High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Case Against Bill Clinton (32 page)

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Authors: Ann Coulter

BOOK: High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Case Against Bill Clinton
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Why would lobbyists who were retained for the purpose of influencing an Interior Department decision bill the clients for so much time related to DNC and Clinton-Gore fund-raising?
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
 
As noted, on February 11, 1998,
the fleet-footed attorney general decided to seek an independent counsel to investigate whether Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt lied to Congress about how wellheeled Indian tribes managed to reverse a government decision that would have allowed a much smaller tribe to compete with them in the casino business. On March 19, 1998, Carol Elder Bruce was chosen for the assignment.
Reno has reportedly asked that the new independent counsel’s mandate be confined to whether Babbitt lied when he told a Senate committee that campaign contributions played no role in the Indian casino decision. Theoretically, Reno’s limitation would insulate Ickes and Lindsey, various DNC officials, and perhaps other Clinton acolytes who sold administration decision-making for campaign cash. (And how about the guy who steered lobbyists with bulging checkbooks, such as O’Connor, toward aides who could gin up the process, such as Lindsey?)
In any event, under the independent counsel statute, the investigation cannot be so circumscribed as Reno would like. The investigation could well spill over into what is obviously the question of broader public significance: did the Clinton administration sell a government-enforced monopoly to a group of tribes in return for campaign cash?
As mentioned, the Supreme Court has held that passive acceptance of a benefit by a public official is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs Act violation if the official knows that he is being offered the payment in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official power. The official need not take any specific action to induce the offering of the benefit. In applying this to Clinton administration officials in the Chippewa case, much would depend on whether they knew that O’Connor or O’Connor’s clients were not making a request with empty hands—that they would pony up to the DNC in exchange for the action they desired.
In addition to the Hobbs Act, there is the bribery statute, which prohibits, on pain of a fifteen-year prison sentence, seeking anything of value in return for the performance of any official act. The thing of value need not be for the official himself: it could before any other person or entity—such as, for instance, the DNC. Here, proving intent would be difficult in the case of Clinton, somewhat less so in the cases of Ickes or Lindsey.
Chapter Nineteen
 
The Manchurian Candidate
 
The Chinese money scandal
is for people too squeamish to face the perjury about oral sex charges. If the president’s “sex life” is no one’s business—as if we were talking about what Bill and Hillary do in the privacy of their bedroom—how about treason? Concerns about treason sound so much more high-minded than concerns about the president having a sexual relationship with an intern and then lying about it under oath. The framers did expressly set forth “treason” as one of the grounds for impeachment. They neglected to do the same for “having an oral-sex affair with White House interns and then lying about it baldly and repeatedly under oath.” Clinton’s defense to impeachment on the sex scandals is essentially that he has engaged in conduct so reprehensible that James Madison couldn’t have imagined it.
The problem with the Chinese money scandal is that Clinton was right when he tauntingly announced to reporters, “I don’t believe you can find any evidence of the fact that I had changed government policy solely because of a contribution.” That is basically a confession: Clinton has admitted that he did change government policy—in part—because of a contribution.
But, on the other hand, it remains true that some plausible alternative explanation can always be dreamed up for policy changes. His statement is a reminder that it is going to be very difficult to prove that, like everything else in the Clinton administration, foreign policy was sold.
What makes the idea of national security being traded for campaign dollars so arresting is that we’re talking about Clinton. As columnist Maureen Dowd said of another Clinton scandal that turned out to be false—and then turned out to be true—“What you need to know about Bill Clinton is that the charge was plausible.”
1
With the exact same money trail followed by the exact same policy changes in a Carter White House, illegal donations to the DNC would be a minor incident. But with a White House “where everything is political and everything is for sale,” it does not take a fevered conspiracy theorist to think that foreign policy was on the block. As Dowd said about other “despicable” charges against the Clinton White House, “it sounded so plausible.”
2
And that was before what sounded plausible turned out to be true.
As we go to press, the public information about the Chinese money scandal has gaping holes. There is “strong circumstantial evidence,” according to a Senate report, that various individuals with close ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were funneling money to American political campaigns during the 1996 campaign.
3
Several of these individuals had extraordinary access to the president. Many small, and some large, Clinton policies coincided with the desires of some of these individuals. But that doesn’t add up to evidence that Clinton changed government policy because of a contribution. And, if the new Clintonian standards for American presidents are to be accepted, it does not amount to evidence that Clinton “changed government policy
solely
because of a contribution.”
THE LIPPO GROUP
 
Mochtar Riady and his son, James,
control the Lippo Group, a $6 billion conglomerate based in Indonesia. They have been friends and supporters of President Clinton since at least the early 1980s, when the Lippo Group acquired a minority interest in the Arkansas-based Worthen Bank, and James had moved to Little Rock to learn the banking business.
The Riadys also had a “long-term relationship with a Chinese intelligence agency,” according to a report by the Thompson committee.
4
The report, which reveals only unclassified information, does not claim that Clinton knew of the relationship between the Riadys and the PRC, nor is that relationship explained.
5
This much is known: On November 7, 1992, two days after Bill Clinton was elected president, China Resources Holding Company, a Beijing government-owned corporation known by U.S. intelligence to provide cover for Chinese intelligence-gathering operations, purchased 15 percent of the Hong Kong Chinese Bank (HKCB), a subsidiary of the Riady family-controlled Lippo Group. The Riadys sold the 15 percent interest to China Resources for $2.10 a share at a time when the public stock was trading at $2.62 per share—a 20 percent discount. As the
South China Morning Post
noted, “It was essentially a private placement… structured in such a way as to circumvent having to secure the approval of the Hong Kong stock exchange.”
On June 17, 1993, Lippo announced that it had sold an additional 35 percent of HKCB to China Resources, giving the Beijing government-owned espionage front half ownership. This time, instead of getting a discount, Beijing paid a 50.7 percent premium on HKCB stock. According to the
Morning Post
, the “deal will also bring a profit of about $164.8 million to HKCB holding”
6
—that is, to the Riady family.
According to a summary prepared in December 1996 for House investigators examining the Lippo-China connection, “under Hong Kong law, China Resources [Holding] Company’s 50 percent share in the bank provided it with access to all [Lippo] corporate information.”
Thus, as of July 1993, every time Riady or Huang met with Clinton, the president was dealing with the partners of a Chinese government-owned organization known by U.S. intelligence agencies to provide cover for Chinese intelligence-gathering operations.
During the 1992 presidential campaign—about the same time the Red Chinese were acquiring an interest in the Riadys’ Lippo Group—James Riady and his wife contributed $200,000 in “soft money” to the DNC. In January 1993 Lippo executives James Riady and John Huang gave a joint $100,000 contribution to the Clinton inaugural fund. By the end of Clinton’s first term John Huang would be at the center of the Democratic Party’s fund-raising scandal.
Soon the Riadys were enjoying extraordinary access to President Clinton. Huang and the younger Riady began a series of Oval Office meetings with the president. In briefing selected news agencies on November 15, 1996, White House spokesman Mike McCurry admitted that in the first Clinton administration Riady met with Clinton at least six times in a minimum of twenty separate White House visits, and Huang met with Clinton at least fifteen times in ninety-four separate White House visits.
Indeed, when the Indonesian ambassador sought a meeting with President Clinton, he went to James Riady to arrange it.
7
There is little doubt that President Clinton changed government policy because of campaign contributions from the Riady family, though we cannot be certain he changed policy “solely because of a contribution.” At least not as we go to press.
In a confidential letter dated March 9, 1993, Mochtar Riady asked the president to extend Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China.
8
(That same month, the elder Riady flew into Little Rock from Indonesia for a March of Dimes banquet for First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, and donated $50,000 in Mrs. Clinton’s honor.
9
)
Reversing his campaign stance against MFN—and his insistence that he would not deal lightly with the “butchers of Beijing”—Clinton did extend MFN to China on May 28, 1993. Soon the president was enthusiastically lobbying Congress to grant MFN
permanently
to China.
In May 1993 Clinton met with Indonesian official B.J. Habibie, over the objections of the president’s foreign policy advisers. Riady had requested the meeting. At the meeting Habibie pled his case for President Clinton to meet with then-President Suharto of Indonesia. Habibie must have been persuasive.
Shortly thereafter, Clinton gave a speech to the Export-Import Bank, where Habibie was in the audience. To the surprise of Clinton’s foreign policy advisers, Clinton at one point diverged from his prepared remarks—and his foreign policy aides’ advice—to discuss Indonesia and declare his intention to meet with Suharto. Referring to Habibie, Clinton said, “I know we have someone here from Indonesia…. We have enormous opportunities there…. I’m going to meet with the president of Indonesia [in Tokyo] to send a signal to the… emerging nations of the world that the United States wants to be their partner in new trade relations.”
10
One of Clinton’s foreign policy advisers later said, “We never figured out how the promise to meet Suharto got in there.”
11
And in fact in July 1993 President Clinton did meet with Suharto in Tokyo. He did so, he later told the
New York Times
with refreshing candor, because, among others, Mochtar Riady had “encouraged me to see President Suharto.”
12
One of Suharto’s top priorities at the meeting was to ask Clinton to preserve Indonesia’s trade preferences with the United States. Since 1992, the year before Clinton took office, the United States had been reexamining Indonesia’s trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences in light of that country’s abominable treatment of workers.
In February 1994, in the midst of a formal governmental review of whether to permit Indonesia to continue to receive trade benefits, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor abruptly terminated the review process and formally announced that the administration was allowing Indonesia to keep its trade privileges, valued at more than $600 million a year to Indonesian companies.
13
Indonesian workers might suffer, but the Lippo Group would benefit.
COMPANY MAN JOHN HUANG
 
At the Riady family’s urging,
Lippo executive John Huang joined the Commerce Department in the summer of 1994, leaving his position as vice chairman of the Lippo Bank to become deputy assistant secretary for International Economic Policy at Commerce. According to sources “who asked not to be identified,” the Riadys boasted that they had won the position for Huang on account of their campaign contributions to President Clinton. Just before leaving for his job at Commerce, Huang received close to a million dollars in salary and bonuses from Lippo as well as another $700,000 from another Riady company.
While maintaining his ties to Lippo, Huang attended 109 Top Secret briefings at Commerce, involving classified information. Huang repeatedly called Lippo following the meetings.
14
Huang’s logbooks recorded weekly meetings with Commerce’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) liaison officer, which were weekly intelligence briefings on the PRC. Any materials related to the briefing were under the control of the CIA.
15
In response to congressional inquiries, a Commerce Department official stated, “Mr. Huang received routine intelligence briefings, including intelligence reports. The office that handles intelligence matters does not make a record of each briefing or item provided in the course of briefings. Available records indicate that 37 intelligence briefings were scheduled. Available records show that Mr. Huang saw 15 classified field reports… [and] received 12 finished intelligence reports.”
16

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