France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (58 page)

On the 25th at 3 p.m. the French Council of Ministers met once more to reach a decision. There was, noted de Monzie, a “steep rise in temperature.” A communiqué released by the British Foreign Office—without consulting Bonnet, added de Monzie—announced that should Czechoslovakia be subjected to German attack, “France would be compelled to provide help and that Great Britain and Russia would certainly be at France’s side.”
¹⁴⁰
There was a lot of restlessness just before the meeting of the Council of Ministers. As of the 22nd Mandel, Reynaud and Champetier de Ribes were considering handing in their resignations. Herriot and Churchill, who was visiting in Paris, talked them out of it to avoid “a crisis in the midst of a storm.”
¹⁴¹

As early as the 21st Bonnet, Pomaret, Mistler, Bergery and socialist deputy René Brunet, back from Prague where he had been sent by Bonnet, all agreed, against those backing “resistance,” to avoid war at any price.
¹⁴²
They had the support of the elderly Joseph Caillaux,
¹⁴³
as well as that of Flandin who wrote to Daladier on September 24 requesting a foreign policy debate in both chambers.
¹⁴⁴

At the meeting of the Council of Ministers on the 25th, those pacifists previously mentioned had the backing of Guy La Chambre, Chautemps, Queuille, and Marchandeau. Those in favor of resistance were opposed to the German plan. Reynaud stated, “The Godesberg project spells the end of Czechoslovakia.” Mandel and Reynaud were convinced that England would take action; Bonnet answered that “he had no information on the issue.” Daladier then joined the “resisters” by saying that he viewed the London agreement as an outer limit. “He does not want to accept the immediate entry of thirty German divisions into the Sudetenland because it would mean war.”
¹⁴⁵

Then came the pilgrimage to London. On the evening of September 25 Daladier and Bonnet, with the usual entourage, met the same British partners as on the 18th. Chamberlain again gave an account of his conversations with Hitler. Daladier stated once more that the French government had not had the time to thoroughly study the Führer’s proposals.

As far as Daladier was concerned, it appeared that if Hitler did not abide by the Franco-British proposal of September 17 one had to “do one’s duty”—meaning go to war. Chamberlain agreed that “it was necessary to face the serious realities of the present.”

Sir John Simon then inquired whether the French forces were contemplating the invasion of Germany. Daladier optimistically hinted that this was possible. To hand over—as it had been done—3 million Sudeten citizens to Germany was “quite a difficult decision, if not a dishonorable one.” Hitler would not be satisfied, meaning that he intended to destroy Czechoslovakia. “France will never accept those kinds of concessions, those who wish to do so can follow us.” Chamberlain was more inclined to do so than Sir John Simon and Samuel Hoare but he “must say in all candor that there had been disturbing news in London regarding the readiness of the French air force.” The French press was “not belligerent at all.” “It would be a futile consolation to want to fulfill your obligations toward your friends and help them, only to discover later on that you are in no condition to do so but are actually caving in.” The British were therefore not prepared to commit to war.
¹⁴⁶
At the short meeting on the morning of the 26th it was decided that Sir Horace Wilson would carry a message to Hitler requesting to “substitute a method of negotiations to violent military action.”
¹⁴⁷

The crisis lasted three days. Many military precautions were taken, the “black-out” started, train windows were painted blue, signs showing the names of train stops were removed and, most of all, the reservists made their way to the borders. Gamelin traveled to London on the 26th and met with the members of the Imperial Defense Committee. He was relatively optimistic but requested “the order of magnitude to send significant British military units to France.”
¹⁴⁸
Admiral Darlan shared that relative optimism,
¹⁴⁹
but not General Vuillemin, who noted a “very pronounced…disproportion of forces.” French aircraft performance (250 fighters, 320 bombers and no reserves) was clearly inferior.
¹⁵⁰

Yet a sizeable mystery remained. Would the Soviets step in to help Czechoslovakia? Yes, they kept on saying, on condition that France step in according to the stipulations of the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact of May 1935. But since the USSR had no common borders with either Germany or Czechoslovakia, how could she possibly intervene? Passage had to be secured through Poland or Romania at the very least. But it was a well-known fact that those countries steadfastly refused to
grant passage; Litvinov then said that the League of Nations could order them to do so. Everyone, however, knew that was impossible.
¹⁵¹

There would be no progress during the whole month of September. Georges Bonnet met with Litvinov on the 11th in Geneva and Litvinov did not change his position.
¹⁵²
Bonnet was barely able to obtain from Romanian Minister Comnène for his country to tolerate overflights by Soviet airplanes: “When the planes flew over they could draw some shelling that would miss the target.”
¹⁵³
Beneš had secured the assurance from the USSR that airplanes would be sent.
¹⁵⁴
However, the general in command of the Czechoslovak air force went to Moscow and was given only delaying answers.
¹⁵⁵
The Soviets only sent some light reinforcements, as Colonel Palasse, the French military attaché found out, to their side of the Polish border.
¹⁵⁶
On September 23 they announced that if Poland attacked Czechoslovakia, the USSR would cancel the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of July 25, 1932, without notice. However, Ambassador Coulondre was unable to find out whether they would then enter Polish territory.
¹⁵⁷
At the height of the crisis the Soviet position was clear regarding the principle involved and totally unclear as to how it would help the Czechs.
¹⁵⁸

The crisis reached its climax with Hitler’s violent speech on the evening of the 26th. It was a clever speech where, as François-Poncet stated, he “excelled at playing the innocent.”
¹⁵⁹
Would this lead to war?

Once just about every possible concession had been made on principle, it became difficult to unleash the catastrophe on formal details. This was Bonnet’s opinion. He told the Council of Ministers on the morning of September 27 that “the diplomatic situation has never been worse and we have no air force…It is impossible to go to war. I am against a general mobilization. An accommodation must be secured at any price. I face the strongest opposition of most of my colleagues. The matter of my resignation has undoubtedly come up.” He saw Daladier that afternoon and “begged” him to continue his efforts toward peace. “He seems shaken. He is thinking of sending François-Poncet a telegram for a final initiative.”
¹⁶⁰
He is, said American Ambassador Bullitt, “tortuous and weak” while Daladier is “sure of himself and strong.”
¹⁶¹
Bullitt did meet with Daladier on the 27th to convey a message from Roosevelt who “will do whatever you suggest in the pursuit of peace.”
¹⁶²

Yet, despite a telegram from Bonnet to François-Poncet during the night of the 27th to the 28th proposing a guarantee to be offered to the
Germans,
¹⁶³
the “saving” initiative once again originated with the British. Chamberlain easily convinced Mussolini to suggest to Hitler a four-power conference in Germany. Corbin telegraphed the news to Bonnet on September 28, 1938.
¹⁶⁴
François-Poncet was meeting with Hitler and had to interrupt the conversation because Mussolini was calling the Führer on the telephone. He asked him to delay the mobilization and the attack for twenty-four hours.
¹⁶⁵
Hitler agreed and decided that the conference of the four powers would take place the following day in Munich.

As he was leaving, Daladier—accompanied by Léger and Rochat but not Bonnet—received a final telegram from Beneš asking him “not to forget the twenty years of political collaboration I have had with France.”

We shall not recount the Munich conference in detail.
¹⁶⁶
Daladier, like Chamberlain, gave in on practically everything. They were only able to have the occupation of the Sudetenland take place between the 1st and the 10th rather than on the 1st. They discussed guaranteeing the new borders of Czechoslovakia. Only France and Great Britain agreed to do so, while Germany and Italy stated that first the issue of Czechoslovakia’s borders with Poland and Hungary had to be resolved.

7.

F
RENCH
P
UBLIC
O
PINION AND
M
UNICH

Much has been written on this subject.
¹⁶⁷
Munich was a greater factor in revealing the changes at work in French thinking, even more than March 1936, more than the Popular Front.

We can turn to two public opinion polls taken by the very new
Institut français d’opinion publique
founded by a young sociologist, Jean Stoetzel, who would later be the author of a very remarkable doctoral dissertation on public opinion.
¹⁶⁸
The Gallup method, perfected in the United States in 1935 and become popular in 1936, was now reaching France.
¹⁶⁹
The first poll asked the question, “Do you approve of the Munich agreements?” Answer: 57% yes, 37% no. The second poll taken shortly after asked the question, “Do you think that France and England must now oppose any new demand made by Hitler?” Answer: 70% yes, 17% no. “Such a high percentage,” as Ageron correctly writes,
¹⁷⁰
“indicates clearly that some Frenchmen only accepted Munich very grudgingly.”

To try to understand what appears to be a contradiction between the two polls, one must not forget that a shocked public opinion remained in a state of flux.

Initially there was the reaction of a country convinced that war was about to begin, feeling naturally relieved at the idea that it was avoided
at the last minute
. This explains why Daladier, returning from the Munich conference on September 30, was surprised to be welcomed by a huge and enthusiastic crowd. Georges Bonnet, Guy La Chambre, and Chautemps were waiting for him at Le Bourget airport. The latter was said to have told Gamelin, “So, General, not getting your share after all?”—which Gamelin, quite rightly, did not like at all.
¹⁷¹
And Gamelin then telling Daladier, “Mr. Prime Minister, you are about to get too warm a welcome.” Several hundred thousand people did take the time to line the streets along the way and at the evening ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe.
¹⁷²
It is a well established fact that Daladier felt that Munich was “an immense defeat for France and England.”
¹⁷³

The daily
Paris-Soir
began a funding drive—that would eventually fail—to give Chamberlain a “house of peace” near Biarritz as a gift (he loved trout fishing).
Le Petit Parisien
opened a “golden book” where one million people were said to have signed their approval. Paris deputy Pierre Taittinger immediately wanted two streets of the French capital to be named after Chamberlain and Daladier. Pierre-Étienne Flandin sent cables congratulating the four who signed on October 1 (and therefore to Hitler and Mussolini). Masses offering thanks to God were being celebrated everywhere.

The initial reaction continued in the Chamber of Deputies on October 2. Daladier was given a long ovation. “A real victory for peace,” he said. He mentioned the guarantees of the Czechoslovak borders and the need to fight for peace. The foreign policy statement was approved by a vote of 515 to 75, among them the 73 communist deputies, socialist Jean Bouhey and moderate Henri de Kérillis. As Gabriel Péri was to say, “The Communist Party refuses to be associated with the highway robbery Munich represents.” Louis Marin, another moderate (who abstained), expressed his disagreement in a striking statement: “A weakened, disarmed France was sacrificing Czechoslovakia in order to avoid a war that she felt she could not fight and win, had just confessed her downfall to the entire world. It was no longer the France of Foch and Clemenceau, of the Marne and of Verdun.” Kérillis said, prophetically, “Germany is insatiable and pitiless toward the weak, and you have just shown yourselves
to be weak. Germany only respects the strong.
You may think she will become quiet and peaceful and I tell you she will become demanding and terrible
.”
¹⁷⁴
[Emphasis added.]

The first impression was one of enthusiasm at saving the peace, which was quickly replaced, even among those who favored Munich, by the feeling that they must live with the inevitable and that Munich was a disaster. Emmanuel Mounier in
Esprit
accused “a disoriented bourgeoisie that finds the energy only to defend itself from its fears…the lower classes confused by alcohol worrying only about their savings.” In his book
L’Equinoxe de Septembre
, Montherlant wrote an oft-quoted line, “France is back to playing cards and to Tino Rossi.”
¹⁷⁵
The lingering enthusiasm was limited to extremist groups like Doriot’s PPF, the newswriter Gustave Hervé, the daily
Le Matin
and the right-wing weeklies. “It’s not a triumph. It’s peace,” wrote Léon Bailby in
Le Jour
.
¹⁷⁶
And very quickly most Frenchmen concluded that it was a surrender.

Was that course of action right or wrong? The issue was to divide France into two groups,
pro-
and
anti
-Munich, that no longer followed the political parties. Four positions appeared very quickly.