Hitler's Spy Chief (17 page)

From Canaris' point of view, Germany's support for Franco would place him at the centre of German-Hispanic relations; a development which was to have far reaching strategic consequences when it came to 1940. Hitler had to rely now on Canaris' knowledge of the country and his relationship with Franco to deal with any problems that might arise. It would enable Canaris to cement his relationship with Hitler, while at the same time winning the confidence of Franco. It would also bring him into contact again with British intelligence, whose network of agents was understandably extensive throughout the western Mediterranean.

Goering, Blomberg and Canaris moved quickly to agree aid to the nationalists. The army was predictably cautious. The Chief of Staff, Beck, rejected outright the idea of any direct intervention. Colonel-General von Fritsch no doubt expressed the scepticism of many of the Prussian-trained generals when, screwing his monocle tightiy into his eye to peruse a map of Spain to evaluate transport facilities, he stared in disbelief: ‘Remarkable … what a strange country, it does not seem to possess any railways.'
6

While the staff officers struggled with their maps and European rail
timetables, the Abwehr swept into action. Canaris' old network of agents in Spain was reactivated to produce raw intelligence reports on Republican munitions, arms dumps and military strength. Then, front companies were established to channel the aid programme. Bernhardt was made director of a new company called Hisma (Hispano-Marroqui Transport Company). Goering then helped establish Rowak (Raw Materials and Wares Purchasing Company). Further companies were set up and grouped into a new holding concern called Sofindus (Sociedad Financiera Industrial Ltd). Nor were these companies limited to German capital. There was plenty of capital backing to be found in London for Franco. The more internationally minded of the British merchant banks were prepared to channel funds through Canaris' old friend Augusto Miranda, who would become Franco's arms agent in London and was, of course, well plugged into Canaris' old acquaintance Zaharoff and the Vickers Empire. Vickers had long coveted Spain and had a long-standing interest in that country moving to the right. Whatever the protestations of the British government concerning non-intervention, Vickers could only view the emergence of Franco as a highly positive development. As early as March 14 1934, Sir Charles Craven of Vickers-Armstrong had written thus to his fellow merchant Mr Spear of the Electric Boat Company in the United States:

‘I can tell you at once that there is every possibility of the Spanish government approving the construction of certain warships … Of course things look very stormy in Spain at present, and I sincerely hope nothing will be done to check the swing to the Right which has recently taken place, because the present Government look as if they are going to be most sympathetic to the Sociedad and give us a modest naval programme which I can assure you is very sorely needed to keep the place going.'
7

Indeed the first aircraft Franco ever received, enabling him to cross the Strait of Gibraltar to the army of Africa in Tetuan, was chartered in
London.
8
It could be argued that without that particular craft, his ambitions would have been stopped in their tracks.

If the British Labour party could sympathise with the Republicans and Clement Attlee warn of strikes if London showed any sympathy for the insurgents, there were many interests in London prepared to profit from a weak Spain, as well as one that needed armaments.
9
Equally unsurprisingly, it was London where most of Franco's financial debts to Germany were met.
10
The Spanish aristocracy had important friends in the City and the likes of Juan March were not unknown in the square mile.

Twenty Junkers 52 and six Heinkel 51 fighters were earmarked for transport to Spain, together with supplies, spare parts and ammunition. Then a sympathetic army officer, Colonel Walther Warlimont, code name ‘Waltersdorf', was appointed to represent the German armed forces in Spain. A personal letter from Canaris to Franco expressing support accompanied Bernhardt and Langenheim back to Spain. It promised imminent material aid. In particular, it hinted at the supply of the aircraft vital for Franco's efforts to step up his airlift.
11

At the same time, aware that Mussolini would not hesitate to climb fervently aboard once he was informed of German involvement, Canaris initiated discussions with his Italian counterpart Roatta. Roatta, codename Mancini, soon to be commanding Italian units in Spain, and Warlimont were dispatched to Tetuan to discuss aid requirements with Franco. By the end of the summer more than 15,000 men of Franco's Moroccan forces had been transported by German and Italian aircraft to the mainland. These men of the African army were disciplined, brutal and hard. They were, however, more efficient than anything else the nationalists had at their disposal and began to affect significantly the balance of forces on the peninsula.

By the time Canaris arrived at Salamanca, a mood of optimism was palpable and talk was of the offensive against Madrid to be launched the following month. Already, the outskirts of Madrid had been captured,
Toledo had fallen and Oviedo invested. At lunch the conversation between Franco, General Luis Orgaz, the director of military training, and Franco's brother, Nicholas, was of a swift conclusion to the war. Only the recent ominous eruption of Soviet tanks in Esquivia under the command of a Russian general, Pavlov, which had badly mauled Franco's cavalry, cast a shadow over the proceedings. The German kept his counsel during the lunch, listening carefully to the conversation but keeping his remarks to superficial comments until he was alone with Franco. Then, with the same intuitive skill with which he had convinced Hitler of the need to intervene in Spain, he convinced Franco of the necessity of his dependence on German support in a dazzling report compiled by the Abwehr of the French and Soviet intentions towards the Spanish conflict.

Speaking again in that calm understated way, which is so effective with military men, Canaris proceeded to give Franco an intelligence update. It was not reassuring. The General may have thought the war was proceeding well but the Soviet Union, the Comintern, France and Britain were active and an estimated 50,000 volunteers were on their way to constitute the formidable International Brigades.

Moreover, attached to this serious fighting force there were tanks, aircraft, machine guns and ammunition flowing in from France and the Soviet Union. At first Franco stared at the German in impassive scepticism, but Canaris had prepared his brief. He could name the eight Russian supply ships that had passed through the Dardanelles in the last month, laden with supplies. He could even furnish lists of their cargo. The
Kurak
had just delivered to Barcelona forty trucks, twelve armoured cars, six artillery pieces, four aircraft, 700 tons of ammunition and 1,500 tons of food. Another ship, the
Komsomol
, had delivered a further eight tanks, 2,000 tons of ammunition and 100 tons of medical supplies. The international Left had, with its brilliant cross-border structures for coordination, created a new factor. Moreover, it was one that would dramatically alter the situation on the ground. As one Englishman
who fought in Franco's forces against the International Brigade remembered, they were men ‘almost impervious to death or fatigue.'
12

Canaris, of course, knew Franco's character well enough to realise that such foreign interference in the affairs of Spain would strike a particularly sour note. Franco's response was brisk: ‘International mercenaries are trying to impose on Spain a foreign ideology and the rule of Moscow' He accepted that a new force would be required to resist it, but such a new army could only be equipped by Germany and perhaps Italy. Canaris realised that Franco would be unwilling to accept outside support in so heavy a measure. So he stressed that Hitler's support would not impinge on Spain's independence. However, having made this point Canaris went on to stress that Berlin's only demand was a less methodical and hesitant approach to the war. Berlin wanted decisive action to take Madrid. This would soon lead to recognition of the national government by Berlin, Rome and Lisbon and it would justify Hitler developing a much bolder aid programme.

Franco's reply was predictable: ‘I cannot exterminate the other side or destroy towns, agriculture, industrial installations or means of production … If I made haste, I should be a bad Spaniard. If I made haste, I should not be a patriot. I would be behaving like a foreigner.'

The general continued in the same proud vein: ‘Give me aircraft, give me artillery, give me tanks and ammunition … and I will be very grateful. But above all do not require me to hurry. Do not force me to win at any cost as that would mean a large number of Spaniards killed … and a less firm basis for my government … I will occupy Spain town by town, village by village and one railway line after another. Nothing will oblige me to change the pace of my programme; there may be less glory in it, but there will be a greater peace at the end of it.'
13

This bravura performance, combining as it did utter confidence with an almost mystical sense of national identity, impressed Canaris, who like many intelligence officers operating in a world of subtly shifting sands
and cynical allegiances could not fail to admire the utter clarity and noble sentiments with which Franco enunciated his ideas. The unshakeable faith, so bound up with Franco's devout Roman Catholicism, which so impressed Hilaire Belloc and other English politicians and writers, gave Canaris an image of a fervent autocrat, imbued with a sense of responsibility towards God and Spain, against which the pagan paladins of the Third Reich seemed an inferior breed. Henceforth, the many disputes which would inevitably arise between Berlin and Franco would be brokered by Canaris, and where possible in the Spaniard's favour. It suited Canaris' own Christian ethics that Franco was proceeding according to a programme of slow reclamation rather than through a scorched earth approach. Later he would be profoundly distressed by Franco's violent reprisals against the Communists, warning Franco that summary justice and mass executions were not consonant with Christian ethics. But even when Franco's purges got into their full sanguinary stride, Canaris refused to bracket the Spaniard with Himmler or Heydrich, though a long shadow began to fall over their friendship.
14

One of the reasons he may have had for this was that while Franco proceeded against his political enemies mercilessly, believing them to be incapable of pardon, he shared none of the racial theories of Nazi Germany. In one later recorded conversation between Canaris and the Caudillo, the German warned the Spanish leader of the dangers of totalitarianism: ‘If I have understood you correctly, Spain will be a Kingdom without a King and you will be a King without a crown,' Canaris said. ‘Are there not in this totalitarian form of yours risks of a sort that I have already detected in Germany?', he continued, subtly alluding to Germany's racial laws. Franco handed Canaris a copy of the weekly
Noticiero de España
and asked him to read a tolerant article about the Jews, rejecting anti-Semitism. As Franco's biographer Brian Crozier observes, the fact that Franco chose to surround himself with the panoply of fascism ‘did not mean that he accepted the Nazis should dictate
his behaviour and still less that he should subscribe to their anti-Jewish theories.'
15

The fact that Madrid would not fall for many months did not, however, inhibit Berlin from announcing a few weeks later diplomatic recognition of the nationalist government.

Canaris soon hammered out an agreement for the supply of German bomber and fighter formations. He explained to Franco that such a German air corps, to be known as the Condor Legion, would be commanded by General Hugo Sperrle and that a military chargé d'affaires, in the form of Hitler's former commanding officer in the First World War, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Faupel, would be accredited to the nationalist government as soon as Madrid fell. The German proposal included the following terms:—

1. That the German formations in Spain be placed under a German commander, who will be the sole adviser to General Franco in matters concerning the German air corps and responsible to General Franco only for its overall activities. Outwardly the appearance of a Spanish command would be preserved.

2. That all German units already in Spain be attached to this German air corps.

3. That the German air bases be adequately protected, if necessary by infantry reinforcements.

4. That the conduct of both land and air operations be more regular, active and co-ordinated, having in view a more rapid occupation of the ports which Moscow might utilise to increase its reinforcements.

Such terms inevitably would allow full rein for Canaris' negotiating skills, not least as many of the senior German officers involved had little finesse in dealing with the Spaniards. More than once, the fury of Prussian officers over the poor condition in which the Spaniards looked after their weapons
would lead to heated exchanges between Franco and his senior advisers. Canaris, as always, understanding both sides of the argument, defused the debates when they showed signs of escalation.

When this proved impossible, he never criticised Franco but merely worked hard to remove the German officer involved. Thus he was able to liberate Franco from the Prussian pedantry of General Faupel and replace him with a career diplomat and old friend, Eberhard von Stohrer. When the officer commanding the Condor Legion, Sperrle, began to get on Franco's nerves, one report from Canaris was enough to have him replaced.
16

Hand in glove with this diplomatic activity, Canaris continued to develop more practical ways of assisting Franco in his cause. In a devilishly cunning scheme, if Richard Protze of Abwehr IIIF is to be believed, Canaris also sought to exploit, on Goering's suggestion, the time-honoured practice among arms dealers of supplying inferior material to one's opponents. Canaris directed a German-Dutch arms dealer, Josef Veltjens, to buy up all the superannuated weapons of the First World War which Canaris had helped to sell abroad after the Treaty of Versailles. Rifles, carbines, ammunition and grenades were bought up in Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. These weapons were then tampered with by German armourers, who filed down the striking pins, doctored the ammunition, reduced the grenade charges or inserted instantaneous fuses. The consignments were then distributed to the arms dealing ‘ring' in Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia and Holland, from where they were sold to the Republican government for gold. This dubious but common practice was an act of sabotage that would have appealed to Canaris, as the casualties would be limited to Republican soldiery.