Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (103 page)

5
Quoted in Carl-Axel Gemzell,
Organization, Conflict, and Innovation. A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning 1888-1940
. (Lunde: Esselte Studium), pp. 286-287.

6
Gemzell writes
,
“Moreover, the results of our investigation make it possible to establish with certainty that, from the start of the war, Carls was greatly involved in the Scandinavian question and advanced opinion about the importance of bases in Denmark and Norway.” (
Organization
, p. 381)

7
Erich Raeder,
My Life
(Henry W. Drexel, transl. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960), p. 300.

8
Michael Salewski writes, “The ‘Norwegian case’ remained, as already demonstrated, permanently in the considerations of the Naval Staff since 1937” (
Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945
. Volume I.
1935-1941
[Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1970], p.177).

9
International Military Tribunal (IMT),
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946
(Nuremberg: 1947-49), vol. 14, pp. 85-86.

10
See Carl-Axel Gemzell,
Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien. Der Kamp für einen Maritimen Operations-plan
(Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1975), pp. 301-308 and 380 for detailed discussions of these events. Also Ottmer,
Weserübung
, pp. 17-20.

11
IMT,
Trial of the Major War Criminals,
vol. 14, pp. 85-86.

12
IMT,
Trial of the Major War Criminals
, vol. 14, p. 86. An entry in the
Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945
(hereinafter
KTBS
), for October 3, 1939 confirms Raeder’s testimony and treats the questions that needed to be answered by the study in more detail. See also IMT, document C-122, GB-8.

13
The document titled “Überlegungen zur Frage der Stützpunktgewinnung für die Nordsee-Kriegführung” appears in Salewski,
Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung
, vol 1, pp. 563-565.

14
KTBS
, October 9, 1939 and Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol 1, pp. 126-127.

15
Fuehrer Conferences On Matters Dealing With the German Navy 1939
(Translated and printed by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 12-14.

16
Fuhrer Conferences
, December 8, 1939, p. 46.

17
Ralph Hewins,
Quisling. Prophet without Honour
(New York: John Day Company, 1966), pp. 178-179.

18
Letters between Admirals Böhm and Schniewind as quoted in Gemzell,
Organization
, p. 389 n. 43.

19
Gemzell,
Skandinavien
, p. 270.

20
Hans-Dietrich Loock,
Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven. Zur Vorgeschicte und Geschichte der national-sozialistischen Revolution in Norwegen
(Stuttgart: Deutsch Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), pp. 207-209.

21
IMT, Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 14, pp. 92-93.

22
Fuehrer Conferences 1939
. Annex 1–Minutes of a Conference on December 11, 1939 at 1200, p. 56.

23
Fuehrer Conferences
, p. 54.

24
Loock,
Quisling
, p. 371.

25
Fuehrer Conferences 1939
, p. 54.

26
Hewins (
Prophet without Honor
, p. 179) reports that the first meeting between Hitler and Quisling took place on December 15 but this is apparently an error. The
Jodl Diary
gives the date of the first meeting as December 13, but this is also most likely a mistake since Raeder’s handwritten note at the bottom of the letter he received from Rosenberg on December 13, refers to the meeting scheduled for December 14.

27
This according to Telford Taylor,
The March of Conquest. The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940
. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958, p. 88.

28
Entry in the
Jodl Diary
for December 13–a probable error in date as already noted–and in the
Halder Diary
, dated December 14, 1939.

29
Churchill, 537 and 564. [add title]

30
IMT, 14:95.

31
There has been considerable speculation about what was discussed at a meeting between Colonel Hans Piekenbrock, Chief of the Abwehr’s espionage section (Abwehr 1–Nachritenbeschaffung) and Quisling at the Hotel d’Angleterre in Copenhagen on April 4, 1940. There is no evidence that Quisling was informed about the impending invasion. The Germans made a mention of this meeting (see IMT,
Trials of the Major War Criminals
, vol. 14, p. 41) but they also state, “Quisling and Hagelin, according to orders, could not be informed of the imminence and the time of operation.” See also Walter Hubatsch,
Die deutsch Bezetsung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940
. Gottingen: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1952, p. 55 and n. 33 on that page. It is more likely that the meeting was an attempt by the Germans to see if Quisling knew anything that would indicate an intelligence leak. To tell Quisling about the operation five days before the landings would be very reckless and not in keeping with the security measures adopted to protect the whole venture. It would have been contrary to specific orders issued by Hitler on February 29, 1940.

32
Fuehrer Conferences 1939
, p. 62.

33
Hubatsch,
Die deutsch Bezetsung
, pp. 40-41.

34
Ib Damegaard Petersen, “Aksen OKW-OKM”, in
Historisk Tidsskrift
. Copenhagen: 1966, 12. Række, 2:1:92-122. It appears Gemzell (
Organization
, pp. 397-399) supports the views expressed by Petersen.

35
Gemzell,
Skandinavien
, p.227 and
Organization
, p. 399.

36
Walter Goerlitz,
History of the German General Staff 1657-1945
. New York: Praeger, 1957, p. 371.

37
However, an entry in the
Halder Diary
for February 21 states that von Falkenhorst had been placed in charge of preparations for the Norwegian operation and that Hq. XXI Corps would be placed under OKW “in order to avoid trouble with the air force.” There is also a note by Halder, “Not a single word has passed between the Fuehrer and ObdH [Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch] on this matter, this must be put on record for the history of the war. I shall make a point of noting down the first time the subject is broached, not until 2 March.”

38
General von Falkenhorst was tried and found guilty of war crimes by an American–British–Norwegian military tribunal in 1946 and sentenced to death. The sentence was subsequently reduced to 20 years’ imprisonment. He was released from prison in 1953 because of health problems. Von Falkenhorst died in 1968. xxxix Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 1, pp. 134-135.

40
Kurt Assmann,
The German Campaign in Norway
. Admiralty: Naval Staff, 1948, p. 4 n. 7. See also,
Jodl Diary
, 5 and 7 March 1940.

41
Hans-Guenther Seraphim,
Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs aus den Jahren 1934/35 und 1939/40
. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1956, p.102.

42
Fuehrer Conferences 1940
, February 23, 1940, vol. 1, p. 14.

43
John W. Wheeler-Bennet,
The Nemesis of Power. The German Army in Politics 1918-1945
. New York: St Martin’s Press, Inc., 1954, p. 494.

44
Fuehrer Conferences 1940
, March 9, 1940, vol. 1, p. 20.

45
KTBS
, March 10, 1940.

46
Salewski,
Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung
, p. 147. As the Norwegian operation was underway (April 29), Hitler ordered severe curtailment in the navy’s shipbuilding program. Construction on two aircraft carriers, one battleship, and three light cruisers was terminated.

47
Entry in
Jodl’s Diary
for March 14, 1940: “Ob.d.M. ist zweifelhaft, ob es jestz noch wichtig ist, in N. das preventive zu spielen. Fraglich ob man nicht Gelb vor Weserübung machen soll.” By hinting at delaying the attack on Norway until after the attack in the West, Raeder was obviously thinking that the very hazardous operation in Norway might not be necessary if the attack in the West was successful. See also
Jodl’s Diary
entries for March 21 and 28, 1940.

48
See
Fuehrer Conferences 1940
, “Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer on 9 March 1940 at 1200”, vol. 1, pp. 20-21 and “Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer in the Afternoon of 26 March 1940”, vol I, pp. 22-24.

49
Earl F. Ziemke,
The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945
. Washington, D.C.: Department of Army Pamphlet 20-271, 1959, p.20.

50
Fuehrer Conferences 1940
, March 29, 1940, vol. 1, p. 29.

51
Gruppe XXI Kriegstagesbuch
(hereinafter
XXIKTB
), 1 April 1940 as quoted in Ziemke,
German Northern Theater
, pp. 21-22.

52
Extract from the
Private Diary
of Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, April 9, 1940, p. 17, quoted in Hubatsch, Appendix J, 454.

53
Quoted in Ziemke, 32.

54
Admiral Carls’ assessment of the situation in the evening of April 7, 1940. Quoted in Steen, 1:149.

1
Ladislas Fargo,
The Game of the Foxes
(New York: D. McKay Co., 1971), pp. 431-436.

2
David Irving,
Hitler’s War
(New York: The Viking Press, 1977), p. 94.

3
Harold C. Deutsch,
The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1968), p. 320.

4
Deutsch,
The Conspiracy against Hitler
, p. 321, and Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel,
The Canaris Conspiracy. The Secret Resistance to Hitler in the German Army
(New York: Pinnacle Books, 1972), pp. 122-123. Stang was not a member of
Nasjonal Samling
at this time but joined that party after his return to Norway. In the trials following World War 2 Stang was prosecuted for failing to forward Sas’ warning. He claimed that he had not knowingly kept this information from the Norwegian Government and the court found him innocent of this charge. However, he was sentenced to four years of hard labor because of his party membership.

5
This and the other intelligence reports received by the Norwegian Naval Staff and used in this book are copied in Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 1, pp. 199-204.

6
Ottmer,
Weserübung
, p. 61.

7
“Norge visste, ingen gjorde noe,”
Aftenposten
, June 14, 2005.

8
Sir Llewellyn Woodward,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
(London: HMSO, 1970), p. 114.

9
Admiral Diesen had ordered his forces to the highest state of alert on a couple of occasions during the winter when the situation appeared threatening. He had received a reprimand from the Foreign Minister on the last occasion and this may have contributed to his lack of enthusiasm for taking this step, but his own views of the nature of the threat were probably of equal importance.

10
Bjørnson,
Narvik
, p. 210.

11
Churchill,
The Gathering Storm
, p. 459.

12
PRO,
FO
371/24815 N 3602/2/63. Laurence Collier, considered a Norwegian expert, was Dormer’s designated replacement as British representative in Norway.

13
T. K. Derry,
The Campaign in Norway
(London: HMSO, 1952), p. 26.

14
Harvey,
Scandinavian Misadventure
, p. 56.

15
The Home Fleet in Scapa Flow consisted of two battleships, one battle cruiser, three cruisers (including one French), and 12 destroyers (including two French). Another battleship and an aircraft carrier (without fighters) were on their way from Clyde to join the fleet. In addition, there was the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth with two light cruisers and eight destroyers. One battle cruiser, one heavy cruiser and 16 destroyers were at sea or off Norway’s northern coast. Then there was the 18th Cruiser Squadron consisting of two heavy cruisers and five destroyers in the North Sea along with one large minelayer and four destroyers. The addition of four cruisers and two destroyers (1st Cruiser Squadron) was not a significant augmentation in view of the damage the disembarkation of troops caused to Allied plans for landing troops in Norway.

16
See, for example, Peter Dickens,
Narvik: Battles in the Fjords
(Naval Institute Press, 1974), pp. 25-26 and Donald MacIntyre,
Narvik
(London: Evans Brothers Ltd, 1959), pp. 35-36.