Hitler's Spy Chief (21 page)

Steeped in the tradition of the 1906 Eyre Crowe Memorandum on Germany, with its implication that Germany, irrespective of her leadership or intentions, on account of her size and capabilities would always be a threat to British interests,
39
‘Van' was temperamentally opposed to a deal with Germany. Accused by one German diplomat of being a well-known Germanophobe,
40
he would later prophetically warn another German
en poste
in London at that time, Theo Kordt, that ‘if necessary Britain would follow the example of Samsom, tear down the pillars of the British Empire and bury Hitler along with themselves beneath the rubble.'
41
This ‘temperamental opposition' to a deal with what A. J. P. Taylor called that ‘recurring figure in European history, the good German', was a dynamic that was to repeat itself grimly in subsequent rounds of conversations between the German opposition and the English diplomatic establishment. As Colvin icily noted, ‘Lord Vansittart's remarks did not seem to me to relate to the main problem.'

One thing seems certain, however: in his explanation of the forces hostile to war, Kleist would have mentioned Canaris' name. If he had breathed it to Colvin he would certainly have mentioned it in London, as Vansittart demanded more details of the aims and organisation of the
secret opposition to Hitler. Kleist, therefore, in giving details of the conspiracy against Hitler, was assuming that these delicate conversations would remain confidential and that his interlocutor was a man of b
on volonté
, ill-disposed to Hitler and the Nazis rather than Germany. Kleist naturally assumed Vansittart was on the same side. In this the old gendeman may have committed a fatal error.

The conversation was repeated the following day at Chartwell, where Churchill received Kleist with solemn precautions. This appears to be the formal beginning of the ‘conversation' Canaris, according to Sir Stewart Menzies, the head of British intelligence, ‘initiated' with Churchill. Kleist left Churchill, like ‘Van', in no doubt that the generals were preparing a coup. (The specious view that Kleist was somehow unaware of what Halder, Beck's successor, was planning in relation to these plans holds no water.)
42

Kleist's request for an official letter that Beck could use to win the support of the generals offended every protocol of established diplomacy. No government could issue an informal demarche of such importance to someone not in the acknowledged government of Germany, but Halifax asked Churchill to send a letter. It was delivered by secret courier to Kleist after his return to Berlin and he laid it on Canaris' desk a few days later.
*
If London had still not woken up to the imminent Czech crisis, Churchill's letter showed that there was considerable foresight in some circles of what was coming:

My dear Sir,

I have welcomed you here as one who is ready to run risks to preserve the peace of Europe and to achieve a lasting friendship between the British, French and German peoples for their mutual advantage.

I am sure that the crossing of the Czechoslovak frontier by German armies or aircraft in force will bring about a renewal of world war. I am as certain as I was at the end of July 1914 that England will
march with France, and certainly the United States is now strongly anti-Nazi. It is difficult for the democracies in advance and in cold blood to make precise declarations but the spectacle of an armed attack by Germany upon a small neighbour and the bloody fighting that will follow will rouse the whole British Empire and compel the gravest decisions.

Do not I pray you be misled upon this point. Such a war, once started, would be fought out like the last to the bitter end, and one must consider not what might happen in the first few months but where we should all be at the end of the third or fourth year.

Churchill predicted Germany would be utterly and terribly defeated. Kleist ‘might ponder these words' with such patriotic Germans as he had come to represent.
43

For Beck, the letter, which went on to quote with official approval Halifax's view that if'war broke out, it would be impossible to know where it would end', was hardly a ringing official call to arms but it was sufficient in many ways to get things moving. Sceptics in London would for decades say the naive player in this was not Halifax but the German opposition, who were, with Churchill, ‘star-gazing'.
44
However, the evidence shows that the Generals were ready to act even if Beck by that stage had decided to resign. Moreover, Beck knew all the details of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, Operation Green, including the projected date in late September, before he resigned.

Beck had resigned in early August after Hitler announced in a speech to his generals at Jüterbog that he intended to solve the Czech question that autumn by force. Beck's logical mind saw that, as sure as night followed day, Germany's disturbing of the balance of power in Europe would unleash a world war which ‘with mathematical logic' would utterly destroy Germany. His successor, General Franz Halder, a Bavarian, was more cautious. Dohnanyi, the Abwehr lawyer, noted that Halder lacked any
revolutionary spirit and seemed obsessed with the details of his uniform. But even Halder – who to Dohnanyi's dismay produced at their first meeting a handkerchief which he carefully placed on his right thigh in order to protect the cut of his trousers before crossing his left leg over his right – was prepared to fall in with the plot and develop the existing plans, convinced, as he was, that Hitler was leading Germany to ruin.

Beck's resignation, far from causing ‘opposition plans to collapse'
45
actually stiffened the resistance. The vital new factor was the discovery in this phase of the planning of several generals commanding troops who, in deference to the leadership of Beck, were prepared to enter the conspiracy. By 14 September General von Witzleben, commander of the Berlin area, had made arrangements with Halder and others to arrest Hitler as he returned from Berchtesgaden to the capital. Count Helldorf, the Berlin police chief, would arrest the other party leaders while General Hoeppner, in command of the Third Panzer Division, would march on Berlin at the signal from Witzleben. Count Brockdorff-Ahlefeld, in command of the Potsdam garrison, would support Witzleben while Count Fritz von der Schulenburg, son of the German Crown Prince's former chief of staff, would secure the government sector of Berlin. These plans were clandestine and drawn up with ruthless precision.

Canaris left the detailed planning to Oster who, in addition to the military timetable, constructed an extensive legal case against Hitler with the help of the lawyers von Dohnanyi and Dr Sack of the judge advocate-general's department. A panel of psychiatrists was even prepared, under the chairmanship of the eminent professor Dr Karl Bonhoeffer, who would certify the Führer as insane so that he could be immured in a lunatic asylum. Canaris himself was personally opposed to the idea of a military putsch against the Reichskanzlei by the Potsdam garrison. He favoured the kidnapping of the Führer by a small group of determined young officers as being easier and less complicated. Hitler would be held incommunicado until after the revolt had succeeded. All the conspirators agreed that
a civilian-led government, or initially a military regime, would then be installed to consult the country on the form of government it desired for the future. ‘By the beginning of September,' Halder could write, ‘we had taken steps to immunise Germany from this madman.' As Churchill noted in
The Gathering Storm
, these were formidable steps. ‘There could be no doubt of the existence of this plot and of serious measures to make it effective.'
46

But the vital factor for the conspirators' success, on which the entire conspiracy was predicated, was that France and Britain would state that they would intervene in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. But as the days wore on, the chances of such intervention began to recede. As Wheeler-Bennett has written, the conspirators and generals were ‘playing with fire in every sense of the term … No balancing feat, no trick of prestidigitation, demanded a greater control of nerve, timing and equilibrium.'
47
For London and Paris the challenge was to ‘screw their courage to the sticking place and maintain a firm and united front.'

But London had other intentions. Within days of Kleist's return to Berlin on 23 August, Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, who had vehemently opposed Kleist being received in official quarters, was summoned to London for discussions with Chamberlain. Chamberlain, who had initially commented on Kleist's visit dismissively, noting that ‘like Jacobites, a good deal' of what Kleist had said ‘must be discounted', had changed his mind. Perhaps intelligence reports had confirmed Kleist's ‘offer'. As one distinguished historian has written ‘the official documents and files are silent. Perhaps some relevant papers are still kept secret or have been destroyed.'
48

Whether this is the case or not, the documents show that on 28 August Chamberlain gave Henderson two important instructions: first, to prepare a ‘serious warning' to the Führer concerning action towards Czechoslovakia but then to ‘very secretly' prepare for a personal contact between Hitler and Chamberlain. The fact that the first of these instructions would
be entirely negated by the second did not seem to impinge on the two men's logic. Henderson, moreover, succeeded within forty-eight hours in having the first instruction withdrawn ‘on his own earnest insistence'.
49
Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler was thus being planned less than a week after Kleist's return and not, as has been generally assumed, on the spur of the moment two weeks later after Hiker's anti-Czech diatribe at the Nuremberg rally on 12 September.
50
Plans were already well advanced for the meeting by the evening of 5 September.

Theodor Kordt, a member of the German embassy, reinforced Kleist's message that evening in a private meeting with Sir Horace Wilson, the chief industrial adviser to the government, and Lord Halifax. Halifax, after the Munich Conference some weeks later, apologetically told Kordt: ‘We were not able to be as frank with you as you were with us. At the time you gave us your message we were already considering sending Chamberlain to Germany.'
51

Kleist had, in a British official's own words, ‘come out of Germany with a rope around his neck to stake his last chance of life to warn Britain.' But Chamberlain, Henderson and even Vansittart had no desire to deal with the generals or help install a non-Nazi regime in Germany. It is very hard not to sense that there was at work here something beyond the reluctance of any government to treat with conspirators. Chamberlain no doubt hoped to win Hitler's gratitude and make him more amenable to a deal. He was convinced that ‘reason and example would influence a dictator.'
52
If Chamberlain could show he was a man of integrity, surely Hitler would realise he could reach an agreement with him. How better to demonstrate this integrity than by refusing to help the generals stage a
coup d'état?
Moreover, as Lord Home, who as Lord Dunglass knew him better than most, points out, Chamberlain believed that in Hitler he had ‘an unwavering ally against Communist Russia', something that was not necessarily the case with the German generals brought up in the tradition of von Seeckt. If fear of offending the Soviet Union would destroy later
attempts to reach a settlement with Germany, at this stage fear of depriving Britain of an ally against Moscow would have the same effect.

Vansittart, was, as we have seen, reluctant to do a ‘deal' with the generals; and Nevile Henderson, ever keen like every ambassador to cut the ground from beneath negotiations behind his back, was, in a fit of almost prima-donna like pique, determined to frustrate the conspirators. Though to be fair, like all diplomats, Henderson believed diplomacy was far too important to be left to outsiders, especially soldiers, even his admired Prussians.
*

To regain the initiative and frustrate the conspirators, Henderson and Chamberlain knew they had to work swiftly. Canaris and Oster had ensured the British military attaché in Berlin was informed of the date of Hitler's projected invasion of Czechoslovakia as ‘towards the end of September, most likely 28th'. The warning was delivered on 21 August, the same day von Kleist was in London telling the British of the generals' decision to act by the end of September. Both warnings hinted at Hitler's speech at the Nuremberg Rally on 12 September being the prelude to mobilisation, and therefore the coup would, according to the plans already discussed, take place shortly afterwards, on Hitler's return to Berlin on 14 September. Taken together, these two pieces of information left Henderson and Chamberlain in little doubt that the generals were planning to move swiftly after the 12th. As A. J. P. Taylor mischievously would note, for some ‘intuitive reason' Chamberlain was convinced he had to take steps by 12 September.
53
The information had been confirmed by further secret emissaries from the German diplomatic corps, notably Kordt and Böhm-Tettelbach, to Halifax and Vansittart, respectively.
54

Hitler, about to be betrayed by nearly every one of his generals, was facing a well-thought-out
coup d'état
which, given the anti-war sentiment of the German people at that time,
55
would receive mass support. At this
point in his career, his future looked at best as if it would be lived out in an institution for the criminally insane.

However, he was about to be saved – not by the SS or the Gestapo or Ribbentrop, who had no inkling of the conspiracy – but by the only people who did, the British. Chamberlain had persuaded himself that ‘where neither concessions nor persuasion nor power' had changed Hitler's mind, ‘his own reasonable approach could do so.'
56
Chamberlain gave his support, fully aware that the German leader was almost certainly about to be deposed if it were not forthcoming. World peace, perhaps he reasoned, would be preserved a little longer if Hitler could be brought to see reason.