France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (57 page)

As of the evening of the 17th France still had no information.
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Chamberlain summoned Daladier and Bonnet to London on September 18. Léger, Corbin, Rochat, Jules Henry (who headed Bonnet’s cabinet), and Roland de Margerie were present. Besides the usual top officials, Chamberlain also had with him the other great
appeasers
, Halifax, Hoare and Simon.
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The British position was already decided. Chamberlain gave a detailed account of his conversations with Hitler, who said he wanted the Sudetenland and had no further territorial demands in Europe. “The racial unity of the Germans is his only goal.” His reasoning followed the people’s right to choose their own destiny. Chamberlain obviously did not object. Runciman, who had been called to London, felt that this was, after all, readily justifiable.

Daladier’s initial reaction was unequivocal: the idea that the Sudetenland was to be annexed was very new and he could not take an immediate position.

Chamberlain then underscored Beneš’ mistake in engaging “delaying tactics.” According to Runciman, “no mediation attempt between the Czechs and the Germans had any chance of succeeding.” What was required was
self-determination
. What was France’s position? At first Daladier thought, “it is always difficult to ask a friend to cut off one or both of his legs.” He also felt that Czechoslovakia would not survive and that some day it would be the corridor’s turn. In any case, no plebiscite was possible.

Daladier added, “France’s treaty obligations are clear and inevitable… There wasn’t a single one of his fellow citizens who would readily betray.” Halifax then proposed a way to avoid perpetrating a betrayal. All that was required was that Hitler not attack, meaning that they had to negotiate and Hitler had promised not to use force during negotiations.

Following a discussion within the French delegation, Daladier made his first concession. In losing the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia was also losing its fortifications, and only an
international guarantee
could replace them. This was the birth of the idea of a transfer followed by guarantees. Georges Bonnet underscored that point: “The objective is above all to give Czechoslovakia moral support in exchange for the sacrifices required with the guarantee of France and Great Britain.”

The British didn’t like the proposal but ended up agreeing to it. During the last phase of the meeting, on the evening of September 18, the French gave in completely. A Franco-British note was drafted
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to be sent to Prague if the French government, which Daladier wanted to consult as soon as he returned to Paris on the morning of September 19, agreed. And it would be Daladier himself, cleverly manipulated by Chamberlain, who came to the conclusion that “
The two governments must exert very strong pressure on Prague for Czechoslovakia to accept the solution proposed by two friendly powers.”
[Emphasis added.]

The following step was the meeting of the Council of Ministers on Monday morning, September 19. It was the first discussion among the ministers regarding the Czechoslovak problem. Some ministers had in fact taken a position on an individual basis.
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Georges Bonnet had at times quickly mentioned the issue, but—as we have noted regarding the July 20 document—he was pursuing his own policies. It was rather dangerous to present the problem to the Council of Ministers, known to be divided. The risk of a break-up and cabinet crisis was looming in the
midst of a European tragedy—similar to what happened during the Anschluss. When British journalist Alexander Werth, an excellent observer, described a debate on Czechoslovakia at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on September 15,
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he was no doubt confusing some points of discussion with a binding decision. The
Carnets Secrets de Jean Zay
begin as of September 19. De Monzie, who joined the Council of Ministers at the end of August and who was a sworn enemy of Beneš, makes no mention of this as of the 15th.
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However, on September 4 he wrote, “The Council has not yet discussed the issue.”
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If we follow de Monzie, those supporting resistance were: Paul Reynaud, Mandel and Champetier de Ribes; the pacifists were Bonnet, Marchandeau, Guy La Chambre (the air minister who was in turn influenced by General Vuillemin), Pomaret and de Monzie himself. Chautemps “was discreetly encouraging Bonnet.” He also influenced Daladier whom he impressed with his “reputation of being clever.” The radicals Queuille, Rucart, and Jean Zay followed the same line. Actually we now know that Jean Zay was a firm believer in resistance. Sarraut and Campinchi “were waiting.”

The debate was relatively short since the meeting began at 10:30 a.m. and Bonnet came out at 12:30.
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Daladier summarized the London discussions by saying that he had defended the French position “with all his energy but to no avail.”
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He repeated the proposals made by Beneš to give up part of the Sudetenland. “Daladier said that the Cabinet was free to deliberate, but that it was his duty to be the first one to offer his opinion. He feels we must accept.” In any case, “it would be impossible for us to help the Czechs.” “Short discussion,” said Jean Zay. Mandel asks clarification that the Czechs must agree to the plan. “Bonnet said that should the Czechs refuse, he would ask us to “interpret” our pact with them.” Campinchi then disagreed. But the conclusion was that “it is premature to have this discussion this morning.” Bonnet added, “We would never be in a worse case diplomatically,” and that “he never had a meeting with Osusky without warning him confidentially that in any case we would not intervene without England.” But some ministers said that was not the policy of the government. Bonnet, lowering his voice, told Campinchi that he agreed with Daladier on that point. This was totally false, as we have seen, regarding the note of July 20.

The other speakers as recorded by Jean Zay were Chautemps, de Monzie, Marchandeau, and Bonnet, who pointed out “the exaggerations
of Czech propaganda.” Chautemps stated that should Beneš refuse he must be warned that he could not count on us, which prompted some objections. But the issue was set aside.

De Monzie recorded a statement by Guy La Chambre who brought up a recent report by General Vuillemin that was no cause for optimism. Russia’s support was also mentioned. “Bonnet proved that even though Russia could take a position she didn’t want to do so.” The Franco-British plan was finally approved and on a motion by Anatole de Monzie it was clear that the approval was unanimous.

The remaining task was to convince the Czechs. An unpleasant business if ever there was one, and quite sordid an operation, actually, that would take less than two days.

At 12:30, right after the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Bonnet met with the unfortunate Czech Minister Osusky. He told him about the discussions in London and indicated “the extreme difficulty we encountered in securing a British guarantee for Czechoslovakia.” He underlined “the serious nature of his government’s response… The British government has in fact told us that should Prague refuse it could do nothing but end its involvement in the dispute.” In such a case the French government would “take stock of the
current
situation… The assistance France would be able to provide to Czechoslovakia would be totally ineffective if it did not have the assurance of British support.” This was actually the position taken on July 20.
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At 2:15 p.m. in Prague, Lacroix and Newton, following instructions informed Beneš. The president said he needed to consult with the government and with Parliament. The two diplomats insisted “on the urgent nature of the answer” because Chamberlain had to meet with Hitler on Wednesday the 21st. They also attempted to “convince the President not to take desperate measures that included the use of force.” It was a short but “extremely unpleasant” meeting.
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It must be noted that Bonnet had not consulted with the offices of the Quai d’Orsay. In an important note political director Massigli wrote on the same day, “not being aware of the debates that had taken place yesterday,” showed the difficult problems posed by the idea of guarantees and examined “the consequences for France of
the weakening of Czechoslovakia
.” Those consequences were to be disastrous from every point of view: military, economic, intellectual and moral. “Far from getting Germany to return to a policy of cooperation, the success of its methods can
only encourage it to continue. The enormous sacrifice made by the western powers will not be matched: we would be reduced once again to an act of faith in the peaceful change of the new pan-Germanism.”
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During the entire afternoon of the 19th and the morning of September 20, there was no news coming out of the Czechoslovak deliberations. On the 20th at 1:30 p.m. Lacroix phoned that Prague was hesitating between two solutions: to accept the Franco-British plan with a few reservations, or arbitrage.
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Bonnet immediately instructed Lacroix to say that to ask for arbitrage would be “an irreparable mistake.”
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Then by sending cables every hour Lacroix reported that the Czechs were leaning toward rejection and choosing arbitrage. It became official early in the evening.
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The Czechoslovak government was rejecting the Franco-British note. Public opinion was supporting the government and condemning the offers coming from Paris and London.

Another initiative was in the works, however. Czech Prime Minister Hodza was “softer” than some of his ministers. He summoned Lacroix and told him, “If I went tonight and told Mr. Beneš that in case of war between Germany and Czechoslovakia about the Sudeten Germans, France, because of its commitments toward England, would not go to war, the President of the Republic would take such a declaration into consideration; the Prime Minister would immediately summon the Cabinet where all the participants are now in agreement with the President of the Republic and they would agree to it.
The Czech leaders need that cover in order to accept the Franco-British proposal
.”
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[Emphasis added.]

Two versions exist regarding the events that took place between September 20 at 9:45 p.m., the time the message was received, and 12:30 a.m. on September 21 when Bonnet phoned in the wording of the warning message requested by Hodza to Lacroix. According to Georges Bonnet, he summoned Daladier to the Quai d’Orsay. The phoned instructions to Lacroix were drafted following a discussion with Léger and Jules Henry, who headed Bonnet’s cabinet. Daladier felt that it would be impossible or useless to call a meeting of the Council of Ministers since President Lebrun (reached by phone) was at Rambouillet.
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According to Pierre Comert, head of the Quai d’Orsay’s press office, Bonnet never once called Léger, who was waiting to be summoned during the entire evening. Everything would have taken place between Bonnet and his “brain trust.” During the morning of the 21st Comert expressed his indignation to Jules Henry and criticized the fact that the minister phoned on an open line (knowing that German intelligence was
listening in) rather than sending an encrypted telegram.
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Since Léger did not provide his side of the story, it is impossible to know what really happened. Bonnet, in any case, used the opening provided by Hodza. His determination was confirmed by a phone call that same night of the 20th to the 21st by Sir Eric Phipps to Jules Henry.
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In the face of such a final position the Czech government was still hesitating. Mandel called Beneš several times to encourage him to resist: “Neither Paris nor London should dictate your conduct.” Prague was beginning to think that the French government could fall.
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That afternoon both the French and British were worried about Beneš’ silence. Bonnet spoke to Léger and Daladier about it.

But at 5 p.m., after a final call by Beneš,
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Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Krofta handed Lacroix a resigned and “painful” acceptance, “forced by circumstances and the many pressing requests coming from the French and British governments.”
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6.

T
HE
G
REAT
C
RISIS AND
M
UNICH
(September 23–30)

Once again for two days France could do nothing but wait. Chamberlain went alone to meet with Hitler at Godesberg on September 22 and 23 bringing him “an acceptance intended to avoid any use of force.” Corbin was instructed to tell Halifax that the French government had “full confidence” in the prime minister.
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Hodza resigned, along with his entire cabinet, and was replaced with General Syrovy while Chamberlain was meeting with Hitler. As early as the evening of the 22nd he phoned Halifax, and Corbin learned that “the afternoon meeting had not been satisfactory. Mr. Hitler feels that the Franco-British plan is unacceptable.”
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Everything remained confused until the evening of the 23rd as Chamberlain spent the night at Godesberg in order to decide on the morning of the 24th “whether or not the discussions should go on.”
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Significantly enough, France and England informed Czechoslovakia on the evening of the 23rd that they no longer opposed the general Czechoslovak mobilization, which was then ordered at 10:30 p.m. on the 23rd.
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Chamberlain returned to London without having reached an agreement with Hitler and with a German memorandum—transmitted
to the French—stating that Germany intended to immediately occupy all the areas it was demanding. A plebiscite would then be organized by November 25 at the latest. This was too much to take, even for Chamberlain. As early as September 24 France decided on the call-up “of some categories of reservists”: 753,000 men (287,000 regular army and 266,000 from the reserves) were sent to the northeastern border.
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