France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (63 page)

Chamberlain had signed an agreement with Hitler on September 30 without consulting his colleague Daladier in any shape or form, and it was therefore appropriate to seek information regarding its content. There was no mention of “non-aggression” but of a “consultation” procedure and a statement of the German and British peoples to “never again go to war against one another.”
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Chamberlain and Hitler did not discuss the colonies during their meeting. Chamberlain brought up the issue of disarmament. Hitler, putting on a saintly air, replied by listing all his failed attempts in that area.
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Daladier, who often dreamt of a meeting with Hitler as “old war veterans,” was not against a rapprochement. The German crowd had warmly cheered him as he was leaving Munich; François-Poncet felt “it was more than a chorus acting for a command performance.” Hadn’t Göring said that “with a man like Daladier one could talk politics”?
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François-Poncet agreed with the idea as early as October 4. On October 5 a note by the political directorate analyzed the issue, concluding that such a Franco-German declaration “did not create a political problem and could have some positive psychological effect.” However, it was preferable to negotiate “a new Western pact”—similar to the Four Power Pact—and it was necessary to define the “French position towards the Franco-Soviet and the Franco-Polish treaties.”
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But Hitler, who when “meeting with foreign heads of state showed that he could be conciliatory, understanding, almost reasonable and moderate,” quickly displayed—when it came to the borders—his “brutal, imperious,
and impulsive temperament that showed impatience with any kind of contradiction.” France, concluded François-Poncet, must “try everything to have a policy of détente with Germany and attempt to link her to as many commitments as possible… But…it would be mistaken to show confidence in Germany prematurely… Unfortunately, Mr. Hitler’s word may have only a relative and passing value. Deep down, Hitler remains an adventurer.”
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He would show it during his speech of October 9 in Sarrebrück where he actually attacked England by saying Germany did not need any “English nannies” and spoke kindly of France.
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That kind of attitude practically cancelled the Four Power Pact project that sounded as if it came from Massigli. Georges Bonnet was fed up with that director of political affairs who had disapproved of Munich. Bonnet replaced him on October 24 with Émile Charvériat, Massigli’s deputy up to that point, packing him off as ambassador to Ankara. It signaled a major diplomatic rotation: François-Poncet went from Berlin to Rome, Robert Coulondre from Moscow to Berlin, Naggiar from Peking to Moscow, Jules Henry replaced Eirik Labonne in Madrid who, in turn, was appointed Resident General in Tunisia on October 24. The former minister to Vienna, Gabriel Puaux, was appointed High Commissioner to the Levant.
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As he was about to leave Berlin, Ambassador François-Poncet met with Hitler on October 18 at the “Eagle’s Nest” he had built for himself overlooking Berchtesgaden. He went by plane with Captain Stehlin. The ambassador would write the most famous of his innumerable dispatches,
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describing the extraordinary residence as a fantastic castle of Burgraves. He discovered that Hitler “was disappointed by the aftermath of the Munich accords” and sharply critical of Britain’s selfishness. François-Poncet asked him three questions: Could there be a mutual guarantee of the borders between France and Germany? Yes, answered Hitler, who preferred that formula to non-aggression. Could we return to arms limitations? There were obviously many objections. Germany was encircled and required greater weapons than all the countries that could potentially attack her. Finally, could economic relations between the two countries be improved? Hitler deferred “to others for the handling of that issue.”

All told, “except for a few spats of violence against England, the Führer was calm, moderate and conciliatory.” Hitler immediately gave Ribbentrop orders to study a consultation pact. “I can promise you on our part that the issue will get a favorable hearing and a serious study,”
added François-Poncet. The ambassador, having communicated to the French government all the reservations emanating from the personality of “this impressionable, changing and sick dictator,” recommended that the agreement be negotiated. Germany was taking the initiative. “If we close our ears we shall provide her, to our disadvantage, with the alibi she is looking for, perhaps to cover her future initiatives.”

Georges Bonnet immediately approved François-Poncet’s proposal.
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The latter also recommended discretion on the part of the press. Rumors were beginning to filter through.
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Just as preparations were getting under way, tragedy struck in Paris. A Polish Jew, Herschel Gryszpan, born in Hanover, fatally wounded the third secretary of the German embassy in Paris, Ernst von Rath, after firing two shots. The Wilhelmstrasse and the press did not blame France
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nor would the Franco-German rapprochement have suffered had the event not caused an extremely violent reaction against the Jews in Nazi Germany. The sadly famous
Kristallnacht
(November 9–10)—with its looting of homes, and Jewish stores, burning of synagogues, beatings, attacks, and the compulsory contribution of 1 billion reichsmarks by the Jews—reminded world opinion of the true nature of the Nazi regime.
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Bonnet had invited Ribbentrop to visit Paris in early November. Was there an Italian initiative?
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A desire to let some time pass after the
Kristallnacht
?
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Did social unrest in France, which would peak with the general strike on November 30, play a role? Whatever the real reason, Ribbentrop’s trip was delayed.
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The French government at the same time invited Chamberlain and Halifax to come to Paris. It was the first meeting of the two heads of government since Munich.
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In view of the “British line” the matter was important enough. According to Corbin, the meeting was to have crucially important ramifications; but he was unable to identify which concrete decisions could be reached. Chamberlain, said the ambassador, remained wedded to the policy of “general appeasement.” He had become “in the eyes of the entire world its living symbol.” Obviously, the main worry was the condition of France’s armaments and of the air force in particular.
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The Franco-British discussions took place on November 24 with meetings in the morning and afternoon. Besides the two prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs, Alexis Léger and Alexander Cadogan took part, as did the two ambassadors, Corbin and Sir Eric Phipps, along with some top functionaries (Charvériat, Rochat, Strang, etc.).
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Two months after Munich, such a meeting could have been one of resurrection after the disaster. One can imagine the two countries setting up a Paris-London axis without mysteries or cracks to face the dictators, establishing common plans and pooling their energies. Nothing of the sort took place. The main interest of those conversations was not their content but rather their
tenor
—absolutely courteous, friendly yet formal and filled with innuendo. What transpired was not unity but subtle suspicion. Chamberlain was, after all, very satisfied with his latest achievements, Munich, the Anglo-German declaration, the implementation of the Anglo-Italian agreement. He also knew that Great Britain was making a serious effort with its air force. Daladier, facing him, was sickened at having been the man of Munich and having to face the enormous problems of rebuilding the French aviation industry (which we shall discuss later).

There was even greater disagreement on another issue. At Munich France and England had promised to guarantee the new Czechoslovakia. Germany and Italy had declared that they would also join once the Czechoslovak borders had been set with Germany, Hungary and Poland. Was it not the right time for a Franco-British initiative toward the two dictators to remind them of their promise? The political director of the Czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs, Krno, had just pointed this out.
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On that issue Lord Halifax, remembering the September crisis, sought only to find a way of avoiding any kind of obligation. He succeeded by adding to the guarantee such conditions making it effective only when three guarantors out of four established that an unprovoked aggression had taken place. Three out of four meant that one of the Axis powers had to join France and England. That’s impossible, said Daladier. “Mr. Chamberlain does not feel he needs to share that opinion. It could be possible that Italy would not adopt the same position as Germany.” This is very interesting and confirms everything we know of the single-mindedness with which the prime minister was attempting to draw Italy away from Germany.
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“Mr. Daladier noted that this being the case, it was preferable not to have promised a guarantee.” No decision was reached.

The other issues were handled in cursory fashion. German Jewish refugees were discussed—there were 40,000 in France which, said Daladier, could take no more. Could they be sent to the colonies? The French were given the task to ask Ribbentrop a relaxation of the regulations forbidding them from taking their possessions. There were discussions—useless once again—about the impossible issue of withdrawing the foreign
volunteers fighting in the Spanish civil war, and no conclusion was reached apart from an agreement between the two democracies to not recognize Franco’s “belligerent” status. Franco-Soviet relations were discussed, as well as the potential Hitlerian threat to the Ukraine. Georges Bonnet took the opportunity to illustrate the limits of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935, which the British never liked. The Near East and Far East were briefly mentioned.

In the end Daladier and Bonnet read to their counterparts the draft of the Franco-German agreement and, as expected, were given a warm approval. But it should be noted that during this discussion there was no mention of a Four Power Pact, or of a broad initiative for an economic rapprochement with Germany, nor a broader plan for a rapprochement between the democracies and the dictatorships.

The most clear-cut conclusion one may draw from these discussions was one of
continuity
. Munich had not changed the way the two democracies behaved toward each other regarding a reversal of alliances, or the reinforcement of democratic solidarity. Chamberlain pursued his
appeasement
policy unperturbed and Daladier continued along the “English line” with increasing anxiety.

The groundwork for Ribbentrop’s visit to Paris had been laid out. Daladier was extremely well prepared. He had a memorandum provided by Ambassador von Welczeck on November 19. The Quai d’Orsay provided him with a file concerning German intrigues in French West Africa, the treatment of German newsmen in France and German nationals subject to the French judicial system. More importantly there was a questionnaire regarding guarantees to Czechoslovakia, the Jewish issue, Italy’s real position, the humanization of war. The document concluded that a “western” pact or a “Four Power Pact” would be inappropriate.
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Ribbentrop arrived in Paris on the morning of December 6. Since there was concern about popular reaction, he made few public appearances. Following lunch with Daladier at the Hôtel Matignon, the main discussions took place on December 6 in the afternoon at the Quai d’Orsay between Bonnet and Ribbentrop, accompanied by Léger and Welczek. In the evening there was a reception at the German embassy where, contrary to the legend, Jewish ministers Jean Zay and Georges Mandel had been invited. The president of the Chamber, Herriot, refused to attend and Gamelin was traveling. A second discussion took place on December 7 in the afternoon between Bonnet and Ribbentrop at the Hôtel Crillon. After having told the foreign affairs commission of the Senate that he
had met with Ribbentrop on December 6 and 7, Bonnet later denied that a meeting had in fact taken place on the 7th.
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There is a French summary of the meeting of the 6th by Léger
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and a German embassy summary of the meetings in general.
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Finally Paul Schmidt, Ribbentrop’s interpreter appears to have been present at least in part of the conversations, but only part because, as he mentioned, “Ribbentrop spoke in French at times; at others I translated what he was saying in German.”
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Those details are important but not as they relate to the agreement which was signed early on and was extremely simple. The two countries were convinced that peaceful relations between themselves “make up one of the essential elements to consolidate the situation in Europe.” They “solemnly recognize the border between them as being permanent.” They were committing themselves to consult with one another, within the limits of their agreements with third party countries, in the event of international difficulties.
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Several points stand out in the discussions. Ribbentrop declared that Germany was not directly interested in Italian demands in Tunisia but that the “unalterable basis of Germany’s foreign policy is the Rome-Berlin axis.” He pushed the issue of guarantees of the Czechoslovak borders into the future to assess the kind of relations that country would have with Germany. He hoped in Franco’s victory. Bonnet brought up the issue of foreign volunteers. Ribbentrop condemned the Franco-Soviet Pact and declared that the colonial issue was “not current.” Finally, we must note that from the start Bonnet brought up the possibility of extending the Franco-German rapprochement to the areas of culture, tourism, and the economy through increased exchanges. Ribbentrop agreed with the proposal that France develop purchases in the German market.