Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (105 page)

27
The Germans noted the failure of the Norwegian defense plans to use their troops to the best advantage and to exploit the difficulties presented by climate and geography. Karl Ruef writes “But also the natural advantages of the whole countryside around Narvik, the steep mountains, the flanking possibilities for infantry weapons, the lack of roads, the narrows and passes, the railroad tunnels, the knowledge of the terrain, the winter mobility of their own troops, the proximity of supply depots, all that the Norwegians failed to exploit.” (
Odyssee einer Gebirgsdivision. Die 3. Geb. Div. im Einsatz
[Stuttgart: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 19760).

28
O. Munthe-Kaas,
The Campaign in Northern Norway. An Account of the Norwegian 6th Division’s Advance Against the Germans in the Narvik Area April 9th–June 9th, 1940
(Washington, D.C.: The Royal Norwegian Information Service, 1944), p. 13.

29
One example of such despicable behavior took place in late May 1940 when, as a prisoner, he provided the Germans with the name of a person who could possibly serve as a guide for General Feurstein’s forces in the wilderness area between Bodø and Narvik.

1
Dietl and Hermann,
General Dietl
, p. 70, report the following entry in Commander Erdmenger’s (
Wilhelm Heidkamp’s
skipper) journal: “The absence of the ship was of decisive significance for the future development of the Narvik undertaking.”

2
Jan Wellem
also served as a submarine tender and carried a cargo that consisted of a mixture of diesel oil for submarine and boiler oil for destroyers.

3
As quoted by Dickens,
Battles in the
Fjords, p. 42.

4
Dickens,,
Battles in the
Fjords, p. 46.

5
This destroyer belonged to Captain Warburton-Lee’s destroyer flotilla but it was detached earlier to serve as an escort for the cruiser
Birmingham
. When this cruiser was sent back to England,
Hostile
hurried back to join its flotilla.

6
Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, p. 46.

7
Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, p. 47.

8
Churchill,
The Gathering Storm
, p. 597.

9
Hubatsch, p. 113, n.ote 13.

10
Donald MacIntyre,
Narvik
(London: Evans Brothers Limited, 1959), p.75.

11
Alex Büchner,
Narvik. Die Kämpfe der Gruppe Dietl im Frühjahr 1940
(Nechargemünd-Heidelberg: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft GmbH, 1958), p. 24.

12
Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, pp. 56-57.

13
Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, p. 75.

14
Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 4, p. 113, second note.

15
Bey advanced in rank to Rear Admiral. He went down with the battleship
Scharnhorst
on December 26, 1943.

16
Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, p. 78.

17
Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, pp. 94-95.

18
Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 4, pp. 171 and 222. The salvaged equipment included 96 aerial bombs, about 320,000 rounds of machinegun and small-arms ammunition, 30,000 boxes of hermetically sealed food, 20-mm guns, cars, and motorcycles.

1
Churchill,
The Gathering Storm
, pp. 590 and 606.

2
Richard Petrow,
The Bitter Years: The Invasion and Occupation of Denmark and Norway April 1940–May 1945
(New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.), 1974, p. 1.

3
PRO,
FO
371, 24829, N4101.

4
Chr. Christensen,
De som heiste flagget
, pp. 74-75.

5
Tamelander and Zetterling,
Niende april,
vol. 3, p. 271.

6
Odd-Bjørn Fure,
Norsk uterikspolitiske historie.
Vol 3.
Mellomkrigstid 1920–1940
(Oslo: 1996), p. 378.

7
Nicholaus von Falkenhorst,
Bericht und Vernehmung des Generalobersten von Falkenhorst
p. 84. “That was absolutely von Spiller’s private war. I knew nothing about it. It was in no way anticipated.”

8
PRO,
FO
371, 24834, N4326, April 13, 1940; Otto Ruge,
Felttoget. General Otto Ruges erindringer fra kampene april–juni 1940
(Olav Riste, ed.; Oslo: Aschenhoug, 1989), pp. 29, 37, 43, 53, and 55; and PRO
FO
371, 24834 N4339 and N4579, April 14, 1940.

9
O. Lindbäck-Larsen,
Krigen i Norge 1940
(Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1965), p. 77.

10
This committee had been in existence since 1923 and in April 1940, it consisted of Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, General Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyrice Newall, the Chief of the Air Staff.

11
PRO,
CAB
79/3 C.O.S.C. 9.4.1940 and Lord Ismay,
The Memoirs of Lord Ismay
(London: Heinemann, 1950), p. 120.

12
This committee was formed at the outbreak of war in 1939 and consisted of the three service ministers along with their chiefs of staff. The Prime Minister was the chair and Churchill was the deputy chair.

13
United Kingdom,
Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons
, vol. 359, col.511.

14
Kersaudy,
Norway
, p. 86. 17, “Copy of a message written out in Manuscript by C.I.G.S. for General Mackesy 2330 hours 10th April, taken by Brigadier Lund,” (Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, Appendix A, pp. 247-248).

18
Loc cit.

19
Churchill,
The Gathering
Storm, p. 612.

20
Ismay,
Memoirs
, p. 111.

21
Kersaudy,
Norway
, p. 91 and PRO,
FO
371, 24834, N4317, April 13, 1940.

22
As quoted in Kersaudy,
Norway
, p. 92.

1
Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, p. 104.

2
Ibid, p. 105.

3
Ibid, p. 106.

4
As quoted in Hubatsch, p. 128.

5
Information received from knowledgeable individuals in Norway–including long-time residents–indicate that Ramsund had a depth of 10–15 meters and that ships with a length of 120 meters could not transit safely without the use of a knowledgeable pilot. The German destroyers were about 120 meters in length and had a draught of approximately 12 meters. Others have written that the Ramsund-Kjeldsundet-Vågsfjord route can take civilian cargo ships up to 40,000 tons. The fact that the Norwegians established a coastal artillery battery of two 105mm guns at the northern entrance to Ramsund–Forholten during World War II is a further indication that the strait was navigable for warships. Even if Ramsund was not sufficiently dredged or the service of reliable pilots could not be obtained, there was the option of turning right just west of Barøy, into the more navigable Tjelsund and from there north to Vågsfjord. Large ships, such as
Jan Wellem
, used this route on a regular basis.

6
Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, p. 108.

7
Kurt Assmann,
The German Campaign in Norway
(Admiralty: Naval Staff, 1948), p. 41.

8
Munthe-Kaas,
Krigen i Narviksavsnittet 1940
, p. 66.

9
As quoted in ibid, p. 64.

10
Message from Admiral Whitworth to Admiral Forbes at 2210 hours on April 13 and forwarded by Admiral Forbes to the Admiralty in Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, p. 51.

11
Message from Whitworth, loc cit.

1
Despatch by Lord Cork, Section I, (6), as quoted in Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, p. 147.

2
Kersaudy,
Norway
, p. 125.

3
Ziemke,
The German Northern Theater
, p. 90.

4
See, for example, L. E. Maund,
Assault from the Sea,
29-30.

5
Report found in Despatch by Lord Cork, Appendix A, Section 6, as quoted in Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, p. 151.

6
Bernhard von Lossberg,
Im Wehrmachtführungs-stab. Bericht eines Generalstabsoffiziers
(Hamburg: H. H. Nölke, 1949), p. 70.

7
3. Gebirgsdivision Kriegstagesbuch
(hereinafter
3GDKTB
), April 17, 1940.

8
Major Omdal, one lieutenant, one sergeant, and seven soldiers managed to escape on May 19. Two soldiers were caught trying to cross into Sweden. Major Omdal rejoined Norwegian forces further north on May 20 and took command of the 1/15th Infantry on May 24. The other seven apparently made good their escape to Sweden.

9
Olof Sundell,
9. april
(Stockholm: Sohlmans, 1949), p. 227.

10
3GDKTB,
04261130
.
These, and later specialists, were mostly camouflaged military personnel. A message from Group XXI (Nr. 298 dated May 22, 1940 at 1900 hours) reads, “40 machinegun and mortars specialists are leaving Berlin for Narvik via Sweden at 1000 hours on May 23. A further 80 specialists will follow in about 3 days. Appropriate attire will be worn for the purpose concealment.”

11
Büchner,
Narvik
, p. 52.

12
Reports by Major General Dahl in 1946 and Captain Olav Løvland in 1941 as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 240.

13
Arne Dagfin Dahl,
Med Alta bataljon mot tyskerne
(Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1945), p. 60.

14
Ibid, p. 53. He writes, “… A determined advance by the hitherto un-noticed concentration of three rested enemy battalions in the Elvenes area would have encountered a precarious Group Windisch and could have opened the road to Bjerkvik. It is thanks to the determined attack by the 1/139, under the command of Major Stautner that this did not happen. Because of his surprise attack, the Norwegians were forced into a more careful tactical mode that was noticeable repeatedly until the end of the fighting and thereby he secured for Group Narvik a gain of decisive significance.”

15
Hovland,
Fleischer
, p. 126.

1
Lindback-Larsen,
Kriegen
, p. 66.

2
Ziemke,
The German Northern Theater
, p. 70.

3
Bernard Fergusson,
The Watery Maze
(London: Collins, 1961), p. 44.

4
Dudley Clarke,
Seven Assignments
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1948), p. 88.

5
Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, Appendix A, p. 251.

6
Ibid, p. 99.

7
Kersuady,
Norway
, p. 116.

8
Tamelander and Zetterling,
Niende april
, p. 164.

9
Jørgen Jensen,
Krigen på Hedemark
(Oslo: Tanum, 1947), p. 138.

10
See, for example, Tamelander and Zetterling,
Niende april,
p. 165 and Derry,
The Campaign in Norway,
p.111. Morgan was not present when the Germans attacked. He had traveled to Åndalsnes where the 15th Brigade was landing the following day.

11
Gudbrand Østbye,
Krigen i Norge 1940. Operasjonene på Vestsiden av Mjøsa–Follebu-Gausdal
(Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1960), pp. 231-233, 250-251 and Lindbäck-Larsen,
Krigen
, p. 95.

12
Tage Ellinger,
Den Forunderlige Krig
(Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1960), pp. 27-28

13
As quoted in Derry,
The Campaign in Norway,
p. 122.

14
Lindbäck-Larsen,
Krigen,
p. 94.

15
Kersuady,
Norway,
p. 154.

16
As quoted in Tamelander and Zetterling,
Niende april,
p. 165.

17
MacLeod and Kelly,
Time Unguarded,
p. 287.

18
As quoted in Kersuady,
Norway,
p. 167.

19
Ibid, p. 176.

20
Norwegian Broadcasting System (NRK) interview with Major General Roscher-Nielsen on January 18, 1965 as quoted in Kersuady,
Norway,
p. 170.