Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis (44 page)

Theo Habicht was a considerable improvement as a party leader; but even he was handicapped by his unfamiliarity with Austrian politics, his impulsiveness, and his German citizenship. Following the ill-conceived July Putsch, Anton Reinthaller and Hermann Neubacher lacked sufficient seniority in the party and were too willing to compromise with the hated Schuschnigg regime to suit the
Altkampfer.
Josef Leopold had a strong following among the SA but was considered far too plebeian by the middle-class SS. Worst of all, his determination to seize power on his own, by force if necessary, eventually cost him die backing of Hitler. Hubert Klausner did not enjoy much respect outside SS circles and his native Carinthia, whereas Arthur Seyss-Inquart was distrusted by many Austrian Nazis because of his Sudeten birth and nonmembership in the party.

Thus, for all their talk about “ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Fuhrer,” the Austrian Nazis remained dogmatically parochial and class conscious, traits shared by many of their countrymen. Rarely did a Nazi, or for that matter a Heimwehr leader, attract much of a following outside his home province. If there was an exception it was Theo Habicht, who was, significantly enough, a Reich German. Yet the Austrians resented being dictated to by “outsiders” from either Germany or the Sudetenland, a fact that became especially obvious after the Anschluss.

Austria between the wars is a classic example of the importance of a talented and charismatic leader to the success of a fascist movement. The conditions that gave rise to fascism in other countries existed in abundance in this Alpine state. A sense of betrayal stemming from the Treaty of Saint-Germain, despair over the economic future of the country, an impoverished and underemployed middle class, fear of a powerful Marxist party, hatred and envy of wealthy Jews, and a rebellious and unemployed youth. Yet no single fascist leader, inside or outside the Nazi party, was able fully to exploit the situation. None was even able to attract a group of fanatically loyal lieutenants in the manner of Hitler or Mussolini. Far from uniting their country, as they claimed they would do, the fascist leaders could not even unite their own party.

Although the Austrian Nazis failed miserably in standing behind a common leader—other than the distant and preoccupied Hitler—they had considerably more success in pledging their allegiance to a common ideology. For example, the Anschluss issue had long been a feature of pan-Germans and Nazis. To be sure, the DAP did not jump on the Anschluss bandwagon until 1918 and the Nazis had anything but a monopoly on the Anschluss idea before 1933.

Anti-Semitism was another unifying bond of all right-wing groups in Austria. Dating back to the Middle Ages, it acquired “modem,” “racial” characteristics in Austria after 1867 and was part of Schonerer’s Linz Program. The dislocations of the World War and the postwar inflation served to intensify anti-Jewish feelings. The ideology was particularly strong among university-aged students who, not surprisingly, became the hard core of the Austrian Nazi party.

The idea of a
Volksgemeinschaft
(people’s community) was already part of the prewar program of the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, and territorial expansion was, in a sense, found in the Linz Program of 1882. Extremism, opposition to the international aspects and “Jewish” character of Marxism, and antiliberalism were already well developed in the programs of Schonerer and the prewar DAP as well as in the postwar Austrian Nazis. They all saw compromise as a sellout.

All these common ideological denominators may be a little deceiving, however. Austrian Nazi literature seldom gives the impression that geology was taken all that seriously by its adherents. Actions were always'far more highly regarded than words. Seizing power, by almost any means, was the supreme goal. And such an aim could more easily be realized through charismatic leadership than by even the most refined and sophisticated ideology, or so it was believed. The high percentage of young people in the Austrian Nazi party as well as their heterogeneous social and political backgrounds, may help account for this relative indifference to ideology
.
²

Only the Schulz Nazis showed a real interest in ideology. But they may well be the exception which proves the rule; for it is doubtful whether they can really even be considered Nazis, at least in the orthodox “Hitlerian” sense of the word. And in any event their preoccupation with ideology eventually made them more a historical curiosity than a real force in Austrian, let alone Central European politics.

The theme of continuity is also very much apparent in the social composition of pan-Germanism and Nazism. Young people, especially students, supported Georg von Schonerer in the 1880s just as ardently as their grandchildren were to idealize Adolf Hitler in the 1930s. The high unemployment rate of the Depression, particularly in the professions, only heightened the desperation and fanaticism of the later generation.

Groups that felt threatened by the Industrial Revolution and Jewish competition were also likely candidates for right-wing extremism, both before and after the World War: small businessmen, professional people such as lawyers and doctors, and above all, teachers. Civil servants, either unemployed or underemployed after the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy, were ready to join any organization that promised to unite Austria with Germany, thus creating more civil-service opportunities.

Protestants, especially recent converts, although small in absolute numbers, flocked to the ranks of Schonerer and Hitler to an extent out of proportion to their tiny percentage of Austria’s population. The ostentatious Catholicism of the old regime and the governments of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg only enhanced their sense of alienation.

Geographically, the ethnic borderlands such as Styria and Carinthia, with their long history of national conflict, and provincial capitals, with their high percentage of civil servants, students, and professional people, consistently provided the nucleus of the pan-German, Nazi, and Heimwehr fascist ranks, especially their leadership.

Only in two areas can a significant shift in the composition of right-wing Austrian organizations be noted between the 1880s and the 1930s. Trade unionists (frequently railroad, and telephone and telegraph employees) made up an important element of the pan-German movement, particularly in the DAP and the DNSAP from the beginning of the twentieth century until the early 1920s. Thereafter, however, they began to decline, if not in absolute terms, then at least relatively. When the Austrian Nazis split in 1925-26, the trade unionists remained loyal to Karl Schulz, thus leaving the Hitlerian Nazis with a younger, more professional, and academic membership.

The other major change in the social composition of right-wing groups involved peasants. Long discriminated against by franchise laws, they voted at first for Karl Lueger’s Christian Social party. This affiliation continued after the war, although peasants often belonged simultaneously to Heimwehr units. With the catastrophic economic conditions of the Depression, however, along with the German boycott of Austrian products and the prospects of new markets in a Greater German Reich, the peasants began shifting their support over to the Nazis.

The most important leitmotiv in our story has been Hitler’s ambition to absorb Austria into his Third Reich. From the start of his political career in

1919, or at any rate from his writing of
Mein Kampf
in 1924 until the Anschluss itself in 1938, he never lost sight of his ultimate objective. This fact is all the more remarkable in view of the changing international circumstances that sometimes forced him to alter his tactics. Austria, in fact, provides an outstanding example of the basic characteristics of Hitler’s overall foreign policy: “consistency of aim with complete opportunism in method and tactics
.”
³

Although Hitler declared the necessity of Austria’s “returning to the Reich” in the very first sentence of
Mein Kampf,
he never allowed the Anschluss question to distract him from what he regarded as more important, or at least more pressing issues. His first aim, as far as Austria was concerned, was to gain control over the Austrian Nazi party, even though this involved splitting the party into two almost equal parts. Nor did the sensibilities of Austrians, both Nazis and non-Nazis, prevent him from renouncing the South Tyrol in exchange for winning the friendship of Mussolini and Fascist Italy. Even after his rise to power, Hitler kept Austria on the “back burner” while he consolidated his power in Germany and built up the Wehrmacht.

The image of Hitler foaming at the mouth and impulsively attacking countries indiscriminately may have some validity for the years between 1941 and 1945. But it would distort the truth to apply this image to his handling of the Austrian question. On the contrary, he was able to exercise considerable restraint, flexibility, and above all, patience in realizing his long-range goal. Indeed, one of his most important difficulties was curbing the reckless enthusiasm of some of his followers, not only in Austria, but also in such places as the Sudetenland
,
⁴
Danzig, Yugoslavia, and the Memelland.

The relative ease of the Gleichschaltung process in Germany in 1933-34 misled Hitler and the Austrian Nazis into pursuing a rapid takeover in Austria, which was seen as a domestic problem that could be solved with the usual Nazi combination of terror, promises, and bombastic electoral campaigns. The refusal of Engelbert Dollfuss to surrender to Nazi intimidation and the Austrian chancellor's abolition of elections, and slightly later the Nazi party itself, forced Hitler to adopt a new approach. On 26 May 1933 he launched his “thousand-Mark blockade,” accompanied by propaganda attacks on the Austrian government, which originated from German territory. InteK national indignation aroused by Habicht’s radio speeches merely caused Hitler to switch to more subtle—and more insidious—propaganda in February 1934. His attempt to call off the terror campaign in Austria, however, proved disastrously ineffective.

More drastic changes were required in Hitler’s Austrian policy following the July Putsch fiasco. Theo Habicht and his Landesleitung were both sacrificed to appease an outraged world public opinion. Hitler now reverted to the same politics of legality he had used with such success in German domestic affairs after 1925. So abrupt did his change of tactics appear that Austrian Nazis felt depressed and abandoned by their Fiihrer. But Hitler was merely making a virtue out of a necessity, renouncing for the moment something that he lacked the power to seize by force.

The July Agreement of 1936, although not initiated by Hitler, can be regarded as a continuation of the same policy of patience and ostensive legality. Once again most Austrian Nazis felt betrayed and deserted, and once again Hitler had to assure them, through Friedrich Rainer and Odilo Globocnik, to have faith and patience.

Hitler had several ways of influencing the Austrian Nazis after 1934 (when they were officially independent), even though his control was far from absolute. His new German envoy to Austria, Franz von Papen, kept a watchful eye on Nazi activities as did the German economic expert Wilhelm Keppler, after July 1937. Further control was maintained through the Hilfswerk, whose subsidies to Austrian
Gaue
could be increased or decreased according to their degree of cooperation. Finally, Hitler could exercise substantial influence over events by giving or withholding his blessings to moderate or radical Austrian leaders, depending on the needs of the moment and their willingness to follow his commands.

After 1933, when Hitler altered his policy of directly annexing Austria in favor of the more subtle goal of Gleichschaltung, he was extremely reluctant to revert to his original aim. To be sure, he decided to speed up the process at

p..

j    the so-called Hossbach conference in November 1937; the actual acceleration

j:|    
began with his famous meeting with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden in Febru-

I;;;    ary 1938. In all likelihood he expected it to be several months, if not years,

p?    before Austria became a fully Nazified state. Yet it was his threatening speech

|    to the Reichstag of 20 February that (probably inadvertently) encouraged

|j;!    Styrian and later other Austrian Nazis to take matters into their own hands.

Hitler probably did not realize that he had helped set in motion a chain reaction which would reach its climax only with the annexation of Austria just three weeks later.

Although Hitler did not directly intervene in the drama unfolding in Austria
ijc    
between 20 February and 9 March, he did expect Arthur Seyss-Inquart and

Wilhelm Keppler to restrain the more rambunctious Nazis in order to avoid pp    the kind of trouble that might necessitate a German invasion. Only when

|:    Schuschnigg announced his luckless plebiscite on the ninth    did Hitler feel

f    compelled to “unleash” his Austrian followers at a time when many of them

had long since unleased themselves. But even then his intention was simply to force Schuschnigg to call off his vote, not to invade, and certainly not to annex Austria. It was Hermann Goring rather than Hitler who played the leading role in ousting Schuschnigg and engineering the German invasion. And it may have been Goring, once again, who helped persuade Hitler to discard his inhibitions and carry out the Anschluss on 13 March.