Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (13 page)

When Hitler decided to expedite
Weserübung
, Jodl suggested that a commander for the operation be selected, and he and Keitel, apparently without consulting the army,
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recommended the 54-year old General der Infanterie Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, born in Breslau and a descendant of a military/ aristocratic family named von Jastrzembski.
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In 1918, at the end of World War I, von Falkenhorst had served as operations officer of General von der Goltz’s division in Finland. Von Falkenhorst had commanded the XXI Army Corps in the Polish campaign. He was still commander of the XXI Corps, stationed at Bacharach, and its troops were undergoing training in Grafenwöhr. Jodl and Keitel recommended von Falkenhorst for the Norwegian operation because of his experience in Finland. Hitler accepted the recommendation and Falkenhorst was summoned to Berlin.

Hitler interviewed von Falkenhorst on February 21, and the following day, after he had reviewed plans prepared by the Krancke Staff, Hitler confirmed his appointment. Hitler told von Falkenhorst he would have five divisions for the operation.

In a statement to the Norwegian High Command (Forsvarets overkommando) on September 30, 1945, General von Falkenhorst related how General Brauchitsch viewed the Norwegian operation. He let von Falkenhorst understand that he did not agree with Hitler’s decision and opined that the operation did not serve any useful purpose. Brauchitsch pointed out that his opinion had not been solicited, that Hitler alone had made the decision, and that he was now making all arrangements with the help of Admiral Raeder.
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Von Falkenhorst brought a select group of staff officers from the XXI Corps to Berlin and they began their work on February 26, among them Colonel Erich Buschenhagen, the corps chief of staff. These were combined with the earlier Krancke Staff and the new organization was designated Group XXI or Army High Command, Norway (Armee-oberkommando Norwegen, i.e., AOK Norwegen).

The intelligence estimate contained in the plan produced by Falkenhorst’s staff placed the peacetime strength of the Norwegian Army at about 40,000, with a 3,000-strong permanent cadre. Despite recognizing the excellent physical condition of the majority of the population, the army was given only a moderate rating because of the short training period, an over-aged officer corps, the perceived lack of competence among non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and lack of modern equipment. The conclusion was that the Norwegian Army could not offer any resistance worth mentioning against a major power, and units would quickly break when faced with surprise and bold action. German intelligence considered the ships in the navy too old to pose any problems for an attacker. The same was true for the aircraft assigned to the navy and army. They concluded that the coastal forts were unmanned in peacetime and therefore no obstacles as long as the element of surprise was maintained. Generally, the Germans overestimated the strength of the Norwegian military forces (except for the navy) while underestimating their fighting capability. With the exception of their conclusion regarding the coastal forts, however, the shortcomings in the intelligence estimate caused only minor difficulties.

Von Falkenhorst presented his plan for the invasion of Norway to Hitler on February 29. In addition to the increase in force levels, there were several changes to the earlier Krancke plans. These changes made the undertaking more realistic militarily. The increased force levels reflected a more reasonable view of the difficulties confronting the German armed forces in some of the most inhospitable areas on the globe, opposed to an army very familiar with the terrain and climate. It also recognized that the various landings had to be self-sustained until link-ups, a task not easy in difficult terrain with poor internal lines of communications. Finally, it represented a more sober assessment of the threat posed by the British Navy.

Krancke’s group had recognized the importance of bases in northern Denmark, but had suggested that these should be acquired through diplomatic pressure. This was also how OKW viewed the issue, although the threat of military force might have to be used and the forces should therefore be ready. The occupation of Luleå in Sweden and the railroad leading from that city to Narvik was also considered, but the OKW, in the person of Colonel Warlimont, changed these ideas in reviewing a February 26 working paper from von Falkenhorst’s staff on February 27. There was to be no action against Sweden, and the acquisition of bases in Denmark was no longer left to diplomatic pressures. The seizure of bases in Denmark by force was also in accordance with von Falkenhorst’s views since he did not want to leave the outcome of this important part of his operation to the uncertainties of diplomatic negotiations. He requested an additional corps headquarters and two divisions to seize the Jutland Peninsula and possibly the rest of Denmark if the Danes resisted.

Up to now, it was assumed that the attack on Norway would be carried out either just before or after the attack in the West. Jodl now proposed that
Weserübung
be carried out independent of that offensive. Hitler’s agreement to this proposal was contingent on an examination of the practicability of such a solution.
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The carrying out of the two operations independent of each other involved scaling back on some of the parachute troops the Krancke Staff had considered necessary for the operation.

Hitler approved von Falkenhorst’s plans on February 29 but insisted that the capture of Copenhagen also be included as a mission. Hitler again directed Rosenberg that there should be no attempt to enlist Quisling’s support for the operation “in any form.”
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In the meantime, Raeder continued to feed Hitler a mixture of caution and alarm. On February 20 and again on February 23, Hitler asked Raeder about maintaining the ore traffic from Narvik following the occupation of Norway.
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Raeder answered that the “best thing for maintaining this traffic as well as for the situation in general” was the maintenance of Norwegian neutrality. However, he went on:

Raeder stated that the ore traffic from Narvik, which amounted to 2,500,000 to 3,500,000 tons, would have to be suspended for a time since the protection of this traffic through the 800-mile passage along the coast would require large naval and air resources. He advised Hitler that there were alternatives available in case the transport of ore through Norwegian territorial waters proved too risky. Six million tons of the anticipated supply of 10 million tons could be shipped through Luleå during the months that city was not ice-locked. Another three million tons could be stored and/or shipped south by rail to the port of Oxelösund, south of Stockholm. That would leave about one million tons to be shipped through Narvik instead of the much higher tonnage normally associated with that city. He cautioned that not all of this would be achieved in 1940 since it appeared the weather conditions would keep Luleå ice-bound longer than normal. Finally, Raeder pointed out that all supplies would be cut off if the British occupied Norway while a German occupation of Norway would oblige Sweden to meet Germany’s demands.

So far, the army and air force had been kept in relative darkness about the Scandinavian operation. However, this now changed since the actual forces to participate had to be designated. This led to serious inter-service wrangling and to disputes between OKW and the service chiefs.

Von Falkenhorst and his chief of staff had their first meeting with General Halder, the Army Chief of Staff, on February 26. Halder took a hard attitude with respect to von Falkenhorst’s troop requirements. He requested full and timely information about all future requests. He insisted that OKH should be fully informed about future requirements before they became formal OKW demands, and received von Falkenhorst’s verbal assurance to this effect.

The OKW issued the directive for
Weserübung
on March 1, over Hitler’s signature. The directive was issued in nine copies. Five copies were for OKW and one each for von Falkenhorst and the service chiefs. On the same day as Hitler signed the
Weserübung
directive, OKW presented the services with the force requirements. This came without prior consultations despite von Falkenhorst’s assurances to the contrary three days earlier. The requirements presented to OKH included a corps headquarters, two divisions, and a motorized brigade for Denmark, as well as five divisions and a number of special units for Norway. The requirements caused anger in the services and a flurry of wrangling and power struggles between the service chiefs and OKW over the next week.

The army managed to obtain some reduction in forces they were required to provide. However, Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring caused most of the difficulties. He had a large ego, felt slighted, and refused to tolerate subordinating air force units (except for tactical control) to any other service or joint commands. While the attack on Denmark and Norway was the first combined operation of the war, any semblance of a unified command structure for Group XXI disappeared because of Göring’s protests. The air force component of
Weserübung
, X Air Corps, was removed from von Falkenhorst’s control. It would now report to Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force High Command, OKL) and von Falkenhorst would have to submit his requirements and requests to OKL. To compensate for the lack of a unified command structure, OKW had to make detailed decisions about command relationships and even had to exercise direct control in certain cases to ensure smooth cooperation between the services.

However, Göring also caused difficulties for the other service chiefs. He was very critical of previous planning, and the result was that the concessions OKH had wrung from the OKW were not only rescinded, but the original requirements were increased. In a directive on March 7, the number of requested divisions rose from seven plus to nine plus. The navy had planned on a rapid return of its warships, in order to escape the expected furious counterattacks by the British Navy. They were now required to keep ships in Norwegian harbors, particularly in Narvik.

The Army commander-in-chief, General Brauchitsch, did not raise further issues about the size of the army requirements. He appears to have been satisfied to take a back seat in all future planning for the Scandinavian venture. He did not even attend Hitler’s final conference with the service chiefs and General von Falkenhorst about
Weserübung
on April 2. OKH had been opposed to the Scandinavian adventure from the very start, regarding it as a lunatic idea. Brauschitsch’s absence from the conference on April 2 is only one of many indications that the army wanted nothing to do with
Weserübung
, an operation with so many inherent flaws and dangers that they fully expected it to fail.

There had been an undercurrent of opposition to Hitler among high-ranking members of the army, if not outright plotting. Their goal was the removal of Hitler and a conclusion of peace with the Allies. To have any hope of success they needed the support of Brauchitsch and Halder. There were no prospects of these two officers turning against Hitler, to whom they were bound by both traditional loyalty and fear, as long as he remained popular and respected by the German people. His popularity had increased over the years after a series of successes, often achieved despite doubts or opposition from the armed forces. It may well be that the army leaders believed strongly that the Scandinavian adventure was doomed. The failure could then be laid squarely at Hitler’s feet and would be a serious blow to his prestige and standing with the German people. The prestige of the General Staff, on the other hand, would be enhanced by its non-participation in the preparation for and execution of
Weserübung
. Under such conditions, the time could be ripe for planning a regime change.
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The Germans were increasingly concerned that the Allies would soon make their move in Scandinavia and present the Germans with the worst of all possible scenarios. Speed had become a necessity. On March 3, Hitler called for a substantial speed-up of preparations and indicated that he would not tolerate any delays by the services. He directed that the forces for
Weserübung
assemble by March 10 and be ready to launch within four days. During a stormy session with the service chiefs on March 5, Hitler again reiterated that he wanted preparations for the Scandinavian operation hastened.

The German Navy was well pleased with the developments in the plans for
Weserübung
, with one major exception. Almost the entire surface fleet would participate in the attack on Norway, and a few older ships would be used against Denmark. The outward journey to Norway would be hazardous, and the return journey, after the British had a chance to recover from what the Germans hoped would be surprise, would involve extreme risks for the units deployed to central and northern Norway. The navy considered the critical point of the outward journey to be at the latitude of the Bergen-Shetland Islands. There was a good chance that the German ships would be discovered by the British in this area, and it was planned that they would pass during the hours of darkness. If the German naval units were discovered before reaching this point, operations north of Bergen could well become impossible because of the proximity of the British naval bases in Scotland.

The one exception to the navy’s satisfaction was the requirement that it should leave naval units in Norwegian harbors. To do so without air support amounted to suicide in the views of the naval staff. Admiral Raeder, who was more adept at handling Hitler than his army counterpart, wasted no time in appealing the decision to leave naval units in Norwegian harbors after the invasion. He wrapped this appeal very nicely into an overall appreciation of the Norwegian situation that he presented to Hitler on March 9.
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Hitler was impressed by Raeder’s arguments, but because of Göring’s objections, the matter remained unsettled for nearly two weeks.