 | nitely easier to deal with on Germany than de Gaulle, should the latter come to power. In particular the Socialists and the MRP group of the Bidault-Teitgen tendency are less rigid and more realistic in their thinking and desire to reach a satisfactory agreement with U.S." (Caffery to State, November 5, 1947,
FRUS, 1947,
2: 699700).
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| 47.
Conversations franco-américaines relatives au, régime futur de la Ruhr,
in New York, September 29, 1947, and
Note,
October 8, 1947, MAE, Y-Internationale 194449, vol. 399; Memorandum of Conversation, Marshall and Bidault, September 18 and October 8, 1947,
FRUS, 1947,
2: 68084; French Proposal, October 8, 1947, ibid., 68485. Jean Chauvel, the political director of the Quai, took up the same issues with British representatives in London in late October. See Memorandum of Conversation by Jacob Beam, October 30, 1947, ibid., 69294.
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| 48. See, for example, the reasoned analysis of the French position prepared by the staff of the French political counselor in Berlin, Francois Seydoux, September 16, 1947, MAE, Y-Intemationale 194449, vol. 399. It argued that the new American determination to supersede the inefficient British management of the Ruhr would be a threat unless France secured an agreement on the distribution and control of Ruhr resources. On changing French attitudes, see Memorandum of Conversation, Marshall and Bonnet, November 18, 1947,
FRUS, 1947,
2: 72022; and Caffery to State, November 6, 1947, ibid., 702.
|
| 49. Koenig to Paris, November 12, 1947, Bidault Papers, AN, 457 AP, box 15. Judging from indiscreet remarks Bidault made to Lewis Douglas in London regarding Koenig's links to de Gaulle, it appears Bidault was just as averse to the maintenance of the veto as the Americans would have been, had they ever been informed of Koenig's ideas. See Memorandum of Conversation, Bidault and Douglas, December 17, 1947,
FRUS, 1947,
2: 81113.
|
| 50.
Fusion de la zone francaise et la bizone,
General Jean Humbert, October 18, 1947, MAE, Y-Intemationale 194449, vol. 380.
|
| 51. Massigli to Bidault, November 22, 1947, MAE, Y-Intemationale 194449, vol. 380.
|
| 52. Minister of Finance to Secretary of State for German and Austrian affairs, December 10, 1947, MAE, Y-Intemationale 194449, vol. 380. See also the note, initialled J. M. (presumably Monnet), which supported fusion on the same grounds,
Comparaison de la fusion et du statu quo au point de vue financier,
December 6, 1947, Bidault Papers, AN, 457 AP, box 15.
|
| 53. Memorandum, European Office, Central Europe Bureau, November 1947, MAE, Y-Intemationale 194449, vol. 380.
|
| 54. Bidault signaled a complete break with his earlier tactics when he insisted that there be no split at the CFM "with the Russians and French on one side and the British and the Americans on the other." Bidault also told Marshall that he would avoid any serious discussion of the Ruhr issue. See Memorandum of Conversation, Marshall and Bidault, November 28, 1947,
FRUS, 1947,
2: 73739.
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| 55. The French minutes of this meeting make this fairly clear: December 17, 1947, Bidault Papers, AN, 457 AP, box 15. Bonnet to Marshall, December 22, 1947,
FRUS, 1947,
2: 82930, recapitulated the discussion of the 17th, making it
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