOs, there would still be only 13,000 by the end of 1935.
⁷⁷
To these one must add the huge paramilitary formations: 1,000,000 SA; 30,000 SS; 350,000 NSKK—Nazi transport services—and 400,000 Labor Front members. The
Deuxième Bureau
, however, considered their military worth as practically nil. These militias, even armed with rifles, cannot be compared to trained reservists, and then how could they be mobilized since there were no officers?

There had to be someone else who, using these reassuring numbers, would then extrapolate them. This was, in fact, the key to the problem.

By estimating the manpower of the units present in the Rhineland on March 11 at 60,000 men—seven divisions—Gamelin,
despite the Deuxième Bureau
, added another 235,000 auxiliary troops but, above all,
rather than describing them as 235,000 disorganized men, transformed that evaluation into fifteen divisions, that is, into combat-ready units
. Therefore, the French were already facing twenty-two German divisions!
⁷⁸

To whom and to what can such a high wire exercise be attributed? Was Gamelin attempting, through excessively cautious precautions, to overestimate the enemy’s troop strength in order not to be in a weaker position? Was he the victim of the fears of some of his subordinates? According to eyewitnesses, the
Troisième Bureau
was not at fault. Since we know today that Generals von Fritsch and von Blomberg, frightened by Hitler’s bold move, were recommending the cancellation of the March 7 operation; and we know of the calculated risk he was willing to take: the French are stronger than we are but will not dare respond! With our knowledge that Hitler was ready to sound the retreat immediately, should the French army cross the border,
⁷⁹
then the sheer enormity of that responsibility becomes apparent. General Maurin and the government, not having direct access to
Deuxième Bureau
intelligence, could not know that they were being misled regarding the size of the German forces. Strangely enough, Gamelin would write later on in his memoirs that in 1936 France let the “last opportunity” go by to beat Hitler’s Germany.
⁸⁰
This statement sounds rather naïve.

4.

T
HE
D
ECISION
T
O
N
OT
R
EACT AND
G
ETTING
B
OGGED
D
OWN

François-Poncet’s first dispatch of March 7 reached the Quai d’Orsay at 9:30 a.m.
⁸¹
The ambassador announced that the Reichstag was being summoned to a noon session. He was received by von Neurath at 10:30 a.m. immediately following the Italian ambassador. The German minister handed him a nine-page memorandum breaking the Locarno Pact and offering a negotiation that would create a demilitarized zone on both sides of the border. The ambassador protested “in the most vigorous and solemn manner” against this unilateral breach of the Locarno Pact which Germany had signed of her own free will. He asked von Neurath whether Germany would send troops into the demilitarized zone. A few symbolic units, answered the minister. The cable reached the Quai d’Orsay at 11:30 a.m.
⁸²
Another cable phoned in at 3:40 p.m. stated that 19 battalions and 13 artillery groups were taking part in the operation.
⁸³

The coup took place early on a Saturday morning. All the French morning papers were already published, unaware that the irreparable move was taking place, and some dailies—mainly
Le Populaire
—had awkwardly published optimistic articles. Saturday turned out to be a good day. Members of Parliament and cabinet ministers, almost to a man, were off in their electoral districts far away from Paris. Public opinion found out on the radio—there were still few listeners in those days—and from the evening papers. The government was unable to meet on March 7. In the afternoon Albert Sarraut met with the three defense ministers, State Minister Paul-Boncour and Georges Mandel, minister of the PTT. The latter two supported a firm attitude, while the others hesitated. Decisions were delayed until the following day since they necessarily belonged to the full cabinet. On the military side General Maurin had issued the order in advance to enact the “simple alert.” Corps commanders recalled soldiers who were on leave; troops were dispatched to the Maginot Line. Then they waited to see whether the reservists would be called up once more. According to the calculations by Michalon and Vernet,
⁸⁴
in two days some 55,000 men were sent to the border to face some 30,000 German soldiers.

The big decision was scheduled for the cabinet meetings of Sunday, March 8, and Monday, March 9. It had actually been prepared by the
meeting of February 27, where it was agreed that France would take no isolated action. The problem was to see whether, faced by a brutal event, there wouldn’t be a stronger reaction.

It becomes necessary before examining the government’s role to take into account the mood of public opinion and its reaction. The public was not prepared and it was amazed and frightened, displaying a rare unanimous reaction: “Above all, no war!” The newspapers published on Sunday, March 8, all firmly opposed any strong reaction. War was something the political opposition wanted. In other words, the March 7 events, so threatening to France, were reduced to an internal political dispute. The Communists issued a statement:

“Men, women, young people: unite to prevent the curse of war from descending upon us once again… Let us bring about the unity of the French nation against those who would lead us to carnage.” And they were “the Laval clique,” the right—Taittinger, Philippe Henriot, Kérillis—the businessmen de Wendel and Schneider, the “traitor” Doriot and war veteran Jean Goy.
⁸⁵
The Socialists gave Paul Faure a column (Léon Blum was still at Muret at the home of Vincent Auriol, convalescing after being wounded on February 13). This is what Paul Faure wrote: “The view we reject is that war could be the end result of the diplomatic conflict created by Berlin’s
coup de théâtre
.”
⁸⁶
Furthermore, Oreste Rosenfeld and Marceau Pivert were vigorously objecting to the “provocative” attitude of the French government that had dared send troops to man…the Maginot Line! The CGT, reunited once more, voted a resolution on March 11, demanding “that the country not lose the necessary calm.”
⁸⁷
The Socialist members of Parliament stated that any action outside the League of Nations would effectively “reduce the current serious clash to a simple problem involving pride and prestige.”

The radical
L’Œuvre
entitled its editorial of March 8, “Serious? Yes. The end of everything? We shall see.” On the same day Geneviève Tabouis was asking “whether France would enforce respect for international law.” How? “France will not mobilize, she will not even call up some classes but will prepare security measures, for example, by occupying the fortifications in the Rhineland and enforcing economic, financial, and even military sanctions by most countries at the League of Nations.” The “even military” takes on a comic and tragic significance under the circumstances. In any case, there would be negotiations with Germany.
⁸⁸

The left was up in arms against the right-wing warmongers and demanded peace. But the right was incensed at the left-wing warmongers
and also demanded peace, under threat by the Bolsheviks and their supporters. The headline of
Le Matin
on March 8 read: “Adolf Hitler has forcefully indicated the communist threat.”
⁸⁹
Leon Bailby announced in
Le Jour
, “We are already involved in a Russo-German war.”
⁹⁰
He pretended to complain that there had been no retaliation but added that “in order for it to happen it cannot only be French, it must be Anglo-French above all.”
⁹¹
Colonel de La Rocque the leader of the
Croix de Feu
, thought there could be only one solution: to have “a government that is representative of the vital, social and energetic part of the “reconciled” nation.
⁹²
Marcel Bucard’s “Francist” movement felt that “the threat could only be eliminated by a direct and loyal agreement between France, Italy and Germany.”
⁹³

As usual, the most violent position was that of
L’Action Française
. A banner headline on March 8 read: “The Republic has assassinated the peace.” On March 9 a second banner headline screamed, “S
ARRAUT AND
F
LANDIN
G
ET
O
UT
!”, followed by “G
ET
O
UT
Y
OU
B
UNCH OF
C
UCKOLDS
!” on March 10. Maurras provided the following commentary: “And first of all no war. We don’t want war… We are ready to offer the last drop of blood for our country’s independence… We will not shed any…for words that are meaningless.”
⁹⁴

Among the veterans’ associations the CNAC was pleased “in seeing how the nation once again showed its cool self control” and declared its support for the government. The UFAC suggested “forbidding any kind of action that could cause anxiety in the country” and voiced its trust in the League of Nations. The main association, UNC, berated the League of Nations, declaring that the country was in danger, and proposed the formation of “a government of French reconciliation and national defense” and the postponement of the elections. It would agree, “if necessary,” to the recall of the latest classes of conscripts that had been discharged—a very bold move indeed.
⁹⁵
This would earn them a sarcastic comment by the communists: “The UNC wants to mobilize several classes. We understand the type of interests that move them in any case.”
⁹⁶