 | explanation; nor does Young,
France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance,
21011. Wall,
The United States and the Making of Postwar France,
inexplicably neglects the entire question of Germany during this crucial period. Buffet, noting the general trend in the Quai during the spring of 1949 to opt for a constructive settlement with Germany, nevertheless underestimates Schuman's importance in breaking the deadlock (
Mourir pour Berlin,
24143). Poidevin has posited, and the evidence bears him out, a basic continuity between Schuman and Bidault, and sees Schuman's German policy as part of a persistent and pragmatic French effort to extend as much influence as possible over the future West German state (
Robert Schuman,
19798). This point is implied also in Soutou, "Georges Bidault et la contruction européenne."
|
| 32. For the Washington meetings and subsequent agreements,
FRUS, 1949,
3: 15686. The Quai's leading policymakers, including Henri Bonnet, Hervé Alphand, Jacques-Camille Paris, Pierre de Leusse, and Jean Laloy, agreed that the framework of the Washington accords would serve French interests far better than anything offered by the Soviets in a four-power agreement on a neutral, demilitarized Germany. See
Eventualité d'une conférence à quatre sur l'Allemagne,
April 20, 1949, MAE, Y-Internationale 194449, vol. 207. Chauvel had just taken over Alexandre Parodi's job as delegate to the U.N.; Parodi in turn took Chauvel's position as secretary-general of the Quai d'Orsay. An officer in Alphand's office in the Quai admitted that a failure of the four-power conference might aggravate East-West tensions, but this was a risk France must take: "France must reject a priori any solution which might liberate Germany from these indispensable security guarantees, or which might allow Germany to play the role of arbiter between East and West" (Memorandum by Valéry, Office of Economic and Financial Affairs, April 23, 1949, MAE, Y-Intemationale 194449, vol. 207).
|
| 33. For general accounts of the Paris CFM between May 23 and June 20, 1949, see memo on
Conversations tripartites préalables ß la sixiéme session du Conseil des Mmistres des Affaires Etrangères,
May 19, 1949, MAE, EU 194955, Généralités, vol. 85;
FRUS, 1949,
3: 8561065; Acheson,
Present at the Creation,
293301; Bullock,
Bevin,
69398.
|
| 34. Indeed, their relations grew very strained during the summer of 1949, when Britain, without consultation with France, devalued the pound by 30.5 percent, triggering a storm of protest in Paris. The inability of London and Paris to coordinate their economies even in the broadest sense certainly weakened French claims that the OEEC might be able to monitor and control German economic behavior.
|
| 35. For accounts of the formal proclamation of the FRG and the role of the AHC, see Adenauer,
Memoirs,
17691, and Schwartz,
America's Germany,
5783. See also the detailed account by the CIA, "Germany," SR-20, December 9, 1949, Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files, box 260.
|
| 36. Adenauer,
Memoirs,
188, 193.
|
| 37. Bevin to Acheson, October 28, 1949,
FRUS, 1949,
3: 61821.
|
| 38. Acheson's message to Schuman was included in Acheson to Bruce, October 30, 1949,
FRUS, 1949,
3: 62225.
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