Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (98 page)

The invasion of Norway was history’s first three-dimensional military campaign and it illustrated the dangers of not using the three elements in harmony. The Luftwaffe has been identified by most writers as a factor of decisive importance. Derry and Roskill emphasise its undermining of sea power and conclude that the period of fleet operations without air cover was over. Moulton and Liddell-Hart view British failure to understand the concept of three-dimensional warfare as a root cause for the defeat. It was not only the physical damage inflicted by the Luftwaffe but the psychological effects of its domination of the skies over the battlefield and the rear areas that had to be taken into account. In his after-action report on operations in Norway, General Auchinleck writes, “that to commit troops to a campaign in which they cannot be provided with adequate air support is to court disaster.”
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The British air force was never much interested in the Norwegian operations. It was responsible for the defense of Great Britain and the forces in France and saw the operations in Norway as an unwelcome distraction. This is at least a partial explanation for the failure to provide adequate air units to support operations in Norway. The fleet air arm proved incapable in countering the German air threat. This was partially due to the type of aircraft employed but also because the carriers stayed so far offshore that they could not effectively support the troops fighting in the valleys of eastern Norway or north of Trondheim.

The movement of troops, equipment, and supplies into Norway by air was history’s largest airlift operation up to that time. The Norwegians and the Allies also underestimated the German capability to move reinforcements and supplies by air to isolated beachheads. This was an important factor in saving General Dietl’s forces at Narvik and supplying General Feurstein’s drive through Nordland Province. The air-bridge established to Oslo and from Oslo to Trondheim allowed for a rapid build-up of forces in both areas.

Operations in Norway gave the Allies their first taste of the German doctrine of close air support for ground operations. Norwegian and British forces were unable to counter the devastating effectiveness of coordinated German ground and air operations. In this respect, the operation in Norway was a curtain raiser for what was soon to follow on the western front.

The Allies also failed to provide their troops with adequate artillery and anti-tank weapons, leaving their troops helpless against German employment of only a few light tank units in eastern Norway.

The British command structure was not geared for quick decision-making. The time-consuming coordination between the British cabinet and its subsidiary committees was nothing short of disastrous when trying to cope with the tempo of German operations. Most issues requiring quick decisions were debated and studied in a leisurely manner more appropriate for a peacetime environment. Studies and recommendations were thrown back and forth between committees until it was too late. The events leading to the cancellation of
Hammer
is a typical example. The only member in the War Cabinet with any experience in military matters was Churchill, and it is not an overstatement to say that his experience and views were primarily focused on naval matters.

The Norwegian campaign revealed the glaring inadequacies in inter-allied cooperation and coordination. Mistrust, suspicions, and too much emphasis on national versus coalition objectives infected the decision-making apparatus. The cavalier and insensitive manner in which the British treated their brothers-in-arms, particularly the Norwegians, had a deleterious effect on the campaign.

One aspect of the campaign in Norway that is often neglected is the effect of differences in operational philosophies. These differences, and their effects, are illustrated repeatedly in this book. German officers and NCOs were taught to expect the unexpected on the battlefield and were instructed to deviate from plans in order to achieve their goals. Higher German commanders intervened in operations of subordinate units to a far lesser extent than the Allied commanders, who tended to be schooled in a much more centralized operational philosophy. The Germans expected quick decisions and equally quick execution, a cornerstone in the German military doctrine. The speed at which operations at all levels were executed resulted in keeping an opponent, operating under more centralized and methodical guidelines, off balance. There is a long-standing principle that one of the most lucrative objectives for a military commander is the mind of the enemy commander. The Germans achieved this objective by confusing, demoralizing, and paralyzing the enemy through unrelenting pressure.

The operations in eastern Norway, in Trøndelag, and in Nordland Province are full of examples of how well the differences in the two doctrines worked to Germany’s advantage.

In their after-action and lessons learned reports, the Germans show a relatively high regard for the operations of smaller Norwegian units, particularly in defensive operations. Special mention is given to ski units and to the marksmanship abilities of the average Norwegian soldier. However, they held a rather low opinion of how larger units functioned. The Norwegian lack of large-scale maneuvers and exercises in the 1930s was telling, and their rather rigid operational philosophy translated into weakness on the battlefield.

The Germans viewed the British units as having low morale, poor self-reliance, and lacking fighting qualities and spirit. This is an interesting observation in view of General Auchinleck’s confidential report on June 19, 1940. An abridged version of this report was published in 1947 but two paragraphs were suppressed:

As later years in the war would demonstrate, a great deal had to do with poor training and inadequate equipment.

The Long Term Effects

There is no doubt that the occupation of Norway was a constant drain on German resources. At times, nearly a half million men from the armed forces were tied up in Norway. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the resources tied up in Norway could have had any major influence on the events in other theaters of war.

Hitler, like Churchill, had what can be characterized as an unhealthy preoccupation with Scandinavia, particularly Norway. Hitler was extremely proud of having pulled off the “sauciest” military operation of the war, against virtually all military principles except surprise and against the almost unanimous views of the renowned German General Staff. He undoubtedly viewed Norway as a trophy attesting to his military genius and wanted to protect that trophy at nearly any cost. He continued to maintain, “Norway is the zone of destiny in this war” and demanded unconditional obedience to all edicts pertaining to its defense.
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Concern about Norway after the British/Norwegian commando raid on Vågsø in December 1941 was the reason for ordering the battleships
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,
and the heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen
to make the famous Channel dash in February 1942 and for subsequently stationing most of the German fleet in Norway.

Was this expenditure of resources warranted by the advantages obtained? Let us first look at what is considered a primary motive for Hitler’s move against Norway, iron ore. While the harbor facilities in Narvik were so damaged that the first shipments of iron ore from that port could not tale place for over seven months, the Germans shipped over 600,000 tons through Narvik in 1941. This amounted to no more than 25% of what had flowed through that port in 1939 but by 1943, it was back up to 1.8 million tons. Shipments from Swedish ports more than compensated for the reduced volume going through Narvik. While the successful German offensive in the west secured a 14 million ton annual supply of iron ore from the French and Luxembourg mines, Hubatsch claims that the flow of Swedish ore made the great battles of 1942-44 possible for the Germans.

While the German Navy obtained bases for a wider starting line against the British, the problem was that the naval losses sustained in the invasion and the cancellation of most of the building program in the famous
Z plan
, made obtaining these bases rather meaningless. Furthermore, the German Navy acquired excellent harbors on the Atlantic after the fall of France but this could also not have been anticipated. The advantages secured by a less restricted access to the Atlantic were countered by the British occupation of Iceland in May 1940. Aircraft operating from Iceland and the Faeroe Islands were able to patrol the gateways to the Atlantic, including the strait between Iceland and Greenland. While the movement of the heavy units of the German fleet to the fjords of northern Norway in 1942 presented a potent threat against the Murmansk convoys, the concentration of most of the German fleet in Norwegian waters was welcomed by the Royal Navy.

German occupation of Norway complicated British blockade measures. They were also forced to prepare to defend against air and naval threats from the Scandinavian Peninsula. However, these threats were more than offset by the resources Germany needed to employ to defend against the reverse threat of Allied raids and possible invasion.

Nevertheless, all of this fails to address adequately the question of advantages versus disadvantages. We have to place ourselves in the position of the German planners and ask what the situation would have been for the Germans if the Allies had seized strategic points in Norway. This would have allowed them to exert pressure on Sweden and Finland and eliminate Swedish export of iron ore to Germany. Allied air power would be more effective in the Baltic and over German ports on the southern shores of that sea. An Allied presence in Norway would probably have kept Finland from joining Germany in its attack on the Soviet Union and Stalin would not have had to worry about an Arctic front or a threat to his supply line from the United States. While the wisdom of the German preoccupation with Norway was an advantage or an unnecessary drain on its resources is debatable, Hitler was not paranoid when he concluded that an Allied occupation of Norway would be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war.

Those in Germany who secretly hoped for a failure in Norway that would weaken Hitler’s hold on power were silenced. In fact, the stunning success strengthened Hitler’s popularity. His military advisers became increasingly reluctant to argue against his plans. To some, he took on the qualities of a genius. The incidents of Hitler losing his nerve when confronting the possibility of failure were forgotten in the elation of success and they did not resurface as serious issues until the military reverses in the east and in North Africa. Hitler’s international standing was also elevated by the series of military successes from Poland, to Norway, to the Low Countries and France. This was offset by the hardening of public opinion against Germany in neutral countries, particularly in the United States.

The initial effect on the British was negative. Their inability to confront the Germans successfully in Norway reduced their standing as a military power and this was reinforced by the calamity in France. In a strange twist of history, Churchill, who was largely responsible for some of the most serious mistakes in Norway not only survived politically but also became Prime Minister. His eloquence and determination became factors of immense importance as he became the personification of Allied determination to prevail. Churchill himself was surprised by his political survival. In the initial draft about these events he wrote, “it was a marvel–I really do not know how–I survived and maintained my position in public esteem while all the blame was thrown on poor Mr. Chamberlain.”
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The British put their lessons from Norway to good use but there remained resistance to the recognition of the problems and the necessary corrective actions. Although Churchill had toyed with the idea of restructuring the cumbersome command structure earlier, the fiasco in Norway gave impetus to the effort. The reorganization did away with some of the maze of committees involved in planning and decision-making. A Ministry of Defense was created and a system of theater commanders was established. These reorganizations eliminated some of the most serious command structure problems that had plagued the operations in Norway.

The operational lessons were also taken to heart. British troops were not again sent into battle in the sad state that they were in Norway. There was increased emphasis on training. The problem of close air support for ground troops was addressed and it became an increasingly important factor in future operations. The British were impressed by the innovative German use of airborne and air assault forces to seize airfields and this gave an impetus to the development of similar capabilities.

While the lessons from the Norwegian campaign led to important improvements in the planning and conduct of combined operations, their importance should not be overstated. As Kersaudy points out, some of the mistakes were repeated at Dakar, Crete, and Dieppe and it was only through the resistance of military advisers, that Churchill was kept from carrying out major landings in Norway later in the war.

Improved inter-allied cooperation and coordination was forced on the British more by the developing situation than by lessons learned from Norway. As the war became worldwide, the British sometimes found themselves in the unaccustomed situation of being a junior member of a coalition of great powers. This uncomfortable position required a revision of some traditional thinking and the establishment of new command structures. The eventual success of the more compromising approach was due in large measure to the leadership of Churchill and Roosevelt. They recognized that coalition warfare requires compromises and accepted the necessity that coalition goals take precedence over more parochial ones.