Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis (39 page)

ii would presumably forestall the pressure he expected the Reichskanzler to
t
■ exert. In exchange for Hitler’s removing Leopold and his Landesleitung from Austria, Schuschnigg was prepared to appoint Seyss-Inquart as minister of |! public security and arbiter in cases involving the Nazi opposition. The chan-| cellor could make this concession with relative equanimity because he was | convinced that Seyss-Inquart and other Nazi moderates were independent of Berlitfand basically on his side.
^M

Beyond this, Schuschnigg, through his negotiator, Zematto, was willing to make still more far-reaching concessions. He would agree to a new amnesty for imprisoned Nazis and the appointment of a Nazi finance minister with four other Nazis holding high government offices. Point Seven of the agreement, called the “Ten Points (
Punktationen
) with Dr. Seyss-Inquart,” declared that there were “certainly some important basic concepts of a nonparty-bound National Socialism which can be organically incorporated into a political ideology of the new Austria ” After the necessary preconditions had been met, there could even be a military cooperation between Austria and Germany. Members of the National Opposition would also be permitted various athletic, educational, agricultural, and industrial clubs
.
¹⁵

Schuschnigg had in fact conceded the essentials of a Gleichschaltung with Germany even before his unhappy meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. In Schuschnigg’s defense, one should add that he considered the Punktationen to be
maximum
concessions. But Seyss-Inquart passed on the substance of the secret negotiations to Friedrich Rainer and other Nazis. They in turn forwarded the information to Hitler who used the Points as his
minimum
demands on Schuschnigg
.
¹⁶

The Ten Points proved to be the undoing not only of Schuschnigg but of Leopold as well. In an attempt to disrupt the Schuschnigg/Seyss-Inquart talks the Landesleiter ordered a wave of bombings and demonstrations, which led to the arrest of400 Nazis. But such activities only served to solidify Leopold’s enemies against him.

In a final effort to eliminate his rival, Seyss-Inquart sent the moderate Nazi and art historian Kajetan Miihlmann to Berchtesgaden ahead of Schuschnigg. Miihlmann was instructed to insist to Hitler and Keppler (who was also at

Hitler’s mountain retreat) that Leopold and the Landesleitung be removed

from Austria.    /

/

Seyss-Inquart got his way. Although neither Leopold nor the Austrian Landesleitung was specifically mentioned in the Berchtesgaden Protocol of

12
February, it did stipulate that “such persons whose further stay in Austria appears to be detrimental to relations between [Germany and Austria] shall, after an examination of each individual case and by agreement between the two Governments, be made to transfer their residence to the Reich
.”
¹⁷
Moreover, following the signing of the agreement, Hitler assured the downcast Austrian chancellor that he intended to demand Leopold’s resignation as Landesleiter in the near future. Thus Leopold “would not be able any long#' to really follow a line of conduct which was at absolute variance with the one now determined upon
.”
¹⁸

Superficially, the terms of the Protocol did not go far beyond the Ten Points. In addition to reaffirming the amnesty of Nazis imprisoned in Austria, Schuschnigg agreed that Austrian Nazis should have the right to participate as individuals within the framework of the Fatherland Front and all other Austrian organizations. Seyss-Inquart was given the responsibility for implementing this measure.

In the Punktationen the chancellor had merely conceded that
moderate
Nazis could enter the Front, an important distinction not made in the Protocol. Likewise, Seyss-Inquart became not only the minister of the interior, as previously discussed, but was also named minister of security The latter responsibility was watered down, however, when Schuschnigg increased the powers of Vienna Police President Michael SkubL Finally, all economic discrimination against the Nazis was to end, and they were to be given equal access to military service. Wearing the swastika was also permitted in the Protocol, as was the Hitler salute. The party flag and uniform, however, remained forbidden
.
¹⁹

Many Austrian Nazis, the great majority of whom had no detailed knowledge of the agreement, were at first unhappy with it. They had had no opportunity to participate in the negotiations and resented that the agreement enhanced the position of Seyss-Inquart. But far more revealing of the real nature of the Berchtesgaden Protocol was the judgment of Hitler himself. Two weeks after the agreement had been signed he met with Leopold and his followers. The Fiihrer characterized the Protocol as “so far-reaching that if completely carried out the Austrian problem would be solved automatically
.”
²⁰

What was even worse for Austria was the impression given by Schuschnigg that he had made the concessions only under pressure. It was natural for Austrian and German Nazis to assume that more coercion would net still more

gains. The chancellor had also set a disastrous precedent by allowing the IjJi leader of a foreign country to dictate his selection of ministers
.
²¹
jjiL; The meeting at Berchtesgaden and its immediate aftermath provided Leo-pold’s enemies with an ideal opportunity to move in for the kill. When Hitler
p
; asked Muhlmann whether Schuschnigg could be trusted to respect a treaty, the ,
_;
j:; i professor replied in the affirmative. The chancellor would do so, however, || only if Austria’s independence were recognized and Leopold recalled. Two days later Papen himself repeated to Hitler Seyss-Inquart’s demand for the removal of Leopold and Tavs
.
¹²
In his
Memoirs
Papen remarked that he “was astonished at how willingly Hitler accepted this petition. [Papen could] only assume that Leopold was too much of a bull in a china shop, even for him
”
²³
Taking no chances on Hitler’s changing his mind, Seyss-Inquart hurried to Berlin on 17 February to argue his case before Leopold, scheduled to arrive in j:i the German capital the next day, could defend himself. When Seyss saw ]ji Hitler, he demanded the removal of Leopold and his top associates to Ger-| many. Only then would he agree to serve as arbiter between the German and | Austrian governments in cases involving the Austrian Nazi party
.
²⁴

In reality, the new policy, which Seyss-Inquart now proposed, was not entirely different from what Leopold’s had been before 1938. Like Leopold, Schulz, and Riehl, Seyss insisted on the need for an independent leadership, not bound to the party in Germany. Hitler should be viewed in Austria as merely the founder, leader, and carrier of a political idea. But the implementation of that idea had to be adjusted to Austrian conditions. Where Seyss differed from Leopold’s radical policies of February 1938 was in pointing out “the necessity of rendering the National Socialist activity lawful in the framework of Austrian contingencies” (thus reverting to a position Leopold himself had taken in 1937) and promising to “imprison the National Socialists who would show any illegal activity
”
²⁵
Hitler approved of Seyss-Inquart’s proposals while telling Seyss that “he was not quite sure that he [Seyss] would be able to carry out [these] plans in Austria
.”
²⁶
Seyss-Inquart made a good impression on Hitler. The Fiihrer especially liked the fact that Seyss (in contrast to Leopold) was “not too strong a man
”
²⁷

The ultimate humiliation for Leopold was the desertion of several of his longtime associates, as well as most of the Austrian
Gauleiter
after the Berchtesgaden meeting. When Leopold called a conference of all the top Nazi leaders in Austria, Kaltenbrunner, Leopold’s one-time deputy Dr. Hugo Jury, and Anton Reinthaller, refused even to attend. The
Gauleiter of
Lower Austria, Salzburg, and the Burgenland along with Alfred Persche reaffirmed their support of the Landesleiter. But the other Gau leaders all remained silent
.
²⁸

When Leopold learned that Hitler had ordered him to appear in
Berlin
on 18 February, he made one last desperate attempt to assert his independence On the 17th he authorized a circular order to the party calling for wide-ranging violence. Tavs, who had just been released from prison the day before by Schuschnigg’s Berchtesgaden amnesty, gave instructions (never implemented) that the windows of the German embassy in Vienna be smashed. Other plans called for provoking Seyss-Inquart, now the minister of interior and security, into arresting Nazis and then branding him a traitor to the nationalist cause.
²
®

Captain Leopold was now summoned to the chancellery in Berlin to receive the Fuhrer’s wrath. The recent actions of the federal leadership, Hitler fum£cf
_t
had been “insane.” “Such activities could have put him into the most painful and mortifying predicaments. ... It was his unalterable decision to remove and replace Leopold
.”
³⁰
Every attempt by the Landesleiter to defend himself was interrupted by Hitler. Leopold was ordered to stay completely out of Austrian politics. He and his immediate subordinates, including Tavs, would have to move to Germany.

A few days later (on 26 February), after Leopold and his colleagues had returned to Germany for good, Hitler was in better spirits. He treated the Austrians like honored guests at a special evening reception. They were assured that their removal was merely a small tactical necessity and that nothing would happen in Austria without Leopold’s approval. Within a short time they would be able to return to their homeland. To keep him out of mischief, Hitler appointed Leopold to the staff of Rudolf Hess
.
³¹
But there was no disguising the fact that these measures were Hitler’s way of sugar-coating a bitter pill.

During Blomberg’s last meeting with Hitler in January 1938 the Reich chancellor had promised him that he would be recalled in time of war. But that was the last time Blomberg ever saw Hitler, and the field marshal was forced to sit out the entire war. Leopold likewise never saw the Fuhrer again in private and had to experience the Anschluss from his German exile under what amounted to house arrest. But Hitler’s flattery and promises served their purpose; neither Leopold nor Blomberg offered any resistance to their dismissals.

So ended, for all practical purposes, the career of Captain Josef Leopold. However fanatical a Nazi he considered himself or was considered by others, he was in fact more of an Austrian than a Nazi. And it was this local pride which led him to commit one unforgivable sin: he had defied the Fiihrer by attempting to build up a following of his own. Hitler could forgive anything

A Vacuum of Power: Hubert Klausner as Landesleiter

S
^:
'

In the meantime Hitler, on the recommendation of Keppler and 1;    Seyss-Inquart, had appointed Major Klausner as the new Austrian Landes-

leiter on the very afternoon he sacked Leopold. Klausner was given specific |    instructions about how he was to change illegal activities into legal ones by

I    following the “inspiring” example of Gauleiter Josef Biirckel in the Saar.

I    Klausner was also ordered to cooperate with Seyss-Inquart, “who had no

' ambitions of any kind to lead the party.” In particular, Klausner had to curb the activities of the radicals in order to facilitate the task of Seyss-Inquart.
I
   Seyss was to take orders from Klausner, but (in the usual confusing Nazi way)

J;    was directly responsible to Hitler within his own political sphere
.
³²

r|;    According to Keppler, who had been ordered by Hitler to check up on the

iivI    Austrian party every three or four weeks, Klausner did an excellent job in

1
   his new position as Landesleiter. The latter presumably enjoyed respect and

“loyal cooperation everywhere
.”
³³
Alfred Persche had a far different opinion ;i:    of Klausner’s effectiveness. Persche, who had just been replaced as leader of

;
_{
;    the SA by Johann Lukesch, on 22 February, described the latter as courteous

!    but Klausner as downright insulting toward him
.
³⁴

;■    Persche related how, when Klausner summoned the SA-brigade leaders and

Gauleiter
to a meeting in Vienna on 10 March, no one greeted or cheered the new Landesleiter. And there was nothing but ridicule and curses for the temporizing policy of the new federal leadership. Moreover, the events of 20 February to 11 March also demonstrated that the Nazi Landesleitung was unable to maintain full control over the party, particularly in Styria
.
³⁵