France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (67 page)

To begin with on September 27, 1938, in the midst of the Sudeten crisis, Franco had expressed his firm decision to remain completely neutral should there be a conflict and had so informed the French consul general in San Sebastian. He also hinted that this deserved some gestures on France’s part: to stop supplying the Republicans and to send a representative to Burgos, at least recognizing its “belligerent” status. However, during the fall of 1938, it was still believed that “a certain balance of the forces” existed that perhaps allowed a mediation.
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The Negrin government accepted the withdrawal of the International Brigades’ 10,000 to 12,000 men and Mussolini that of 10,000 Italians.
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But this was a sham.
“The bulk of the Italian air force and all of the German air force are still present… Without Italian air power, without Italian artillery, without Italian tanks the offensive power of the nationalists is inconceivable,” wrote Lieutenant Colonel Morel, the military attaché in Barcelona. He concluded, “Facing a poorly equipped republican army with all kinds of equipment purchased from all the arms dealers of Europe; organized and commanded by national leaders; fighting with desperate and admirable courage, there is the so-called nationalist army, well equipped with foreign matériel that was being constantly resupplied when it is not being increased and that is attempting to secure victory by attrition.” And finally: “As for sportsmanship this is not a pretty picture.”
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Should the borders be reopened to favor the Spanish republicans or should Franco’s status as a belligerent be recognized? This was the French government’s dilemma at the end of 1938.
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The total withdrawal of volunteers would obviously help the loyalists. On August 15, however, Franco rejected that possibility.
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As long as the front remained static it was more convenient to avoid any changes one way or another. At the end of the Franco-British conference of November 24, Chamberlain voiced his opposition to a mediation offered by Daladier. The idea of recognizing implicitly Franco’s belligerent status was shelved. To the Spaniards’ “resigned fatalism” the French offered a wait-and-see attitude.
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The nationalists resumed their offensive on December 24, 1939. On January 13 Ambassador Jules Henry met with the Republican prime minister, Juan Negrin, who complained that France was only shipping wheat. He wanted 10,000 trucks—at least 2,000 for the army in Catalonia.
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The bombing of Barcelona forced Henry to evacuate the embassy. He rejected being sent a cruiser to take the trip and would attempt to travel over land.
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The cruiser
Suffren
arrived in Barcelona in any event. A huge wave of 150,000 people, mainly women and children, were said to be on their way to the French border. For Lieutenant Colonel Morel, the military attaché, the republican units resembled poorly equipped “skeletons.” Negrin’s will was “indomitable” but “morale was awful.” There was “no logical chance of turning the tide, nor stopping it. It is the disintegration of the popular forces.”
¹²

Barcelona fell on January 26. French policy was now forced to switch from wait-and-see to becoming actively engaged. The refugee problem required an urgent solution. The Spanish ambassador was requesting that France welcome them into metropolitain France or to North Africa. Bonnet proposed creating a neutral zone inside Spanish territory, but there
were no accommodations nor supplies, and bombing was always a possibility.
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France was forced to set up camps.
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In other words a political solution became necessary. As early as January 20 Bonnet had a conversation with a former Mexican president, Francisco de la Barra, who had just had a meeting with General Jordana, Franco’s minister of foreign affairs, who asked that he, de la Barra, meet with Bonnet and Daladier. La Barra was visiting in San Sebastian with his daughter and was unable to meet with Franco who was at the front in Catalonia. Jordana, who held the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, told him that he felt a lot of friendship toward France. Relations were not so good with the Italians or the Germans, who were efficient but arrogant. Spain had financial obligations toward them but would not make any territorial concessions. “I give you my word of honor as a statesman and a Spaniard… You may transmit my assurance to Mr. Daladier and Mr. Bonnet.” France should name a “general agent” in Burgos as England had done. It would be “possible for France through a dialog with Burgos, to detach the national government from the influence of the Rome-Berlin Axis and have its support for the development of French Mediterranean policy.”
¹⁵

This deserved further investigation. On February 2 Daladier and Bonnet sent Léon Bérard, an important national figure, a senator from the Basses-Pyrénées, and a member of the French Academy, who was very reassuring to the Franco side because he was a Catholic, on the right politically and acceptable to the French left because he was a Basque.
¹⁶
The right and part of the radical-socialists, particularly
L’Ère Nouvelle
, were in favor of the mission. Léon Blum and the socialists understood the need for recognition but hoped it would take place as late as possible. “What impatience, good God, to humiliate oneself in the face of success!”
¹⁷

The mayor of Bilbao, de Lequerica, welcomed Bérard at the border on February 3 with great honors. He traveled to Burgos and remained there until the 6th. General Jordana received him very cordially and expressed his friendship for France. Bérard told him that he came to examine the conditions to establish relations and that the main French preoccupation was to make sure that Spain would be free of foreign troops. Jordana complained about the moral and tangible support France was giving the “Reds,” but confirmed that Spain would rather go to war than cede any piece of its territory to foreigners. He mentioned the main issues that were still open such as confiscated property, and the gold from
the Bank of Spain that the government had deposited in France. Finally, he clearly stated that the only kind of recognition that Franco’s Spain would accept from France would be a
de jure
recognition, which implied that she would stop recognizing the Republican government.
¹⁸

The Republican government was in bad shape. On February 5, as 150,000 soldiers joined the civilians on their way north, the president of the Spanish Republic, Azaña, who favored an immediate peace, crossed the border into France offering an armistice. Negrin, who wanted to continue fighting, immediately declared that Azaña was no longer qualified to speak for Spain. Negrin moved his offices to Valencia.
¹⁹
The secretary of the republican minister of foreign affairs, Alvarez del Vayo, sought shelter with the nationalists, taking the papers of his ministry with him. Bonnet made a note in the margin of Bérard’s telegram relating the news: “That rumor was totally wrong but it helps Mr. Negrin who is eager to compromise the French government at the last minute making it impossible to establish relations with Burgos.”
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During his last meeting with Jordana on February 6, Bérard insisted on a
de facto
recognition and sending “a general agent of the French Republic.” Jordana did not give in and took a petulant tone. “Spanish public opinion feels that France is responsible for the continuation or the prolongation of the war.”
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During those discussions an awful human tragedy was taking place, the passing waves of Republican soldiers in rags, of women and children through the border at Cerbère, normally closed, was now overwhelmed by a crazy mob… Drowned in a fog that erased the horizon, whipped by icy gusts, the lines of Spanish refugees that were crowding the border posts were simply pitiful.”
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Large quantities of war supplies crossed the line and were immediately seized by the French.
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The fate of those who fell into the hands of the nationalists intent on an implacable repression was even more dramatic. Hundreds of officers were shot by firing squads in Barcelona. France and England tried unsuccessfully to obtain a guarantee of no reprisals from Burgos.

On February 10 British ambassador Sir Eric Phipps was given the task of telling Georges Bonnet that his government was ready to recognize Franco unconditionally and as quickly as possible. It was viewed as a way of separating him from foreign influences.
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While waiting for that recognition, Bonnet had a final contact with Republican Minister Alvarez del Vayo who thought that all hope was not lost.
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Léon Bérard was sent back to Burgos with the government’s approval—which was given quietly “so as to avoid reigniting a dispute that had never quite ended.”
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The Chamber itself would be consulted. In January it had voted against intervention on the Republican side—374 to 228. After a short debate, on February 24 it voted in favor of recognizing Franco, 323 to 261.
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It was the Chamber of the Popular Front. Daladier, who wanted it, voted yes. Herriot, the president of the Chamber who did not want recognition, was shocked and opposed to it but suggested to Jean Zay not to resign.
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Bérard had a whole series of discussions with Jordana as early as February 18. He stated that France was ready for a
de jure
recognition if it was to have “the meaning and the scope of a strong reconciliation.” The documents were prepared on Sunday, February 19, by Bérard on the French side with the assistance of Charles Saint and Baraduc; and on the Spanish side by the director of political affairs.
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The atmosphere was more tense than during the first trip. Berard tried unsuccessfully to obtain a commitment of neutrality.
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Bonnet cabled Bérard with new instructions on February 21. He wished that, for reasons of prestige, Bérard could meet with Franco. He was requesting that the nationalists accept the return to Spain of women and children—who were less threatened by reprisals—followed by the men, “except for those who were actually members of political movements.” He announced that with Daladier he would propose recognition to the Cabinet within forty-eight hours of his return.
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The British wanted to announce their recognition as early as the 24th but he agreed to wait for Bérard’s return scheduled for the 25th
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and the French Cabinet meeting set for February 27.
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Therefore, on February 28, Britain and France recognized Franco
. Rochat, the deputy director of political affairs,
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brought French recognition to Burgos on March 1.

On March 2 it was made public that Marshal Pétain was appointed ambassador to Burgos. It was clever to send such a prestigious man, whose right-wing ideas were well known, to Spain. If Franco had not seen fit to receive Léon Bérard, he would certainly feel flattered to meet the victor of Verdun. We do not know whose idea it was to make such a choice, very well received by the right and viewed as a poor one by the left. The Spaniards appointed José-Felice de Lequerica, who had a reputation of being pro-German, to Paris.

Pétain focused on the refugees, Republican war equipment and the Spanish gold. He met with Jordana on the 23rd and presented his credentials to Franco on the 24th. “I wanted to stress that I took the mission offered to me because I firmly desired to reestablish between our two countries the relations that they used to have.”
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As early as April 20 he felt optimistic. The information he gathered went to prove that there were no suspicious troop movements toward Tangier or on the border with French Morocco. Between 18,000 and 20,000 Italians, along with 7,000 Germans, remained in Spain. The rumors regarding new Italian landings were false. Finally, he had been told repeatedly enough that the new government was following a “policy of total independence for Spain.” In any case no naval base was being used by the Axis powers.
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The most delicate issue was that of the refugees. The total number was estimated at 450,000.
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Sarraut as interior minister thought that 50,000 of them would be seriously at risk if they returned to their country. The soldiers were disarmed and divided into five centers that the army had organized. The Basque deputy Ybarnegaray estimated the total—as of March 10—to be 226,000.
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This sudden immigration prompted a violent debate in the Chamber on March 10, 14 and 16. “The issue goes beyond France,” wrote
Le Temps
.
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By March 15, 50,000 members of the militia had gone back. The total number of returnees didn’t go beyond 200,000. Therefore, there was a mass of 200,000 to 250,000 persons that France had to shelter.

Pétain attempted to elicit from the Spaniards an effort that was viewed as justified and was to be rather thin. In July, for example, the authorities at Irun declared that they could welcome 50,000 militia at a pace of 2,500 per day. But it became extremely difficult to find volunteers willing to go back.
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On the other hand, there were neither difficulties nor serious delays to the return of the fleet (partly located in Bizerte). As for the gold of the Bank of Spain, a decision on the part of the French courts was required. The Franco government was impatiently asking for the gold, since it was heavily indebted to Germany and most of all to Italy. Bonnet could finally cable Pétain on July 21 that he had turned over the gold to the Spanish authorities that same day.
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The Pétain mission succeeded at the most important level. “Spain wants to be neutral—because—the country is exhausted and divided.”
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As embassy councilor Gazel wrote in a personal letter to Bonnet on August 6, “I feel we are on the right track in our policy of détente with Spain. The Marshal’s personal reputation is considerable…we must proceed slowly and not be too ambitious.”
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