Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (106 page)

21
Ash,
Norway 1940
, p. 100, after describing the troops’ lack of essential equipment, notes how they were issued lavish personal kits “to make up for everything…” which they had to carry due to lack of transportation and “General Carton de Wiart declared with some heat that the men could not carry all their kit, while if they put it on they looked like paralysed bears and were unable to move.”

22
Since ammunition for Norwegian weapons was not produced outside Norway and because they were cut off from their source in southern Norway, the solution was to supply them with British weapons. About 7,000 rifles and 250 Bren guns with ammunition finally arrived in the transport
Chobry
on April 28 but off-loading priority was given to French antiaircraft batteries (despite that day’s evacuation order). The Norwegian weapons and ammunition sailed away on the transport. This may have been deliberate since the British did not want these weapons to fall into German hands.

23
Ole Berg Getz,
Fra krigen i Nord-Trøndelag 1940
(. Oslo: Aschehoug & Co., 1940), p.139.

24
Ibid, p. 144.

25
Kersuady,
Norway
, p. 181.

26
As quoted in Kersuady,
Norway
, p. 125.

1
Karol Zbyszewski,
The Fight for Narvik: Impressions of the Polish Campaign in Norway
(London: L. Drummond, 1041), p. 3. While styled Chasseurs de Montagne or Chasseurs du Nord, many of the troops had never seen any mountains and they were definitely not trained for arctic winter warfare.

2
Raymond Sereau,
L’Expedition de Norvège 1940
(Baden-Baden: Regie Autonome des Publications Officielles, 1949), p. 48.

3
Ibid, p. 51 and an 11-page manuscript in Norwegian titled “Rapport–General Bethouart,” p. 3.

4
3GDKTB
, 04281945, 04300930, and 05011900.

5
Ibid, 05020330, 05030230, and 05031420.

6
Munthe-Kaas,
Kriegent
, p. 109, note.

7
Ibid, p. 109 and Johan Helge Berg and Olav Vollan,
Fjellkrigen 1940. Lapphaugen-Bjørnefjell
(Trondheim: Wennbergs Trykkeri A.S., 1999), pp. 142-143.

8
3GDKTB
, 04290930.

9
“Rapport–General Bethouart”, p. 3.

10
Sereau,
L’Expedition
, p. 54 and “Rapport–General Bethouart”, p. 3.

11
As quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 54.

13
3GDKTB
, 05042010.

14
Trygve Lie,
Leve eller dø. Norge i Krig
(Oslo: Tiden norsk forlag, 1955), p. 206.

15
Quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 67.

16
Hovland,
Fleischer
, p.157.

17
Ibid, p. 227.

18
Sandvik
, Operasjonene
, vol. 2, pp. 114, 69.

19
Ruge,
Felttoget
, p. 130.

1
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, pp. 60-61, n. 4.

2
Lindbäck-Larsen,
Rapport
, Section 8:3-4 and Getz,
Nord-Trøndelag 1940
, pp. 115-116, entries for 1225 hours on April 28 (Message 329 from 6th Division) and 1330 hours same day (letter Nr. 125 from Getz to Fleischer).

3
Getz,
Nord-Trøndelag 1940
, pp. 122-123, entry 1130 hours April 29.

4
Ibid, p. 116, entry for 1300 hours April 28 and Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, pp. 60-61, n. 4. Ruge was in the process of relocating his headquarters from Åndalsnes to North Norway and had no communications with Colonel Getz until May 3, by which time the situation had changed.

5
Getz,
Nord-Trøndelag 1940
, pp. 117 and 122. Getz notes that he sent messages to the 6th Division direct, via Sweden, and through the Allied headquarters but received no explanation for the orders. Sandvik relates that General Fleischer sent a letter to Getz on April 30 confirming that the order was genuine but that Getz never received the letter (
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p.61).

6
Lindbäck-Larsen,
Rapport
, Section 8:4.

7
Getz,
Nord-Trøndelag 1940,
p. 140, entry for 0850 hours May 2.

8
Valentin Feurstein,
Irrwege der Pflicht 1938-1945
(Munich, Verlag Welsermühl, 1963), p. 73.

9
Hovland,
Fleischer
, p. 150. He points out that the military investigating committee, in its review of Colonel Getz’ surrender, gave special weight to the fact that road connection to the north was severed by Fleischer. He goes on to state that Getz should have been the first to know that the destruction of the road northward had not been carried out. Getz, however, claims that the destruction had already started and this is why the 1/14th Inf left the battalion trains behind when it began its retreat into Nordland Province.

10
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, pp. 100, 106.

11
Quoted in Lindbäck-Larsen,
Krigen,
p. 124. The order read: “Send as many troops as possible back to Mosjøen. Seek connection with units of the 6th Division in that area. The forces will thereafter come under General Fleischer. Destroy the roads thoroughly as the troops withdraw. Roadblocks must be defended.”

12
Quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 63.

13
Macleod and Kelly,
Time Unguarded
, p. 289.

14
Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, p. 178 and Moulton,
A Study of Warfare
, p. 235.

15
Maurice Gustave Gamelin,
Servir
, (3 vols; Paris: Plon, 1946-47), vol. 3, pp. 366-367.

16
Macleod and Kelly,
Time Unguarded
, p. 292.

17
Churchill,
The Gathering Storm
, p. 648.

18
Marie Emile Béthouart,
Cinq années d’espérance. Mémoires de guerre, 1939-1945
. (Paris: Plon, 1968), pp. 31-32.

19
The 2nd Mountain Division, like the 3nd, was formed from units in the Austrian army after the incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich. The 2nd was formed from units of the 6th Austrian Mountain Division and German mountain troops in April 1938 and mobilized on August 26, 1939. Like the 3rd, it participated in the Polish Campaign as part of Army Group South. It was transferred to Germany at the conclusion of that campaign.

20
Karl Ruef,
Odyssee
, p. 54.

21
Feurstein,
Irrwege der Pflicht
, p
.
71.

22
Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, p. 167.

23
London Gazette
Supplement, 10 July 1947, 3173 as quoted in Jack Adams,
The Doomed Expedition. The Norwegian Campaign of 1940
(London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 71.

24
Macleod and Kelly,
Time Unguarded
, p. 297.

25
Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, p. 180; Moulton,
Study of Warfare
, p. 237; Adams,
The Doomed Expedition
, p. 73; and Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 84, n. 74.

26
HOK 916/40 quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 88.

27
Hovland,
Fleischer
, p. 150.

28
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, pp. 88-89.

29
Hubatsch, 215.

30
Ellinger,
Den Forunderlige Krig
, pp. 65-66. The morale in Ellinger’s company had deteriorated and some of the troops tried to leave on May 13. Ellinger decided it was better to operate with people who wanted to fight. He spoke to each platoon and told those who wished to leave to step forward and turn in their weapons. In the end, he had only 52 men left. The disarmed soldiers were sent to Mo where Roscher-Nielsen put them to work on a road-gang.

31
Lindbäck-Larsen,
6. division
(Oslo: Gyldendal, 1946), p. 118.

32
Ruef,
Odyssee
, p. 63.

33
John Connell,
Auchinleck
(London: Cassell, 1959), pp.119-120. The instructions read, in part: “You will have had my telegram telling you that I wish the detachment at Mo to hold on to its position, and not withdraw. I think it most important that we should give up no more ground. I know the detachment is somewhat isolated at present, and I know the Germans may be in superior force to the south of you, but I am pretty sure that they are groping in the dark very much as we are, and I hope that when they come up against really determined opposition they will sit back and think about it.” 34 Macleod and Kelly,
Time Unguarded
, p. 292.

35
Connell,
Auchinleck
, p. 115.

36
Connell,
Auchinleck
, p. 119; Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, p. 184; and Adams,
The Doomed Expedition
, p. 69.

37
Adams,
The Doomed Expedition
, p. 70.

38
Report to the Naval Court of Inquiry, D.3A Reports of Losses of H.M. Ships. Effingham 17/5. Prepared on H.M. Transport
Sobieski
at Sea on May 20, 1940, paragraph 6.

1 As quoted by Adams,
The Doomed Expedition
, p.17.

2
General Béthouart’s Journal de Marche, chapter 3, p. 38, as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 30.

3 Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 31 and Loben E. H. Maund
Assault from the Sea
(London: Methuen, 1949), pp. 52, 58.

4 Instructions from the Secretary of State for War to Lieutenant General Auchinlek, found in Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, Appendix A, pp. 259-260.

5
Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
, pp. 169-170.

6
Macleod and Kelly,
Time Unguarded
, p. 295.

7
Maund,
Assault from the Sea
, p. 40.

8
Béthouart,
Cinq années d’espérance
, p. 51.

9
Moulton,
Study of Warfare
, p. 225.

10
Hovland,
Fleischer
, p. 162.

11
Büchner,
Narvik
, p. 93.

12
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 116.

13
Ruge,
Felttoget
, p. 209.

14
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p.116.

15
Büchner,
Narvik
, p. 103.

16
In his letter of May 12, Lieutenant Colonel Berg wrote, “
An attack to the south is difficult from Læigastind-Gressvann. The mountain area is even without the possibility of cover and is under effective fire from German machinegun positions…. The brigade still has maneuver possibilities in the area Nævertind-Isvann-Swedish border, provided we don’t lose our chance as the Germans move their positions eastward.”
Berg and Vollan,
Fjellkrigen
, p. 257.

17
Berg and Vollan,
Fjellkrigen
, p. 241.

18
Hovland,
Fleischer
, p. 175.

19
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, pp. 124-125.

20
See, for example, extracts of reports dated 10, 12, and 21 May, in ibid, pp. 52, 124, and 140.

21
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, p. 30.

22
Hovland,
Fleischer
, p. 173.

23
A report by the German war correspondent Karl Springenschmid is quoted in Berg and Vollan,
Fjellkrigen
, p. 314: “it was customary for the Norwegians to attack in inclement weather. They now fought harder than at any time. The mountain troops had already learned that they [Norwegians] were outstanding skiers, could fight on skis, and that there were excellent sharpshooters among them. However, the fact that they launched direct assault on fortified positions came as a surprise. Driven back, the reassembled, and time after time assaulted over their own fallen and forced their way into the positions. These stubborn Norwegian ‘peace soldiers’ had in the course of a short time, accustomed themselves to war and had become dangerous opponents.”

24
Munthe-Kaas,
Krigen
, p. 154.

25
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 2, pp. 134-135.