France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (71 page)

Litvinov’s replacement with Molotov on May 4 immediately led Coulondre to face the issue of a reversal of alliances and the division of Poland. However, he felt that the Führer would be against it despite “the deep similarities between the two regimes.”
¹⁶⁷
According to information that Captain Stehlin obtained from German General Bodenschatz on May 7, he again mentioned “the fourth partition of Poland.”
¹⁶⁸
This time he felt the matter was so important, given the quality of the source, that he sent Stehlin to Paris to carry his dispatch. Stehlin said that he waited unsuccessfully for five days for a meeting with Bonnet and left without having seen him.
¹⁶⁹
On May 10 from Moscow, Payart felt that a sudden Soviet reversal “appears unlikely
for the moment
. But we should not be lulled into not worrying about an about-face.”
¹⁷⁰
Bonnet was finally impressed and in a note following a visit by Soviet Ambassador Suritz on May 26 he wrote, “We must not overlook any possibility, such as the USSR remaining out of the conflict or even that it might reach an agreement with Germany.”
¹⁷¹
Rochat, the deputy director of political affairs, in the course of the weekly liaison meeting of May 24 in discussing the Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations, added, “We are informed of contacts between Moscow and Berlin that could change everything.” That information came from the
Deuxième Bureau
. There was even a rumor that General von Fritsch was in Moscow with a German delegation. But the USSR denied it.
¹⁷²
On May 17 Molotov had spoken to German Ambassador von der Schulenburg about “the political foundations” that should be given to the commercial negotiations and that Hitler had decided on May 29 and 30 to enter into negotiations.
¹⁷³

On July 8 Coulondre met Soviet chargé d’affaires Astakhov in Berlin, who “stated in the most categorical manner that there were no political talks taking place between Berlin and Moscow.” Astakhov knew full well that he wasn’t telling the truth because he was involved in it up to his neck. But Coulondre was not convinced. “If, as it is being said in some German circles, there are political contacts between Berlin and Moscow—these were not being handled through official channels.”
¹⁷⁴
From Moscow, Naggiar mentioned a possible partition of Poland and of the Baltic States.
¹⁷⁵
The rumor became even more insistent by early July. The imminent arrival of von Papen in Moscow was being discussed.
¹⁷⁶
The military attaché, General Palasse, stated that no German
delegation had arrived; however, he underscored the possibility of a partition of Poland.
¹⁷⁷

We should linger no further. All these communications indicated that the thought of a possible reversal of alliances went beyond the dreams of diplomats seeking explanations and was viewed as a serious possibility by the Quai d’Orsay, which was the reason to want to reach a quick resolution. The objectives of the two delegations were not the same. General Doumenc’s was to “
obtain the signing of a military agreement in the shortest time available in view of a war thought to be imminent
. [Emphasis added.]

The British delegation led by Admiral Drax-Plumkett was also looking for an agreement “difficult to secure rapidly” but if not, it
“planned for some lengthy negotiations, to keep Germany under the threat of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet military pact and therefore reach the fall on the winter thereby delaying the war.”
¹⁷⁸
[Emphasis added.]

Chamberlain had some strange ideas regarding the methods that were likely to intimidate Hitler. The French began traveling to London, then to Tilbury on August 4. The trip on the passenger liner
City of Exeter
took them through the Baltic and lasted a little more than four days at a speed of 13.5 knots per hour. The two delegations (twenty-six officers in all) held discussions among themselves in a perfectly cordial atmosphere. First, a very general draft of military agreement was prepared, it being decided that plans and operations would be discussed only after the draft was signed. All preparatory draft documents were incinerated before arrival in Leningrad on August 10. They were given a thoughtful welcome. The two delegations traveled to Moscow in special rail cars where they arrived on August 11 and were welcomed there by many officers. The meeting of August 11 was basically to introduce them to Marshal Shaposhnikov, the chief of staff, Admiral Drax and General Doumenc, accompanied by Naggiar and Sir William Seeds, then went to the Kremlin to meet with Molotov. Finally, there was a formal dinner at the Commissariat of Defense with toasts and a concert. Everything started off in a euphoric atmosphere. The meetings took place in a handsome building on Spiridonovka Street and everyone in attendance was in uniform.

As early as August 12, Marshal Voroshilov, who chaired the meetings, took over the proceedings. Drax and Doumenc proposed to begin with a discussion of general principles. Voroshilov refused, saying that they must work usefully and exchange definite plans. The two westerners were forced to give in. Thus the Franco-British project drafted aboard the
City of Exeter
was no longer operative.

On August 13 Doumenc attempted in any case to return to certain parts of the plan. As Beaufre said, “One had to seem sincere and give the impression of revealing secrets.”
¹⁷⁹
Voroshilov was savvy and tackled the difficult issue: “Will Poland accept the entrance of Soviet troops on its territory…in order to make contact with the enemy?” It was, as the author of one of the accounts we have, navy captain Willaume wrote, “The obstacle upon which all our discussions were to stumble.” Voroshilov also noticed that his counterparts were not “plenipotentiaries” and were constantly obliged to refer back to Paris and London. It was therefore necessary for those two governments to reach an agreement with Poland and Romania. “Without answers to these questions the work that had begun would be destined to fail.”
¹⁸⁰

The August 14 meeting was the most dramatic one.
¹⁸¹
Voroshilov immediately requested an answer to the question he had asked the day before. Doumenc proposed that Soviet troops be ready to help Poland and Romania should those countries request it; the USSR could in the meantime offer weapons. Voroshilov, turning red with anger, restated the question, “Will Poland accept the entrance of Soviet troops into its territory in the Vilno corridor to make contact with the enemy; can Poland also allow passage in Galicia; and the same for the passage of Soviet troops in Romania?” And, since his counterparts were using deceptive language, he went on mercilessly, “I have not mentioned concentrations” but rather “contact with the enemy in East Prussia.” To wait idly by for the two countries to request Soviet help was unacceptable.

“I truly believe that our mission is over,” said Admiral Drax during a pause in the proceedings. The discussion resumed in the same rough vein. “Without details, without clear answers, to continue our conversations would be useless,” said Voroshilov.

The French and British then answered with a written text. “Poland and Romania are sovereign states… the authorization the Marshal is mentioning must therefore come from their governments. This becomes a political issue and we propose that the Soviet government ask the Polish and Romanian governments the question… it’s the most simple and direct way. If desired…we are ready to communicate this to London and Paris…” And the idea of urgency resurfaced: “It is possible that the German army could enter Poland tomorrow—if we wish to avoid wasting precious time could we not continue our work under the assumption of a positive answer?”

The Soviets discussed the matter among themselves. Their answer was unequivocal. They would not ask Poland or Romania anything themselves. It was up to the western governments to take the initiative. “The Soviet military mission feels that without getting an answer to these questions all the work accomplished until now by the three delegations would be unsuccessful.”

On the evening of the 16th the French government refused to send Doumenc’s deputy, General Valin, to Poland “because of the reaction it might produce,” and preferred to negotiate through General Musse, the military attaché in Warsaw.

On the 17th Voroshilov requested that the discussions be adjourned until August 21, which was agreed. On the same August 17 Doumenc, on his own initiative, decided to dispatch Captain Beaufre to Warsaw. Beaufre arrived by train on the evening of the 18th and immediately met with Ambassador Léon Noël and General Musse, who had just returned from Paris the day before. What could be done? Léon Noël felt that Franco-Polish friendship was rather fragile. Musse was very suspicious of Soviet good faith. In any case, they both agreed to take some initiatives; the ambassador would see Beck, while Musse would meet with General Stachiewicz, the Polish army chief of staff. Lukasziewicz, the Polish ambassador to Paris who had met with Georges Bonnet, had already informed Beck. The latter was totally negative and his attitude was confirmed by that of the commander in chief Marshal Rydz-Smigly.

Musse called very energetically for the creation of a “resistance front in the East of Europe” showing how the break in the Moscow negotiations would have immeasurable consequences. “Hitler is hesitating between peace and war, the break-up of negotiations could be a factor prompting him to undertake the boldest kind of gamble.” He insisted on the limited nature of the corridors to be used to get through. Poland’s agreement could remain totally secret. “I know that your idea is to wait for the fighting to begin before holding talks with the Russians, but by then it will be very late.”

Stachiewicz refused. “I cannot believe that the Russians really want to fight the Germans… It’s too obvious a bluff, it is blackmail… If we allowed them into our territory they would stay there.” So there was no hope. A new initiative by Musse with his British colleague Colonel Sward on August 19 yielded the same results. “Yet we tried every possible language to reach a compromise,” wrote Musse. The Poles were unmovable.
Léon Noël was given the same answer during a new visit to Beck. At least it was agreed that this would not be an “official” answer.

Beaufre left on the 20th and reached Moscow on the evening of the 21st. That morning the newspapers had published the German-Soviet economic agreement. Then the scheduled meeting took place. After a few acrimonious exchanges, Marshal Voroshilov put an end to the meeting. No date was set for a resumption of the discussions.
¹⁸²

A few hours after Beaufre’s return, Doumenc received a cable from Daladier at 10:30 p.m. stating, “You are authorized to sign as best you can, in the common interest and with the ambassador’s agreement, the military agreement pending approval by the French government.” Did this mean that Paris had obtained an approval from Poland on its own? Obviously not.
¹⁸³
It meant rather that in desperation Daladier intimated that the opinion of the Poles would not be considered as to the passage of Russian troops on their territory. Beaufre thought that had it been sent four days before such a cable would have been effective. This is highly improbable because four days before August 21, the Soviet position regarding Germany had already been decided.

On the morning of August 22 the Soviet press announced the imminent arrival in Moscow of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, to sign a German-Soviet non-aggression pact. Doumenc, through his insistence, was able to meet with Voroshilov at 7 p.m. while Naggiar was received by Molotov. When he was told about Daladier’s attitude, Voroshilov immediately asked whether the Polish government agreed. Doumenc obviously was unable to give him a positive answer. The break-up of the military discussions was complete by August 25. It was a complete failure.

6.

O
N THE
P
ERIPHERY
—T
HE
N
EAR
E
AST

French foreign policy’s greatest effort took place in continental Europe and in the western Mediterranean. There were possessions elsewhere requiring protection but these were relatively secondary or so distant from France that they could not be defended. The possessions in the Americas could well be considered as being beyond the reach of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. The same could be said of Madagascar, the Comoro
Islands and La Réunion in the Indian Ocean, and French Polynesia in the southeastern Pacific. What remained were the French mandates in the Levant and Indochina, which could not be defended at all.

The defense of Syria and Lebanon
¹⁸⁴
relied mostly on the British fleet at Alexandria assuming that it was powerful enough, meaning that France played a key role in the western Mediterranean that was in any case a vital area for transporting troops from North Africa. But France’s position would greatly improve if Turkey were to participate. The idea of convincing Turkey into joining an alliance was a common worry for both Britain and France.

The Turks, however, had a territorial ambition at the expense of the Syrian mandate. They wanted to reannex the Sandjak of Alexandrette or Hatay where they claimed, without it being really certain, that a majority of the population was Turkish.
¹⁸⁵
The Franco-Syrian treaty of 1936 with Syria—that had never been ratified—was being used as a pretense to their demand for a special statute for the territory that the Council of the League of Nations had established on May 29, 1937. Syria—and therefore the mandated power—retained foreign affairs, customs and finance; internal affairs had an autonomous status. The Turks did not like this outcome and on July 4, 1938, wound up obtaining an agreement whereby a Turkish and a French battalion would each occupy the territory. The Turks, however, considered that state of affairs as temporary. Mustapha Kemal, the president of the Turkish Republic,
¹⁸⁶
did not hesitate to refer to Hatay as an independent country, while stating that it constituted “the basis of the development and crystallization of Franco-Turkish friendship.”
¹⁸⁷